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Curs is an age of crisis not only because of gross iriternational
strife and poverty (an age permeated with sociological and economic
"wars and rumours of w'1.rs") but also because of a great spi ritua 1
vacuum in modern man. Having sought certainty in his own technolog'ical
and scientific advancement, man faces a grmving sense of alienation.
It has suddenly dawned on him that the "promised land" of economic
and social bliss that technology prophesied is shifting sand.
Among the numerous manifestations of this awareness of alienation
are two evident signs: a quest for freedom and a growing disenchantment
with faith. The quest for freedom, in our time, has become most
vociferous in the movement of philosophy that has been termed
"existentialism". However, existentialism as ph"ilosophy is only the
conscious reflection on a "mood" that under'lies the spirit of
our age and whi ch emerges in its art, scu 1pture, 1iterature and 1ife-
style. There is a certa-jn disillusionment with orthodoxy and
conformism, and a refocusing on the greatly ignored individual and
hi s freedom.
The crisis of individu,l freedom has emerged within both
listic and communist societies. In the former the freedom
capita-
of the
individual has been forfeited to monopolies, the technocrats, the
specialists and mass-man. In the latter the individual has been
subsumed by "the party", and has annuled his freedom by vesting it in
a society governed and manipulated by guardianship. Collective
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social being swallO\'I!s up individual man. Capitalist society,
in the name of IIfree enterpri sell, and communi st soci ety, by its
sentimentalizCltion of the proletariat, pay only lip-service to freedom.
This dissertation attempts to elucidate a single argument in two
mai n parts. Fi rst ly, it is argued that freedom is dynami c
and obtains in man's ongoing quest for authentic existence. This
view is elucidated and assessed vis-a.-vis the ideas of freedom
that have emerged in modern man's philosophical quests.
The term "mo dern ll is intended to cover the period since the
En 1i ghtenment i e. the immedi ate background to the three most
influential contemporary philosophical approaches: Positivism
and neo-Positivism; fvlarxism and neo--Marxism; and Existentialism.
The immediate antecedents to these approaches include the empiricist
and rationalist schools of thought, Kant's critique of reason and
Hegel's universal synthesis. Their notions of freedom are
described in order to understand the Sitz-im-Leben of the three
main contemporary forms and in order to facilate an elucidation
of the thesis that freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence.
The time span covered and the wide scope of this first part only
permits a selection of historical philosophical expressions relevant
to clarifying the controversial nature of modern theories of freedom.
The dissertation cannot accommodate a detaned study of anyone
philosopher or philosophical tradition. However, it is often impossible
to extract a philosopher's idea of freedom from his whole thought
because as in the case of
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Hegel, the quest for freedom i,5 central to his thinking. In order
to obviate this difficulty \"Jithin the confines of this dissertation,
only a brief synopsis is made of the salient features of a particular
philosophy in so far as this is necessary to focus on its notion
of freedom.
Another great difficulty that a study of this nature faces is the
'Sift"ing through the mountain of material available on the sections
and sub-sections of each of the approaches stud."ied herein.
Therefore, only the main primary sources and the more useful
secondary sources were gi ven pri de of place. The author had at
times to will h-imse If to proceed forward in the argument 1est he
was at anyone sing 1e poi nt side-tracked. Selections wi 11
inadvertent ly admi t some 1acunae but it is hoped that the argument
is sufficiently lucid to overcome any such omission.
In Part One, then, first an analysis is made of the notions
of freedom that emerged in the Enlightenment, Kant, Hegel and in
PosHivism, Marxism and Existentialism. Then the thesis that
freedom is the ongoing quest for authentic existence is discussed
on the basis of the important argument that G.A. Rauche has
elucidated in several publications, namely that the abdication
of philosophy is equivalent to the abdication of man because
phi losophy as ongoing critical theory is what ensures the freedom
of man. Rauche also presents an incisive critique. in this connection,
of the three main contemporary philosophical forms. The benefit
of analysing Rauche's critique and of his
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argument in genera1 for' th is study is
i) It leads to the thesis that freedom obtains in
critical quest for authentic existence and that "it is





therpfore, not a postulate;
ii) This thesis in turn presents, in an analogical way, the
II structure" of the quest for freedom which theology cannot ignore
since it also makes a truth claim in the market place where the
three contemporary approaches find a ready clientele. In Part II
it will be argued that faith as existential encouhter not only
fu 1fi 11 s the "structurell for the quest for freedom but also that
it underpins human freedom;
iii) It lays the foundation for the claim in Part III that the
abdication of theology leads to the abdication of faith and, in view
of our contention in Part 2, to the abdication of man also.
As already intimated, this dissertation contends that the dialogue
between theo 1091 and phi losophy has unnecessari ly been confi ned to
the ant ithes is between faith and reason where both have been vi ewed
in essentially epistemological terms. Reason, the underlying
guide for the Enlightenment achieved a new legitimation during the
sev(~teenth and eighteenth centuries mainly under the i~Jact of
the rise of the natural sciences. Christian theology responded
to the En 1i ghtenment by postu 1at i ng new and more refi ned arguments
for revelation. Revelation, conceived in epistemological terms,
became the bastion against the onslaught of the Enlightenment.
More "solid" bases for certainty were sought: in a historical
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Jesus (Renan, Strauss, Schv,Jeitze.r); the kerygma of the ear ly church
(Dibelius, Bultmann); in the church's tradition (Roman Catholicism);
in devotion and inner illumination (the Pietists~ Fundamentalists,
the Pentecostals); in the faith of the believers themselves (the
new questors) or in the eschatological hope proleptically present
in the Christ-event (theologies of Hope: Pannenberg, Moltmann).
\
The dialogue bet"'Jeen theology and phi losophy has in the main rEmained
at the epistemological impasse bet\eleen faith and reason. To the
question "How ::an I know for certain?", Revelation claimed a realm
of validity vi~-a-vis reason not unlike the distinction that Kant
had made between the sphere of phenomena and that of noumen~.
Where theo 1ogy became adventurous it ended up endangeri ng faith
itself, for example, in seventeenth century Deism and nineteenth
century liberalism. The faith-reason antithesis lead.s the dialogue
between theology and phi losophy into a 1ogi ca 1 cu l-de-sac.
A more meani ngfu 1 basis for the d"j a1ogue is the quest for freedom
that both phi losophy and theo 1ogy are deep ly concerned wi th.
However, before such a basi s is understood, there is a need for
a radical re-evaluation of the nature of
central impulse of theology viz. faith.
towards the reo,'valuation of the nature of
philosophy and of the
Rauche's views help us
philosophy (which should
be vitally concerned with the quest for freedom ie. man becoming
fully man), and with "its reformulation in dynamic terms. Only
such redefinition will make the philosophical quest relevant to man's
ongoing quest for freedom. It will then have an openness that all




Thi s openness wi 11 -1 ead to the interchange of ideas and
radical commitment of man to his fellowman. /
Theology, on the other hand, needs to take seriously the dynamic
quality of a person's commitm0 nt to God. In this age of systemati-
zation, professionalism and specialization, the individual has
largely gone unattended, a problem which the Existentialists have
highlighted for our time. After all, the basis for any meaningful
talk about God must be on the basis of commitment. Hence theology
must reconfi rm constant ly a-id protect what 1i es at its very heart
viz. the dynamic d"imension rf "subjectivity" which is faith as
existential encounter. Such a view does not jettison systematic
theology but merely ensures that faith
the Reformation la"ter had highlighted, vita 1
as the Bible and
and dynamic~ The
second part of the argument is to clarify the nature of faith as
existential encounter. In order to do this a critical evaluation
will be made of Existentialism's contribution to the unveiling in
our time of that which is endemic to the very earliest proclamations
of the Gospel. Special focus will be on the idea of faith in the
thought of Kierkegaard, Bultmann. Brunner, Gogarten, Tillich and
Ebeling.
There are at least three ways a study of these theologians can proceed:
i) An evaluation of their thought vis-a-vis a conservative theological
or confess i ona 1 approach whi ch i nvari ab ly puts them out of the pale
of orthcx:loxy. Such an approach benefi ts very 1i tt 1e from thei r thought;
i i) An assessment of their interpretive method and their significance
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for hermeneutics. This approacn achieves much more. It highlights
a very controvers i a1 issue and an ongoi ng debate.· These theo 109; ans
sometimes develop an "Existentialist" methodology which is often
imposed on Scripture and invariably constricts the message of the
Scri ptures to the 1imHs of its predetermi ned Procrustean bed. A
great amount has been published in this area. The hermeneutical
contribution of these thinkers~ albeit important. is also not the
immedi ate concern of this dissertation;
; i i ) To understand their idea of the nature of faith. This does
not mean an uncritical acceptanu: of th;ir Christian existentialism
but to understand the exi stenti a1 dimens'lon of Chri sti an commitment.
This brings to light their most significant contribution to all
of Christian theological quests viz. the dynamic understanding of
faith which acts as the keystone of theological thinking.
Therefore~ the dissertation does not cater for a detailed description
of thei r who 1e systemati c theo 1ogy. On the contrary. several aspects
of these theologies confound their understanding of faith; for
example~the strict demythologization approach of Rud01ph Bultmann.
Thi s approach remai ns hi gh ly controversi a1 and cannot be accommodated
in thi s study wi thout detract i n9 from the overa 11 argument. The
reactions to dernythologization and thE' ne'v\} herrneneutic has so
preoccupi ed theo logi ans that thei I" important understandi ng of
faith has in the main been overlooked or trivialized, The react'ion.
unfortunate ly, has 1apsed agai n into the epi sterno 109i ca 1 debate on
the certainty of revelation and inspiration, or of historical certainty.
The parallel development in philosophy has been the reaction to
-8-
Existentialism which also missed the Existentialist refocusing on
the freedom of the i ndi vi dua1• The Ii baby" as it were ~ 11 gets thro~m
out wi th the bath-'I'Jater. 11 Even the evange1i ca1S j \l'Jl1o understandab 1y
are wary of the approach of these theologians under considerat'ion
here, must take seriously what they say about faith and freedom
in order to rescue Christianity from the ravages of institution-
alism and conformity to the functionalist spirit of our age~
The argument presented here is bri ef ly th is: if freedom is the
ongoing quest for authentic existence ie. if man is free in so far
as he is still free to strive for authentic existence than-
i) faith has an indispensable role to play in the quest for freedom
i e. in so far as f a1th itself does not 1apse into a be 1i ef"system
but remains an ongoing, existential encounter with God;
i i) if freedom is the ongoi ng quest for authentic existence then
it is presupposed that man is free as man i e. in so far as he is
fu 11y m~m. not Grossmensch or ~ to one or other phi1 osophi ca1
or religious system or ideology. This idea undergirds the Christian
doctrine of reconciliation.
The third part of the thesis attempts to point out some
implicat'ions of this argument for theological method. It i§
argued that the attempt to jettison theology as ongoing~ theoretical
clarification of the dynamics of faith and as the critical quest
denominational confessionalism~
for 11 the Gospe19 11 for either pietistic devotion only or
leads to the abdication of faith.
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PART
FREEDOM AS ONGO!NG QUEST FOR
AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE
-10-
1.1 THE ENLIGHfENMENT AND THE QWEST FOR FREEDOM
Endemi c to the age of En 1i ghtenment \.<Jas a quest for freedom from
absolutist powers~ many of which had gained eminence during the
Medieval period and VJhich were exemplified in the totalitarianism
of the Roman Church. The Enlightenment ushered in an optimistic
mood into Europe as it emerged, or struggled to emerge, from a long
period of superstition and feudal"ism. The Enlightenment is best
understood ~\Jhen percei ved as a mood or mental att"i tude rather than,
as is often done, only ~ period in Western history. Such periodization,
which vie~1Js the AufklalAung as the years 1720 to 1770, ignores the
fact that the sp"irit of an age moves in the spirit of man over and
above, and definitely beyond, its particular objective manifestations
; n the arts, se; ence and cu 1ture of anyone peri od. The mood of
En 1i ghtenment permeated all of modern hi story. The Enlightenment's
quest for freedom under 1i es a11 of modern man t s existent i a1 cri si s.
As J.D. Stowell stated,
The process of Enlightenment as a lib0:ration from
the chains of traditional patterns of thought proceeded
only slowly during the first 50 years of the
(eighteenth) century, in the 60 l s it became agitated,
in He 70' s tradition was overthrown and the
'creative life' of the emotions was prized more
highly than the reflective pOvJers of the mind. 2
-11-
of the natural sciences. H"is d'iscovery of the laws of physics facili-
tated a rational explanation of the vvorld. The sense of cosmological
mys tery wh i C;1 the toto.1Har; an po\'Jers, both secu1ar and re1i g"1 ous,
had exploited, could now be explained away. Pope's \t,Jell known lines
captures the new found confidence of the natural sciences:
Nature and nature's laws lay hid in Night;
God said, Let Newton be: - and all was Light.
Principia highlighted the control that man could have over nature
since the universe was now considQred' rat"ional in all its aspects.
This belief in the rationality of the universe, which is still taken
for granted, represented a major "paradigm shift" in human history.
In the eighteenth century it heralded a sense of well-being that
permeated the consciousness of man and it demanded a major reorienta-
tion of man to his world. As a result of the discoveries of the
natura1 sei ences, the war 1d-vi ew of western man underwent upheava 1.
In this connection, the Copernican revolution and the discovery that
the world \'Jas not flat, ~~ere accompanied by a reshaping of man's
mental world.
Nowhere is the struggle to wrench free from absolution more vividly
illustrated than in the church's intolerance and high handed treatment
of Galileo. The church had married its theology with a particular
system of philosophy and a particular view of science. Therefore,
with the rejection of an outdated science came the rejection of the
church and its theo 1ogy. Hence Luther IS Y'eject i on of theo 1ogy that
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had became cloud.ed by the termiti010gy and method of inquiry of Aristo-
telian thought ,especially to the ends the scholastics had putit.3.
The Enlightenment was accompanied by a this-worldly belief that Reason,
if effectively applied, would lead to the mental, socio-economic
and political liberation of man. Hence from Locke to Rousseau education
was acclaimed as the means by which Reason would achieve its goal:
the freedom of society.
Reason, Nature and Progress were the three cardi no. 1 signposts that
marked the way to freedom. Because nature was rational and therefore
predictable, man by harnessing nature was assured of unending progress.
If people from their infancy were educated correctly in how nature
intended them to be, they could attain unlimited progress tmlJard
material and spiritual happiness. For example, Gottho1d Ephraim
Les si n9 (1729- D81 ), one of the greatest representatives of the German
Enlightenment, pursued this view. 4
This kind of optim'ism, grounded in the natural sciences, became the
foundation of all human quests for kno\lJledge: sociology, anthropology,
history and economics. The anthropologist, fvJontesqLrieu held that
hunan behaviour was detemrined by certain lal'JS that wer'e to be rationally
uncovered, a knowledge of which would aid in the ordering and ameliora-
ting of society. Gibbons, the historian, propounded a universe
and human history that possessed a rational plan.
In theological circles, Deism epitomised the impact that the mood
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of the age had on re 1i gi on 0 • The unpred i ctab1e, the mi racu 1ous and
the immanent di vi ne were remove-d from the wor 1d 0 God who made the
universe with its own 10g-ica'l rules and physical laws, like a perfect
clock, lets it runs on its own. Herbert of Cherbury's denial of
/
revelation -in 1624, John Toland's Christianity not fvlysterio.u.~ (1696)
and Matthew Tindal's Christianity as old as the creation (1730)
are key examp 1es of thi s natural theology. 5
Alongside reason, nature and progress lay yet another underlying
be 1i ef: the inherent harmony of human soci ety. Descartes maintained
th(1t all men have bon sens 6 and Roussea u spoke of vo 1onte.,genera1e,
the true will of the \'Jhole. 7 Adam Smith (1723-1790) held that in
spite of the personal profit motive, in, the end the who 1e soci ety
would progress by some hidden law: some "invisible hand" that
gui des men's economi c pursuit. 8 The same ki nd of bel i ef occurred
in polHics where it was held that if every individual followed his
own persuasion, a majority consensus would emerge that \!>}Quld benef-it
the whole society. As Paul Ti11ich stated, this belief in the harmony
of society still underlies our present views of capitalism and
democracy as it did their founders. 9
Thr doctrine of harmony enabled the Enlightenment's intelligentsia
to bracket the contradictions in society. It admitted the dimension
of "in spite of" which facilitated the optimistic view of progress.
Leibniz, for example, held to the view of harmonie preeab'lie, a
pre-established harmony, which existed between all the monads that
constituted the world. 10 "In spite of " human error and the
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imponderables in societys with.time s
harmoniously smoothed out.
these contradictions would be
In the above discussion~,n the attempt to descroibe the mood of the
age of Enlightenment s the impression could be given that the development
of thought proceeded in 1i near progression. On the contrary, the
Enlightenment was culturally and ideologically greatly varied
including within its orbit such moderates as Descartes, Spinoza,
Leibniz and Locke as ~'Iell as radicals such as Bentham and Paine.
A11 agreed, however, in thei r be 1i ef in the autonomy of the i ndi vi dua 1
which reached its most potent formulation in Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804). In his often quoted essay "What is Enlightenment?"~ he stated,
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred
irnrnaturi ty. Immaturi ty is the i nabi 1ity to use
one I s own understand; ng wi thout the gui dance of
another. Immaturity is se 1f incurred if its cause
is ... 1ack of reso1uti on and courage ..• The motto
of Enlightenment is therefore sapere aude. 11
The eighteenth century brought to fruition the humanistic spirit of the
sixteenth century Renaissance. Kant's doctri ne of man I s autonomy
rei terated the Renai ssance be 1i ef in the tl comp 1ete autarchy of
rational man in a rational world." 12 This view was embodied in
the life and philosophy of Leibniz who stated that,
The utterly self-sufficient monad is an emanation,
an urge, a mirror of God himself and is therefore
nowhere 1imited by things outside it, but only in
its own being ~I}h i ch has no windows, and changes
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only by its .own principle, its own particular
striving. 13
Thus as Karl Barth succi nct ly commented, "The geocentric picture
of the uni verse "'Jas rep 1aced as a matter of course by the
anthropocentric." 14
Following in the wake of this awareness of the individual's freedom
to determi ne his own future and soc i a1 we ll-bei n9 9 \'Jas a new percept ion
of human soci ety. A new - found sense of democracy fostered the dec 1i ne
of i mper"j a1i sm as "the peor} 1e" themselves replaced the emperor
as the embodiment of the Stat2. Nationalism emerged as the attempt
to ensure the freedom of "j ndi vi duo. 1~ by furtheri n9 and protect i n9
the freedom of the nation. liThe people" nmlJ decided among themselves
who shou 1d govem and when the government shou 1d be rep 1aced i e. /
when that government violated the nation's interest. Thi s perception
of social liberty "is lucidly illustrated in the two, now famous,
documents whi ch appeared with i n a fevv years of each other: the
Declarat-ion of Independence of the U.S.A. (June 1776) and the
Statement of Human and Civil Rights ratified by the French National
Assembly in August 1789. Both affirm that governments are instituted
by the peop 1e. The French Statement promu 1gated freedom, property,
security and the ri ght to pl"otect onese 1f from vi 01 ence as bas ok
rights. It defined freedom as consisting "in being able to do
anyth i ng that does not harm anybody and is not as such forbi dden
by law." The U.S. statement listed as "basic rights"-life, liberty
and the pursui t of happi ness. Rousseau, the philosopher of the
French Revo 1ut ion, gave forma 1 theoret i ca 1 underpi nni n9 to thi s
-16-
view of life and politics.
In the area of philosophy an epistemological sequence was set up
in the theories of knowledge that emerged in the writings of Locke,
Berkeley $ Hume and Kant. Locke ' s Essa/ Concerni ng Human Under-
standing (1690) gave the Enlightenment doctrine of Reason its formal
formulation. The quests for truth became epistemologically based.
Not only was the question "How can truth be known?" stated anew,
but also the questi on "'las now reformu 1ated: "HO\!1 can truth be known
and conclusively shown to be known?" In other words, philosophical
pursui ts i n ~Jestern thought centred around the prob 1em of certai nty
of knowledge. This emphasis vvas directly the result of the ability
of the natural sciences, mathematics and physics in particular, to
demonstrate the grounds for their claims.
Accompanying this epistemological quest was the polarizat'ion of the
universal and the particular, a problem that had always existed in
the history of Western philosophy and VJhich had emerged prior to
the En 1i ghtenment in the nomi na list controversies. Nm\l in vi eltJ of
the focus on the autonomy of man, it was held that genera 1 freedom
wi th; n an appropri ate sac; a1 order can on ly be brought about- through
the knowledge and activity of free individuals. Both the rationalists
and empiricists agreed on this although they disagreed totally on
what constituted the basis for certain knowledge.
For the empiricists the alleged laws of reason that the rationalists
claimed existed, were the result of custom and habit. 15 Such laws
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or universals do not govern the facts; they mere ly adhere to them.
Hence both John Locke and Davi d Hume rejected Descartes I vi ews
concerning general ideas. Such ideas, Locke held, were
inventions and creations of understanding 0 •• the creatures of our
own making." 16 Hume sim"ilarly believed that universals can never
provide rules or general principles since they "were abstracted
from the particular and 'represent' the particular only." n
Thus by refocusing on experience the empiricists laid the basis for
a radical questioning of the rationalists' claims to truth by the
methodo 1ogy engi neered by Descartes, Spi noza, Le; bni z and Wo 1ff VJho
functioned on the premise that reason could organize reality. However,
by denying the universal, the empiricists had undermined metaphysics.
The rationalists, as the empiricists attempted to show, by attempting
to free man through reason, abso 1uti zed reason and 1ed man into a
ne\i'J form of alienation from reality. The emp i ri ci sts, on the other
hand, in the name of liberation, also led man into a new captivity.
they made him the pri soner of hi s senses. Empiricism, therefore,
as Herbert Marcuse observed, "resulted in not only scept"icism, but
conformism." 18 Hence Hume could write,
we are no sooner acqua"inted with the impossibility
of satisfying any desire than the desire itself
vanishes. When we see that we have arrived at
the utmost extent of human reason ItJe 'sit down
contented. 19
Our descript"ion of the man of the Enlightenment has to be qualified
by at least four limitations that existed side by side \tJith the
optimism of the age:
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The first limitation is the el.ement of scepticism that existed in
several quarters and whose standpoint reached comprehensive form
in the writi ngs of Davi d Hume. Alongside the confident and busy
man of the ei ghteenth century also 1i ved the i ndi v-i duo. 1 who was
extremely doubtful about the dream of endless progress that his
compatr-iot proffered. As Karl Barth pointed out, in Goethe's yaust,
alongside the confident was the incurably sceptical r~ephistopheles
in whom 11 the En 1i ghtenment doubts itse 1f or at 1east reaches
enlightenment about itself." 20 Voltaire's Candide (1759) was
an attack on the vi ew of Lei bni z that thi s wor 1d is the best in
the best of all possible, worlds. 21 Jan sen ism, wi th in the Ron,an
Catholic ~\}orld,and Methodism in Protestantism, represented a religious
reaction to the rationally removed and clinical God of Deism. 22
Secondly, the Stunn und DY'ang, also represented a refutation of
rationalism which had become dogmatic and authoritarian. The
1i terature and art of the Stu rm und Drang furthered the ideals of
tolerance, freedom from rational arrogance and the search for
virtue. Lessing's Nathan der Weise (1779) preached religious tole-
rance argui ng that all are in the Jsearch for perfection and that
the importance of revelation lay in the ""Jay men lived in the world
not in the way they adhered to fixed dogma.
Thirdly, there was the disillusionment that set in with both emp-iricism
and rationalism which, at the end of the eighteenth century, is best
represented by Romant; ci srn. Rousseau "s writi ngs exemp 1ify the transition
since he was very much part of the En 1i ghtenment and yet had a
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Romanticist view of nature. ~vhi le he exalted the power of reason
and advocated a view of society based on "harmony", he spoke of
the paradisiacal state of man where for example~ as among the
IIsavages,\ no private property existed. 23 They'e emerged here the
Romanticist longing to gr back to the natural. By a formal concept
of nature, Romantism commenced the conquest of the principle of reason.
For the Romanticist, the Enlightenment lacked imagination and spirit.
Its perception of the world was too mechanistic. William Wordsworth's
The Tables Turned succinctly captures this reaction:
Enough of science and of art:
Close up these barren leaves;
Come fOt th, and bring with you a heart
That watches and receives.
Fourthly, it became a.pparent that contrary to what the rationalists
had maintained~ man is basically unpred'ictable and that freedom
is not necessarily the result (nor the initiator) of rational and
harmonious progress; that the irrationalities of human existence
cannot be logically explained al;Jay. The French Revolution highlighted
this irt~ationality and did a great deal in tempering the prevalent
optimism. The Revolutior. I;!hich had proceeded in the name of freedom
and the Y"ights of man~ and Which heralded a new age of democracy~
lapsed into a reign of terror.
Hence Rousseau had to admit that the freedom of saci ety ItJas not
the resu 1t of an i ne 1uctab 1e process and that "it may be necessary
to compel a man to be free ll • 24 Kant a1so mai ntai ned that on ly a
few, by cultivat'ing their own minds. have succeeded in freeing
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themselves. He held that,
a public canor,ly achieve enlightenment slowly.
\
A revolution may put an end to autocratic despotism
and to rapacious or power-seeking oppression, but
it will never produce a true reform in ways of
thinking. Instead, new prejudices, like the ones
they rep1aced, \vi 11 serve as a 1eash to contra1
the gre~t unthinking mass. 25
Although still affirming the absolute value of reason j it gradually
became clear to ei ghteenth century man j that the nature of human
soci ety and human cansci ousness was more camp1ex than had been
previously assumed. The age of Enlightenment had inadvertently
reduced the prob 1em of the autonomy of man, whi ch it had correct ly
perceived, to the equivalence of the autonomy of reason, which admitted
new problems. Hence j as Barth stated 9 the eighteenth century sought
freedom but 11 i n the very search for v/hat it understood by freedom~
again and again, recreated the old unfreedom." 26
It was pointed out already that the mood of Enlightenment which
was given theoretical form in Locke's writings underwent Cl radical
redifinition in Hume. Hume went beyond Locke in his undercutting of
the metaphysical foundations of natural 1aw and in i ntroduc"j n9 a
thorough-going epistemological scepticism. Hume's revolutionary
doubt about the abi 1i ty of reason stemmed from hi s "di scovet'yll
that there was no "necessary connection" beb~een matters of fact.
Reason, he he 1d, cou 1d di se lose noth i ng about the rea 1 war 1d but
mere ly aided in detect i ng re1at ions between ideas. As ~J. T. Jones
states, Hume by pointing out that there was no rationale in nature
to which the rational mind of man conforms since we experience nature
as ordered ~ in effect was
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."driving a wedge between reason and
nature ll • 27 It was Immanue 1 Kant IJJho understood most clearly the
implications for Reason that Hume's view had.
Pure Heas~!). \'Jas an attempt to provi de a ne\!J parad i gm to restore the
absolute value of reason.
1.2 IMMANUEL KANT AND TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM-- ....... ~....
In Kant~ German ideal i srn reacted to Hume is attack upon reason as
the guide of experience since it viewed Hume's empiricism as an
attack upon metaphysics and therefore an attack upon the conditi ons
of human freedom. For German idealism, unity and universality vvere
not found in empirical realityo Hhat~ then g t'ias the ba.sis of knowledge?
A new epistemology was required that would overcome the empiricist
cr"iticisms but still maintain the rational ideals of the individual
and society \'Jhich were considered the conditions of freedom. Kant
believed that the basis of the new epistemology lay in the structures
of the mind itself.
that,
He begins his Critique of Pure Reason by stating
... all our knowledge begins
For hm'J 'is it possible that
should be awakened into
wi th experi ence,
the f dCU lty of cognit i on
exerci se othen'IJi se than
be means of objects which af~ect our senses
to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions
into a kno\rJledge of objects, \rJhkh we call experience?
In respect Of time~ therefore~ no knm'IJledge of ours
is antecedent to experi ence. but beg'j ns with
it. 28
Thus Kant agreed with the empiricists and Hume in particular. However~
in his next statement he lays the basis for this new epistemology
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that totally differs with Hume:
But though our kno'ld edge begi ns with experi ence,
it by no means follows, that all arises out of
experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible
that empirical knowledge is a compound of that which
"'le receive through impressions, and that which the
faculty of cognition supp 1i es from itself (sensuous
impressions giving merely the occasio!:.). o. Knowledge
of this kind is called ~ priori, in contradiction
to empirical knowledge, \<'Jhich has its sources
a post~Jo~, that it is, in experience. 29
With this opening statement Kant intimated the direction such a
redefined epistemology \~ould take. His Critique of ~ure Re_~ is
a carefu 11y worded ana lys is of the means and modes of understandi ng
in order to show that knowledge is grounded "in the mind. Only i1
thi sway, Kant be 1; eved ~ cou 1d the whole of rea 1ity st i 11 be rooted
in man's rational. faculties; that iS j the mind provides the modes
of understandi ng. He maintained that philosophy was in need of
U a science which shall determine the possibiiityg principles and
extent of human kno\'Jledge la pr"jor;i." 30 H·is Critiqu~ attempted
to provide such o.n lI architectonic of pure reason. 1I By "archHectonic"
Kant meant the art of constructing a system for without.
... a systematic unity, our






Kant attempts to prove that the mi nd possessed the un; versa 1 forms
that organised sensuous experience, namely, the forms of intuition
(space and time) and of understanding (the categories). While objects
are gi ven to us by means of sensi bi 1i ty I! all thought must di rect ly,
or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuition
•• 0 because in no other way can the object be gi ven to us." 32 By
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"Form" Kant referred to that· It/hich arranges the content of the
phenomenon under certain relations and by "intuition" in both space
and time. IiSpacell being a 11 necessary representation ~.:!. VJ1hich
ser'ves for the foundation ol all external intuition ll 33 and I/timel!~
lS a necessary representation lying at the foundation of all
intuition. 34 The forms of understanding, Kant called the categor<ies. ~~~
by which ideas were synthetically formed ie. lithe process of joining
dHferent t~epresentations to each other, and of comprehending theh'
diversity in one cognition". 35 He claimed that the synthesis of
cognition is only pure \'l/hen lithe diversity is not given empirically
but 2.jJrior.'!. as in space and time. 1I 36
These forms were uni versa11y va1id and app 1i cab1e because they
constituted the structure of the rn'ind and the basis of 5=ertainty
is now shifted from the world of objects to the mind itself. In
thi S Itlay Kant hoped to "free reason from the vie; ssitudes of empi ri ci st
particularism." 37
It was at thi s poi nt that Kant made a most important di st; neti on:
\'/h"ile his categorica" structure of mind (causality~ substance,
qua1ity and such 1i ke) pertai ns to phenomena, they were not va 1i d
for what he termed noumena, that which cou ld not be understood in
space and time. Whi 1e Kant a1so was deep ly impressed by Newton IS
findings, he maintained that the natural sciences were limited to
describing spatio-temporal experience. To understand the concepts
of God~ freedom and immortality within the forms governing spatio-
temporal experience V;las, therefore, impossible. This was the error
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of natural theology. Kant wrot~,
I cannot even make the assumption-as the practical
interests of mora'lity require - of God, Freedom
and Immorta1i ty if I do not depri ve specll 1ath,e
reason of its pretensions to transcendent/ ins'ight.
For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles
wh'ich, in fact 9 extend only to the objects of possible
experience~ and which cannot be applied to objects
beyond th is sphere without convert 'j rig them i I1tO
phenomena and thus render; ng the pract i ca1 ~~s ion
O'f pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish
knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism
of metaphysics •• o is the true source of unbelief
(always dogmatic) which militates against morality. 38
Hence Kant was led to the conclusion via his transcendental idealism
that phenomena are nothing but representations which have no self-
subsistent e>dstence ;n isolation from human thought. 39 Therefore,
ItJhat the "things-;n-themselves ll are that give the impressions cannot
be knmm. 40 Furthermore, the noumenon cannot be an object of thought
because it "represents an object for perfectly different intuition
and perfectly different understanding from ours 9 both of wh"ich ar'e
consequently themselves problematic. 1l 41 Hence the conception of
noumenon remains problematic because it is connected with the limitation
of our sensibility. 42 The categories were insufficient for a knowledge
of things-in-themselves. Noumenon remains "problematic ll , ll unknm'Jable ll
and Cl 1l1imiting concept ll since it fulfills the important role
of harnessing the pretentions of sensibility.
Kant, more than any philosopher before him) clarified man's finitude
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in the realm of the mi od. By rescui ng God, freedom and immrtality
from the sphere of rational argument, he destroyed the optimism of
the Enlightenment or- at least cautioned the untempered claims for
Reason. Barth rightly concluded that ~
With Kant and from Kant om'Jards the human use of
reason has left the broad way and finds itself within
the 'strait-gate' ••• all self"affirmat"ion of human
re'ason WO!! 1d be asked and wou 1d cont i nua l1y have
to bear being asked, whether it in fact rests upon
a true maturi ty and everyone who used thi s reason
wou 1d be asked from now on whether hi s use of it
mi ght not perhaps just be sophi stry masquerad-j ng
as reason, an uncritical adventure of the understanding
prompted by obscure feeling. 43
It was a knowledge of man's finitude, however, that accentua.ted man's
rational striving for it is in this striving that manls freedom is
realized; that is, in so far as he heeds the imperative \\lhich is
lod.ged within him. Obedience to this imperative \'Ji11 lead into the
realm of noumena wherein exist God, freedom and immortality. Hence the
shift from the llbroad way 11 of Pure Reason to the 11 strait gate"
of Practical Reason. 44
In the Critique ~.Practica!-Reason Kant set about clarifying the
nature of this moral imperative which he als0 called the "categorical"
or "unconditional" imperative. Man's breakthrough from finity
does not obtain in theoretical or rational argument but in his awareness
of the moral imperative v"fl"ich as lIimperative" makes an unconditional
claim upon him and which is given in his will.
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The basis for th-is view had been laid in his first Critique. There
he had argued that lithe words I I ought I expresses a species of
necessity~ and imply a connection "l/ith grounds which nat.ure does
not and cannot present to the mi nd of man. 11 45 Kant use:; 11 necess ity!l
here not for natural necessity but for logica~ necessity ~vhere the
(i e. the moral imperati ve) oj s necessarily the consequence
of the rational. It is not natural because it is not derived from
experience. He wrote,
••• the idea of an ought or of duty i nd'j cates a
possible action~ the ground of \'IIhich 'is pure
conception, while the ground of a merely natural
act ion is, on the contrary, always a phrlnan2non. 46
Contrary to the behaviorist theories of psychology today, Kant rejected
any vie\"1 that implied that the win itself was determined by physical
or natural conditi ons. liThe moral ought is beyond the-j r power to
produce ll 47 and these condit; ons t'e1ate on ly to the effects of the
wi 11, and the consequence of those effectsin the war 1d. Kant's
vi ewof freedom was grounded in the undetermined moral ought ~ in
the sphere of the noumena. In his writings, there is a clear break
between freedom and necessity and this break was the result of the
autonomy of the human will. He therefore spoke of lithe cosmological
idea of freedom. 1I 48
It is in the centra 1 doctri ne of the autonomy of man that rat i ona 1ity
and freedom coa1esce. Although man as autonomous is a "l aw unto
himself li he could never become la\I/less if he lives by the law of
reason. 11 !\utonomyll \'/as the reject; on of "heteronomyll \Alhereby
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one subjected oneself to something beside pure reason such as desire,
pleasure or fear. Hence in his Religion writhin the limits of Reason
alone 49 he repudiated the subjection of the empirical church and
the fear and superstitution that underlay the observance of its customs
si nee these endangered autonomy. ItDogmas and formulas," he wrote,
"those mechanical instruments for rational, use (or rather misuse)
of his natural endoltJl11ents, are the ball and chains of his permanent
immaturity'" 50
En 1i ghtened man is autonomous man and for "enlightenment of this
kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question---
is the most innocuous form of all freedom to make public use of one's
reason in all matters. 1I 51 The only 'i-Jay to bring aboLlt enlightenment
among men is to e'!sure that the pub 1i c use of reason remains freeo
Once people begin to think f!~~~9 they will be able to act freely, 52
It is the rational striving of man that undergirds and accentuates
his moral striving. It is the urge for emanc;pat'ion that forces
striving for the unconditional. "Thou canst, therefore, though oughtest ll
is the command of pure reason which leads to freedom. As G.A. Rauche
points out, thi:c act of liberation through striving leads to a
transcendental autonomy ie. a rational form 'of existence free from
the limitations of the senses. 53
Kant anticipated a possible objection to his view of freedom when
he posed the following question,
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Now granting that reason stands in a causal relation
to phenomena~ can an action of reason be called
free, when we know that, sensuously - in its empirical
character, it is comp1ete ly determi ned and absolute ly
necessary? 54
Yes, he replies, because this empirical character of an action or
effect of reason is itself determined by reason alone and not in
accordance with empi ri ca1 1aws. The causal rel ati on between reason
and phenomena poi nts on ly to the fact that reason is the ori gi nator
of the character of an empirical series of effects. 55
Kant clearly stated that he intended to descri be freedom as a
transcendental idea by which "reason aims at originating a series
of conditions in the \.'wrld of phenomena with the help of that ~Jhich
is sensuous ly unconditi oned. 1I 56 He po; nted out tha.t it was not
his intention to prove the actual ex!ytence of freedom or to demonstrate
the possibility of freedom. To attempt the former would endanger
the transcendental nature of his argument since freedom cannot be
inferred from expeY"j ence or understood in terms of natural 1at\ls.
Therefore, any proof for the actual existence of freedom is impossible.
The 1atter Cl 1so was a poi nt 1ess exet'c i se si nee it was beyond the
mind to "cognize the possibility of a reality or of a causal power
by the aid of mere ~..!:iori .,:onceptions. 1I 57
Hence. as F.P. van del" Pitte observed. the awareness of autonomy
"forces man to postu 1ate freedom as a fact of hi s own moral experi ence il
and it is freedom which Kant employs as the "!<.eystone of the whole
archi tecture of the system of pure reason. 11 58 The idea of freedom
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is inextricably bound up with hjs view of reason as that which regulates
reality.
Kant attempted to solve the d; 1emma that Hume i ntraduced by d; vi di ng
, /
the knowl edge of objects and the a\'Jareness of values ; nto two modes
of exper; ence too different to contrad; et each other. Therefore,
if man is both empirical self and noumenal, to at.tribute freedom
a.nd natural necessity to one person did not appear contradictory.
The empirical self could well be conditioned by history and the
environment while the noumenal self is still free to choose and be
morally responsible.
Thi s di st; net; on may be illustrated in h'j s understand; ng of the exi st-
ence of God. On the one hand he rejects any logical proof of God
si nee,
Bei ng ; s evi dent ly not area1 predi cate ie., a
conception of something which is added to the
conception of some other thing... Logically it
is merely the copula of a judgement... NO\'J~ I take
the subject God with a11 its predi cates. . • and say
God is or ~~od 1 add no new predicate
to the conception of God. X mere ly pas it the object
in relation to my conception ... there is 110 addition
to the conception. 59
Yet in the preamble to h"is Critiq~e_~.f Pure Reason he insisted that
God and free immortal self are real because their reality is guaranteed
by the facts of moral experience~
••• "it is plain that the hope of a future life arises
from the feeling which exists in the breast of every
man> that the tempora 1 is; nadequate to meet and
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satisfy the derpands of his nature. In like manner~
the clear exhibition of duties in opposition
to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to
the conscio~sness of ft~eedom... and that the glorious
order~ beauty and providential care, everywherE!
displayed in nature, gives rise to the belief in
a wi se and great Author of the uni verse. •• the schoo1s
have no ri ght to arrogate to themse1ves a mre profound
insight into a matter of human concernment ••• 60
To live autonomously is to live as if the la~'4s to IfJhich you subject
yourself are your very m-m and at the same time universally valid.
The will alone is the lawgiver even when one obeys la\'Js. 61
Kant's view of freedom~ nonetheless, remains ambiguous for one is
not quite sure whether freedom is a possession of man or whether
it is the resu 1t of him achi eV'j ng autonomy or ~Jhether on 1y autonomous
man is free to achieve frt"'C.-mn in the nourenal sphere through triOrCl1
striving. Aspects of all these alternatives emerge in citations
of his thought that appeared in the above description. In spite
of his division of man into the noumenal and the empirical~ the problem
of the relation bebJeen freedom and necessity remains unsolved.
W.T. Jones points out that this "double and highly ambiguous sense"
of freedom arises from his understanding of freedom in terms of
autonomous free voJi 11 • The mora1 act is free because the w; 11 is
self-leg'islative~ but freedom is also considered as "being
spontaneous." 62 In this second sense~ freedom is inconsistent with
necess'j ty in the first sense that says that ItJhen a maxim VJith a
particular structure occurs and man acts on it, man is free. Kant
is therefore accused of "sliding back and forth between freedom
as 'spontaneous causa 1ity' and as 'max im with autonomous
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structure'.1l 63
In the ~itique of Judgement~ 64 Kant attempted to reconcile theoretical
and pract i ca1 reason "1 n the idea of nature whereby the phys <i ca1 war 1d
could be viewed as a whole organic structure in spite of (als ob)
its mm complex phys i ca1 1aws. Pau 1 Ti 11 i ch remarked ~ however 9 that
"in his Cr:L~!l~Jlldgement he tried with great caution to escape
the prison of f'jnitude but succeeded only in beautifying it." 65
The arbivalence that remains is inevitable if freedom in the end is
secured on ly in the attainment of moral"ity. It ari ses from the sch i srn
between man's epistemological self and his mm~al self. Positively
the awareness of man's empirical limits ensures his awareness of
his finitude but negativelY2 freedom is made the inevitable result
of rational striving. Kant has not abandoned the optimism of the
Enlightenment that man will invariably break through the epistemological
limits. For example 2 he stated:
A11 the i nteres t of my reason (specu 1at i ve as we 11
as pract i ca 1) comes together' in the fo 11 owi n9 three
questions:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope? 66
That these three questions form the agenda of rationally liberated
men is far from se If··evi dent. On the contrary ~ "i n our age that
testifies to the power of science and technology and the unprecedented
awareness of man's ab"ilities, a new functionalism places after the
quest,'on "What can I know?1I th t' "\ h 11e ques , on 4 at. wi \oI/ork?" or
"\·jhat wi 11 bri ng greatest benefit to the greatest number of peop 1e?"
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The moral ought is not the necessary consequence of more incisive
knowledge.
The problematic nature of this view of freedom emerges 9 for example,
when one e)(am; nes Kant I ~ vi ews on the freedom of soci ety. Here the
theoretical consistency of his views breaks down. Because of his
claim that the goal of human eid stence is the real i zat i on of the
moral lavJ v/hich is based on the idea of freedom t he adopts a highly
optimistic view of human society. He 3 for 'instance~ rejects any
public resistance to ?:uthority since the rights of people to live
under the condHions of freedom will be ensured by the responsibility
which is incumbent on rulers to govern in a manner "v~hich a people
of mature rational powers would prescribe for itself. 1I 67 He argued 9
therefore 9 that even under conditions of limited civil freedom,
i nte 11 ectua1 freedom can still "expand to its fu 11 est extent" and
"Eventually, it even influences the principles of government, which
find that they can themselves profit by treating man ••• in a mannet~
appropriate to his dignity." 68 Hence he could state, IlArgue as
much as you like and about whatever you like but obey. 11 69
Such an argument places too much confidence on the attai nment of
"ma ture rational powers u and presupposes too much on the part of
those in positions of authori ty. It ignores the irrationalities
of human existence~ for example~ human selfishness, the obsession
with power and the individual profit motive. It places too much
confidence in the abil'ity of rational discourse or on the possibility
of sufficient numbers in a socie'ty to participate in such discourse.
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Hence, while Kant is committec.j to the goals of human autonomy and
freedom, there is in practice, as R. Singh points out, the danger
of 11 compromi sing the real i ty of one of the most va1ui:~b 1e of Kant IS
insights - that of the moral responsibilities of finite but free
human beings" since he absolutizes obedience. 70
Hegel perceived the epistemologica.l dilemma that Kant had highlighted.
As long as the "things-in-themselves ll I,oJere unknm'Jable, reason remained
merely a subject'ive principle. As long as thought and e>(istence,
understandi n9 and sense remai ned separated, the a1i enat i on of the
mind remained. Kant's dualism was built on this antithesis between
subject and object. Regarding Kant's attempt to first become acquainted
wi th the instrument of thought (the mi nd) before \'Je undertake the
quest for knm'llledge 9 Hegel commented~
Un 1ess we wi sh to be decei ved by words ~ it is easy
to see what thi s amounts to. In the case of other
instruments, we can try and criticize them in other
ways then by setting about the special work for
which they are destined. But the examination of
knowledge can only be carried out by an act of
knmvledge. To examine this so-called instrument
is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to
know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution
of Scholasticus not to venture into the water unti 1
he had learned tr swim. 71
The histOt~'ical form of this conflict Hegel caned the "Entfremdung"
and set about to construct a vi'eltJ of rea 1ity that wou 1d overcome
this alienation. His phi losophical system ItJas to avoid the
epistemological purview of Kant and be logical. Kant's transcendental
solution was to be replaced by an immanentist one.
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1.3. G.F. HEGEl: FREEDOM A~D U~IVERSAL SYNTHESIS
To overcome the logical problems of Kant's approach IrJhich entrenched
the subject-object anti thes is and confi ned knO\"J1edge by pure reason
only to phenomena~ Hegel makes reason centY'al to his whole thought
as Kant had attempted by distinguishing beb!een pure and practical
reason. The main tenets of his ph i1 osophy are 1091 ca lly i ntertv,d ned
with reason from wh i ch they a1so are deri ved; Ird nd 9 notion 9 freedom
and such like. For example 9 ~eason presupposes freedom which is
construed as the ability to act in accordance vrith true knot'Jledge.
On the other hand 9 perfect freedom obtains when the subject comprehends
the independent objectivity of all objects. IAs 10n9 as an object
exists which the subject has not mastered by pure thought i the subject
is unfree. The free subject has no object. 72 Hence true rea 1i ~r
like reason presupposes freedom \r~hi1e the basis for attaining reality
is reason alone. This tautology must nO\'J be explicated vis-a-vis
the mai n tenets of Hege 11 s phi losophy ~'ii th a vi e~'J to understandi n9
his idea of freedom in particular.
Hegel, in attempting to reconcile the subject and the object, coined
the terms an si ch (in itself) and fUr sich (for its~lf) t:\.hich Sartre
used to elaborate his m'm philosophy of self-actualization: en-soi
and ~~2i The an sich is implicH. until it becomes aware of
its potential and its relations to its context. In developing such
an awareness it becomes fUr sich. It is no longer implicit and potential
but explicit and actualized.
Hmvever, both an si ch and fUr- si ch themselves represent two levels
of alienation.
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In an sich the subject remains alienated from its
ti~ue real i ty in the ~\}or1d. In the state of fUr sich the subject
is alienated from its potential and the particular considers "itself
the whole. A1i enat ion is on ly overcome when through a process of
development, the end (telos) is achieved where no externalized subject
remains. This unity of subject and object Hegel called
AmmdfUrsichsein: the state of "being-in-and-for itself." 73 This
state itself is not the end but a stage in the historical process
towards the eschatological merger of history and Absolute Spirit.
Thus by postulating a mon-ism of Sp"irit, Hegel hoped to overcome the
Kantian dualism.
Th ishis tori ca 1 movement tOlfJards the eschato 109; ca 1 goa1 is ach i eyed
by a dialectical process. In Pheno~enol0.2~~ Hegel attempted
a grand and comprehensive conceptualizat-ion of this process which
is perceived as the logical outcome of the negations of history.
Life is self-generative and expresses itself in successively unfolding
forms. 74 The process begins with simple contradictions and develops
to more camp 1ex ones, the reso1ut i on of each 1ead i ng to the
"blossoming" of consciousness. The whole process achieving all
the time a greater aV,lareness and a higher degree of freedom.
Hegelian thought introduced into philosophical discussion an unprece-
dented historical dynamism. The achieving of truth and freedom was,
as Kant had said, a rational activity but, according to Hegel, it
was also historical: a process and a becoming. Each stage of the
a\.'Jareness of truth was understood to be a ~ec"~ step in the
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process and each conflict a necessary negation to drive the process
forward. Hence Hege1 stated, 'I! The truth is the who 1e and the ~'iho1e
is merely the essential nature reaching its completeness through
the process of its own development.1! 75
In his seminal lectures on Art, Religion and Philosophy where his
-~--
ma in ideas are more occessible, Hegel stated, IIWhat is true is
found in motion, in a process... Difference while it lasts, is but
the temporary condition through ~'Jh;ch comes unity full and
concrete." 76 In this connection, he agreed with Goethe that I'that
which is fonned ever resolves itself back into its elements.1! 77
In the process of becoming, all matter \'Jhich has developed form
const itutes once more the materi a1 for a ne~'J form. Reason seizes
a11 forms and, by cancelli n9 and Cl. Heri ng them, makes them more
adequate to their no!~. 78
By Il no t ion ll Hege1 had in m'j nd that quality or dimensi on of be; ng
whi ch passes into its opposite \'Jithout becomi ng anyth'j ng dHferent
but which, even in the opposite, remains identical with itself.
Herbert Marcuse pointed out that Hegel's term for this concrete
universal (Begriff) is the activHy of comprehending (Begreifen)
rather tha.n its abstract logical form or result; 79 More akin to
the Eng 1i sh \I• .:;rd I concept I • Hence Begriff as we fi nd it used by
Hege 1 is best trans 1ated I not i on I or I 'j dea I to ma.ke sense of
the Hegelian view of striving towards an idea (or notion).
The quest for truth is directed towards the notion for in it the
truth of the object is found. Reason, as it were, chisels the raw
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materials of historical forms .making them more adequate to their
notion, that is~ their state of being-in-and~for-itself. Notion~
therefore, is Cl 1so the IIsphere of freedom 11 since freedom is
actualized in the kno\r11edge of truth.
has been overcomeo
In the not ion 9 the oppos i te
The notion is the sphere of freedom because it is self-mediated g
and since lithe other" is theteby absorbed ~ it is a1so se1f-deter-
mined. To be self-determined is to be free whereas to be determ"ined
by another constitutes necessityo The movement from Essence to Notion
is the deve1opment from neces s i ty to freedom. Hegel stated that,
The Idea as concrete in··itself and self-developing,
is an organic system and a totality which conta.'ins
a mu 1t i tude of stages and of moments in development. 0 •
The Idea is one in its totality and in all its
i nd-j vi dua1 parts 0 • 0 a11 the parts (part icu 1ars)
are but the mi rrors and copi es of th"j s one 1ife
and have thei r actual i ty on 1y in th-j s unity. Thus
the Idea is the central point, \lJhich is also the
periphery 000 It/hich in all its expansion •• o remains
present and immanent within itselfo Thus it is
both the system of necessity and its own necessity,
\'shich a1so constitutes its freedom. 80
Hegel illustrates this point by referring to the fact that gold contains
in every particle all its qualities in their entirety.
that the vie\<>J which pet'ceives this dialectic betvlleen
He argued
'the whole'
and I the part I as suitable for sensuous things and not for the
spiritual, lacks justification.
In the process of becoming~ freedom and necessity coalesce. I n the
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Science of Logic, Hegel argued +that the process of freedom is of---
necessity because it follows the laltJs inherent in its own nature
and freedom is this necessity because the process is self-determined
and is not the result of external forces. 81
Hegel refutes the presupposition that underlies the argument that
if the mind is free it is not in subjection to necessity or inversely,
that if its wi 11 and thought are deter-m; ned through necessity, it
is not free. The presupposition being that freedom and necessity
are mutually exclusive. He maintains that the mind -is "itself concrete
and incorporates the attr-] butes of both freedom and necessity and
more than this 9 "mind is free in its necessity and 'finds its freedom
in it alone 9 since its necessity rests on its freedom. lI 82 HoweveY'~
he admi ts 9 that un 1i ke the natura1 objects ~ th is unity of freedom
and necessity is more difficult to show. 83
~1en~ unlike the plants and animals~ can deviate from the necessity
of the; r nature (thei r truth) and become what they ought not to be
since in human freedom what is and what ought to b! are separate.
\~ith the pm\fer of choice that freedom bri ngs~ comes the possibi 1ity
for alienation ie. when contrary to the laws of necessity~ freedom
works in opposition to the fulfilment of true destiny. When freedom
is severed from necess i ty, the viii 11 "persists in obstinacy and
stands aloof from its necessity and truth." 84 This "abstract"
and "false freedom ll is "self-will and for that reason is self-
opposed. unconsciously limited. an imaginary freedom \'Ihich is free
in form alone." 85 This is \'Ihat Hegel meant in The Logic by "The
truth of necessity is freedom." 86
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Furthermore. there are bJO perspectives to th-i s freedom. On the
one hand, man has attained truth when the mind has attained the
self-consciousness of its freedom and has become capable of free-ing
society. On the other hand, when truth is attained the Absolute
Spi ri t has thereby attai ned se 1f-knoltll edge in the sphere of human
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consci ousness and has thus created freedom. Spirit, as it were,
breaks into history or inversely, man is in step wHh Spidt, at
the moment of truth 0 Thus, Hege1 un; tes personal, i ndi vi dua1, communa1
and 1oca1 striv; n9 in one epoch with the goal of human hi story.
As Karl Lowith commented,
The absolute or spirit \'\Ihich continuously surrenders
and recollects, is ~!, ~ historical, even though
the dialectic of becoming does not proceed in a
st ra; ght 1i ne toward i nfi nity, but rather goes in
a circle, so that the end is the consummation of
the beginning ••• And because the essence of Spirit
is the freedom of existing with itself, complete
freedom is achi eved It/ith the camp 1et i on of its
history. 89
At the heart of his philosophical system, Hegel constructs a definite
philosophy of history, devoting a whole book to this aspect. liThe
history of the world~1I he wrote~ "is none other than the progress
of consciousness of Freedom. 11 90 History -is a transforming process,
a process \t4hich carries forward each new B.nd higher perception of
freedom, which Ro Dunayevskay described as lithe task which Spirit
accomplished as actual history." 91 Individuals invariably, and
often inadvertent ly, promote the task of spi rH 0 Individual
achievements are "leversll of all historical progress. The universal
is the true subject of hi stOt1Y and hi stori ca1 reason works through
and beyond individual interests. As fvlal1 cuse states it, 11 The 1alt}
of history "'thich the world mind represents •.• operates behind the
backs and over the heads of individuals s in the form of an irresistible
anonymous power. 1I 92
Phi1osophy~ says Hegel, is
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"the apprehension of the Development
of the Concrete." 93 It is conceiving thought and is itself this
deve1opment in thought. Philosophy begins "where the universal
is comprehended as the all-embracing existence or \'Jhere the existent
is laid hold of in a universal form." 94 Thought must free itself
from nature and sense perception and be IIfor itself ll but it must
a1so be fi i n itse lfli to arri ve at the consci ousness of freedom.
The task of philosophy is not merely to think freely but to grasp
the Idea: it must bring thought and the object of thought into the
form of universality. 95 PhilosophY9 as F. Copleston states, must
incorporate in the process of the Absolute's self expression the
oppositions and divisions in hi~tory and society. 96
The Idea of universality is also the ground of Hegel's ethics. The
wi 11 is free in so far as it wi 11 s the uni versa1. Thus, as ,,~ith
Kant~ freedom is not caprice or tlmotiveless action." A dialetical
relation obtains between wi 11 and the universal. For will to be
free its goal must be the un; versa 1 but it -j s itse If un; versa 1.
Hence its modus vi vendi is -its constant task to preserve its freedom
by making itself its own object. 97 In Willing the" unoiversa1 it
\'Ji 11 s the r-i ght and is free. It remai ns in bondage to nature if
r
it \'11115 the particular ie. selfish or parochial ends.
is to be ruled by nature t what is not me. 1l 98
"Unfreedom
Freedom is not 1awl essness fOl~ the nature of true 1aws is that they
embody the universal. Obedience to bad laws ie. those which reflect
the interest of some individuals or class, leads to bondage because
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it \.'IOU 1d mean that I am governed by the other. But si nee 1aws that
embody the uni versa1 are \/Jhat I myself shou 1d project ~ obeyi n9 them
means I rule myself and I am free. liThe inherent nature of la"'l is
to embody universality~ that is~ to embody myself. 1t 99
As a consequence ~ Hege1 has Cl dynami c vi ew of state. The state ; s
the true self of the individual and achieves reality when its laws
are commensurate to the potential Hies of its citizens and which
a.ll ow thei r fu 11 deve 1opment. The reconc i1 i at ion of human freedom
and the manifestation of state must be constantly ensured. 100 This
means that the state must be constant ly changi ng to ensure the freedom
of the subject or else it wi 11 cease to be fu l1y reasonab 1e. 101
The ideas of motion and historical becoming admitted into politics
a new dynamism which Avineri summed up as follolljs: "~·!hi1e political
philosophy before Hegel \vas preoccupied \'Jith legitimacy~ Hegel
introduced the dimension of change and historicity VJhich has since
become central to modern politicao, thoughLll 102 in his Philos0.E.!:.r
~. the process of attai ni n9 freedom in soci ety s whereby greater
consciousness of freedom is achieved by historical mediation~ is
explicated. Since the state is based on rational freedom and since
its function is to al"lm'J eac'"! citizen to realize their freedom in
re 1at i on to one another ~ the state is the sphere of un i versa1 and
object·jve freedom. It is lithe extension of man's self-conscious-
ness. ll 103
In terms of the hi story of freedom, Hege 1 mai ntai ns t.hat the Graeco-
Roman man understood himself to be free as ~enuus but did not
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understand individual freedom. essentiall.t as in-and-for-himself free;
as free-born. That dimension was introduced into the world by
Christianity li'Jhich proclaimed that men are free in Christ and are
equal before God. HO\\Jever~ Hegel claimed, that although Christianity
made man I s freedom independent of bi rth, class or cu lture, it di d
not fully grasp that "ta be free constituted the very notion of
man." This problematic interpretation shall be evaluated in the
second section of this study. 104
Hegel maintains that actual freedom develops political freedom.
This freedom will only emerge when the individual attains consciousness
of the fact that he is independent l.et possesses universal signif"icance.
Because this freedom is dependent on self-determination~ Hegel maintains
that phi losophy could only begin in the Grecian 9 not the Oriental
WOY'ld~ since in the Greek vwrld, mind must separate itself from its
natural will. In Moksha ther'e is a vanishing B\oJay of consciousness
and all distinction between substance and individuality is
removed. 105 He \'Jrote,
In the brightness of the East the individual merely
dissappeal~s; in the West~ the subject endures and
continues in the substantial. In Greece we first
see real freedom flourish, but still in a restricted
form vri th a 1imi tat ion. 0 • ill the Eas t on 1y one
individua.l is free, the. despot; in Greece the few
are free; in the Teutonic wm'ld the proposition
i s tl~ue that El 11 are free, that is, man is free
as man. 106
Thus the sphere of right (of the individual, family, society and
state) derive from, and must conform to, the free will of the
individual. Since state and society are to be constructed by free
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individuals, liThe realm of ri,gllt is the realm of freedom." 107
L.W. Lancaster points out that because of th'is preoccupation \'Jith
freedom in the state 9 Hegel believed that his political philosophy
suppl'ied the valid recoildliation of individual freedom and obedience
to authority. 108
Hege l' s whole system was thus permeated with the quest for freedom.
Writ; ng to Schell;ng9 he remarked, 18Reason and freedom remai n our
principles." 109 Sciences
introduces hi s elaborate system of tri ads and sub tri ads and sub-
sub-triads, each dialectically related to one another and the rationale
of the system is to understand the deve 1opment of the, consci ousilp.ss
of freedom in the whole. Being t-ot Nothing --~) Becoming forms
the basic triad whi le Being ~-~ Essence --~ Notion forms the
main triad. The final triad which marks the eschatological
fulfilment of history and of freedom is the triad Idea f"7 Nature
--~ Spi ri t. Each new tri ad reveals a greater awareness of freedom
and· withi n the system~ Hege 1 affi rmed that
freedomo" no
"Freedom wills
Hegel constantly reaffirmed the universal in order to objectively
account for the whole of existence. This may be further il1ustrated
in his vie\'J of Art and Science. He rejects the view tha\. Art is
unworthy of scientific consideration because what "is enjoyed in the
beauty of art is the freedom of its product i on and 11 p'l as tic energy"
as in contemplat1ono This view maintains that in Art and its
product i on one who lly escapes from the fetters of ru 1e and regu 1arity.
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Art cannot be scientific bec~use science excludes imagination v.Jith
its contingency. Science occupies itself with what is necessary.
Therefore~ there can be no uni versa1 1aViS of beauty and of
taste. 111 Hegel in contradicting this concept of science~ points
out that science \<;Jhich is used for finite ends~ liberates itself
from this service to fulfil its proper aims - the acquisition of
truth. It can also ~~ise up from being determ<ined to be self-determined
in order to be adequate to its noti on \lJhi ch is Reason. Fi ne art,
similarly, is not free until it is free in this sense also. Art
must be free in its end as it is in its means. 112
In art~ religion and philosophy the human mind is infinite for in
them the object is rationally assimnated and subject attains self-
detetmi nation and freedom. 113 ~Jhi1 e even in "objecti ve Spi r<j t"
human freedom objectifies itself in the external IrJOrld, that very
objectifying implies that something is still not grasped by the subject.
Therefore, the full notion of freedom;s atta<ined only \lJhen object-ive
Spirit is elevated to Absolute Sp"irit. For example~ the freedom
of the individual is only approximately realized in the State because
the State in so far as it is objective is still outside his subjecti-
vity. All otherness is removed only in Absolute Spirit.
Hege l' s phi lusophy is undoubtedly the grandest attempt to present
the whole of life in a comprehensive and logically coherent form
which takes seriously both lithe Idea" and history. The importance
of the uni versa 1 was re-affi rmed in the face of its reject ion in
favour of only particulars by Locke and Hume. The importance of
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synthesis was restored in the face of the Kantian dualism.
Nevertheless 9 Hegel1s un;versa"l synthesis and its accompanyiilg idea
of freedom have difficulties of thew OI,lJn. Its view of authentic
existence is not free from ambiguity in spite of the inbuilt dialect"le
that removes the contradictions of the world and human existence.
Man is free as man yet he is in a state of becomi ng, for freedom
wills freedom and Absolute freedom is attained by rational str-iving
when freedom embodi es the un; versa1. Hence, by its very nature,
idealist philosophy in order to be complete, as W T Stace points
out, must deduce every detai 1 in the universe. 114 This means that
it can never be complete yet th is is what Hege 1 bel i eved must be
possible and believed his own system represented.
Freedom and reason appear as the ~ri. and the j_£~rior.!. of
the system so that thei r manifestati on is 109i ca lly worked out over
and above the exigencies of existence which the Existentialists were
at pains to rediscover. They reacted to Hegel's view mainly because
his system of Ideas explained c.way the paradoxes. As L. Kolakowski
states,
the doctrine justified every actual reality as praise-
worthy by the very fact of its existence, which
proved it to have been planned by the di vi ne mol nd.
Freedom of the individual is in great danger if
it is admitted that thi ngs cannot be different,
that man was wro~g and that he can redress. That
what is, is not necessary. 115
Simi1arly~ Hegel's historical vision, albeit comprehensive~ may be
criticised in view of the crisis of modern ma.n who though possessing
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greater abil ity to conttqo1 nature is not necessarily any more free
than hi s forbears. On the contrary, he appears to be more severely
dehumanised. To understand history is often to question the validity
of historical progress which in Hegel is cast in deterministic terms.
Even retrogressions are explained as necessary and indispensable
to progress. If Absolute Spirit works behind the backs of individuals
in a deterministic 'v~ay, what then is the nature of man's true freedom?
Hege1 \'10U 1d answer that a free man is one who acts in concert vd th
Abso 1ute Spi rit and not for parochi a1 ends. While there is some
merit in this answer since all arguments for Providence wi 11 adopt
a sim"ilar line, one is not sure I.nlhat . the grounds are for Hege l' s
optimist-ic view of man; an optimism which is open to much scepticism.
U1t imate ly 9 Hege 1is man is governed by the i nexorab 1e 1aw of \'Jor 1d
reason working out in the historical blossorn'ing of Spiv'H. One may
still justifiably ask whether it is possible for man to escape the
tyranny of historical inevitability and habit by mere rational activity.
A major criticism of Hegel. therefore. is that he resolves man's
crisis and alienation in theory only. To theoretically understand
or descri be the nature of freedom does not mean the attai nment of
that freedom any more than graspi ng of the noti on of freedom means
the attai nment of freedom. Hege1 has on ly managed to show \'\ihat can
potentially be the lot of man.
Herbert Marcuse maintains that Hegel is perhaps the best ex amp 1e
of the cultural di 1emma that existed in Germany at the time when
IItheory ll \'Jas alienated from IIpracticell. The educated classes had
isolated themselves from practical affairs and II rendered themselves
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impotent to app ly the; r reason to the reshapi ng of sac; eti' 116 and
fulfilled themselves in the -realm of science~ art, religion and
philosophy. Culture was essentially idealistic and, Marcuse maintains,
Hege11 s system was "the last 3reat expression of this cultural
idealism, the 1ast great attempt to render thought the refuge for
reason and liberty.1I 117 It set freedom af thought before freedom
of action and since the majority of our societies, albeit more
scientifically advanced than the society of Hegells, still cannot
attain rational freedom, the questions of morality and practical
justice rema'ln unattended. These problEmS v.€re the chief questions that the
r·1a.v'Xists and neo-Marxists were to address thEmselves to. In this connection; both
Kant and Hegel in their attEmpt to rescue reason and freedan fran the rationalistic
and arpi riei st attacks, were not thEmSelves free of the be1ief in the inherent ~jaYmOny of
society and the doctrine of eternal progress based on rational striving.
Horality and freedom are fullt atta"ined at the end of a process:
either when man attai ns a~omy or has outgrown hi s imn:,?t~i!r in
Kant I s case, or when he has grasped the Ul'-! versa I and when objective
Spirit has merged into Absolute Spirit. in Hegel1s case. Both claimed
that man is free and that lifreedom wi 11 s freedom" but what that
means in practice they do not say; in society where the masses daily
become dependent either on the fe\\I or "the partyll who economi ca lly
and politically manipulate their whole lives and 'tJho insidiously
detennines their value-systems because they manipulate their needs
through sophisticated advertising and marketing.
Also, Hegel presupposes too much about historical
The nature of humanity is to
wi th one another. and its very
in the explicit realizat'ion
harmony. He held that,
impel men to agree
existence lies simply
of a communi ty of
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conscious life. 118
This view not only admit::; a determinism that logically undercuts
individual responsibility (since willing the universal even when
it appears in Sartre -1s stin only an interesting intellectualism)
but it also underestimates the problem of synthesis. 119 For example~
the great difficult-ies existing in getting men to agree with one
another in a large scale politically volatile context. That it is
not self-evident tha~ opposing views can be harmonized is best
illustrated in the catastrophic \'JOrld wars "in our century which cont~
rary to any theory of progress led to the most wanton destruction
of men by men themse 1ves. Contrary to the theory of hi stor; ca1
ineluctability, these wars, as Nicolai Berdyaev stated~t,!ere a judgement
in history on history. 120
Any theoretical frame\'\Iork whether phi losophical, theolog'ical or
historical, as 'IJe shall elaborate later, suffers from the problem
of having to explain the \o'/hole and its diverse parts on the basis
of a preconceived view. Theoretical frameworks are always means
to an end and can never be ends in themse 1ves because no one theory,
especially of history, can cope with the complexity of life. Frameworl,s
are by their nature static even if, as in Hegei's system~ this ultimate
static quality emerges after an almost indefinite process of develop-
ment. Hhen Abs:)lute Spirit is attained the system is closed and
then even reflection (philosophy) becomes redundant. 121
Hegel criticised the rationalists for their "raisonfl€lT€nt"; their
speculative quests in the name of reason which were doomed to failure
because thei r vi ew of reason predi sposed thei r understandi n9 of
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the world. Yet his selecting o~ historical data was also predetermined
by his theory of history and thus his system ultimately is the
Procrustean bed into which the various data are made to fit.
Kolakowski points to a further problem with Hege1ian historiography.
The system den; es the independent value of personal human 1He fm~
the sake of the demands of un i versa1 Reason and in the name of those
demands permHs the state to coerce i ndi vi dua1s for a hi gher free-
dom. 122 In pract i ce, therefore ~ freedom ends in the all po\!/erfu 1
state. In The Philosophy of Right Hegel argued that the monarch
alone can provide a stable reference point since he is what he is
by birth and not iJy his social existence. 123 Marcuse strongly reacted
to this view that makes "Freedom ••• 'identical \\lHh the inexorable
necessity of nature~ and reason terminates in an accident of
bi rth. 11 124 The phi losophy of freedom turns into a phil osophy of
necessity.
In the history of the quest for freedom in ~~estern thought since
the Enlightenment, Hegel1s synthesis of epistemology and metaphysics
was one of the two most distinguised responses to the Kantian dualism
and the epistemological crisis of the Enlightenment. The second
response manifest2d itself in several attempts to abo1i sh metaphysics
altogether. TheSE: include Positivism and neo-positivism, and r~arx'ismo
Existentialism attempted o. radical redefinition of metaphys"ics.
Each of these three contemporary philosophical quests also . offer
a different conception of freedom VJhich must no\1J be clarified and
evaluated.
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1.4 POSITIVISM AND NEO-POSITI~ISM: FREEDOM FROM METAPHYSICS
David Hume. by undercutting the rationalist position by his radical
scepticism 9 isolated an aspect of the Er.lighterment that was gl"eatly
to influence Positivism. Radical doubt 9 Kant saw, would endanger
the rational principle itself. It, however, fostered confidence
in empirical verification and the methodology of the natural sciences.
Hume 9 for thi s reason, may be said to have been the fore-runner of
Positivism.
August Comte gave thi s approach formal defi rd ti on. He proposed that
theology. metaphysics and lithe Positive!' represented three historical
stages. Theology represented the projection of the emotions vis-
a~vis the world; metaphysics depersonalized these projections and
transformed them into abstract essences; but the PosH i ve abo l"j shes
abstracts and essences and formulates relationships betvveen what
is directly observed. Science is the ground of the Positive and
represents the evolution of man from the stages of theology and
metaphysics. 125
Positivism and its sUbsequent neo-positivist schools s like the
Enlightenment s fostered an intense epistemological quest. The quest
for certainty of knovJledge remained central.
G•E. fvloore in his IIRefutation of Idealism" (1903) argued for
epistemological r 1" d" th "ea lsm regar 1ng . e object of knowledge. Like
Bertrand Russell, his writings were nioneering projects of the logical
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positivist schools which caught the imagination of the Anglo-Saxon
world. Russel1and Moore adopted scepticism: Russell became known
as lithe passionate sceptic." 126
Russell maintained a Realist position at first, and defended the
vievJ that particulars \I/hich have quantities or relations are instances
of universals. 127 In 1955, he added a footnote to his article
liOn the relations of Universals and Particulars" "in which he stated
that his argument "in favour of the existence of particulars no longer
seemed va1id. The theori es that assert part i cu 1aI's and deny them
are equally tenab 1e though the 1atter
parsimony.1t 128
"has the merit of logical
Moore's scepticism emerges in his attempt to refute Idealism in VJhich
he stated that it is not possible to sa.y anything about the universe
in general. liNo conclusions can be drm\ln about any of the subjects
about which ItJe most want to know. An attempt to do wi 11 frustrate
rather than 1i bel~ate. Il 129 Hege 1 had attempted to understand that
wh i ch cannot be understood. There was on ly one alternate to Kant' s
answer that matter and spirit exist and that t\las absolute scept-icism.
Philosophy adds nothing to the knowledge of things by its abstract
speculations. Beside scepticism»
All other suppositions - the Agnostic's that somethin9~
at all events, does exist, as much as the Idealist's,
that spirit does - are, if we have no reason for
believing in matter~ as baseless as the grossest
superstitions. 130
Freedom of thought obtains in rational explanation, that is, in logical
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and empirically viable formulations of truth not in abstract specu-
lations. That which is inexplicable must be left unexplained. Hence
the neo-positivists are content ItJith clarifying only and they fight
shy of explanation.
Freedom is conce<j ved as fref::dorn from doubt, confl iet and frustrati ons
ItJhich result \'!hen man indulges. in abstract theoretical speculations.
Both major schools of neo-positivism, Logical Positivism and Linguistic
Analysis hold to a simi lar idea of freedom. The former represented
mcl."inly by the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Schlick, Reichenbach,
Russell and Popper, and the latter by Ryle, J\ustin, ~~isdom, Strawson
and the later ~Jittgenstein also. Logical positivism attempted to
show that only scientific concepts yielded meaningful propositions
since they recorded verifiable facts. Man's freedom lies in his
being one with truth and reality as reflected in his speech.
Wittgenstein~ one of the chief initiators of neo-positivism, held
that everything is given in language and nothing can be added by
philosophy whose task is to demonstrate the meaninglessness of concepts.
However, he realized the restrictive nature of truth within the
confines of scientific language in the Tractatus and, in his
~il~~~p~ical Investig~tion~, broadened his view to include all language
and he adopted the approach of 1i ngui st i c ana lys is. A closer look
at the nature of these approaches must now be taken.
1.4.10 LOGICAL ANALYSIS------_.
Russell defined logical analysis as "the analysis of denoting phrases,
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the resolution of incomplete symbols, the method of dispensing with
abstracti ons and logical constructioni sm. 1I 131 Philosophy's role
is the translation of grammatically misleading or defective expressions
into their logical form. Russell's IItheory of descript-ions ll wh'ich
defined this approach, became veryi nfl uent i a1 in the 1930 IS. In
1929, F.P. Ramsay had concluded that tl"ris "theory of descriptions
was the paradigm of proper philosophical method. 1I 132
Russell also maintained that "all philosophy;s logic." '133 Mathema-
tical logic was understood to be the correct basis for understanding
abstract concepts and facilitating logical viability. This principle
of abstraction or "enables US,II Russell wrote, IIto see quickly what
is the smallest store 6fmaterials vJith which a given logical or scientific
edifice can be constructed," "134 and wou 1d "clear away incredible
accumulations of metaphysical lumber. 1l 135 Because philosophy has
opted for creating a super"'sensible world of ideas, it has failed
to give an account of this world and has lapsed into flights of fancy
and intellectual sophistry.
Russe 1'1 goes beyond the errpiricists "nth his claim that "if there is
any kno\'Jledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowled~e
of such truths which is independent of empirical evidence. Hhi le
Kant be 1i elled that Reason .a pr2 ~i'i is the source of kno\'J 1edge, Russ( t 1
bel ieved that such knm\lledge vias grounded in logic. r~odern log'ic
is able to provide self-evident general propositions that can aid
the quest for true knowledge and aid the analysis of complex
facts.l36 "The old logic put (facts) in fetters, while the new logic
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gives them ItJings." 137 Influen~es are replaced by logical construc-
tions 138 and any need for metaphysical postulates 9 such as Kant's
Gilbert Ryle 9 influenced by Russell's theory of descriptions and
logical analysis 9 suggested that the task of, philosophy should be
"1 09i ca1 paraphrase ll \'!hereby 1anguage wou 1d be freed fl~om absurdities
and inadequate concepts. 140 Thi s i nvo 1ved a systematic restatement
which include~9 more than semantics or literary criticism, the transmu-
tations of syntax in order to exhibit the forms of the facts. This
he maointained \AlaS "the sole task" of phio'osophy. '141
This rejection of metaphys"ics became more intense with the emergence
of logical Positivism
1.4.2 LOGICAL POSITIVISfVJ
Logical Positivism gained popularity in the years between the emergence
of the Vi enna Ci rc 1e (1922) and the outbreak of the second \-Jor 1d
Har. Its epistemological emphasis included the verifiability theory
of meaning~ the unity of science and the conception of 1anguage as
calculus. If a sentence is not verifiable or not a truth tautology
it is cognitively meaningless.
Philosophy was defined as the systematic presentation of the logical
syntax of the language of science. This approach to philosophy had
two important formulations: Rudolph Carnap's The Logical Syntax_.
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~! La~[LJage (1934) and A J Ayer's !:.anguage9~!ruth.. and Logic (1936).
earnap expounded a formal theory of language and philosophy was
construed as the logical analysis of sentences, terms, concepts
and theories of science. Ayer, using Russell's theory of descriptions 9
defined philosophy as analysis.
In his IIRejection of Metaphysics" Carnap argued that Cl. statement
possesses meaning only if it can give rise to perceptual statements.
Metaphysiciclls, he argued~ av0 id makin 9 the i r statements verifiable
so that they would not have to meet the rigours of empirical science.
They pretend to teach knm'/l edge IrJh ich is of a higher 1eve1• Hence
11 they are compelled to cut all connection bet1JJeen their statements
and experience and precisely by this procedure they deprive them
of any sense 11 142 Metaphysical statements because they lie outside
the field of knowledge have only an expressive function but no
represent at i ve function. They are 11 neither true nor false because
they assert nothing; they contain neither knm't'ledge nor error. 1I 143
In this regard Carnap compares the statements of metaphysicians and
poets both of whose statements are expressive. The difference 1ies
in that the metaphysician enters controversy with others believing that
he is asserting something. while the poet does not claim that the
other's verses are \"Jrong.
bad. 144
He contents himself with calling them
Carnap cites the following statement from Hume's ~iry Concerning
Huma~,Under.~can~i~_~ to affirm this point~
It seems to me ... if \'/e take in our hand any volume
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of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance;
let us ask, [joes it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or numbers? No. Does it contain
any expel'''lmenta1 reason; n9 concerni ng matter of
fact and ex i stence? No. Commi t it then to the
flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion. 145
earnap infers that only the statements of mathematics and empirical
science have sense, and that all other statements are 1r"ithout sense.
To the objection that his O\rJn book is neither mathematical nor empiri-
cal, earnap cites the answer that Wittgenstein had given in the
I~act~t~s Logico-Ph!1~~ophicus,
The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophi-
cal statements but to make statements clear
r~y statements are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me fi na11y recogni ses them as sense 1ess 9
when he climbed through them g over them. (He must
so to speak throwaway the ladder after he has climbed
up on it). He must surmount these statements;
then he sees the ItJOr1d rightly. Vlhere one cannot
speaks thereof one must be silent. 146
HoltJever, while acknowledging his olfm indebtedness and that of t.he
Vienna Circle to Wittgenstein's analysis of metaphysics 9 Carnap takes
issue with Wittgenstein 011 t\rJO counts: one 9 that he overstates the
case \.vhen he thinks that ultimately his statements are as meaningless
as metaphysi ca lanes; two 9 he thi nks that Wittgenstei n contradi cts
h-imse1f by insisting that philosophical statements are rnean"ingless
and then proceeding to write a whole book on the subject. Carnap
believes that it is imperative for philosophy to adhere to its "only
proper task" of logical analysis since it is an exact mettlod. 147
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Hans Hahn came to a similar conclusion in his attempt to resolve
the impasse between rationalism and empiricism both of which he believed
had.
Suffered shipv,Jreck - rationalism, because its fruits
lacked nourishing value, and empiricism because
it could not do just'ice to logic and mathematics.
Both have something vital to contribute since thou~~,
as formu.lated in logic and mathematics, grasps the
most general laws of all being while ~~ation
fills in the framework. 148
The only sOlution lay in a purely empiricist solution where observation
is the only source of knowledge, wHhout postu1at'ing, as K~:'1t had
done, an a priori knowledge. This ne\'1 empiricism would require a
new definition of logic and mathematics.
There are two kinds of statements: those \lJhich say something about
facts and those which express the 'JJay ~'ioY'ds are dependent on each
other to be meaningful. The latter Hahn called "tautologies" which.
say nothing about the objects but are universally valid and irrefutable
by observation. 149 Logic and mathematics are construed as universally
valid tautologies. 150
Hahn rejects the old empiricism and metaphysics ~vhich he cid1ed the
"traditiona1-platonizing" view where"in thought and the laws of logic
and mathemati cs are understood as the means to comprehendi ng the
,
eterna1 1aws of the vlor 1d. On the contrary, because thought can
only transform tautologically vJhat has been said about the world
it cannot "pi erce through" the sensible world. Hence metaphysics
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is impossible not because it is too difficult for the mind but because
it is meaningless. 151
From the above descr-iption of their approach~ it is evident that
the logical Positivists conceive of human freedom as existing within
the limits of that \'Jhich can be logically defined and empirically
verifiable. One can only be assured of knowledge in so far as the
incessant temptation- to abstract or infer beyond these limits is
overcome. Hence the logical positivists or logical analyt'ic approach
unanimous ly rejects metaphysics as the threat to human freedom since
it a1i enates one from certa -j n know 1edge rather than achieves a surer
knO\'Jledge of the world. Th2 finitude of man, \'\fhich the Enlightenment
had real'ized in Kant~ now became exemplified in the empirical limits
of logical and mathematical tautologies.
J.G. Urmson criticised this approach which attempted to be a,
prophylactic against linguistic abuses but in equating
phi losophy with logic, it had not gone beyond the
old empiricist· position. The business is sti 11
old reductive analysis even if under new manage-
ment. 152
He believed that the logical analysts had not really broken I'rith
Hume1s analysis of cousation~ Berkeley's analysis of physical objects
or even Plato I s ana 'jysi sin the Theaetetus.
detai 1. '153
They only differed in
A general problem with this analytical approach is that the logical
positivists consciously limit, and fix the parameter of truth on
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the bas is of the; r empi ri ca1 critet~i on and then proceed on that basis
to determi ne what can be mean; ngfu 1 and what cannot. While we
criticised the Hege1"ian approach for forcing truth into a preconceived
historical scheme which is imposed upon the world, the logical
positivists forced human consciousness of the world into the Procrustean
bed of their revamped logical empiricism; for example 9 Hans Hahn in
his attempt to refute metaphysics had said,
Every attempt to do metaphysics is an attempt to
speak in a way that contravenes the .agreement as
to how we wi sh to speak, comparab1e to the attempt
to capture the queen (i n a game of chess) by means
of an orthogol1a1 move of the bi shop. 154
Hahn and the logical posit-ivists a'lso may be asked 9 who determined
the 11 agreement as how to speak 11
their logical positivistic chess game?
or \'Jho determi ned the ru 1es of
The Log'ical analysis of Russel1 and t·100re and the logical positivists
were repudiated by Wittgenstein 9 ~Jisdom and Ryle themselves \'iho formerly
had some connection with these approaches. The subsequent react i on
to logical analysis gave rise to what came to be called "linguistic ll ,
"ord i nary" or Ii conceptua1"
elucidation. 1l
1.4.3 LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
analysis or sometimes I! conceptua'l
l~ittgenstein realized the restriction he had placed on language 'in
the Tractatus by limiting truth to scientific language only and,
in his Philosophical In'y_estiga.!ion~, broadened his view to inclUde
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all language. Gilbert Ryle describes the implications of this shift
thus~
The rules of logical syntax, which in the Tra.£~c:~~.~
appear chiefly as conditions of construi n9, appear
in the Investigations as conditions of composing •• o
the world in the Tractatls is l-i!<e the newspaper
---~._.-
room in a municipal library, in wh"ich old aged
pens i oners peruse sequences of pri nted sentences
but never themselves \AJrite anything or even say
anything, save ·yes· or Ino'.oo In the Investiga-
tions we hear of people learning how to say things,
even of their inventing \flays of saying things. 155
The linguistic analysts attempted to elucidate concepts and not merely
ascertain form. The later ~Jittgenstein, Wisdom, Ryle and Austen
rejected Moore·s theory of analysis and Russell's theory of description.
The logical positivists had confused the ::::ea~ing of a statement with
the use of a descriptive expressiono The logical positivist theory
was nm'J seen as "an illusion imposed upon language by language
'itself." 156
John lrJisdom maintained that the problem of philosophical language
is that they embody "puzzles" and "paradoxes" and that the task
of phil osophy is to resolve these puzz 1es. 157 Wisdom, who at
first adopted a linguistic analytic approach disagreed, therefore, with
Moore's approach Wtiich "with horrible ingenu'ity 0 •• can rapidly reduce any
metaphysical theory to a ridiculous story" and with its falseness
throws out the good also. 158 Wittgenstein. on the other hand,
percei ves thi s "PUll 1ement" of phil osophi cal language but represents
it as the sign of lingu'istic confus'ion. Wisdom argues that these
"puzzles" are also the symptom of linguistic penetration for
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"philosophies should be. conti'nually trying to say what cannot be
said. 1I 159 Hisdan, therefore, finally overcare linguistic analysis.
Other linguistic analysts like Ryle and Austin pursue the need to
2stablish the nature of true understanding and perception ... Austin's
Sense and Sensibilia 160 aimed at refuting Ayeris argument from iilus"ion
i e. that knm\ll edge is gai ned on ly by our sense'~data and not by materi Cl. 1
thi ngs di rect1y because our senses decei ve us; they do not represent
the object as it is. Against this view Austin pointed out that proposi-
tions are part and parcel of a particular situation and not of a
class or category 0
category mistake. 161
Hence like Ryle, Austin repudiates Descartes'
Ryle argued that mind is not an extra metaphysically hidden entity
affixed to the body like a "Ghost in the Machine.1! He argued that
Descartes had reduced crucial mind-statements to categorical ones
and as such commi tted a fundamenta lly~. mi stake. -162
~Jhile Carnap had maintained that all proposit"ions were .E!0tocols
ie. propositions of observation, Ayer and Austin argued that there
must be a non-verbal reality by which the truth or falsehood can
be determined. For Ayer such non-verbal reality is the sens'::!~data.
For Austin it was the particular factual situation:
The quest i on of truth and fa 1sehood does not turn
on lyon 'tJhat a sentence is, nor yet on what it mea~~,
but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances
in which it is uttered. 163
Thus, as Rauche points out, for Ayer the sentence is incorrigible,
\'Jhile for Austin the circumstances in \"ihich the sentence arises is
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incorrigible. 164
It w'i1] be obvious from the above description of the rationale of
the mai n neo-pas it 'j vht movements that the centr-a1 conce\~n rema 'j ns
the freedom from idealistic abstraction and meaningless speculation.
The log"ical posHiv;sts themselves came to see the limita.t-ions of
the; r a.pproach. However ~ they had succeeded -i n he 1pi ng phil osophy
to see the need to constantly reassess its metaphysical presuppositions.
As r~orris Weitz states~ 11 ••• their services in arousing philosophy
from dogmatic slumbers cannot be over-estimated. 'Classical'
logical posHivism may be dead but it did not l-;ve in va"in. 1I 165
Nevertheless, lingu'lstic o.no.lys";s9 although it broadened the scope
of analysis 9 did not fare any better 'in addressing the problems of
man. Its inherent caution for metaphysical enquiry results in little
being said about the world itself. The fact that "it in theory excludes
this possibility makes its methodology as problematic as that of
log"ical positivism. In going beyond the theoretical framework of
the log'ical positivists s the linguistic analysts did not escape their
epistemological pl"ison. The fact that the age old questions of man
cannot be vd shed avJay is evi dent in Wi sdom is o"Jn writings but under
the same, cfutiously analytical stamp.
To wish away or logically explain away those questions that plague
man does not lead to their solution or elirninaUol1. The analysts
have been too smugly content 'frith mere descript"ion and have neglected
to grapple with 1ife and human existence. The analysts, of course,
wi 11 di sagree.
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B. Weitz points to Kurt Baier's book The ~n.e~n.in9.
of Life (1957) as an example to refute this general criticism. 166
Baier argued that "Human lHe is meaningful; and peop 1e who claim
it is meaningless if God does not exist, simply confuse purpose in
life with purpose of life." 167 He proceeds to argue that the accep-
tance of the scientific world-v'ie~v provides no reason for saying
that life is meaningless, but on the contrary, every reason for saying
that there are many 1i ves whi ch are meani ngfu 10 He refutes as unsound
the view that claims th;~t the retention of the Christian world-vie\'>I
gives a guarantee of meaning for human existence. 168
An examination of Baier1s views, although purporting to be in quest
for meaning, reveals the blandness of the analysts view of life and
its coldly common-sense detachment. Man is reduced to a function
whose meaning i's assessed in terms of the scientHic vwrld picture.
In the end, this view lapses into an uncritical humanism within which
the opt imi srn of the abil ity of reason (Sei ence) is taken for granted.
This is accompanied by an unwillingness to think through the Christian
position which it attacked, especially since Baier himself admits,
''It may still be objected that the best and most modern views (ie. of
Christianity) are wholly cifferent. I have not the necessary knO\"iledge
to pronounce on the accuracy of the claim." 169
Neo-positivism arrives at a view of human freedom via negativa.
Only in the absence of meaningless speculation is man free from
the frustration of having to account for the unaccountable and from
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escaping his responsibilities fn this world by postulating a urealu
or 11 super-sens i b1ell ~\lor1d above or beyond th is \'JOr"I d. 1f man were
free from such compu 1si ve escapi srn he \'JOU 1d be free to 1i ve in hi s
world and accept his responsibilities in H. This view. though
remade 11 ed. has not escaped the be1i ef in the inherent reason and
harmony in society. It still functions on the belief that logical
analysis and careful description. a h'ighly intellectual exercise.
will resolve the crisis of human existence.
Neo-positivism does not say what freedom is and in spite of the cr'isis
of human freedom in our times. neo-positivism has contributed little
to the solution. Hith its methodological caution against not saying
too much, many applications of the method lapses into either insipid
indifference or intellectual smugness; Like the scholar at a recent
philosophical conference who attempted to prove from the inherent
contradictions in the propositions for God's existence, that God
in fact could not ex'ist. In the attempt to free man fromrneaningless
speculation. neo-positivisrn has led him into the bondage of a linguistic
pri son. Lack of the ab i1 ity to expres s adequate ly becomes "proof"
of the non existence of the object of expressiono At best, neo-
positivism can only offer ethical humanistic solution to the problem
of freedom. a position that admits nevJ ;:rob1ems, which we observed
in our evaluation of the Enlightenment. ~
t'ifHtgenstein in one of his musings in The Investig~t'!..~ asks the
question. "t4hat is your aim in philosophy?" to which he ansl'/ered ,
"To shew the fly the vvay out of the fly-bottle." 170 One can
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justifiably ask wnether the neo-positivists, by absolutizing their
analytical methodology and by repudiating man's freedom to raise
the questions of his existential meaning, ruling such questions out
of order, have not succeeded only in re-decorating the jar? The
implications of their abdication of philosophy will be discussed
later.
'* * '* * '*
BebJeen the Hegelian synthesis and the other blO contemporary philoso-
phical approaches, Marxism and Existentialism, which specifically
address the prob 1em of human freedom, stands the thought of Ludwi 9
Andl~eas Feuerbach (1804-1872). Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel in-
fluenced both these approaches.
Feuerbach ma"jntained that Hegel only apparently rejected transcendence
and that his attempt to recanci le the primacy of reason and necessity
results in the negation of the whole system. By making reason the
self-realization of i'),bsolute being to itself, Hegel "alienates and
expropl"i ates from man hi s typical essence and acti vity." 171 Feuerbach
argued for a materialist metaphysics ItJhich went. beyond idealism.
Philosophy resolves theology into anthropology.
Feuerbach was to influence both f~arx and Engels. Engels stated that
"\~ith one blo~J (Feuerbach) pulverised the contradiction of Idealism
and ••. pla.ced materialism on the throne again" but relented that
he had "stopped half way;
the upper half Idealist." 172
the lOIt/er half of him was materialist.
Karl f,iarx in his well-known '\Theses on Feuerbach" pointed out that
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the chief defect with previ.ous materialism, including Feuerbach's,
was that things (Gegenstand) are considered in the form of the
lI object ll or of contemplatioi1 9 but not as IIsensuous human activity.
pract ; ce. 1I 173 Feuerbach wavers between Ii the theoret i ca1 attitude"
and want; ng "sensuous objects. 11 He does not grasp the s·j gni'fi cance
of IIrevolutionary" and "practical-critical activHy." Marx maintains
that Feuerbach, by resolving the essence of religion into the essence
of man, fails to see that "the abstract individual wfrich he analyses
belongs to a particular form of society." 174
On the other hand. Feuerbach resolves Hege 1i ani sm into psychology
by refocusing on the consciousness of man. As such he was to influence
phenomenological anthropology which in turn influenced Martin Heidegger
and Jean-Paul Sartre.
1.5 MARXISM AND THE FREEDOM OF SOCIETY
- .
Centra"' to Marxls view of freedom is his understanding of "alienation"
wh i ch appears in Hege 11 s thought a1so. For Hege 1~ a1i enat i on was
the result of the failure to realize that Spirit I'Jas not a-historica1.
Man's freedom emerges when he understands his whole existence in
the 1i ght of the history of Spi ri t. r~arx. with Feuerbach. rejected
the Idea of Spirit and viewed alienation as existing not between
\'Iorld and Spirit but betv.Jeen man "and his social being. He wrote,
"For Hegel, the human essence, man, is the same as self-consciousness.
All alienation of man's esence is therefore nothing but the alienation
of self-consciousness." 175 In Hege 1, history and man are reduced
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to an abstraction in pure thought and alienation occurs in the
mi nd. 176
The idea of alienation is cem,ral to Marx1s thought. It is a fund a-
metal issue in G~undrisse and £a~,_Ca~ital where it ;s described at
length how capital! having obtained in itself an inhuman power,
arrogates the role of contra 11 i n9 the hi storica1 process and thus
alienates man. In D~s Capital he spoke of this arrogation as fetishism
wherei n the products of 1abour as soon as they are produced acqui re
a !I mysterious s0cial character.1! 177 One's produced commodities
become the objects of desire of another mak i ng the other dependent.
. Production instead of be'ing the basis for freedan in practice, actually
1eads one into bondage. 178 I t becomes the means whereby peop 1e
are ru 1ed by others, since obj ects of product i on are robbed of thei r
own soci a1 pov.Jer and is used by some to control the process of produc-
tion itself. The individual is thus swal1o\t~ed up by the means of
his o\tm hands. 179 The relation between men takes the form of a
relation between things. 180
This alienation affects the whole of society~ both the workers and
landed class. In the case of the worker, work is ultimately directed
against himself since what he produces is used to control him and
increase hi s poverty. liThe worker is re 1ated to the product of hi s
labour as to an alien object. 11 181 Moreover, alienation extends
from his own alienation to that of his social alienat'ion whereby
he is alienated from his fellow-man and from nature. The influence
of Hege 1 on ~'1arx is evi dent here: liege 1 held that as long as someth i ng
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is externalised man is not free. Marx argued that~
the more the worker externalises himself in his
vwrk, the more powerfu 1 becomes the a1i en 9 object i ve
~'l/orld that he creates opposite him, the poorer he
becomes himself in his inner life and the less he
can call his own. 182
Elsewhere, he stated that selling is the embodiment of this externaliza-
t i on and that the a1i en ent ity under whose domi nat i on man places
activity is "money". 183
The propertied class and the capital"ists are also rooted in the
same alienation but unlike the proletariat are una\'lare of it, but
derive from this self-alienation pm'ler and legitimation. 184 Because
his motive to accumulate surplus value (~\!hat ~'1arx cal1ed the "se lf-
valorisation" of capital) is fulfilled, the capitalist remains content
in his semblance of existenceo He shares the same "slavish relation
to capital as the workey\ although at the opposite pole." 185
The healing of manls alienation requires a radical. re-definition
of philosophy. Marx stated that~ "The philosophers have only in-
terpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change
it. 11 186 Phil osophy has to become pract i ca1. Kant and Hege 1 had
not gone far enough. Kant envisaged progress in a free society and
Fichte viel'Jed human history as rational development. Hege 1 with
his doctrine of dialectical progress gave both views comprehensive
form but hi s was sti 11 a system based on· the Idea.
to have stood Hegel's system, therefore, on its head. This he did
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by replacing Hegel's abstract principles with the dynamic economic
and social dimensions of history. To Kugelmann, Marx wrote,
"tv1v method of development is not Hegelian, since
" --
I am a materialist and Hegel is an idealist. Hegel's
dialectics is the basic form of all dialect"ics s but
only _~fte!:. it has been stripped of 'its mystica"1
form, and it is precisely this \I·lhich d"istinguishes
my method. 187
Pract ice does not deri ve from ideas but ideas are formed from the
understanding of material practice.
Therefore, philosophy, pol"itics and religion are secondary in that
they are interpretive lIo/hereas productive activity is fundamenta 1
and primary. 188 In the r~anifesto Marx maintained that the dominant
idea of each age are those of the ru 1i n9 class hence what was needed
was the freedom fiAom ideological theorizing. What was needed was
not criticism but the practical overthrov,' of the social relations
that gave ri se to thi s "idealistic humbug" 189 for revolution \~as
the driving force of history. All ideological forms, including philo-
sophy and relig"ion, must be abolished. He h1rote that "as long
as man is imprisoned within religion, he only knovo/s hOIl/ to objectify
his essence by making it alien. imaginery being." 190
narx has been criticised like Hegel \Alas for his view of history viz
that it was deterministic. Although there are elements in his thought
that do give this impression it should be remembered that, unlike
Hege 1, he attempts to gi ve much greater si gnifi cance to the act ion
of men in the mater; a1 change, of soci ety. Thi s he makes clear in
The Ho ly Fami ly ,
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History, does nothing; it does not possess immense
riches, it does' not fight battles. It ;s men, real,
living men, who do all this, who possess things
and fight battles. It is not 'history· v/hi ch
uses man as a means of achi evi n9 ~ as if it were
an individual person - its own end. History "is
nothi n9 but the acti vity of men in pursuit of the
ends. 191
In The German Ideology the same point is reiterated but \1Jith the
word of caution that men do not make history just as they please
but are influenced by the past. 192 Man is conditioned by his histori-
r.a 1 ci rcumstances even as he i nfl uences those ci rcumstances also.
Each generat ion recei ves from its predt"Cessor a range of product i ve
forces together with a historically created relation of individuals
to nature and to each other. 193
By this historical materialism, Marx believes, men can resolve their
alienation of self-consciousness and achieve freedom ie. freedom
from all tha.t is opposed to the resolution of the class struggle
in capitalistic society. He wrote.
The positive abol ition of private property and the
appropri at i on of human 1ife is therefore the POS"j Vi ve
abolition of all al"ienation~ thus the return of
man out of religious, familY9 state is his human
(ie. social) being ••• Religious alienation ••• occurs
only in man's interior consciousness, b"'t economic
alienation is that of real life and its abolition
therefore covers both aspects. 194
In the future communi st soci ety, the absence of pr"j vate property
is the indication of real human life. Individual freedom is dependent
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on one1s freednm in society. Hence society must be radically reorganised
so that man expl"esses what is really human as he reaches altJareness
t
of himself. "If man is shaped by his surroundings~ his surrounding
must be made human." 195
Since the problem of alienation is rooted in the exigencies of the
production process and the fruit of production~ the free soc-jety
is one that sha11 have had redef'j ned and transformed 1abour. Agai nst
Adam Smith who considered labour a neces"sary evil, ~1arx maintained
that, in the free society, labour ltJould be the self-realization of
the subject and thus the very basis of real freedom. Against Fourier,
who mai ntai ned that in the idea 1 soci ety work wall 1d be the equi va1ent
of play, Marx i st argued that II tru ly free 1abour di d not exc 1ude,
but fulfilled, labour especially since such free labow~, for example,
the composing of music demands the greatest effort. 1I 196
Free 1abour in the future free communi st soci ety \'4i 11 be the resu 1t
of the freedom of people to realize their full potential which, in
the present society, is stultified by the long hours of the production
line. All struggle with nature remains at the level of necessity
even in the communi st state. As long as 1abour is determi ned by
need and externa1 purposes, production remains at the level of necessi-
ty 0 197 Freedom on'iy begi ns when 1abour moves beyond the. 1eve 1 of
necessity It/hen o:"le is free to fashion things to "the laws of beauty." 198
In the future communist state, Marx envisaged that there would be
a shortening of the \,.,ork-ing day as a prerequisite to even the abolition
of labour. 199 Labour would be emancipated from its present unnatural
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use to accumulate surplus capi·tal and access wealth. 200 He wrote~
II\fJith labour emancipated~ every man becomes a '.'Jorking man, and produc-
t i ve 1abour ceases to be a class attri bute. 11 201 There wou 1d be
in the classless soC'iety, for the first time, the possibility of
lIassociation in which tfle free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all. 11 It WOll 1d be a soc; ety vJhose
u·international rule would be peace, because its natural ruler would
be everywhere the same - labour." 202
In this ~'JaY9 ~~arx constructed his view of society also -in terms of
the historical process b!.lt for h-im the sufficient and necessary condi-
tions lie in social existence itself. Communism, he claimed, is
not an IIIdeal to which reality ItJill have to adjust" but is "the
real movement that abolishes the present state of things." 203 Hegel's
dialectics is thus rooted in the reality of everyday socio-economic
1He.
~~arx appears to be very much aware that h"j s vi ews of the eventua 1
communist state could easily be construed as idealistic or utopian,
hence he objected to his vi eVJS bei ng app 1i e d wi"lly'" ni lly outs i de
Uestern Europe. In a reply to Mikhailovsky (1877) he objected to
his views being turned into "a historico-philosophic theory of
the general path every peop 1e is fated to treadll and poi nted out,
quite rightly, that historical understanding is confounded "by using
as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the
supreme virtue of ~\lhich consists in being supra-historical." 204
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Tlli s cautionary note that rIJarx here offered appears to have had 1Ht 1e
effect on many of his disciples and on the ideologues of socialism
who have reduced the historical process of social development to
an i ne 1uctab1e progress that r~arx was \'lary of. However, the seeds
for this mi sunderstandi n9 1i e scattered throughout r""arx I s writi ngs,
both i 11 hi s descri pti on of hi stori ca1 mater; a1i sm and of the future
communist society. For example, his vie\'J that in the future communist
society people will 1I0rganize production and exchange in such a
way as to make possible the normal satisfaction of all des'ires, that
is, a satisfaction limited only by the desires themselves.1! 205
Such a dream for the future, if 1eft at the 1eve1 of a theory about
the revision of society, no matter how practical-sounding it may
be, is utopi an. As the neo-Marx i sts were to poi nt out, what was
requi red here \fJas a radical transformati on of human consc;ousness.
That this consciousness~ as ~1arx pointed out, is socially determined
is on 1y ha1f the truth. Freedom cannot be based on theori es of soc; a1
behavior, although these do provide an interesting ~£9st understanding
of human development. If human consciousness was environmentally
determi ned then freedom is based on necessity, a po; nt that j'!arx
as we observed ~ was not averse to. However, such freedom ; s on ly
acari cature of freedom, not only becalJse freedom cannot be deri ved
but also freedom cannot be a posteri~, a consequence of mater'j a1
necessity. To nlustrate this point, the central role that the
proletariat ~'Jill play in shaping the future society is based on
the assumpt; on that the fact of the; r oppress i on makes them aVJare
of a change. Marx assumed that the workers~
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fired by a nev.;\ social task to be accomplished by
them for all society, to do aI/fay with all classes
and the class rule, were the men to break the instru-
ment of that class rule ~ the state" the centra l'j zed
and organised governmental power usurping to be
the master instead of the servant of saci ety. 206
Marx in postulating this role, which Helmut Gollwitzer discerned
as lithe messianic role" of the proletariat, 207 failed to recognise
that the pro1etari at are as much part of the system and that a great
number of the Itwrkers ei ther do not possess the It.Ji 11 to change it
or have a vested interest in the system. Several slaves, for examp 1e,
refused their manumisssion. The neo-Marxi sts IJ.Jere to show that the
fact of socio-econcmic deprivation viaS not necessarily the basis for
the self-avJareness of the proletariat and that the process of self-
consciousness was certainly more complex than Marx had supposed.
1 .5.1 NEO-r·1ARX ISM
The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School attempted to make
the Hege 1; an ~1arxi st tradit; on rel evant to contemporary sac; ety and
found best expression in tfle writings of Horkheimer. Adorno, Neumann,
Kirchheimer, LovJetha1, Marcuse and Habermas. The early critical theorists,
proved to be the most incisive critique of f·1arx and the historical
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dialectics was replaced by the djalectics of Enlightenment:
The changed ci rcumstances that gave ri se to thi s neVJ criti que i ne 1uded
their awareness of the "reification 11 of the ~vhole of modern society
that Lukacs and Korsch, in the 1920 1 s, had observed. The way the
forces of production had development has the opposite effect to that
which Marx had anticipated. Capitalism, instead of being merely
a .stage "in the development to communism, in practice had replenished
its strength and offered a new basi s for its 1egitimacy. 209 These
special circumstances were manifested especially in the USA where
a transition occurred from entrepreneurship to advanced capitalism.
The critical theorists were also disillusioned with the Hegelian
logic in history and Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas rejected the
view of logical progression. They observed that there existed a
sinister unfreedom in society which could not be depicted within
the categories of the class-struggle and economics but was the result
of the ideological hold of scientism and technologism on modern society.
r"iarcuse in tIle wen-known attack on Weber at the Heidelberg Congress
of 1964 p~inted out the very idea of technical reason is ideological
and that technology exercised a methodical and calculated control
of society. Finding support in Horkheimer IS critiaue of, capitalism.
Marcuse argued that the rat i ona1ity whi ch produces effi ci ency and
growth is itself irrational. Techno 1ogi ca1 domi nati on creates needs
which the very structure of the modern capitalistic society depended
on, and VJhi ch techno 109Y, cannot sat i sfy. In service to freedom
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of the individual, technologi~al domination stultifies freedom by
a new form of authoritarianism which in the name of objectivity even
creates the space for opposition but withi n the status quo. As Lezek
Ko 1akoltJsk i states, .. Sci encE'. by vi rtue of its own method and concepts
has projected and promoted a un; verse in \'lhi ch the domi nat i on of
nature has remained linked to the domination of man." 2"10
Hence in his .. Repress i ve To 1erancell • Marcuse attempts to unveil
the state of unfreedoiil in the so··called free societies \'Ihich boast
freedom of speech and thought. In the name of freedom of speech,
the banal and the terrifying cease to be aberrat -i ons and appear
as necessary elements in a covertly repressive system. In the name
of 11 object i V"j tyll all possibil Hies for a critical publk are
removed. 211 All that exists is a one-dimensionality in thought
and pract-ice that rules lIout of order" ideas, aspirations and objectives
that do not fi t. t\larcuse be 1i eyed that the general contentment that
the 'good life' gives accentuates one-dimensionality. 212
The Frankfurt School, in vi e\'J of the need to redefi ne soci ety and
to develop a sound hermeneutic to analyse society. integrated into
their aproach several approaches in order to reconstitute the relation-
ship between the individual and society, and nature. As David Held
poi nts out these "seeming ly di fferent approaches" include Hegel's
Universal Reason, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Nietzche, Freud,
Weber and Lukacs. Habermas incorporated even the linguistic analytical
tradition. 213
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Horkheimer believed society to .be diseased and in need of a radical
transformation. His position is lucidly stated in his essay "Critical
Theory and Traditional Theoryll (214) written ;n 1937. Traditional
theory, he points out~ is the logical appl-ication of "conditional
propositions ll to given situations with a cause and effect formula.
It corresponds to the approach of the scientists who have fai led
to see that traditional theory has become absolute and a-h'istorical
and therefore is unable to expose historical relativity and the social
funct i on of sc; ence. Therefore ~ tradit i ana1 theory cannot ai din
freeing society from scientific determinism and totalitarianism but,
on the contrary, rei nforces the st.atus~ qu?, by it's claims to object; vity.
etHical theory, on the other hand, is aimed at the radical reconstruc"
tion of bourgeoisie society. It aims to breaking the confines of
theoretical explanation ex P2st. It argues that if bourgeois
economy is the result of "blind" forces resulting from the activity
of man~ then that activity can be co-ordinated so that not only
the part but the rJhole can be consciously directed and freed. 215
Crit i ca 1 theory seeks to remove the tension that ex; sts between man
and society. By achieving a radical conversion of the subject to
critical thinker, objects \....uuld have a new status and the relation
between subject and object \iJi 11 change. On ly in such a way, he
maintained, "~vill there emerge in the future age the relation between
rational intention and its realization." 216
Thus Horkheimer \"Ias mindful that for the freedom of society, the
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freedom of the individual was d non - negotiable prerequisite. Although
the proletariat had an expedence of meaninglessness by their increased
~Iretchedness and exp~rience of the injustice of the ~~atus C£:!2, the
experience was not a guarantee of correct kno\lJledge. This awareness
of the meaningless does not become a social force because of the
differentiation of society imposed from above by those \lJho are in
II s1avish dependence on the status quo." 217
Critical theory in its concern for social justice neither can rest
in detachment from practice like the liberalist intelligentsia, 218
nor can it accept the separation of thought and action as the II sc ienti-
fie method ll assumes. 219 Such a dualism, which Decartes had isolated,
cannot accommodate a' theory v/hich becomes a genuine force and which
results in the "self-aif.Jareness of the subjects of a great h'istorical
revolution." 220 Even the theoretician's profession is deeply immersed
in the struggle in society of which his thinking is a part. 221
JUrgen Habermas' theory of communicative action \'JdS also such an
attempt to resolve the dualism between thought and action. He believed
that language as a means for commun-jcation possesses the ability
to underpin social action by serving mutual understanding and not
be me}~ely the medium of objective speculation. 222
act'ion is,
Communicative
that form of social interaction in wh-ich the plans
of action of different actors are co-ordinated through
the exchange of commun i cat"i ve acts i e. through the
use of 1anguage (or of correspondi ng extra-verba 1
ex pres s i on s) or i entated tovJard reaching understanding. 223
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In hi s ~now.ledge and Human Interests he attempts to dev'j se a transcen-
denta1 method that would re-estab1i sh the unity of reason in the
theoretical dimension which he believed would lead back to metaphysics
and into a 11 re-enchanted ll vJOr 1d. 2211,
Herbert ~1arcuse9 in his study of Hege1 9 pointed out that the tfo.ditional
idealist view of reason in society is content to merely provide the
concepts but does not actually gui de experi ence. Hence, idealism
}Aepresents an 11 attack upon the condit -j ons of human freedom. 11 225
He attempts to re-think alienation which has, in our time, adopted
a more insidious form than the economic-labour-production-based aliena-
tion of r~arx. In vJhat Marcuse calls the Illie against humanity,"
the propagators of the system present a case for the legitimacy
of Jhe system by pointing to the apparent compatibility betv.leen man's
desires and the ability of the system to satisfy them. For example 9
the elaborate apo 109i a for free enterpri se that the economi c experts
provide. Underlying this apparent compatibility is in fact the marriage
of dominant social realities and what Marcuse understood as sublimated
instincts (false essence). The goals of the society in reality are
incompatible with Eros, man's authentic existence. 226
There is here a major shift in rethi nk i ng man IS inner freedom \'!h i ch
falls outside the orbit of the Marxist paradigm. 227 The psychoanaly-
tical philosophy of Freud added a dimension that was absent in Marx.
Individual consciousness was now taken more seriously whereas in Marx
it was absorbed into social consciousness. 228
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John Fry highlights the influence that Freud had on Marcuse with the
regard to his understanding of freedom and necessity. 229 Prior
to Freud, ~1arcuse agreed with Marx that necessary 1abour VJOU 1d forevel~
remain unfree labour. Later in his Eras and Civilization he believed
. --~_---
that this was not necessarily so~ since science and technology can
help in lithe free play of human faculties ll by increasing leisure
time. 230 When men are free to fulfill the demands of IlLife instincts"
(Eros) and not their sublimated false essence~ people vdll be more
committed to their work. Labour vJill cease to be alienating not
because, as t~iltX thought, it wou 1d put t.he worl<er in control of hi s
own labour and production, but because it will fulfil 1 his true
essence. 231
This perspective of work influenced his vie1rJ of freedom. If the
goa I of soci ety is to real i ze Eros, then soci ety wi 11 on ly be free
vJhen individuals can live in harmony with the "unfolding demands
of Life Instincts." 232 This perspective requires a redefinition
of society and v~i i 1 influence the socio-economic structure of society,
but requires free individuals to begin the process of change. The
Hegelian notion that freedom wins freedom is translated into concrete
social terms, True freedom can only be achieved when the need for
free exi stenoo becomes the central need of those 1'.710 fight for it. 233
The revolution of society ~vill be led by an "Erotic elite" who
are totally conv-jnced about the need to achieve authentic existence
and who themselves have achieved a measure of instinctual freedom
that they can do no other.
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To begin the liberation of the individual, in his Repressive Tolerance,
Marcuse argued for the creati on of a "mental space for refusal." 234
Such a mental space ~\las i nd; spensab1e for inner freedom because of
the ability and the extent manipulation If.Jithin the system
especi ally in hi gh ly affl ucnt soci eti es 1i ke the USA where such a
lack of freedom is not understoodo 235 He presents a potent critique
of the manipulative power of the news media If/.tlich, he claims, pays
only lip service to freedom.
Authentic freedom can only be achieved if a revolutionary vanguard
of "nev;J people", those who have escaped the "massification of
the mind" 236 and the technological manipulation of the instincts,
will lead such a revolutojono Thus the unwarranted sentimentalization
of the pro 1etari at is overcome 0 The mere fact of poverty is shovm
to be inadequate to greater awareness of unfreedom. The cha 11 enge,
when vieltJed -in the context of affluence, is for individuals to break
\f/ith the manipulation of the system in spite of the comforts they
enjoy in it.
Hence, as ~;1arcuse points out in his One Dirrensional tJja~, a society will
be rationa
o
, and free to the extoent that it was organised, sustained
and reproduced by an essentially new historical subject who has attained
Eras. 237 He wrote 9
radical change in consciousness is the beginning,
the first step in changing social existence: emergence
of the Nev/ Subject. Hi stori ca 11y, it is agai n the
per; od of the en 1i ghtenrnent pr; or to materi a1
change. 238
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Neo-~1ar)(ism certainly presents. one of the liveliest and incisive
assessments of modern sod ety whi ch cannot be ignored 6 However~
its sol ut ions are not without prob 1ems. There is much truth in
Marcuseis view wh;ch~ with some help from Freud g perceived that only
changed individuals can change society. He describes It~hat the changed
or linewli individuals \'Jould be but does not adequately address himself
to hm'lf the change wi 11 come about? If hi s vi ew l'j ke Marx I s is funda-
menta1'ly materialistic~ what win be the impulse for this change?
Marcuse appears to have been not unaware of this problem also since
he thought that the fringe groups of soc'iety vvould be predisposed
to enlightenment of this kind. He quickly changed his mind and thought
that~ perhaps~ the Third \\lorld vwuld fulfill that role but changed
his mind again.
It is because~ in the end, the critical theorists are overly cautious
preferri ng to defend parti cu 1arity, autonomy and non-i dent Hy agai nst
a total itari an saci ety where free 'chi nld n9 is great ly endangered ~
that they have been accused of escapi n9 into 11 abstruseness and i so 1a-
tion. 1I 239
vJe shall return to evaluate further the implications of Marxism and
neo-~·1arxism9 together with neo-posit'ivism, after a consideration




1.6 EXISTENTIALISM: FREEDOM ,AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The ci rcumstances of the twent; eth century 1ed to a refocus i n9 on
lithe individual ll who had been lost' sight of in all the philosophical
quests of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. ~~ore than any other
philosophical approach, existentialism has highlighted the crisis
of human freedom~ an issue which lay at the heart of its criticism
of phil osophy at 1arge and of the present obsession with
progress and objectivity in part'icular. As S.E. Stumpf states,
Existentialism '.'Jas bound to happen. The individual
had over the centuri es been pushed into the background
by systems of thought, hi stoY"j ca1 eVf.'ilts and techno 10-
gi ca1 forms. Phil osophy for the most part. .. by-
passed the intimate concerns of man about his personal
dest-iny. 240
Existentialism defies neat compartmentalisation and clearly defined
membership. Its most significant members reject the title
"existentialism." Existentialism embodies an anti-naturalist and
an anti-idealist spirit since it rejected the deprecation of the
individual either into objects of his own making or into the wotld
of things, or to the essences of these things. Pascal was one of
the early forerunners of th-is approach. He had arguad that the intel-
lectual resolution of Descartes to the mind-body pi~oblem had not
grasped the existential dimension of man. Man \<Jas neither res cogita.n.s~
nor res ex~ensa but, what he termed, les raisons du coeur.
Partly because of the trauma of the tvJO world VJars, there _ emerged
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an unprecedented 1ack of confi oence in the idea of progress or in
reason to solve all of man's crises. The questions of the mea~51
of human life, individual decision and the problem of death became
fundamental issues on the agenda of the Existentialists. Dostoevsky
in his Notes froffi_Under]found reflects this changed. mood and points
out that "no good society can rid man of depravity." 241
Belief in an ineluctable progress of society, the inexorable law of ra-
tional development and the harmonious summation of history became
meaningless in the face of the irrational in human existence which
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers~ Sartre, Camus and Marcel among others,
no"" "discovered". Science and technology as reflections of the
geni us of man had promi sed a society free from confl i et but then
came the atom bomb, the exemp 1i f-i cat i on of the warped use of th at
genius. Existentialism may be characterised as the attempt to uncover
and to make sense of the irrationality endemic to nature, the world~
the individual and the society of men. 242
The philosophies of the Enlightenment, especialy Hegel's synthesis,
proved inadequate because they rationalised aVlay the irrational and
d'id not face it. Existentialism may be seen as the logical end of
the sequence in thought extending from Scheliing,Feuerbach, the younger
~"arx, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. (Kierkegaard had heard Schelling
in Berlin distinguish between Existentialism and essentialism).
Paul Tillich considers Existentialism a dispensation as wide-
reaching as the Enlightenment, Romanticism or Natural·ism. 243 f~alter
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Kaufman 211A and Seyppel 245 viewed Existentialism as a "timeless
sensibility," a "philosophy as old as mankind" which has been
reaffirmed in the exigencies of our ~ge. As D.E. Roberts states,
Existentialism calls man away from stifling abstrac-
tions and automatic conformity... It drives us
back to the most basic, inner problems: vJhat it
means to be self, hOi'J we ought to use our freedom,
how we can fi nd and keep courage to face death.
Even more important, it bids each individual to
think and\'Jrestle with these problems until he has
grown into personal authenticity. . • By clear; n9
away philosophical under-brush it brings us face
to face with the urgency of ultimate questions.246
Part of this clearing of the "philosophical underbrush" included
the attempt to go back to a pre-Kantian, pre~dealist and pre-empiricist
perspective. Hence Existentialists were sceptical of systems and
the application of so-called scientific modes of logic to understand
human affairs. Neither the cold consistency of science nor the attrac-
tive notion of harmonious determinism were ab"le to grasp the ambiguity
of existence. Hence 9 as Hector Hawton c011TEnted for the Existentia-
lists. the metaphysics of Hegel, for example. YJhen applied to society
result "in a slave state;
the best a human beehive.1! 247
at the vJOrst a brutal despotism. at
A brief sUi~vey of the main representatives \"Ii11 nOvJ be undertaken
in order to elucidate the Existialist idea of freedom.
1.6.1 KIERKEGAARD:
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FREEDOM ANO THE LEAP OF FAITH
--- -
S~ren Kierkegaard, (1813-1355) the Danish thinker, r ~latively anonymous
until our century, marks a vital turning point in Western thought.
Not only was he to highlight the crisis of the ex"istential subject
in his 'IJritings and h-js own lHe, but also he was to provide the
later ex"istentialists with many of their key ideas. The mark of
the truly great thinker, the one I'Jho makes a difference for having
lived and dared to be different, is surely the creative way he influen-
ces 1anguage and conjures cl i ches and thought forms that have a 1ast i ng
effect on all of man I s future di scourse.
th"inker.
Kierkegaard was one such
His innovative approach included an incisive critique of Hegel who
he bel"ieved had tried to comprehend all of reality in his system
but ended with on ly a grand abstracti on that had not grasped what
rea lly mattered - ex i stenee. He \'Jrote, "If Hege 1 had written the
whole of his Logic and then said ••• that it \!Jas merely an experiment
in thought then he eau 1d certain ly have been the greatest th i nker
who ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic." 248 Hegel left no
room for ind"ividual man except to see him, his decisions, culture
and history as a means to a greater end and not an end in it-
self. 249 In the face of empirical scepticism, Hegel had emphasised
. the importance of the uni verse but had in effect clouded man I s percep-
tion of reality which Kierkegaard believed could only be realized
2~ participation, decision and commitment. Hence his distinction
between the spectator who assesses in detachment and pseudo-objectivity,
and the actor ~ho subjectivPly understands in participation.
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In this connection, Kierkegaard.drew a distinction between the Rennai-
,sance Periclean man and existential man. The former was the good
citizen, reasonable in all respects,who enjoyed the world in temperance.
EX'istential man lived 'in the awaren€ss of the crisis of human existence
which reason could not grasp. The Enlightenment gave us several
examp 1es of Peri clean 1eve l-headedness.
Kierkegaard ~\le-re examples of the latter. 250
Nietzsche, Dostoevsky and
Kierkegaard wrote,
One may be great as a jogician and become immortal
through one IS accomp 1i shment and yet prostitute
oneself by supposing that the logical is the eX'isten~'
t'jal, and the principle of contradiction is removed ..•
in the realm of existence since it undeniably is
removed in the realm of logic. Existence is exactly
that separation which frustrates the mere logical
stream. 251
In a logical system the possibility of fl~eedom is limited to the
ability to choose right or wrong and this possibility is understood
to pass into reality whereas in reality thi s does not occur. An
i ntermedi ate determi nant is necessary and thi s for Ki erkegaard is
dread.
Thi s concept of dread \vas to great ly i nf 1uence Hei degger and Jaspers.
Alongside apparent bliss and repose, there exists "something different
which is not dissension or strife s for there is nothing to strive
v.Jith it. ~Jhat is it then? Nothing. But what effect does it produce?
Dread." 252 Dread is not fear or similar human emotions which are
di rected towards an object, Dread is inextricably connected with
the factness of man, his spiritual nature and freedom. He called
it "a womanish debility in which freedom Sv/Oons ... In dreacl there
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is the egoistic infinity of possibility which does not tempt like
a definite choice, but alarms and fascinates with its sweet
anxiety." 253 I\nimals do not experience dread since they functio'n
on the basis of necessity, are not qualified by Spirit and therefore
cannot ach i eve an aV,Jareness of freedom. In chi ldren~ dread emerges
as a thirst for the prodigious; the myster-jous. The fact that some
children lack the spirit of adventure 9 for Kierkegaard, is the exception
that proves the general truth ~ "the less spirit, the less
dread." 254 Dread "i s the rea 1ity of freedom as poss i bil ity anteri or
to possibility.1I 255
Dread accentuates and t.herefore makes possible (or impossible) the
possib -i 1ity • It is not determi ned by either necess ity or freedom
but is itself lI a trammeled freedom ll 256 \i.Jhich makes the "l can"
possible and therefore makes possibie t:he undeterm"jned leap and freedom.
Hence he spoke of the dizziness of freedom~
Dread is the d"izziness of freedom which occurs when
the spi rit wou 1d pos it the synthes is, and freedom
gazes down into its own possibility, grasping at
finiteness to sustain itself. In this dizziness
freedom succumbs... and when freedom ri ses aoai n.,
it sees that it is gui'lt:y. Between these two instants
lies the leap, which no science has explained or
can explain. 257
Thus freedom in dread makes faHh possible, a point that ¥/i11 be
elaborated in Part 11. Here, however, it suffices to show how freedom
is already, for Kierkegaard, made part of the existential self-a\'lare-
ness. Hence he insisted that "SUbjectivity is truth" and that
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the cro~Jd is the lie~ and delivered his polemic against institutiona-
lized Christianity. The crowd represented the absorption of the
individual and the annihilation of personal responsibility. The
institution exemplified bourgeois convention where the ind"ividualls
commitment to God is trivialized.
It is because man feels a sense of insecur"ity and finitude (both
recurring themes in later existentialists), he attempts to resolve
his insecurity on his o\lm only to increase guilt~ despair and anxiety.
Manls alienation from God is the ground for this existential vicious
circle VJhich only the leap of faith can break thro1lgh. Man is free
to choose God or not" yet that freedom is realized only in passionate
decision. The decision to choose God can be only with such total
passion that it can ultimately be the only option open; so great
"is the choice of faith. It could be argued that one can choose "in freedom
someone or something other than God with equal passion. Kierkegaard
would disagree on the grounds that man's entire nature~ his authentic
existence and the only way out of the vicious circle of existence,
is dependent on his relation with God.
The existing ind"ividual is one who, unlike "the Idiot," does not
conform to society's standard which Kierkegaard, in his day, was
highly critical of. He called his age an age of mediocrity and com-
plained that it was "an age without passion!" 258 Life \'Jas not to
be contemplated but must be lived. The leap of faith cannot be logic-
ally deduced or rationally derived. Existence is fundamentally irra-
tional and offers no safeguards or objective certainty. Such safeguards
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would trivialize faith and h~man choice;
* * * * *
decision and commitment.
The ph~nomenological approach oi Edmund ~~~se.r~ also was to influence
the emergence of modern Existentialism. Husserl aimed to construct
a presuppositionless philosophy (philosophia prima) which would
radicalize Descartes· demand that all philosophy be grounded in
abso 1ute 1y certai n ins i ght. Such a ground must be sought in phenomena
but~ unlike the empiricists and the methodology of the natural sciences,
such an analysis of the phenomena. can only take place by an analysis
of consciousness. He used the view of his teacher~ Brentano~ that
consciousness is an activity constituted in relations betv"leen the
act-jve subject and the object he is conscious of. Consciousr,c:ss is
always a consciousness of something since every act is characterized
by intent-jonality. 259
Husserl spoke of the Lebenswelt, the life vJorld of existing persons
which Kant had made the unknowable noumena. Freedom lies in thi s
experienced ~~benswelt not in noumena. Science, while it can objective-
ly descri be the Lebensv1e 1t, it cannot reveal it because it is 1i ved
by me, is relative to me and finds its true meaning in my consciousness
of it. Phenomenology is an attempt to avoid this ~!be~welt becoming
unknowable noumena and by analysing consciousness hoped to analyse
the everyday world of existence.
Phenomena were~ therefore~ not mere objects but disclosures of Being-
in-itself and the basis of understanding being is man himself vlho





(1i ke the novelist
and art) in revealing life from within: to exp lore the mode of con-
sciousness, to intens"ify it, and to bring it to self-expression." 261
For the phenomenological existentialists the subjective human bebenswelt
ItJas accessible only by the phenomenological method and since, they
argue, this life-vwrld embodies true freedom, any other method
(especially the natural sciences) would force freedom into an objective
frame which liwuld destroy freedom. Freedom is in the way of existing
and is neither an object nor Cl process but is expressed in the whole
of human existence.
Husserl was to influence a whole trend of thought via h-is famous
pupil, Heidegger, who although later differed with h"jm still pursued
the task of discovering Being.
Heidegger in his "t4hat is r~etaphysics?lI argued that human existence
cannot have a relation \'rith being unless it remains in the midst
of "nothingness." This doctrine of nothingness had tvJO implications:
either that life was fundamentally meaningless as atheistic existentia-
lists like Sartre and CJ.mus believed; or that Being may be discerned
in ex·istence either through Ilermeneutics or faith or, as we often
see in the musings of the later Heidegger, a mystical religiousness
,a lthough he was vJOnt to avoi d such an impress ion. Kar 1 Jaspers,
holtlever, Itlas more v~illing to uncover the religious implications of
this second alternative.
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1.6.2. MARTIN HEIDEGGER: FREEDOM AS OPENNESS TO BEING
---....------ '" -
Heidegger, following the cue of the phenomenologists, seeks to rescue
I
man from being defined as the objects in the \'lOrld are defined.
r~an was there (Dasein) not as an object but as "a field" of being.
He -is in the world and, therefore, must be open to and for the \'iorld
in the act of Vorstellen ie. in placing oneself before Being. This
openness, which Heidegger called Qff~!'lstand!~it lies at the heart
of the individual's relation with the world.
In Being and Time, 262 Heidegger attempted an ontology based on man's
"being there" (Dasein) rather than, as traditional metaphysics
had done~ on cosmology. ['''an "stands out" (ex - sists) and does
not merely ex; st; never absorbed by thi ngs yet bei ng noth; ng apart
from them. Alongside ex-sisting is the ongoing danger of falling
away (Verfall) and being submerged into things. The inexplicable
dread that Kierkegaard had perceived, Heidegger called the An~_~
which, as in Kierkegaard, has the potential for freedom since it
is in the face of ~gst that man ITay choose Being and authentic existence.
Heidegger does not define Being but maintains that in existing the
awareness of Being is manifest in his anxiety of thrO\'Jness. Angst
discloses Being. Roberts states that for man,
Anx"iety both destroys and constructs like a flame
around t.he portal of freedom: if driven away from
the flame he falls deeper into self-estrangement
because he is unab 1e to pass through the door of
freedom into the realization of his true self.
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But if he can face anxiety, it I,IJi11 drive him to\lJard
the door. Once he crosses the thresho 1d he is cut
off from commonplace kind of existence where the
pattern of hi s 1He was determ"j ned by the everyday
world. 263
Thus the challenge of exi stence is to heed the call of Be; ng to 1i ve
authentically.
This walking in accord ItJith Being is exemplified in the life that
is lived in the acceptance of one's own death. It is "in the face
of the possibility of dying that the dread of nothingness -is most
clearly manifested and the clearer the ai'/areness of Augst, the clearer
the disclosure of Being, the more pointed the call to authentic
existence.
In ~~ng and Tim!.., Heidegger emphasises that the horizon that makes
it possible to understandoing Being as Being ;s time. The relevance
of t ;me is commensurate with the awareness of human fi nitude and,
therefore, is the basis of human freedom ie. when one lives authen-
tically, time is experienced as freedom to meet one's own death.
Thus, like Scheler, Heoidegger was faithful to the phenomenological
insight that freedom is not empirical but isself-oevident insight
into the structure of experi ence 0 Beoj n9 and Time for Hei degger were
the pi 11 ars of that structure. He therefore di st i ngui shed between
the "objectively measured" and the "existentially experienced"
time. The latter V'Jas qualitat"ively characterised by Sorge (the
restlessness of care) and the running ahead of the existential subject
towards his own death. 264 This distinction is not unlike the Biblical
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distinction between Xp0'lOS and I-t- ....,pos
time.
objective and fulfilled
Hei degger, in spi te of hi s attempts to go beyond the confi nes of
Ki erkegaard I s thought, on the cruc; a1 issue of human freedom adopts
a similar position. The 11 stand i ng - open
ll (Offenst~ndigkeit) of
the individual as an inner condition for truth (i nnere Ermog1i chung
der Rich-tigkeH) is based on freedom; "Das ItJesen der irJahrheit 1st
di e Frei heit (The essence of truth is freedom)." 265 Freedom is not
mere ly freedom of cho; ce or the freedom of the \t"i 11 as ; n tradit i ana 1
philosophy, but is the ground of existence and of truth. Freedom
is lithe commitment to the disclosure of Being" 266 rooted in existence
(Ex-;stence). It is the ejection (die Aussetzung) into the disclosure
of Being (in die Entborgenheit des Seienden).
Decision and commitment frees man to use both his past and his culture,
not any longer in a determi ni st; c ItJay, but as an ori entat i on to the
future and to the fulfilment of possibilities. Freedom makes it
!
possible for man to ex-pose (aus-Setzen) himself and to stand out
of (ex-s;stere) himself in the act of participat"ion. However, instead
of viewing freedom as a possession of man, Heidegger held that the
self-transcending structure of Dasein possesses man so that he may
freely have a relation with- Being which is unique to his own history.
Being by holding before man the possibility of authentic existence
also provides the possibility for man to be re-housed;
true home and true self. This is true because •
to have a
••• man in his freedom can turn toward either inauthenti-
city Ol~ authenticity; either sink into the man-
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world correlation i e. existence at the 1eve1 of
everyday concerns or nihilate it by responding to
the mysterious call coming from beyond so as to
be his 'true self'. 267
The history of man is the history of the unveiling and the concealing
of Being. ItJhen one is alienated from Be~~ one is lost in a world
of ~~ings. Hhilefor Husserl~ consciousness of freedom ootains in
the rational, intentional act 9 for Heidegger it is the a\f~areness
of the thro\'mness and the grapp 1i n9 with thi s forei 9n world. and
with the possibility of lapsing into inauthentic existence and the
annihilation of freedom.
1.6.3 KARL JASPERS: FREEDOM AND THE AWARENESS OF THE TRANSCENDENT
Jaspers agreed with Heideggerlsunderstanding of the existential
cri s; s of man but mai ntai ned that He-j degger IS Sei n und Zeit in the
end represented the wrong way to philosophize. In spite of his claim
that existence is irrational, Heidegger still attempts to offer
know 1edge of a tota1 concept i on of Bei ng •. 268 Jaspers denounces
any attempt to gain esoteric knowledge. His Existenz philosop~
can on ly be commenced v/hen the 1imits of sci ence have been understood:
phi losophy only begins ItJere
else is "sub-philosophy." 269
"reason has suffered shipwr;ck;" all
The goal of philosophy is ~~~rhellung, the illumination of
exi stence. Rea 1ity cannot be measured by subjects or objects but
in a relation. If one or other aspect of reality (matter or mind,
Itvorld or the self) is the basis of any generalisation (or prediction)
then the Ittho 1e is exp 1ai ned by a part. Th is was the pr'ob 1ern vJith
"border-
not by abandon"ing such
to its limits .•• What
space of freedom: the
that from which true
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Idealism wherein reality is m~de up of subjects~ or VJith naturalism
which understands reality as comprising objects. 270
In his work on Ni~tzsch~. Jaspers states,
All true philosophysing ••• loosens from the fetters
of deterministic thinking,
thinking but by pushing it
seemed an abyss becomes the
seeming Nothing turns into
Being speaks to us. 271
Authentic self is revealed to us in what Jaspers called
situations~" for example moments of dread, guilt and awareness of
death; experiences that impinge on our cGnsciousness \vhich, as it
were, are moments of awakening.
Therefore, ex -j stence is the creat i ve source of expet"; ence \tJh'ich is
neither purely subjective or purely objective. 272 It is a\vareness
of creative experience that makes any static, objective structure
of understanding inappropriate. Existential truth is not static
knowledge of an object but is directed to~ or rather directs~ the
individual's self-avvareness of his fate in the world.
a possession for then decision 'tmuld be superfluous.
points out in his y!.rnunft. und~, is an appeal. 273
Truth is not
Rea1ity, he
It is in grasping his finitude that man becomes aware of its opposite,
viz. Being as Transcendence for
in Existence." 274 He wrote,
lITranscendence manifests itself
Philosophy "is the thinking by 't,hich I become avJare
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of Bei ng i tse'1f through inner act ion; or rather
it is the thinking which prepares the ascent to
Transcendence, remembers it, and in an exa lted.
moment accomp 1i shes the ascent itse1f as a thi nki I1g
act of the whole being. 275
We do not know what Transcendence is but \fJe become aw(''''e of it in
grappling with our existence.
Jaspers also moves beyond Heidegger at this point. Intrinsic to
.his understanding of reality he includes Il ex istential faith
ll (Glaube)
and argues that faith is the necessary basis for all mf:,~ningful exis-
tence. t4here Heidegger held truth to be grounded in dyrai'1ic freedom.
Jaspers grounded truth in dynamic faith.
truth but are toward truth. 276 He stated.
Both do not communicate
Man lives in his \'JOrld as an ex"istent. I\s thinking
consciousness generally he is searchingly oriented
tOltJard· objects D I\s spi ri t he shapes the idea of
a whole in his world experience. As possib"le Ex·istenz
he is related to Transcendence through which he
knmvs himself as given to himself in his freedom. 277
However. Jaspers emphasized, as Kierkegaard had done, that this aV1are-
ness of Transcendence. which theology calls God is a purely personal
experi ence whi ch cannot be deduced or proved D Philosophy cannot.
like theology. look for Transcendence in the guarantee ()f revelation
but must "approach being in the self-disclosures of the Encompassing
that are present in man as man .•• and through the historicity of the
language of Transcendence D" 278 The truth of the "Encompassing"
un 1i ke object i ve truth obtai ns in the real communi cat i on of man
vJi th man: in the fellowship of human self-disclosures. That human
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ex i stence is condit -j oned by Transcendence wi 11 be eV'j dent in thi s
Encompassing wherein emerges the awareness of the . imperfection
of man, the -incompleteness of the \\forld, the impossibility of a
permanently valid world Jrder and universal failure. Jaspers maintains
that Ilfai1ure ll (Scheitern) is our destiny" yet the "unconditio-
nal decision to obey leads man to his ovm Being." 279
It is in these "border-situations" and this condition of I!Scheitern ll
that one is aware of the Transcendent and therefore, of one's freedom.
Freedom is the basis through which one becomes open for actual
being. 280 Similar to Heidegger's position, one is free, says Jaspers,
to deny or affirm the relation to Trgnscendence. To affirm the relation
will lead to authentic existence. In the end, in the place of
Kierkegaard's Christian faith, Jaspers argues for a kind of philosophi-
cal faith which also has no guarantees but is a union 'l'11th the depth
of life. 281 This point he had argued in his inaugral lecture at
Base1, where he maintained that the philosophical quest which cannot
be authenticated by speculation? can be fulfilled by means of faith.
In hi s Van der Wahrheit also, he mai ntai ned that Freedom of Exi stence
is only as identity \'lith the origin (Ursprung) of Being, viz Trans-
cendence lion which thinking gets stranded." 282 ~1an is free but
his freedom h given to him through Transcendence.· 11 The more I am
conscious of my freedom,1I Jaspers wrote, lithe more I am conscious
of my Transcendence, through which I am. I am Existence only when
I knov.1 Transcendence, which is the power (die t~acht) through v-Jhich
I am myseH." 283
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Jaspers' resemblance to Heidegger's formulation is obvious inspite
of his rejection of the latter's attempt to secure knowledge of a
total conception of man's being, and aversion to log-ic and science.
Jaspers, perhaps because of his O\'m training as a psychologist,
created greater 1eeway for the sci ences. He poi nted out that,
must be freedom for all sci ences, so that there may be freedom from
scientific superstition ie. from false absolutes and pseudo-know-
ledge.1! 284 For Heidegger, freedom exists in openness to Being wh"ich
is the equivalent to saying openness to one's 0\'Jt1 existence and con-
sciousness. For Jasperc;, Being is manifested in Existence and in
Transcendence and freedom obtains in the existent"ial openness to
Transcendence. Jaspers' idea of freedom is therefore invariably
more dynami c. As Nicholai Berdyaev stated, in regard to Heidegger's
view, "Being "I s, as it were, freedom arrested and congealed." 285
1.6.4 JEAN - PAUL SARTRE: THE ABSURDITY OF FREEDOM
Sartre, like Heidegger, perceived that at the heart of existence
1ay Nothi ngness and that fi nitude was integra 1 to the human mi nd.
Yet Heidegger's vision of "Being-itself,'; Sartre maintained. is
unattainable. 286 Sartre disagreed that there isa "Being-itself ll
that transcends the rel'itionship between ind"ividual consciousness
and the world. The difference Roberts states is that,
\tJhere Hei degger speaks of encounter with I mystery'
in the language of philosophical asceticism, Sartre
speaks of encounter vd th the sheer gi veness of a
th i ng in the 1angua£e of repu 1si on and nausea. 287
-101-
Using the Hegelian notions of l'in-itself" (en-soi) and "for-itself"
(pour-soi ), Sartre argues that man is in the permanent 1y frustrating
quest to synthesize both. Because pour~l (man as he is a\lJare of
himself) is different from e~ (for instance, as a table exists
in itself), there is always the possibility that human beings deceive
themselves in their attempt to be something (as en-soi). Behind
everything a man thinks he is or appears to be, is conscious choice
and decision. Nothing. naturally exists in human existence for every-
thing is the result of choice.
of v/hat we have thought.
Hence a11 that we are is the resu 1t
This f~ct is illustrated in Sartre1s
"Portrait of the Ant"i -Semite" where he argues that a man is not
born an anti-Semite but is one because he wants to be somethi ng and
this second role that he projects, after a while~ becomes his oVJn.
He cannot concei ve it as a .!:~~ any 1anger. In the case of the
ant i-Semi te. the person chose that out of fear of change and the
lack of openness. 288
Sartre vis-a-vis Heidegger and Jaspers, the academic philosophers,
has a certain earthiness of style; refusing the exegetical and etymo-
logical profundity of the other two and preferring to express his
thought in novels. As Kaufman graphically states it,
It was Nietzsche who came first to write of faith
and self-deception ... and Jaspers and Heidegger
deeJt with simi1ar tO~jics, ~\lriting like professors,
expounding despair and death and the attempt to
kno\'J oneself in terms of quaint big words and one-
tV·Jo-·three, and even Roman three, Arab; c tvJO, sma 11 b.
Sartre in his cafE~ (the market place), alas, sees
the 'tJai ter 'playing at being a waiter.' 289
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The implication of Sartrels v;'ew is that only an atheistic position is
tenable and that man ;s ultimately responsible for h·imself. The
synthesis between ~soi and po~-so"~ is ideal and only God can attain
it; but since there is no God and man is the bei n9 who wants to
be God~ man is a useless passion. 290 As Orestes in J:b!.f.l.1es. states,
"There is no God, and man is alone in an empty world." He must,
therefore take responsibility for himself. Any alibi, whether histoti-
ca 1, cu 1tura1~ psycho 1og"j ca l' or envi ronmenta 1~ wi 11 not do. To shift
the responsibility for one's existence to anyone or anything else
is to live in mauvaise foi (bad faith) or self-deception.
for Sartre, is inauthentic existence.
This~
He, therefore, rejects Freudi an psychoo-ana lysi s. and behavi ori sti c
theories of psychology which function on the premise that man is
determined. Orestes, Sartre's hero. refuses to blame his crime of
murder on childhood experiences. liMy crime is my own", he exclaims.
Any attempt to explain man's state of existence in terms of predestina"
'.
tion of whatever kind is an abrogation of responsibility and the
greatest threat to freedom ;s bad faith. 291
Because man ;s ~.:~.:.£~, he is "condemned to be free."
and Nothingness he argued that man's thrownness into th. world~ which
Heidegger had perceived, is the basis for man's freedom. It is an
absurd freedom because as soon as one is consci ous of it, one becomes
also aware that one is entirely alone, that one is responsible for
one I s pass; ons and that there ; s no outs i de he 1p or mora 1 gui de to
present the ought.
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Freedom, in the end, is a lack b"ecause it is this freedom that deprives
man of a resting place in en- soi which he only attains in death
when he becomes a thing. ~1an falls into existence and must create
his own values. Human life simply happens and lI absurditi'
only r~tegory that covers both~ and pour-s~i·
is the
Each individual, as we repeatedly see in Sartre1s novels, is a particu-
lar irruption of freedom in the world. All his heroes are lonely
people; for example, Orestes in The Fli~, Antoine Roquentin in Nausea
and Charles Baudelaire in a novel by that name. Freedom exists in
the act of perpetual decision-making' even if those decisio~s are
made in bad faith. Hence even those living inauthentically are free.
As Sartre stated, . "To say that the pour-soi has to be what it is
and to say that in it existence precedes and conditions essence •.•
all this is to say one and the same thing: to be av/are that man
is free. 1I 292 Sartre uses the view of Husserl that consciousness
is always consciousness of something and maintained that only in
such e~ (commi tment to the ever changi ng 1ife situation) can he
make his concrete decisions which manifest h-is freedom. \~hile in
the face of Dasein, Heidegger advocated "willing" authentic existence;
for ')artre, in the face of indeterminate freedom, only in ~~tin~
is there any real i ty 0 295 r'1an I s freedom obtai ns in the concrete
decisions made in the ever-changing situations.
In a lucid passage from his Republic of Silence, Satre reflecting
on the French Resistance (1940-1945), explains the experience of
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freedom in even situations of great danger:
t~e ItJere never more free than duri ng the occupation 0
We had lost 0.11 our rights, beginning with the
right to talk •• o and because of this we \lJere free •••
Because we were hunted down, everyone of our gestures
had the wei ght of sO'lemn commitment. •• 0 • The cho"ice
that each of us made of his 'Iife was an authentic
choice because it was made face to face vvith death •••
I am not speak i ng of the e1i te ••• but of all Frenchmen
who at every hour of the ni ght or day throughout
four years~ answered No! 294
This moving statement pronounces a great existential truth, that
only as one confronts the heart of existence, the danger of. death
and Nothingness where one is called to radical choice which affects
one IS 1He (and death), does one tru ly grasp the mean i ng of freedom
and can live authentically. However, why this radical nature of
choice means the removal of God and the abolition of faith, Sartre
has not shown. As Roberts stated, if the main reason for bel-ieving
in God is one's reluctance to face the fact that human life is threatened
by insecurity and meaninglessness, then Sartre is right but it "does
seem a pHy that he is not fami1 i ar with forms of faith stronger
than those he mentions." 295
As we have mentiolled already, for Sartre, freedom rea1izes itself
in action. Antoine Roquentin in Nausea demands "vJe must live forwards,
not back\'iards, " a view which Albert Camus also emphasised in his
Sartre grounds this action on the Kantian maxim "Act as though thou
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canst \'~ill to be 1a~'i universal." One must choose in the spirit of
choos i n9 for all men. Sartre's ethics functions on the premise that
if man acted in expression of his genuine humanity, honesty will
become hi s very bei n9 not mere ly an idea, 296 He wi 11 not act any
longer in bad faith.
However, because all affirm their freedom in this way, there is the
constant threat that my decision can be governed by society. Hence,
Sartre IS ideal man and the hero of freedom refuses to repent for
his action for if he did he v.Jould accept society's picture of himself
and would loose h-js freedom. Hence King Aegus in The Flies excla-ims,
"1 am trapped in my net, I have come to see myself as they see me."
This constant threat that society presents to my freedom, Sartre
summed up in another of his well-known cliches, "Hell is the other."
It is for this reason that Sartre, inspite of being attracted by
several aspects of Marxism, criticised ~1arxism as a \'1hole and did
not join the Communist Party. In dialectical materialism individual
freedom becomes an illusion since it is socially, behavioristically
and historically determined. Harx·s concept of history as containing
the conditions for its development \''iithin itself \I/as diametrica"lly
opposed to Sartre's view that consciousness makes history in decision
and commitment. 297 Hi story, for Sartre. is the hi story of human
decisions and if he joined the Communist party he \I/ould have contra-
di cted everythi nghe had said about freedom in Bei n9 and Nothi ngness 0
As lIi ll-i am Barrett statec ~
Sartre based his revolutionary activity upon free
choice, the ivlarxist upon an objective historical
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process. The. former recognizing the inalienable
subjectivity of man~ the 1attter reducing man to
an object in a process. 298
R k . h" 1 1ecture on Sartre' s v'i ews of freedomA.G. 00 S9 1n 1S 1naugra
and values makes the following criticism of Sartria~ ethical theory~
By an unusua"i use of language (he) links in a manner
\'Jhich strikes us as being very odd~ his teaching
on Responsibility to his concept of Freedom. Freedom
means responsibility ego I am respons'ible for being
a Jew, blind~ negro~ a proletarian etc. because
I have decided to live viith it~ and therefore
should have done something ego change or modify
it ... in the last resort, commit suicide. 299
Rooks has highlighted here a central difficulty in Sartre1s. attempt
to offer a viable ethic on the basis of his view of freedom. In
spite of the very useful insights he offers~ his approach is ultimately
1eft shi pwrecked in so 1i tude that has the potential to depri ve man
of all moral compulsion.
Sartre's view of freedom is also ambiguous. At times one gets the
impression that freedom is endemic to being human and at other times
freedom appears to exist only in incessant decision-making. This
inconsistency has opened Sartre's view to crit-icism. For example,
Lukacs held that Sartre's concept of freecom is in the end II no t
a necessary and essential characterist of human nature but rather
the contemporary indecision of the rootless bourgeois intellectual." 300
To teach that the blind or the proletariat must take responsibility
for thei r condi t ion is more comp 1ex for the peop 1e themse 1ves than
Sartre \-'Iishes to concede. Hovlever, to rule out all of existentialist
thought~ as Hawton does, as
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"a middle class revolt against the spectre.
of the a.ssembly line" 301 is a gross overstatement.
The Existentialists have rightly observed that at the heart of [J1odern
man's crisis is the problem of the freedom of the inidividual, which
politics and philosophy, claiming to be in service to, have failed
to come to terms with. It is true that their emphasis that "subjecti-·
vity is truth, tl as Kierkegaard had stated, and that their scepticism
about attaining any "objecti ve truth ll about Being or Nothingness
appears to have entrenched the subject - object scheme.
is apparent only from within the epistemological schene
But that
that has
domi nated the hi stmny of vJestern phi 1osophy. On the contn.ry, the
existentialists attempt to integrate both dimensions in the existential
encounter of the v/ho 1e person wi th truth, They attempt to go beyond
the mi nd-body prob 1em and to place the understandi n9 of truth not
in cognition, as if the mi nd can stand apart from the 'object'
or from the rest of the 'subject', Truth is in the encounteri ng
of the object, a proce_ss of understandi ng that ca 11 s one to radi ca1
commitment,
The dynamic nature of the existentialist approach to understanding.
therefore, is much more satisfying than the epistemolog-;cal or logical
entrenchment of subject - object whi ch ignored indi Vl duo. 1 freedom:
for exa~ple, the views of freedom in empiricism. idealism and Postivism.
It is not enough to expose the Cartesian myth, as the analysts have
done, and then stand back in self-satisfaction as if the solutioh
to the Cartesian problem will be self-evident.
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In view of these general - remMks, Alisdair fvlaclntyre's critique of
Ex-istentialism remains problematic. He claimed that the democratic
ideal cannot be made to - follow from the existentialist premises.
302 Th-is vieltJ fails to see that unless each person in a society
is truly free to deci de for themselves ~ take respons i bi 1i ty and wi 11
the good of the who 1e, democracy itse1f is in danger 0 As the neo-
Marxists shmved, societies \'Jho believe they are democratic, because
of the absence of individual freedom, pay only lip-service to freedom.
t'iJaclntyre al~o highlights a common criticism levelled at the E>dsten-
ti a1i sts ~4Jhen he stated that Hei degger by secu 1arili ng Ki erkegaard
frees himself from the ptoblems of Kierkegaard's theology but not
from the problems inherent in both HusseY'l and Kierkegaard, one of
these being "the solitariness of Heidegger's human being." 303
He argues that human existence is social since we learn about ourselves
from the mirror-image offered by other' people. This, of course,
was not what the Existentialists \;,Jished to deny but, at a much deeper"
1eve1, \'Ji shed to hi gh 1i ght the need for i ndi vi dua1s to take respons i-
bility for their l-ives and only in this way \I/ould they be able to
take responsibility for others. Along this line Existentialists
1i ke Buber. ~laritai n, Shestov» Berdyaev and Marce1 have steered the
initial quest That man is a sac; a1 be; ng is not the poi nt of
contention. What the Existentialists wished to clarify~ and none
more so that Kierkegaard himself, was the importance of the ind-ividual
to make his~i~~~ for it is the free individual who can free society.
Cummings, for example, has argued that our language"centred age
has overlooked the Existentialists' preoccupation
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with modus 10quendi where the. problem of alienation lies and has
argued that Existentialism is a "communicative individualism." 304
t/1ac 1ntyre I s comment that whereas Hume \'I1anted to connect re 1i gi on
with one particular frame of mind, Kierkegaard wanted to show pervasive-
ness of thi s frame of mi nd is also unfounded. 305 On the contrary I
it was because of the coo1 detachment of Hume who re1egated freedom,
like Kant also did,to moral action, that the Existentialists reacted
to Idealism. vJhen Kierkegaard (and Heidegger later) argued that
freedom and possib"j lity necessari ly involve dread and that dread
is a necessary feature of existence, he was only attempting to elucidate
the importance of personal decision: a point that ""ill be elaborated
in Part 11 when Kierkegaard's concept- of faith is discussed.
However, i1aclntyre, quite rightly, points out that Heidegger (and
"le may add, Jaspers) "·Ihile sceptical of systems themselves do not
hesitate to let their construction of an ontology Of philosophy of
ex is tence grow out of a11 pro port ion. He writes g " In Hei degger
vv'e are no longer faced Ivith choice as the key to tr'uth; He are faced
\vith asystematic and argued ontology ••. in which choice has its
place." 306
It is also ironical that Heidegger 't/ha wrote on "the end of phi losophy
and task of Thi nk i ng" 307 and at the end of hi s "Letter on Humani srn"
called for"rigour of meditation, carefulness in saying, frugality
vlith I'lOrds" 308 can also as J s 1 d'i d ., a pers Cl so 10 ~ procee to Vin te
so volur.JinoLlsly. It is for this reason that tJilliam 3arrett stated,
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"After Hei degger we feel the ne~d for a new Kierkegaard to pump back
living blood into the ontological skeleton of Heideggerian
daseino" 309
* * * * *
This survey and appraisal of the notions of freedom since the Enlighten-
ment and especially in the three main contemporary forms of philosophy
prepares the ground to clarify now the thes is that freedom is the
ongoing quest for authentic existenceo This thesis propounded by
GoAo Rauche will be evaluated in the light of his cr-itique of the
three mai n contemporary phi losophka1 approaches that have already
been discussed.
Rauche's reaction to the neo-posit-ivist, r~ar-x-ist and existentialist
approaches is based on their rejection of philosophy? and more speci-
fically? their abolition of metaphysics. In a semi na 1 vlOrk The
Abdication ~.:..Ph·ilosophy (1974) he argued that the abdication of
philosophy is equivalent to the abdication of man. In four other
works, The Phi.losop!]' of Actya]2!r (1963)? ~2ntemporac'y Philosophical
Alternatives and the Crisis of Truth (197~-) The Choice (1973) and
I~eory an~ Practice i.~_~iloso~~~\rgument (1985) and several
articles? he has elucidated this theme clarifying the relation between
philosophy as critical theory and man as a free individual.
The benefit of ana iys i z i ng I"(auche' s critique of the three contemporary
forms of philosophy and his defense of philosophy as an
critical study is three-fold:
ongoing
1. It leads to the thesis that freedor:l obtains in the on'Joing critical
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quest for authentic existence. The details of this vievl will be
the main preoccupation of the next pages;
2. This thesis, in turn, presents in an analogical way the "structure
of the quest for freedom \'Ihi ch theology cannot ignore si nce it also
makes a truth- cla'im in the market place where the three contemporary
phi 1osophi es are found. In Part II it Vii 11 be argued that fai th
as eX'istentia1 encounter not only fulfils the !'structure" of the
quest for freedom but also forms an important basis for the quest
for authentic existence;
3. It lays the foundation for our claim in Part III that the abdication
of theology leads to the abdication of faith and, in view of our
argument in Part 11, to the abdication of man also.
1.7 THE ABDICATION OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE ABDICATION OF ~~AN'S FREEDO~l:
-.- • - "'" ''''ROW _
G.A. R~UCHE~~_ CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Positivism and neo-Positivism; Marxism and neo-Marxist; and Ex'isten-
tialism, whose notions of freedom have been evaluated above, in one
way or another reacted to Idealism, and more particularly, to Hege-
lianism. All share another quality also: they attempt to jetti son
phi~osophy, and more especially, metaphysics, or they attem)ted its
redefinition beyond all recognition. This scepticism tmv.rd philosophy
as a theoretical and critical discipline, Rauche maintains t endangers
the very freedom these approaches wish to affirm.
1.7.1. POSITIVIS:1 Mm NEO-POSITIVIS~,1: THE DM!GEr~ OF FUNCTIONALISt"
Neo-Positivism attempts. as we observed, to discard all teleolooical
::J
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and metaphysical features and. by a via nega~iva attempts to free
man from meaningless speculation. Logical Positivism held to the
vie\tJ that only scientific propositions ie. those which are verifiable,
yield meaning. Linguistic analysis tries to expose the fruitlessness
of philosophical speculation and holds to the vievi that truth obtains
in what can be stated in language, and that philosophy can add nothing
further.
Rauche argues that such an approach is paradoxical since the attempt,
say of \4it.tgenstein in the Tracta.tus, to subject man to a therapeutic
treatment whereby he may be cured of his patho·logical desire to a~k
metaphysical que~tions is successful only at manls expense. Any
attempt to rid man of "the wi 11 to truth" ends in the abolition
of individual consciousness and hence of the individua·' as free man
with the right to question his prejudices, his history and his world,
and to think critically about his world. The linguistic analysts,
by their attempt to eliminate all conflict, also dispose of individual
consciousness. "f\-lan's individual consciousness ••• has been levelled
It/ith language (or, rather, the functionalistic aspects of
language) ••• " 310
Linguistic "lnalysis is deeply concerned with correctness of statement'=',
of truth and is rooted in the descr-iptive level of understanding
not vJith understanding itself. It embodies a \....orld-view that a pri0!2
determi nes what can be stated and what constitutes the basi s for
meaning. That \'ihich does not conform to the pre-requisites of that
world-view is eliminated as meaningless.
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Rauche reacts to this approach in a two-fold way:
Firstly, that the inherent vvorld-v'iew is itself restricting since
"it inadvertently places its faith in the methods of natural science
to solve the riddles of man and the universe. 311 The epistemological
presupposition is that kno\ftJledge cons'ists in recording the pif:cemeal
functional relations between natural events established by mathematical
equirt"ions. 312 Th; s "piece-meal atomi stic approach ll of contemporary
physics has been applied to human language by logical positivism:
for example RussellIS functionalistic "neutral monism." The problem
for the logical Positivists is that the scientists themselves have
come to understand that thei r methods are inadequate to resolve the
riddles of the world.
The "scientHic method" is functionalist"ic and It/holly inappropriate
to the humanities, since ~'iithin it al'l phi losophical questions about
truth, reality, lHe. value, self~ existence and such like, have
to be ruled out as speculative and "unscientific" or have to be
reduced to functionalistic terms. "Scientific" lapses into
"sc ientism" and constitutes a religion of its own with its own belief-
system.
Secondly, Rauche point~ out that language is richer than the l·ingu'istic
analysts I'lill have it. \'/hile it may be functional it has a metaphysical
dimension as well. As the studies of Chomsky, Katz and Fodor, for
example, have shown, language has an active and fOfming dimension
as \-Ilell. 313 Hence, the analyst's option, because it ·is restricted
by its own functional theory of language and by the presuppositions
-114-
of its underlying v,JOrld-vievv, cannot grasp the full import of language.
Rauche finds the hermeneutical approach of Gabriel Marcel and Otto
Bollnow, and the integrated logic of Hans Lipps, B. Liebrucks and
Leo Gabriel more fulfilling.
To be fair to the linguistic analysts, it should be pointed out that
some like vJittgenstein and Wisdom had seen the restrictive nature
of their approach; for example, the former's viei'! of his approach
bei ng mere ly the 1adder whi ch shou 1d be put away after the ascent
had been made and also his Oi'Jn shift of emphasis in the 'p~"ilos?.E_~!.cal"
Investigations. Wisdom also, in leadiYlg back to a religious option
in his .Q2.9~ acknovJledged that the metaphysical cannot be wished away.
In his Philosophy and Psychology, he maintained that linguistic
analys"is had shown the futility of philosophical speculation but
itself was the symptom of man's al"ienation with himself and therefore
argued. for the use of psychoana lysi s, That alternati ve admits new
problems which shall not be discussed here.
Rauche r"j ght ly argues aged nst the straitjacket of the neo-pas it i vi st
methodology. By the absolutizatian of the scientifH:: approach, man
"is changed from engineer of this approach into its slave." 314
Its abdication of phi losophy 'in favo! Y' of an atomistic analytical
functionalism has increased rather than decreased man's alienation
from rea 1ity. Hector Hawton, himself very crit; ca 1 of existentialist
phi losophy, admits that "by reducing so many interesting questions
to "nonsense," extreme Positivism has created a neVJ phobia, "the
dread of allY sort of rational speculation." 315
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1.7.2. f',1ARXISH P,~lD NEO-t;lARXISrvl: THE DANGER OF OPERfnIONALISr~
It was noted ear 1i er that for t~arx, phi 10sophy is trans 1ated into
the analysis of man's productive or creative act ,of labour in order
to transform society into a free, classless one. Phi losophy attempted
to understand the world while the need is to change it. Philosophy,
argues Rauche, is thus reduced to a form of operat i ona 1i sm s; nce
act i on and the red i rect i on of human sac i ety is seen as the mean s
to transform soci ety. For r\1arx, freedom is manifested in the harmony
beb.leen man and society establ'ished throu.gh man's productive
action. 316
The Marxist perspective quite rightly perceives the material alienation
of man ; n con,temporary soci ety and vJ; ses to human; ze that soci ety
since, as we noted, they maintained that society determines the develop-
ment of peop 1e to fu 11 potent"i al. However, ~1arx had assumed thCit
the pro 1etari at \.'Jere free by the fact of thei r oppress i on and that
they, unl"ike the rest of society, were in step with historical reality
and, therefore, represented the forces of freedom. The neo-l'<larxists
soon discerned that the proletar"jat were incapable of leading the
struggle since they were captive to the system also. As such the
neo<-Harxists provi de a most important cri U que of 11ar'x.
However, all brands of Marxism, the nea-Marxists 'included, share
the vie\ll that philosophy has to abd"icate as theory divorced from
practice and has to merge in practice. Phi losophy becomes the analyti-
cal science of laying bare the dialectics of economic la~'lsthat covern
societ.'j and to shall! hmJ the proclllctive or other socially t'ased forces
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could transform society. 317
Three basic criticisms of this approach can be gleaned from Rauche1s
writings: Firstly~ the idea of a dialectic at work "in human society,
Marx claimed that he had stood Hegel l s system on "its head by rooting
the h 'j stori ca1 dialectics in the deve 1opment of soci ety through man IS
productive act \'Jhile Hegel's dialectics was left stranded in the realm
of ideas. This inversion~ as Rauche points out~ neither makes the
vie\\I less controversial nor achieves r~arxls aim to rid human thought
of metaphysical speculation since the idea of a world J090S in \<lhatever
form fViarx clothes it. is a philosophical construction and remains
highly controversial. 318 The controversiality of the view is evident
in the numerous conflicting interpretations of Marx and in the intermin-
able debates on hall; to apply r~arxist prin<::iples to practice. As
such s this perspective of truth is as controversial as any other.
By reduci n9 phi losophy to man IS creati ve act s the dialectical process
invariably constitutes an objective histor"ical law or historical
reason which fulfills itself. 319 Marx and the neo-Marxists s therefore~
also share the faith of the Enlightenment in the achievement of freedom
and authentic existence throught the act of self-creation. The
difference being that this act of self-cre?tion depends on the use
of science and technology as its ancillaries which help "to civilize
nature in such a way that "it is brought into harmony with man I s natura 1
reason so that r.lan is set free from ~'Iant, suffering and oppression." 320
Secondly, i)oth the confidence in this materialistic dialectics and
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the ultimate goal of society in spite of j\'larx ' s refusal to write
"recipes for the cook-shops of the future" 321 -j s thorough ly utopi an
in its application. The individual, says Rauche~ is I1 s~va 11 mved
up by both historical reason as well as the utopian society." 322
Such a doctrine cannot stand dissension and independent thinking
an( hence remai ns authoritari an. This intolerance is illustrated
in Lenin's condemnation of the revisionists Edward Bernstein and
Rudolf Hilferding as traitors. 323 The r,jarxist attempt to impose
on all men~ one unified view, especially since it is not above contro-
versy~ is directed at the individual and militates against human
freedom. All absolutism and totalitarianism go the same "Jay. Its
ethic -is at best utilitarian and at worst despotic.
concludes,
Hence :~auche
Thi s aim, ~,e venture to say, wi 11 never be reached
as long as V1e are thinking men". it is humanity's
curse and bane that ever ne\lJ attempts at 1eve 11 i ng
man and making him conform to one vision of truth
are made. 324
Perhaps it is saying too much that it VJill fail because it II-is directed
against nan's basically individualist- nature" since it is not se If-
evident that individualism is endemic to being human. In anothel~
\';01~ld-vi2i'" viith a history of communalism, like traditional African
society vJhich had no concept of private property, such soci21ist
tY!'2 governments may well take root more easily. Neverthe 1ess, Rauche
is correct in pointing out that even in a socialist society, the
need for individual fr-eedom is still imperative. \.}e must agree,
for creativity in the arts, for example, vihile conceivably may be
ilJidespl~ead in a society, is not "mass produced" but remains an indi'li-
dua 1 express ion $ So lOO, viould individual freedom -in th;~ context
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of a socialist society.
Thirdly~ there is the Marxist and neo-t"larxist view that the state
of alienation \'rill n0t be healed by theorising about alienation as
Hegel had done but by praxis; where theory and practice are no longer
contradictions. The belief is that when this happens man will be
free from conflict and oppression. 325
In his latest book~ Rauche begins by addressing this very problem.
He v"arns about the danger of converting theory to funct -j ana1i st i c
practice and argues for phi lasophical theory as a project of "full
human practice." 326
i-ihen theory and practice emerge 9 vlhat then? Do men stop thinking'(
In the face of the treat of totalitarian functionalism and totalitarian
ideo 109i srn represented by both sci enti sm and Marxi sm~ the very freedom
of the thinking individual is in danger. He argues 9 as ....Ie sha 11
elucidate later 9 that human thinking and the resultant conflicts
of opinion and practice. are the "very motor of human activity and
of history." 327 Human progress is not deterministic but is dependent
on the interplay be.tween theory and practice not on their union which
is on ly a utopi an dream.
social theory.
Individual man is ignored in the face of
Such is the theoretical heritage of the neo-Marxists. Although they
isolated several inadequacies in f1larxist theory, they are still
committed to social theory. r'~uch can be said in their favour esp.ecially
their incisive understanding of the social crisis of man even anid
aff 1uence and the trappi ngs of economi c success. They provi de one
of the best critique of so-called free, democratic societies.
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Nevertheless, the doctrine of\ a historical ~ and the utopian
wish to reconcile theory and practice is still there. ~1arcuse I s
egalitarian concept of man points to the disappearance of man as
independent individual and as critical and dissenting thinker. 328
Rauche points out that,
The identification of his own interest with that
of the other man in terms of a utopi an and imagi nery
goa 1, vi z that of abso 1ute equa 1ity, tends to make
man just as one - dimensional 8.S the functionalistic
man of neo-Positivism. 329
Any form of utopianism in providing people with an eschatological
point to fix their minds, may ItJell rouse them from complacency and
into action. However, negatively, especially among the socially
disinherHed, it becomes action for actions sake where no plan of
action or critical insight is evident. As Rauche states, "Feeling
themselves the torch-bearers of historical reason in the darkness
of techno'logical exploitation, oppression and repression, they believe
the ends justify the means." 330 \JJhen Adorno, for example, realized
the implication of his approach and maintained an element of self-
restraint in his teaching~ his pup'ils accused him of having betrayed
the struggle for freedom against the repressive status,~.
The neo-~1arxists, to i:heir credit~ view man as an individual who
should be free of any kind of repression rather than a collect"ive
bei ng ~ as i n ~larx ism, subject to the i nexorab 1e 1aws of hi story.
HO\,lever, because they have not repudiated utopianism~ in spite of





THE DANGER OF EMPTY ACTIONALISM..
Like the neo-Positivists, the Existentialists avoid abstraction from
the f-inite (das Seiende) to the Absolute (das Sein) as traditional
philosophy and metaphysics had done. 332 They start from the facticity
of man! 5 bei ng there and seek to understand man by an ana lY5 is of
his moods.
Man can only achieve authentic existence through an act of self-creation
in the face of Being (Heidegger), Transcendence (Jaspers) or Nothingness.
(Sartre). This act of self-creation makes philosophy redundant and,
Rauche points out, can only be possible at the risk of bracketing
the world, as the neo-Positivists had bracketed human consciousness.
He cites the criticism of Existentialism by r~arcuse and Fritz Joachim
von Rintelefl ~'1ho had argued that the act of self-creation is "an
empty gesture bare of any content and meaning." 333
1n the attempt to abo 1i sh metaphy s i cs and to re-th ink Being, Hei degger,
for example. still leaves several questions unansv.Jered: \'Jhat is
(
Being? Is not such an act of absolute transcendence· from finite
being a constitutive act? Heidegger maintained that "The truth
of Being lays concealedo" 334 Rauche concludes that,
•• ~ this act ;s even L.nptier than are the constitutive
acts of metaphysics and sC"ience~ since it is not
only surrounded by emptiness, but 9 in addition,
is bare of any concrete content... Heidegger's
act of se lf -creat"i on is an act di vorced from the
material world. 335
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Sartre attempted to obviate any metaphysical impl"ications a concept
of' Being may have by affit~ming his well-kno\rm diction: "Existence
rrecedes essence." 335 Hlidegger however g pointed out that Sartre
has taken ex'istentia and essentia according to their metaphysical
which from Platols time has said that essentia precedes
exi stent'i a. He poi nts out that although Sartre reverses the statement
"a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. \,}ith
it he remains with metaphysics in the oblivion of the truth of
Bei n9. 11 336
Hei degger g however. uses "metaphysics" to mean something quite
different to its traditional use. He writes g
Human existence can relate to beings if it holds
itself out into the nothing. Going beyond beings
occurs in the essence of Dasei n. But thi s goi n9
beyond is metaphys"ics itself. This implies that
metaphysics belongs to the nature of man! It
is neither a division of academic philosophy nor
a field of arbitrary notions. ~letaphys'ics;s the
basic occurrence of Dasein. 337
The paradox that occurs even here in Hei degger I s case i s ~ as Rauche
points out repeatedly. that "the abdication of ph"ilosophy always
occurs in a systematic or methodological way and in philosophical
categories." 338 Furthermore, while the ExisT.:ntialists extol human
freedom, the ontological structure of their views ultimately make
man not a possessor of freedom. as they everywhere claim. but one
who is disposed of by Being (Heidegger) or Nothingness (Saftre).
I\lso, the abstruse etyrwlogical v/ay that Heidegger constructs his
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ideas has led to criticism. Ha\.<Jton, for example, points out that
Hei degger and Sartre appear to play word-games when they say that
consciousness "is what it is not and is not what it is" or \'Jhen
Hei degger states, "0nly ·in the clear night of dreadls Nothingness
is \lJhat-is as such revealed in all its original overtnes's: that
it lis' and is not Nothing," then invent i ng a verb li to noth i ng, "
Heidegger declares that "the Nothing nothings." 339
Both, Rauche thinks, commit the error of treating Nothing as a
name. 340 Also, by making freedom inevitable the danger exists that
it can be eas i ly emptied of its contents. Th is prob 1em is conlpounded
v1hen the non-theistic Existentialists speak of choosing at ali cost
the se1f alone or Bei ng of v,;hi ch 'tIe cannot know or 1eap into Transcen-
dence. The danger is that one may exalt one 1 s 1i berty above all
else and above others.
Thi s danger of empty act; ana1ism, therefore, most clear ly mani fests
itself in Existentialist ethics. Heidegger reports· how soon
after Bei..ng and Time vias published, a young friend asked him !'vhen
he was to write an ethics. His reply was ~
\<1here the essence of man is thought so essent i ally
ie. solely from the question concerning the tru\-h
of Being, but still without elevating man '".0 the
center of bei ngs, a 1ongi ng necessari ly awakens
for a peremptory di reet i ve. (Hm~ever) If the name
'ethics', in keeping 'tiith the basic meaning of
the word ethos (abode), shou 1d now say that eth i cs
ponders the abode of fTlan, then that thinking i'!hich
thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element
of man, as 0 ne \'1 hOle' k- s i s t s, i sin itself the 0 rig i na1
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ethics. However, the thinking is not ethics in
t
the first instance, because it is ongoing. 341
Rauche points out that in rooting truth (and ethics) in the indetermin-
able IIthrowness~lI the act of choosing or the act of existing itself
becomes an empty action because the very foundation that underlies
it becomes vacuous. Hence, the existential"ists, Heidegger and Sartre
in particular, turn man into an empty act"ionalist"jc gesture. 342
Sartrels conception of freedom which "turns freedom into a principle
by which man is forced to be free, represents the greatest unfreedom
in terms of which any of manls actionis justified." 343
Albert Camus attempted to prevent the absolutization of the act of
self-transcendence by his conception of humanitarian rebellion as
the manifestation of moderation and freedom. "1 rebel therefore
ItJe are" is his dictum for expressing how the affirmation of individual
freedom must at the same time wish the freedom of the other. Hov.;ever,
here the act of rebelling~ says Rauche, is universalised and
absolutised. 344
t,'iarce1 and Bo 11 nov-I were also mi ndfu 1 of the act i ana l"j srn that -, nheres
in the existentialist vielfl of man. They criticised the heroic defiance
approach of Heidegqel"s man and the solitary actionalfsm of Sartre
and attempted to mOI.~ beyond their positions.
1 .8. FREEDm"1 MiD TH5_...QNGOH1.G~ .FOR AUTHENTIC EX ISTENCE
A study of the three main contemporary phi losophical forms indicate
inter alia that the attempt to jettison iiletaphysics leads to the
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reduction of man to either a. functional? operational or actional
relation. ~~an is either absorbed into a collective being (f'llarxism)
or is the function of his own language (neo-Positivism) or of Being
(Heidegger)? Transcendence (Jaspers) or Noth-jngness (Sartre). Hence
the "abdication of philosophy as a crit-ical, reflective theory leads
to the abdication of man as a critical, reflective individual, one
that is free to di ssent and say No to the system. 1I 345
Rauche's view of philosophy isa dynam~c one because the dimension
of er it i ca1 enqu i ry is free and ongoi ng. He expounds in severa1
parts of his writings what he calls "the permanent crisis of human
truth." Philosophy's quest for the truth wherein all man's questions
vwuld be ans\'Jered and thereby all conflicts and contradictions would
be removed ie the state of permanent authent-ic exi stence, demands
that philosophy remain the incessant striving for truth. The human
quest for truth must necessari ly be controversi a1 because it always
remains a hum~ quest, All philosophical postulates that arise from
this quest, as we repeatedly observed in our survey~ stand in controver-
sial relation to one another. Each postulate or theoretical construc-
tion is at best only a "truth perspective" since it is born in
a particular historical context and embodies the quest for truth
in a particular ~z::~~pben.
Because anyone manifestation of human kno\'lledge of truth is only
a perspec.! i ve on truth ~ the perpetual stri vi ng for truth can mean
on ly a perpetua 1 cri si s of truth. ~!hen such stri vi n9 ass i fi es or
\\'hen the perpetuity of critical interaction betl'leen perspectives
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(philosophica1 9 theologica1 9 'sociologica1 9 scientific and others)
ends 9 then free thought petrifies and phi losophy lapses into ideology
(cf. Part I II ) • The ;)ropensity for such lapsing we have already
highlighted in the main philosophical forms of our tiine. The task
facing us nOlfJ is the elucidation of this understanding of philosophy
as dynamic theoretical reflection. This shall be done under the
fo 11 owi n9 headhtgs: Phil osophy as Freedom from 0!1e I s truth 9 phi losophy
as a human quest,
existence.
and philosophy as ongoing quest for authentic
108.1 PH ILOSOPHY AS FREEDor~ FR01i ONE I S m·JN TRllTH
Rauche contends that if the pursuit of truth never takes place in
isolation and is a thoroughly historical activity then it will al'lJay
be controversial since it takes place between man and his fel1mlJ.
As a reflective being he forms and reforms his views in dialogue
~lJith the other differing radically at t-imes yet changing his vievJs
as his perspective widens. It is imperative that philosophy as critical
theory remai ns the basi s '."herei n di ssent and growth are regi stered
or else all is lost in an ideological prison wherein man simply believes
his own truth at the exclusion of everything else. 346 vlithin such
a prison, individual freedom is sacrificed on the altar of blind
prejudice. .,
A most insidious form of the dogmatism and absolutization of method
is the science dogma of our time. In his "Emancipation from Science
Dogma," 347 Rauche points out that the method of the natural sc;.::;nces
-126-
has been absolutized to such 0.11 extent in our age that it has rendered
knov~ledge (and the university) 348 functional and has created thereby
the climate for the current technologismo This absolutization is
contradictory to the nature of science itself viz "the methodolcgical
systematization of man's world experoience under changing conditions
of life." Hence "science" cannot merely refer to the natural sciences
but to other themes as we 110 It is in the very state of man I Si contingent
experience v~hich is the realm of human freedom from whence also arise
man's science and morality. 349
The systematic aspects of the history of phi losophY9 Rauche argued.
elsewhere~ confirms this non-negotiable dimension of philusophy as
the reference to the other. In the various "models" of phi loso:Jhy
it is evident that since the moral act is practical and obtains in
the controvers i a1 re 1at i on between myself and the other in a11 wo. 1ks
of life~ 'it follows that there is no gap between ethics and science.
Both are governed by a self-critical spirit that must generate modera-
tion of their claims. Thi s "re 1at i on to the other" has permeated
all the logical, epistemological, metaphysical and moral alternatoives
in the hi stray of phi losophy: the .l09~.~~~~!> relation refers to the
truth of the other as a necessary supp lement to our own Truth; the
eEi~!.e!J12..22it!~~l re 1at ion in compari son wi th the quest s of the other
understands the emp.2~cal limits of its own;
relation points to the ""orld-view or cultural system of the other
as bei ng unequa 1 but equi va 1ent to our own;
---~~
and the moral relation
refers :11e to the other man in self-restraint and humility,
liberating me from self-indulgence. 350
thus
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Rauche may be misunderstood here a: assumi ng that man is essentially
rational and critical and that in mutual interaction solves his con-
flicts. Hegel, as we have already pointed out, believed that contradic-
tions and negations were natural for men but that they were necessary
for the ongoing historical movement of spirit. Rauche appears to
be saying something shnilar when he stated in his ~~osophy of3~~~,~­
ty that "the essential nature of man is not rationality but contra-
dictoriness," and that the fact of disagreement must not be rationaliz-
edin ani de a1i stic 0 r di alectica1 way but i sitself 11 the 9enera tor
of history. 351
thei r fellows and
1 "mutual prob ems.
He mai ntains that in phi losophy men are referred to
"in this beneficial atmosphere, discuss their
It should be emphasized that, unlike Hegel, Rauche did not conceive
this philosophy of actuality as proceeding in a deterministic way.
His views are free of any idealistic framework and does mt ins'ist
on necessary syntheses or harmony but emphasizes a critical humanism
that is based on mutual respect. His view does not postulate anything
resembling a utopian model but preserves adequate room for man to
change radically his mind and his society •. The fact that he emphasizes
the need for ongoing theoretical reflection ~oes not absolutize reason,
because both science and morality are grounded in contingent experience.
~lhether everyone can theoretically and critically reflect is also
not the poi nt at issue. l'lhat is important is that the door for se 1f-
criticism be always left open lest one's truth be one's prison and
one loses one's freedom wi thout know; n9 -j t. The phi loso[!her should
be the conscience of his society, holding up alternate iJerspective
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as the prophet did in the conte~t of Old Testament society.
As Rauche states, philosophy as the science of actuality is ~
...the guard; an of man's freedom, in the sense that
it frees him from the chai ns and fetters of h'j s
Olfln '~ruth, his mm self and enables him to make
a break-through to the truth and the person of hi s
fe 11 owman. 352
It is therefore commensurate with the nature of man that any vi ew
of truth be aware of its cant rovers i a1ity and the i ncurab 1e tens ion
in the ongoing quest for truth. Man's freedom lies in the understanding
of the fact of hi s permanent cri si s of truth 353 so that "i nstead
of reaching for the stars, s.Jffering the torture and pain of Tautalus,
because the stars remain unattainable to him, he should accept his
truth visions as mere alternatives for coping with the problems of
a specific situation of life." 354·
The other, therefore, is one1s constant stumbl"ing block, not in the
Sartrian sense of the other determin"ing one1s hell, but in the sense
that the other constantly calls into question one's Olfin philosophical
calculations. It is "only by mutual-self restraint and self-restric-
tion to the field of the actual cris~s_, and by accepting
common crisis, can man and his fellowman really meet in
of hurni 1i ty ." 355
it as thei r
the spirit
This perspective transforms philosophy from a closed system into
an open quest. Ethics and theories of knm'iledge are not made the
derivation of logical propositions only but is placed in the dynamic
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stream of human encounter and fellowship. Dogmatism, polarization
and self-righteousness 356 which appear in insidious forms in contem-
porary society and philosophies are ruled out because the other becomes
indispensable to truth.
1.8.2 PHILOSOPHY IS A HUMAN QUES2
What has just been stated highlights the fact that philosophy alv~ays
remai ns a fi ni te task not on ly because it 'j s conducted by men but
also because it is immersed in the crisis of human ex·istence. That
phi losophy is a human quest is the sign of both its true merit and
its limitation. As a human quest it remains a bastion against the
constant attacks by abso 1ut ism and total i tar-i ani srn on human freedom.
It is because of this~~ anthropological dimension of philosophy
that Rauche is at pa-ins to clarify alongside the nature of freedom,
the nature of man. 357 He descri bes man as characteri zed by fi nitude,
historicality, fallibility and contingency. 358 Hence all philosophical
constructions will necessar'ily remain controversial because they
are truth perspectives; formulated \'/ithin a historical milieu and
therefore bear the marks of its age; are prone to inadequacy and
even error and must bear the possibility of change, growth and develop-
ment.
Any human system ~"hich does not tolerate dissent or which is utopian
is contradictory to the nature of man and is not only absolutist
but a1so a Ganser to human freedom. In such theori es ::-Ian is eas i ly
stricken by nybris (cf ?an Ill) !,here he in the conceiving of theories,
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whetller idealist ur materialist, h~ illusions of grandeur. ~1an ceases
to be man in Marxism, for example, but is 0t:'o£~.:E~h. The individual
is!rlargedwiththe collective being. Hegel's view of the state, Kallt's
vie\'J of absolute obedience to authorities, the functionalistic smugness
of the analysts and the existentialist propensity in some of its
thinkers to make man the measure of all things (as the En 1i ghtenment
had made Reason) - these open the possibi 1ities for the nature of
man to be distorted.
Rauche stated that, "There is no reason to be 1i eve that man wi 11
suddenly cease to be finite, limited, historical and controversial.
If we did we viould be either dead or God." 359
1.8.3. PHILOSOPHY AS AN ONGOING QUEST
It is the dynamic nature of the philosophical .quest that forces it
to remain in dynamic tension wHh various perspectives of truth.
Hence man IS eX'i stent i a1 security (Geborgenheit) has to be won agai n
and again. 360 Hence Rauche called this aspect the dimension of
"actuality." Only in the incessant constructing and reconstructing
of a theory of truth does man become a\'iare that none of hi s creati ons
and constructions are of permanent duration and. as Bollnow had stated,
man is always on the move. 361
The influence that Griesebach1s (1880-1945) thought had on Rauche
is evi dent here. 362 Gri esebach had descri bed the character of human
truth-perspectives as representing many cycles of the human self
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Vlhich clashed wah one another. He had implored his contEmpOraY'-jes
to desist from the mania of shaping the world and man according to
their self-conceived truths. The cr'isis of human truth is the true
dimension of reality and the experience of being contradicted by
the other is the experience of transcendence vvhich would make man
abandon his attempt at self-transcendence and prepare him for beal~in9
the other's contradiction in silent. passion. Griesebach had also
perceived the other as one's eternal stumbling b,lock. For him reality
obtained in the event of being annuled by the other, when self
had been limited by assertive self and when historical time (the
past) has been transformed by real time i e. the actual experi ence
of b0aring the contradiction. Therefore, instead of living in the
oneness of the sec 1us i on of one's Oltm concei ved truth, man now 1i ved
in "tvlOness" ie. in immediate communication and communion with
the other. 363
Rauche appreciates Griesebach's attempt "to save us from our mega-
lomania and our continual self-tran~cendence and self-glorification
and thus to save us from mutual self-destruction resulting from the
total clash of hvo antagonistic cycles of selL" 364 Hmvever, he
disagtees with Griesebach's ultimate view of reality outside of human
cons~iousness since nothing could be experienced without self-realiza-
tion and \tJithout which there would be no dialogue vYith the other.
8y trying to remove all theory in favour of a purely practical
"silently suffering" ethical existence, he has moved beyond actuality
of contradictions. If, says Rauche,I can bear the contradiction
of the other it ceases to be a contradiction. 365
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It ; s ; n the~ crit; ca1 quest that authentic ex; stence and
freedom is manifested. Authentic existence, Rauche describes as
an existence in conformity vdth one1s actual experience of the cr'isis
f tr th 366 I t ,.s ex i st~nce of man as not Gros9l1E'nscho u. or the man
in ~~·.~s or man as slave to one or other system. In· other v.JOrds,
autilentic existence is man existing as fully man and freedom is the
medium or his modus vivendi whereby he ensures his full humanity
and "it obtains in his constant striving to be fully human le. to
live authentically. Ue shall elaborate later on this most important
poi nto
Inauthent i c existence, Rauche defines as an existence where one
is the pri soner of one I s own truth wherei none is di vorced from hi s
fellowman by a ~'Iall of misunderstanding, prejudice and even hatred.
It is an existence in hubris, self-glorification, self-love, self-
righteousness, dogmatism and intolerance. 367
In order, then, to secure human freedom, the modus vivendi of authentic
existence, philosophy rilust remain free, critical theory. In this
regard. Rauche makes a ca 11 for a return back to metaphys i cs. 368
The three contemporary philosophical approaches, whether they are
a~vare of it or not. are transcendenta 1 theori es of the \"!or 1d; t.hey
are comprehensiorls of the world by mind. Although they cl aim to
be anti-metaphysical, they themselves have a :netaphysical dimension
in that they have a "built-in-vlOrld formula as a key to reali-
ty.": 369 transcendental consciousness (phenomenology), lin'juistic
function (analytical philosophy), Flan'S act of self-realization in
the ~vorld (E;.;ist':ntictlism) and n;an":; act of self-emancipation~~hrough
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changing the world (r'1arxism) •• "Back to metaphysics," for Rauche,
means a transformation of attitudes that \"Ii 11 be different from tradi-
tional metaphysics as well as contemporary functionalism, actionalism,
and operationalism. 370 The ne~\I metaphys'ics will be founded on man's
natura1, contingent experi ence whereby all human theory is permanent ly
called into question and will be conducted not in the spirit of hubris
but in humility. Back to metaphysics is in fact a call back to reality
in contingent experience which is the realm of human freedom. By
his contingent experience man is already free and by ongoing self
criticism, the aim of philosophy, he win not throw a\lJay his natural
freedom for total self-transcendence. 371 f;lan, however, ahJays wi 11 s
this self-transcendence because, as Rau::he points out, he has the.
natural inclination to overcome actuality (die
~'li rk 1i chkeit das Geschehen) and to reach... abso 1ute
truth ••• because of hi s constant attempt to transcend
himself ..• he lands in the impasse of alienation
and self-estrangement. He creates - the various
'lds' of science, morality, metaphysics, the Godhead
etc and if all thi s breaks down, or is shattered
by actuality, he even commun-icates with himself
as is revealed by existentialist philosophy. By
so doing he becomes the architect of noth-ing. 372
He, therefore, argues in his latest vlOrk for a "me taphi losophy"
as the philosophy of the future IA/hich will be based on the real ground
of contingent experience and \lJi 11 ~e the \'Iay out of the impasse between
the totalitarian functiona'lism of the ~'Iest and the totalitarian
ideologism of the East. 373 As a ~~losophia perennis 374 it will
prevent philosophy becoming a closed system which violates man's
contingent experience of reality. He writes,
It is the task of the new D~etaphi]osf)phy ~o guide
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humanity out of (the) bottleneck ••• and avoid
artificial levelling of man1s thinking vlith
that of his fellowman~ which t~esults in the uncritical
mass - ... hinking of an unfree mass-man .•• (It It"ill
be) an advocate and a guardian of manls authentic
existence and freedom. 375
I n The Cho; ce ~ Rauche cone 1udes that man is to choose between .eith.er
the offer of Utopia and absolute self-transcendence or rea 1i ty grounded
in man IS actual experi ence of the cr"i si s of truth. Only by choos i ng
/
the latter \'Iill he move from uncritical to critical th"inking~ from
dogmatism to tolerance, from self-seclusion to open-m"indness, from
existence in oneness to existence in twoness. 376
A criti cl sm that some may 1eve 1 at Rauche is that he appears to argue
for theory in its O\-m right, over and above practice and that he
does not address himself to the problem of al"ienation (hat exists
betvJeen theory and pract i ce. He appears to entrench the ant ithes is.
This criticism is il1"founded especially since Rauche is very a\'iare
of the ant ithes is. He states that the methodological separation
had started with Kant and was to lead to its logical conclusion in
the ~ct_~,!.~ and underl'ies the impasses among the three main phi1osphi-
ca 1 contemporary approaches. 377 He cone 1udes. 11 It may be sa; d
that in splitting apart theory and praetic0, man tore himself to
pieces." For Rauche. the solution did not lie "in the trans-
formation of theory into practice. That IAlould lead to operationalism.
YOltJever, if philosophy remained free theory grounded in the reality
of contingent experience, it \'ri 11 never be divorced from practice
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because in the ongoing inte~action with other truth perspectives
it is constantly being called 'into question and, in turn~ by reconstitu-
ting a view of man affects practice. The freedom of thought, Rauche
seems to be saying, ensures the freedom and meaningfulness of pract'ice.
Theory and practice proceed in dynamic tension to one another. 378
SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE
1• The prob 1em of freedom in th~n1i 9htenm~~t become qu i ck ly bogged
dovJn in the problem of epistemology. Hence although the Enlightenment
sav/ the need to break free from all abso 1ut i st tendenci es, the autonomy
of man soon beca.me the equi va 1ent of the autonomy of reason as was
evident in the debates between the enl'piricistsand rationalists. Ratio-
nalisrn abso"lutized the pr'inciple of reason and led man into a nevJ
state of alienation from reality while empiricism made him the prisoner
of his senses.
2. (·.Jith Immanuel Kant the confidence in reason was limited not because
the vlOrld and man vJere not totally rational, in fact the structures
of the mi nd became even more important; the confi dence in reason
was limited because the "thing-in-itself" v/as nOVJ beyond understand-
i n9: freedom together with God and i mmorta 1ity pas sed into the orb it
of the noumena and within the sphere of the moral imperative. In
I<ant \'Ie have the formal sp 1i tin man I s awal~eness of truth. I n the
wake of this schism in human understanding followed ~ositivism,
scientism and technoloCiism,' \·:here the issues 01" ~llloral~,ty d I~ ~ an, nurld.n
fr~er:orn are 0.1so confined to a "different" fielc. :<ant, like Fichte
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in his philosophy of freedom .as pure act (Tathandlung), reduces
freedom to a process of moral self-realization v.Jhich Hegel later
elaborated into spiritual and historical realization,
3. ~egel's u.n.i.yersal synthesis It/as the last great attempt to unify
man I s a~"areness of truth and to place freedom at the centre of hi s
\I/ho 1e system by vi eVJi ng all of truth as part of the onltlard march
of Spi rit. Freedom and necess ity, however, totally merge. Each
manifestation of truth and its negation is a necessary step in the
progression. Freedom is the logical outcome of a previous stage
of development v!hich itself 'Has a clearer perception of freedom fro[";]
a previous stage. H,::nce freedom begats freedom. Such a view of
freedom linked to the logically determined universal synthesis must
be called into question if that synthesis itself is prtJblematic" JiJ!,
\ve observed~such an idealistic solution remains only a theorectical
possibility to the problem§ raised by the Enlightenment in ~1eneral and
Kant in particular. It is an erudite commentary on hi story but is
not the only V'iay that history can be read. In a previous work, Rel_igion
at the Limits?, \'ie ar'g~led that any reading of history which is based
on a preconceived theoretical frame\'iork distorts that history. 379
The framework remains supra-historical. The main problem with Hegel's
vie\1J of freedom is that it is based on necessity.
based on necessity then freedom itself is endangered.
If freedom is
The three contemporary forms of ph i losophy have in one vlay or another
reacted to the Hese 1i an synthesis and have ei ther 00ne back to the
empiricist position or to the l~antian vievl in order to tai(e those
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views to their logical conclusion. They have attempted to go beyond
Descartes as in neo-Positivism or have revolutionised the historical
dialectic into a materialist one as in Marxism.
4. Positivism and Neo-Positivism is a via negativa. A view on reality
- • ....... =--'- ~- ---
is imposed that already prejudges Yihat must be meaningful and \"!hat
not. They are~ therefore, as problematic as any other theoretical
framevJOrk, especially since the methods of the natural sciences are
Itlholly inappropriate to understand all of truth or human existence.
It contributed little to solving the problem of fl~eedol1l except to
protect man from unfreedom in meaningless speculation. The question
of individual freedom is sUbmerged in the analytical concerns emanating
froln the "scientific" functionalism underlying PosHivism. Freeco!:l
is endanged by functionalism.
5. In the '·1arxist concern for the freedom of society~ one observes
6. The neo-;vlarxists sa....1 the need for free individuals to lead the
transformation of society into a free one. This is an important
insight. HOI'/ever, they do not address clearly enough hOI"! the individual
con be freed or \'ihether truly free hUf,lonS are possible in the totalita-
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rian societies of our world, both Vlestern functionalist ideologies
and eastern authoritarian ones.
7. The Existentialists, especially H<;idegger and Sartre, vieltJ manls
very exi stence of ~hroVJ~~ as the sphere of hi s freedom. Nietzsche
and Sartre took the process a step further. Freedom was seen as
the self-realization of the existential subject. Freedom becomes
equivalent to the poss-ibility of existing, its very "nature. fl It·
is not logically, morally or physically determined. Hov-Jever, man
is either a function of Ceing (Heidegger)or Nothingness (Sartre) aM~
in vi eltJ of the absence of the Transcendent, [;)an is condemned to be
free. He is left to determine his own course in the viorld. Neverthe-
less, as Vie observed, such an act could lead to empty actionalisr.:.
Being and Nothingness are also metaphysical postulates even though
it is claimed they are lodged in existence alone and that existence
precedes essence.
8. However, it Vias the Existentialists who perceived freedcm as the
possession of the individual. The ex i stent i a1 act is the sphere
of freedom since the existing subject is ~ree a.l!:~ady. HoltJever,
the danger of act i ona 1i sm emerges when the subject -i s reduced to a
funct i on of· Sei n9 or Noth i ngness and, any 11 1eap into Transcendence"
or to moral action, even with the Existentialist revival of Kant's
'vii 11 ing the good of the i'Jhole l , leaves freedom influx.
Cl Hoy/ever, vvhati s clear from the controversial ncrtlJre J::01 these
Uleori cs of about rreec;orn is thet, as ~:aucre aff,' r,'T'.,ed., .c d ,.!I ree.orl Lees
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1i keFreedomnot ari se as the result of any__t~ory about freedom.
ex i stence cannot be deri ved 1ogi ca lly nor deri ved from one or other
philosophical system because all systems stand in controversial relation
to one another.
10. The danger of ideologism or functionalism however~ is avoided
if philosophy remains self-critical and an ongoin~h critical quest
for authentic existence; authentic existence being the existence
ilJherein man remains free from absolutism of any kind. Only thus \oI1fl1 Phil-
osopi[y not 1apse into ideo Iogy • Rauche argues that the ~ont~~
, therefore, is the sphere of freedom, that
is, in so far as he remains man, he is free.
11. Rauche, therefore, presupposes that man as man is free and that
vvhen he is slave to any system or pretends to be Grossmensch ab so1ut i z-
ing his truth, he ceases to be free or to live authentically. He
is, therefore, in agreement ,·v1th the Existentialist vievJ that freedom
is endem; c to be; ng fu] lyman a1though he ri ght ly rejects the abso 1uti-
zat; 0 n 0 f the; r Cl pproach Vi het her i t i s the 0 nto 10 gy 0 f Hei de99er
or the absolutization of the act of self-realization in the others.
12. The Christian vie\", like 8auche's and the Existentialists',
also understands freedom as endemic to being fully human while rescuing
it from the act of self-realization or empty actionalism. As Berdyaev
poi nted C'JJt. man is free even vJhen he does not choose. 380
"I::is ir!ec ;<:; en~o·.'~lll·C: to the r,'nri,s.1-Li.cl~n .-1 0c tjOl"I'e o.c - L"~ <.: '- ~ - - u "' I i'l cl n .' e1 n9
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Imago Dei. His bearing of a spiritual dimension is the equivalent
-"""""'---- .
of his being essentially free. This freedom bursts forth in man
in all his creativity: his morality~ art and science. Freedom is
the basis of his creativity and his construction of the 'tJorld in
theory and practice. This is the meaning of the command "to replenish
the earth." That his freedom to create has been distorted to manipulate
and shackle the earth is the sign of his having distorted the freedom
of his being the image of God. Hence his abuse of the world and
the use of pOIIJer and science for destroying is the s-ign of his state
of unfreedom.
Hence \Ale agree \t~i th Rauche here that freedom is di storted \'ihei1 man
loses or forfeits hi s freedom to one or other ideology or when he
absolutizes his own perspective, the work of his mm hands. ','lhen
man \Vorsh i ps his mm creation or It/hen any system becomes the object
of his "vlOrs hip," in theological language, that is idolatry.
It is intrinsic to the factness of his being ful"ly human that man
is truly free. Adam, VJhich in HebrevJ means "mankind," is representa-
tive of the incessant desire to be r:ore than man and be "as God."
He thus over and over agai n forfeits true freedom in his at tempt
to be :;lore than man. Freedom, he fails to see, exists in his contingent
experience of reality as f-inite and historical man, \·Jhile fr'eedom
leads to obedience to God (Rauche says humility before reality),
hubris is Dan1s constant attempt to usurp God-ship.
This Jttitu~e is ::hat Rauc~e has repeat~~ly pointed out as the &rrogance
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and intolerance of utopi an man.. Utopi an man and i do 1atrous man are
As the Ba""d stat.ed 1'1-.. he; s 11 the engi neer •. 0basically the same; ,-~,
ho-1st by his o\'m petaro ll In striving to be more than man he destroys
his true freedom as man.
It is this constant danger of lapsing into unfreedom that one sees
illustrated in the history of Israel's disobedience to Yah\'/eh and
in their absolutization of the La\'i, the temple ritual. legalism or
the nation I srae 1. as ends in themse 1ves. Hence Chri st stands in
judgement even of the Terr:ple and of the Pharisees' sincere but empty
piety. The Old Testament prophets had pro 1ept i ca lly performed that
function also. The Tm'Jer of Babel represents most clearly man caught
in hUbr~. seeking to reach God and ending in utter confusion.
A1i enated man alI'iays seeks security in such system buil di ng thi nk i ng
that such structures wi 11 ensure certainty and ensure his freedom.
The oppos i te is the truth. Not even the presence of the phys i ca 1
Temple in Jerusa 1em in the end is proof of God I s presence for
he does not IIdv-Jell in a place made \'vith human hands."
Reconciliation. whatever the details of the Christian doctrine are,
is essentially dir2cted at solving the problem of this alienation
of man. In reconciliation with God. man is put into perspective
again. hence undoing the hubris of Adam. The whole metaphoric
outworking of this reconciliation in terms of redemption (buying
back from slavery) and justification (the penal fl'ete.phor of freein~~
frO:l Cl sentence of Quilt) arc: theoloQical descri:Jtions of the "res tor-
ing of fellowship with GDd"
may be truly free.
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~o that man may be fu lly man; ie. he
Over and above all the finer theJlogical points related to the Incarna-
tion 9 it is the historical illustration of the "making fully human."
Jesus unlike Adam is not given to ~ubris but takes on the responsibili-
ty of bei ng fu 11y ~an before God. Around thi s becomi n9 fu 11y human
the Chr"istian idea of freedom rotates. Freedom obtains in obedience
before God; a freedom v/hich man all too easily relinquishes. Even
riSid religious systems, albeit Christian or Biblically based, can
becane as self-defeating and as absolutist as phi losophical systems. Hence,
the Christian view has con~tantly to ensure that freedom does not
lapse into bondage or ideology also. But \:Jhat is the dynamic principle
I'Jhich, in compatibility "'Iith the structure of the dynamic quest for
freedom, will ensure that the Christian understanding of freedom
is not distorted by theological systems themselves? That dynamic
principle is faith itself. Faith as existential encounter is also
an on90in9, self-critical encounter. An analysis of this vievl of
faith is the task of Part rI.
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PART ! i
FAiTH AS EXiSTENTIAL ENCOUNTER
-160-
Thus far, in Part 19 it has been argued that the problem of the
freedom of man is how to manifest freedom in the world and also hm'3
to preserve the integrity of man as mai1 9 not slave or Gi4 ossmensch_"
It \l4ilS stated vi s-a -vi s G.A. Rauche i s the~d s that freedom cannot
be del'4; v,ed nor postu lated from one or other theory about freedom
but that freedom obtains in man's cont'ingent experience of reality.
Thus freedom is expi~essed dynamically in the ongoing quest for freedom.
On ly in th is ongo'j n9 quest wi n either camp1acency of the man stuck
6'in the systemSl and the arrogance of man in pursuit of his Utop"ia
be avoided. Both, it \'.IilS maintained~ pay only lip=service' to freedom
because both are dogmatic~ intolerant and "wise in their own conceits."
If the manifestation of freedom lies in the ongoing quest for authentic
e}dstence» then "it was also ma'intahled~ man is free in his being
fully human. As the existentialists also have maintained, freedom
is endemi c to be; ng human and has to be real i zed i i1 deci si 011. It
has already been stated that the Biblical idea of faith and freedom
also 'lieNS man in these ter-ms s'ince the salvation of man is, in princi-
ple, the freedom of man for God. It Mfirms that man is lithe image
of God" and that freedom g thet'efore, is essential to being fully
man. Faith is the manifestation of that primordial freedom. l-loVJever~
th~ cris"ls of faith is that in traditional thought faith has not
been viewed in the dynamic frame of reference of the Biblical under-
standing of faith.
---~---
2.1 FAITH IN TRADITIONAL THOUGHT~__ o,.,__
Faith as a system of belief is as totalitarian and absolutist as
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the ph i 1osoph i ca1 alternat i ves . ~Jh i ch have been cons i (1ered in Part 1.
In so fav' as ' faith is structured into Cl \rJorld-view (the temptation
systematic theology has often fallen foul off) it does to faith t"Jhat
\r~e observed ptri losophical systems do to human freedom. Man becomes
a function in a theoretical relation concreti,ed in creeds or sacraments
\'ihich become the objects of faith. They arrogate a timelessness
and an authority they can never possess. Faith CB.nnot 'imply a meta-
physical scheme because it highlights a view of God that vitany
a.ffects the wor1d 9 society and man. It cannot imply a mythological
world-view for then God \'1ould become an object among other object-so
Christian faith cannot be a moralistic standpoint because it is
not founded on the \1/;11 of man but iS$ as \'2-1n be d;scussed~ in~
extricably bound up with justification by grace. R.G. Smith, therefore,
ri gilt ly cone 1udes that I~ • • • the tY'adi t -j ana I di vi s -j ons ~ \'Jhether of
!!~,!!9 ~~ and ~ct~. or subject and object, cannot comprehend
the h"lstorical complexity of God's gracious act. i1 <I
Faith becomes belief when these "objects!! display a kind of h'lster'kal tyranny
and their histoV'"icity is ignored. This is not to triv-ied'ize their
importance but to l~escue faith from being grounded in the temporal
and the fin"ite. for faith then ceases to be fait'! as i1 uHimate con-
cern. 1l On the contrary, sanctity is Cf.lferred on finite things
and religion collapses into -idolatry. ~~ Cantwell Smith mainta"ined that,
is making
deprecate
not to be subordi nated to be 1ief at to
else mundane. To it~ an religious forms
be seen as at best strictly secondary •••
is the intellect to be subordinated... It
be 1i efs primari ly that has tended to






the church hate ruthlessly discerned. 2
If f~,ith is reduced in this way to belief, faith like lea,son becomes
T~ t .h '1 ' t .bogged dmllrl in epistemological terms. ilere are wo POS~)'j!Jl 1 ..,1£:5:
either we achieve a logical1y satisfying theoretkal framework which
by its very nature impinges on freedom and achieves equipoise by ignoring
the contrad'jctions of ejdstenee or VH~ maintain the validity of Godls
and the freedom of human decision which accompanies
the paradox of ex'j ster.ce. To expl ai n these cOlltr'adicti ons away and
to achi eve wholeness in pr; nei p1e only ~ is to i ne,lease the a1i enat ion
of man from authentic ity. Even Kierkegaard's iileap into the _absurd"
can easily be misunderstood as faith acting ovel~ and above reaSOfl 9
if we do not release his vievJs from the epistemological stranglehold.
This stranglehold is exempl'if'led in the \fJay the subject - object
antHhesis has become a non<'negotiable paradigm ~1Jith which to \rie\>,
reality so that it is inconceivable that one can speak of truth except
in these terms. It is considered self-evident and 'incontrovertible
that truth obtai n5 in man as subject percei vi ng and understandi ng
objects (the ~'Jor1cl 9 creeds 9 God 9 the other and such 1i ke) • Hl"i s
is perhaps the sing'le most important reason \'Jhy the quest foy' freedom
has often been a postulate or a der'ivation from one or other perspective
of truth where truth l1as been judged on the basis of the certai nty
of the object. It \'Jas on ly a short step from this to the philosophy
of the natural sciences and Positivism which held that only vJhat
is "scientificallyll verifiable is true. It wa.s this subjectivism that
,
gave b'irth to the natural sciences and technology; that permitted
the mani pu 1at i on of the wor 1d as object. However, as was poi nted
out in the critiqUE of rationalism. empiricism and positivism, this
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antithesis proves a strait-jacket for truth.
The subject-object antithesis has uncritically been the paradigm
in theological thinking also. Revelation, VitMed epistamlogically,
has been unr'e:rstood primarily as the knowledge communicated from
IDabove". It bore a11 the marks of knOltJ1edge except that it COl! 1cl
not be proved, Grand attempts at explanation often perceived faith
I
as an extension of reason. Gogarten pointed out that,
Theo109Y may nm'J attempt to protect its faith from
modern subjecti vi srn by assert; ng the I objecti vity
of its basis for faith' by claiming a 'historical
factuality!... If it does, however, it does so
under the compulsion of subjectivistic thinking
itself... Theological discussion with subjectivism
must enter at an earliei~ point» II'Jhei"e subjecthl'ism
had its source vizy· II'Jith an understanding of faith
which occas"joned science yielding to the ternptat"ion
to construct a world-view le. a faith no longer
understood in the V"igOi'OllS sense of the apostle
Paul and Luther as the faith that alone justHies
. .. i e. \lJhose proper task '"ias to \!Jatch over man IS
freedom for God. 3
Th"is kind of syst~"'matization of faith had forced science in the first
place to seek its autonomy and thus it \''Jas this kind of faith VJhich
caused the "initial alienation between faith and reason» and bebJeen
theology and science.
Belief-systems lulled man into a state of complacency and spiritual
inertia. They provided him with "objective assurances" w'ithin
a relig'ion ex op~ _~to. Faith within Law and credal Chr'istianity
is, therefore, "dead and pO\'Jerless without \l'Jorth." "It is," said
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Emil Brunner~
Cl facsimile of the ty'ue faith 9 Cl counterfeit bin
~'lhich has exactly the same markings as a good Oiie~
but the signature, the cey'tification is lack; ng 0
T!l'l s faith is not ~'irHten in the heart by the hand
of God, but Ofl1y by the church g by the hand of the
apostleso This faith, begotten by permutat'lons
Ii'!hich clings to dogma and literalism ••• which ex=
changes bare doctrine, - even though it be Biblical
doctri ne - for the ~Jord of God ~ is Cl blight wh i ch
lies over the whole history of the church. 4
I t was th is type of reH gi Oil that t'lar){ rejected?
blinds the worker prevent"lng him from see'lng his true condition,
a sod a1 force that ~\lorked contrary to a~Jarel1ess.u 5
prototype of surrogate sat; sfacti on of man v/ho eHher has not yet
attained himself or had lost himself againoll 6 Kierkegaard called
ilidyllic mythology
and fantasy which emphasized the humanistic and soft traits of the
character of Jesus." 7
The ~Jay out of the impasse requires a reorientation of the mind in
O'rder to think beyond the subject-object prisol1o To read the Bible
\'Jithin the confines of this antithesis is to distOi"t its message
since there are several texts \l'!h'ich a,ppear to fit the scheme. Howevei'q,
as Gogarten maintained, "Nothing is accompl"isned by obtaining one's
undet'standing of faith from the warehouse stocked by the very theologi-
cal tradition by ~'ihich one tr-ies to \'IIard off subjectivism. 1I 8
Theological discourse must be rescued from static epistemological
terms. The 1anguage of faith must be exp~'essed creat i v-e 1y and
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existentially; that ·js~ in a way that adequately expresses its true
nature, that touches life and gr~pples with existence.
If the object of faith \'IIas a doctrhle~ faith ~'Jould be ar. intel1ectuc:!
relation, which it 'is not. Since vIe take Christ seriously, we take
ser'iously the God ~~ho is vitally bound up wHh our existence, OtW
history and our death. Jesus did not come to found a nm'>J religion
but to alt;aken faith and faith ineans living wholly before God and
not to give allegiance or worship to anything less.
Therefore~ faith cannot be Sj ,tematised anymore than freedom and
exi stence can. Nevertheless, church history is full of examples
of how the church has sought assurances in system-building which
Brunner refers to as Il a mighty apparatus ••• by li'Jhich it m-ight become
the power 1n control of divine revelation"~ a "practice wholly im-
personal, something physical - metaphysical has evolved out of an
experience who"lly personaLI! 9 This kind of totalitarianism ultimately
destroys both faith and freedom. As R.G. Smith states,
We must be continually ready to ask whether the
dogmas we are i nvi ted to subser; be to, whether
literally or passively~ whether in a church or
in a nation, in c political party or even in a sma.ll
vo 1untary group, rea 11y conti'.d n in themse 1yes the
possibility of personal being. 10
The cr'j si s of faith is that even homo re1i gi osus becomes ens 1aved
---~""""~-~,...,."",.-."~,,,,, ...
to a s\!stem of beli.eT"c: "Jh':lch holds h,'m l'n awe ::J"d . . t'
J ~ " " acqLn res amys·.~,~
tremendum et fascinans of its own.
.. . --. Hence the possibility of him
asking whether the objects of his belief have lithe possibility of
personal being ll is often excluded. It is imperative that faith
be reformulated in dynamic and existential terms. that is, as ongoing
encounter with God. However, before the nature of faith as encounter
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can be elucidated~ it is necessary to clarify the distinction bebJeen
Christian existentialism and existential Christianity. This distinction
'is most important lest what is attempted in this study be dismissed
as existent'ialism in Christian dress. Nothing is further from the
truth 1
2.2 CHRISTIAN EXISTENTLCUS')I OR EXISTENTIAL CHRISTIANITY?
There is a vas'" difference behJeen the two 9 a difference thc\t is
not always grasppd by Christian orthodoxy. Existentialist Christianity
is Christianity viet'ied \'iithin the para.digm of existentialism and
therefore suffers from an the demerits of absolutization of a truth
perspective. Eidstent'ial Christianity has to do \'~ith the witness
of t.he Christian gospel in the changing contexts of man; in their
contingent experience of reality. "Existential ll is the characteristic
of faith as ongoing encounter. To clarify this d'lstii1ction~ a brief
assessment of the evangelical reaction to existential Chr-istianity
\Vi 11 be made i i1 order to show hmv the reaction of orthodoxy has not
always discriminated carefully enough between existentialist Christiani-
ty and existential Chr'-istianity; then a brief evaluation of Chl'istian
existentialism w-\l1 be proffered and final1Y9 an analysis win be
made of the nexistential" dimension of Christianity.
2.2.1. THE EVANGELICAL REACTION
The evangelical scepticism about ChlAist-lan existentialism has been
In
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both var'ied and IfJidespread~ and not \J'Jithout some good reasons.
order to understand the main factors influencing this sceptic;sm~
a by'; ef ana lysi s will be made of :'ft 0 Hunnex! s Existentialism and
Christian Belief since it is representative of the evangelical reaction
and contai ns aid c1es that had been pub 1'j shed in (hr.; ~t i .ili '~i0:l~
the influential evangelical periodical. 11
Let it be stated clearly that \fie appreciate his evangelical concern
"to obey the God of Jesus and of the Nevv Testament" 12 and hi s creat'j on
li'ri th regard to Iltradi n9 the old model for a new model tLat may turn
out to be a ph'ilosophical as \'iell as a spiritual lemon.\! F However~
Hunnex clearly confuses Christian existentialism and existential
Chri sti ani ty v'lhen he states ~ 11 ••• my task is not to cretl.te sympathy
at appreciative understanding of existential Christianity. Rather
it is to provide a philosophical critique of it on behalf of evangelical
orthodoxyll 14 and \'ihen he statesp liThe logical conclusion of existen-
tial Christianity is the death of God;!: 15 especially since he has
in mind J J Altizer's view that;> "Once we truly come to understand
the Christian God as ••. a dialectical process we shall finally be
purged of the Christian religious belief in the existence of a unique
and absolutely aut.onomous God." 16 This is a classical stat~ment
of nChristian ll existentialism which shall be evaluated b~ i01:I; . it
is not what is meant by existentia'j ChristianHy of which Altizer
is clearly not a representative.
Hunnex has tt'JO main problems with the dialectical theo'log';ans
5
especially Bultmann and Brunner:
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Firs'tlY9 he is concerned about ~he objec:t'ive rea"iity of GodeAgainst
Bu ltmar.n i s \ri et'! that ~ liThe act of God is not pure 1y objective 0
The cross of Christ. •• is an objective fact of history for everyone 9
but it is a sav; ng act of God on ly for faith 9 for the man \tJho makes
it his own"~ he asks~
Why is it necessary to mention God at an SillCE;
the eld stence of the sav; ng act is conti ngent on ly
on someone making it his own?... The redemptive
act of God through Chri st is there to be appropri ated
so to speak \'11 thout regard to whether or not you
or I open our eyes to see "i.t. H
Bu Hmann and BrLmner 9 together wi th thc;e who wn 1 be di scussed below ~
had no intention to deny the transcendence or objecthe real "ity of
cannot SpetlK of God except in Cl spec!.! 1at i ve \4ay. Hence they argue
empty actionalism if God were not ilobject.ive"ly true~ G Nevertheless 9
faith appl"ehends God as he identifies with Ollr contingent experience
Men cannot surmise about God-in-himself because
men cannot jump out of their historical skins.
Hunnex agrees with Hepburn that 9
Overwhelmingly concerned with the phenomenology
of faith and the Ufe of faith~ existential thOUGht
;;
is in continual peril of failing to emerge from
the subjectivistic circle at all. A subjectiv';stic
account can provide an informative description of
V'Jha.t it is 1i ke to th ink and act as if there was
--=~"-'-.
God. • • But it is unab 1e to ~Jo furtheY' 0.. and say
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whether the bel"ief is justified or unjustified 'JIJhether.
or not there ex; sts a be; ng before whom the bel i evei~
has taken up the attitude of faith. 18
Ultimate ly, Hepburn \I'd n on ly bE' pleased with objective proof for
God ~'I}hich Hurme~ also does not have. To say that one can on ly speak
of what one knows and ·.~hich the community of men testify to~ 'j s not
to claim that that v'Jhich Vile do not know does not ex'ist. Such a vie~'1
merely recapitulates the error of positivism.
Secondly~ Hunnex finds 9 v;Jhat he cans the "encounter theoryll of
Bultmann and Bnmner p.oblematic. Against the view that God discloses
Himself rathe!' than if,formation about Himself and that He ;s knm'in
exi stenti ally as encounter ~ Hunnex mai nta.i i'lS that it does not follow
that
11
God cannot communicate facts about Himself and therefore proposi··" --=-~
tioos cannot be precluded. There are somethi ngs aboutonese H a.nd
one's wife that are literally inexpressible. But is does not follow
that nothing can be kno\'J11 about myself, my wife or God. Therefore,
religious truth must be both existent"ial and propositional." 19
Hunnexis analogy between knowing oneself and one's \'Jife. and knolpJing
God, mystif'ies the cris'is of revelation because reflecting upon one's
own nature or one IS wi fe is 'i s not the same as comment; ng upon the
nature of God. Furthf';·more. the theologians he takes issue with
have not denied the possibility of propositions or else they would
not have attempted a constitution of theology. Their emphasis that
these propositions be based on existent'ial encounter was an attempt
to temper the scholastic-type speculation of traditional theology
and its smugness within theological systems. What we call propositional
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truths (the creeds~ articles of faith, theologies and even the
scriptures themselves) are the result of, or the reflection on, personal
encountet \1Ji th God, \'ihether it \"Jas the encounter of the prophets
themselves within the historical Sitz-'im-Leben of their prophet'ic
role vis-a -vis the nation Israel~ or the apostles vis-a -vis theii'
encounter \~ith Jesus of Nazareth ~ hi s 1He, df.:Cith and resurrection.
Hunnex and others who argue as they d03 fail to real i ze that
the Church today and any theo log; ca1 attempt to formu late proposit i ons ~
as it were, has to encounter the "er.cow1ters!1 of the prophets,
, the apostles and almost b/o thousand years of Ilencountersll. This
is ~1/hat Ebeling~ for emample, meant by the "problem of histor"Yicity" 20
and by his definition of Church History as "the histo~'y of the intel'-
pretation of scripture." 21
-It is not as if faith is based on "true propositions." Hence it does
not make sense to say as Hunne){ does that. "Either there i 5 pro-
positional revelation or there ;s no tevelation at all ~ since God
who disclosed IlimseH also disclosed propositions about· Himself. IQ 22
Htlnnex asks, "t~hat 'if God v!ere to make a final self-disclosure?
Can we say that He cannot do thi s or VJOU 1d not do thi 5?" 23 He poi nts
out that 'in the theology of Bu1tmann o.nd Brunnel~9 for example~ there
is not the slightest assurance that our decision ;s r"ight in any
but a personal way si nee I~ the truth of encounter needs to be di s-
covered anew." 24
Hunnex appears to have little appreciation for the crisis of truth
and of faith that these theologians had experienced. 25 Even if
some of them i r.du I ge in
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iliV'ory tower 11 intellectualisms at t'imes~
the struggle of faith in Kierkegaard's life and wl'itings, for example,
cannot be overlooked. Hunnex aprears to view faith and revelation
lJ~ithin epistemological categories. Such a view fails to unders:and
that the ongoing encounter of faith \'Jithin the changing experiences
of man is not the result of doubt or the uflcertai nty of f a'j th, but
is the resu 1t of the des i re to hear the Hord of God, the Gospe1,
aga i i1 and aga'j n so that its clarity does not become confounded by
habH, custom, human arrogance or man-made systems or theologies •.
As Gordon Kaufman states,
••• theology is not to be understood as pl"imar'ily
or chiefly exposition or interpretation of the several
creeds of the church of the ideas of the Bible.
Doubtless both the Bible and the creeds are relevant
and important for understandi ng the concept of God
and for judgi ng it/hat are proper, and ~,!hat improper,
uses or formulations of that concept, but it is
the; r uti! ity for gett 'j n9 at the image-concept of
God that gives the Bible and the creeds their im-
portance for theo 1ogy ~ not the other "'Jay around. 26
Hence to speak of
inappropriate.
IIpropositional revelation ll is who l'ly
2.2.2. "CHRISTIAN II EXISTENTIALISM
Hunnex. however'. is quite correct in his scepticism about forcing
the message of the Bible into a pre-determined existentialist frame
of reference. Here Bultrnann's demythologization programme is especially
problematic. As J. Macquarrie had pointed out~ Bultmann's intention,
was to translate all mythical statements into
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ex; stent"i a1 ~tatements (i e statements about man IS
existential situation)~ but-co there is all the
difference ; n the IfJOf 1cl between a statement ab~ut_
humail ex; stence and a statement -1 n terms of human
ex i stence whi ch is s'jpposed to refer analogously
to God .. 0 Either ~Je must say heiqe there is a limit
to deliwtholog;zing9 or else~ we must redefine the
aim of demythologizing ••• \rJe are no i1f~arel" to having
so1\fed the prob 1em of ob1i que 1anguage about God 0
Ttris would have been solved only if demytholog"iz"lr,g~
as purel.y mdstential interpretat"!on j ho.d been pursued
Irri thout 1imit. Hd s wou 1d have meant the abandonment
of any attempt to talk about a transcendent God
and the representation of Christianity as nothing
but a poss"ibia way of existence for man. Obviously
Bultmann did not want this. 27
As ~'3e have "intimated~ the imp"!ications \'Jhich Bu1tmann and the other
theologians studied here~ have for hermeneutics fall outside the
immediate scope of this thesis. However~ the point should be made
that any fixed perspecthe of i nterpretati on ~"Jhen abso 1ut i sed wi n
invariably distort the message of the Bible because as we have argued
elsewhere~ fixed theoretical frameworks of interpretation whether
applied to tdstorY9 rel"igiol1 g philosophy or textual interpV'etatiol1 g
act as Procrustean beds. Any. fact or perspective which does not
fit a predeterm"ined norm is fi<cisedo 28 ~Je observed this forcing
of truth into logical limits in Hegel and Positiv"ism; into soc'i eta1
categories in the Marxists and neo-Marxists and now into existential"ists
categories with the emergence of "Christian" existentialism. Hence~
as Hunnex points out. even when theologians like J ,6" T Robinson intend
to assert lithe centrality of the confession 'Jesus ; s Lord l in
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tht.: fu n Nei~ Testament~ senseli ~. they i nvari ab ly Cl Her the mean; ng
of Ne','J Testament and enr"j st; an 1anguage and convert the New Testament I
\'ili~i ters -I rrto contemporary exis'rentialists. 29 Thi ski nd of hermen?uU c
Uf-inal1y edges out Christian belief very much like the proverbial
camel in the terl't.!~ 30 In so feu' as existent-ialist hermeneutics
is imposed on the understanding of the B·lble~ a secularized,
message. Therefore~ such an approach must elicH tiw same critic-isms
that were levelled at Hege1 9 th{:; neo'~posH,ivists clnd the Mandst
analysis of historyo
Perhaps no one \tUlS more aware of the danger of applying an existentia-
nst interpretat"ion on the Biblical message than ~\Jas Kar! Barth.
Hence the change in emphasis between the younger Barth of the
In tht~ introduction to the first volume of
"The Word of God or ex i stence? The first edition
(ie. rris liThe Doctr'ine of the i~onl of GOd~' of 1927)
gave acumen or even stupidity some cause to put
this quest'ioi'l ••• in an~y thinkable continuation of
th'is 1~ ne 'I can see on'ly the plain destruction of
Protestant theo 1ogy 0 •• ii 31
In this study we have not approached the theologians under scrutiny
here v'ia a confess<jonal paradigm like M [) Hunnex has done. That
would only miss their real intention!
to define a "Christian existentialism"
Neither have we attempted
for such an approach is
fraught with many difficulties especially in the area of hermeneutics.
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Th-is study has attempted to draw. out the dimension of the "exlstentialiJ
from their approach because Chf'istianity in the Bible and later in
the Reformers bears such 1:1 vital ~ dynamic dimension which a-ll too
easi ly has been lost in the history of Christian thoughto This
existential dimens-ion \'1hich is ilfaith ll is what makes theology
dynami c 11 and commi tment to God corr~ensurate with human freedom.
The nature of the "ex;stential ll must now be more closely eXilrrrined.
2.2.3. THE EXISTENTIAL
That Christian existentialism as et clearly defined methodology is
as prob 1emat i c as other truth - perspect i ves ~ i ne1ud; ng Chi"'; st i a:'j ones 9
will be quite evident from the preceding discussion. However, Existen-
tialism, in spite of its formal ontologY9 highlighted a dimension
of thi nk i n9 9 or rather, IIbeingll which is endemic to the Christian
idea of commitment as we fi ne! it descri bed in scr-j pture and most
vividly illustrated in the life of Ch, ist. This dimension Walter
Kaufrnan called n a timeless sensibHity that can be di scerned here
and there in the past bute o. on ly in recent times has hardened into
a sustained protest and preoccupationol! 32 The mysticcll tradition
and some of the more pi et"l st i c groups had been more aware of thi s
dimension than the more institutional"i:z:ed and formally defined tradi-
tions in Church history which had been deeply influenced by
neo-Platonism and later by Aristotle's philosophyo It was aspects
of the pietistic mood that also ungirded the Reformation's re-emphasis
011 sola f-ide. One may cite the influence that Theologia Germanica
...~~~~-
had on Luther of which he had written •
• 00. next to the Bible and St. August"ine, no book
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hath ever come, into my hands, \tJhence I have learnt,
or WOLl 1cl \lJi sh to 1earn more of \>Jhat God and Chr'ist,
and man and all things are. 33
Th-is book" which luther ei1coU!~aged to be read in order "to revive
the consciousness of spiritual life" of his country 11H:'!1i, was wen
received. 3L~
Little l;JOnder that 9 in modern times, the impetus for the revival
of the existentia'j has come from Christian sources. Pasca.'l and
Kierkegaard were not formulating Cl ne\'1 Gospel nor attemp't'ing to'
'.
proffer Cl new di scovery or i nter'pretat'! on of Chri st i anity. They
called men to renewed commitment instead of formal church membership
and nom'inal affiliation to the Christian body. They urged a vHal
dynamic and ongoing l'iving 'in faith. D.E. Roberts, therefore~ is
correct in his assessment that [xistent'jaiism began as a "Christian
mode of thinking." 35 l~e are not using I!existentia"lisml! here -in
the sense of a methodology or ontology of existence. It -i s safer
td speak of l<the existent'ial" as a Christian modus vivend'i \iJh;ch~
as Robey'ts goes on to po; nt out ~ if "sundered from faith become
particularly vivid expressions of the spiritual disintegration of
our age" but that "even where it leads to atheistk conclusions
it is of great importance faY' it offers a particularly poignant
expression of the predicament of modern man fI 36
To highlight the dimens"ion of the existential is not to argue foY'
the absolutization of one methodology or truth-perspective. It is
rather to bring a nev} c!ynanism into commitment which \'Ji 11 remove
faith and theological reflection on faith from the realm of detached
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logical abstraction to considtrring truth and human existence in the
attitude that it deserves; that is, as o. matter of life and death.
J\gai n~ thi s is not to deny the need for theology as ar. ongol n9 ~
critical theoretical discipline (cL Part lIn. To remove faith from
the crh; is of human ex i e:.tence and cant i ngency is to open the door
to blim.:i faith~ or~ as \"ie have already pointed out~ faith becomes
belief in a body of dogma. To affirm the existenthl1 is to affirm
faith as the dynamic v ongoing encounter which makes theology an ongoing
quest and not a closed system of doctrines.
The existential p,~ohibits an a.esthetic or II sc ientific" smugness
~lIhen men come to consider the issue of spiritual commitment. They
must~ as it voJere v "put the shoes from off the'ir feet for the ground
on IfJhich they stand is holy groundo" Their whole being takes part
in the questo It is not a rational quest only but a living, existential
one. Kierkegaard~ who \'Ji11 be consider'eel in greater detail belm'l/~
insisted that Christianity was not a doctrine but a communication
of ex i stence and, therefore, Oile who is i liVO 1ved in it bears the
responsibility of reproducing it. 37 This view has obvious implications
for faith as dynamic corrmlitment. Sartre~ in quite a different "'Jay,
also sat.., the nature of authentic exist'ing as lying in commitment
(engage) •
~~hen Christian doctrines lose this dimension of existential commitment
and become merely one dimensional rationalizations~ they become static
tenets of belief; objects to be examined~ analysed and systematised.
Kierkegaard, for examp,le, had anticipated when the university dons
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would make his own works the subject of lectures and so would thorough-
ly mi sl.mdt~rstal1d them. 38 The third dimension. the existential~
does not rule out the rational but brings to bear on an thinking
the commitment of the who 1e be; ng because the quest for truth is
the apes"" affectIng life and death •
• " " l,
I Thou art the man!
As H. R. Mackintosh states~
are the l'lords \'ilhich must sound
in our ears perpetually if •••
be 'eidstential e I that is~
our thought is to
carried on with the
unfi:d ling consciousness that \'\Je stand before God" ••
vJhh:h rejects the cold and futile objectiveness
of speculat-!ve dhrinHy v:lhich dissolves the Gospel
into idea.s and the tepid object"iveness of conventional
churchmanship~ \'!tdch lies at peace with the ~'Jorld,
atrophies the sense for spiritual heroism and displaces
persona i concern about sal vat -1 on by descent or
prosperous rnernbersrd p of an i nst Hut ion. 39
There are at leagt seven fundamental characteristics of this existential
d'imensi on:
1. The existential~ which Kierkegaard called the IIsubjective"~
is concerned prllflar'i1y not \;d th the un; versa1 or abstracti ans but
with the process of thinking and living as it goes on in the individual.
Therefore~ whi le the objective approach is preoccupied with the
question "L'Jhat Is the truth of Christianity?'u. the existentia'l questor
asks "Hmvan r b'r::come El Christian?n This latter question changes
the agenda from be in9 epistemolog'ically based to being e;dstentially
based 0 The existential, l'nst"~rl_(' o£,~ ~eJ'e~t~1<. u 1 I . _\_... ng the universal as
empiric; srn had done, ground; that is, existence. 4·0
2. The subject i'i changed from a funct.ion or relation to the "existing'l
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subject and is placed vvithi n cont 'inua1 striving~ commensurate with..
his changing experience 'of reality. He is spurred on to be part
of the ongoing quest for truth. t~an is restored from being Cl thing
(an Ilitll ) to being a person~ a problan ~4rlich, as \lie pointed out in Part
I~ l'ies at the heart of man's cdsis and unfreedom.
3. Thi s approach ackno1PJl edges that truth H ke the freedom of the
subject cannot be logically deduced because existence is basically
ambiguous and human beings 9 contrary to deterministic and idealist
world-views~ are not predictable. A11 the truths th?t affect huma.r.
existence and human destiny a.re ultimately not the produr::ts of reason~
what Hegel caned II ra isonnementl! ~ but the a~lS\'Jers of the whole beingo
Less'! n9 had stated that the aed denta1 truths of hi story can never
serve as proofs of eternal truths of fo.l th, 41 a vi ew that WaS to
be greatly criticised by theologians like W. Pannenberg who attempted
to obviate the gulf between faith and reason by constructing a philoso-
phy of history. 42 Pannenberg's anS~'lJer, hm\1ever, like Hegel's syn-
thesis, remains problematic also. 43 Because of the finitude of
man, !la leapll must be taken. However, such Cl leap, as 1fJe shall
observe belmrJ, does not have to be c\'~historical or a blind and empty
gesture.
4. The existential quest is not satisfied \i'Jith neat pseudo·-assura.nces
and absttactions but is inewtricably bound up \'\Iith decision, passion
and with human freedom.
50 The existential "introduces a dimension of vitality into thought
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which abolishes the r"ig'id'ity of 'Systems~ even Bib1"ical ItJell-intentioned
ones, which petrify 'into sterile irrelevance. As J Wahl stated~
it Biinvites 'ustoa kind of sharpening of subjectivity.1! ~-4 Kierkegaard
highl"ights pithily this point in a Journal entry in 1841 when he
reflects on the lecture of Schelling he had heard in Berl'in:
I am glad to have heard Schen i n9 I s second 1ecture,
indescribably glad. I have sighed long enough,
and my thoughts have s'j ghed IJ>Jithi n me. When Sche 11 i ng
mentioned the t'Jord Virke'lighed (actual daily life)
in connection with the relation of philosophy to
Virkelighed, thought leaped w'ithin me as the babe
1eaped in El i zabeth. •• That one \fJOrd remi nded me
of all my philo (':1h'ic sufferings and pains. 4-5
The existential is concerned with'l"ife itself.
6. The existential concentrates on the actuality of the subject,
and~ as was pointed out in Part 1~ "it is ;n taking the actuality
of the existing subject seriously that freedom manifests itself.
Th'is is what Kierkega.ard had intended by his dialectics of e)<istence
whereby he analysed this actuality. G t~Cllal'ltschuk explains th"is point
by drawing a distinction between Aristotle!s conc'ept of tragedy and
Kierkegaard's understanding of actuality. In the former, the individual
is involved in the hero's tragic situetion as he sees it dramat-ized
and i s t~econci 1ed with actuality However~ for K;erkegaard~ this
roconci l-j ation is inadequate because 'it prov'ides no deeper meaning
Kierkegaardfor the ex i stent i a1 s ituat i on of the spectator. 46
described his own shift from spectator to actor thus~
I am going to work toward a far more inward relation
to Chri st i anity, for up to now I have in a way been
competely outside of it ~'ihile fighting for its truth
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like Simon of, Cyrene (Luke 23.26). I have carried
Christ's ct"oss in ca purely external way. 47
KierkegaardBs leap of faith is a leap ftom possibil"ity to actuality~
Cl Il subject"ive actua.lityii~ \.'Jhich H. Diem points out~ wa-:relatedto
Christianity as the base. 48
7. The existential is primarily concerned with the nature of believing
itself and then about doctrine and the reflections about belief.
R. [VI. Bro1tiln stated that it ItJ8S Cl. pre-reflective starting point which
seeks to di seover that \>Jh-j ch is pri or even to our un; on with the
WOl"ld. 49 Jean Wahl maintained that this attempt to delve into thought
11 pr'j or to ref 1ect ion, the predi et i ve ~ to surmount the di chotomy
between idealism and realism" leads to a "consciousness of the movement
of transcendence which is present in existence itself." 50 In theologi-
cal parlance we are dealing here with the road to faith and \'1ith
that which fosters true commitment. The objective schemes of beliefs
and epistemology take the exi stent"i a"' for' granted. The existent-jal
is pre-reflective but does not, as so many aSSl!me~ reject reflection.
There is a difference between the way Heidegger and Kierkegaard
formulated the existential. For Heideggel s through the awareness
of Dread one un~erstands the general conditions of existence.
Wh'ile for KierkegcliH'd the ~!:!2el~~ is the existential condition
of the particular' individual~ Heidegger's ~_ia~~ refers to VI/hat.
is characteristic of ind-lviduo,ls in general. This has led some to
ask whether Heidegger is not delving into essence by his postulation
of ex"jstentialia and whether such existentia-lia are congruent vJith
the affirmation of exi stence. 51
-181-
The existent"ial may wen form the basis of either Christian commitment
or of an atheistic position such as Sartre's. Hector Hawton goes
futther by aUuding to Sartre's "1iter.::ture of extreme i11usions ll
and points to the scope for fanat'icism "in the application of the
existe~tial to life. 52
Hov~ever3 what is meant here by faHh as existential encounter vis-
a -vis the divine cannot be reduced to the kind of empty actionalism
we have isolated and cr-it'icized in Existent"ia.1ism generally. Faith
is nr-t merely self actual i zat i on Ot~ se 1f transcendence. T. H. r.roxa 11 9
for ex amp 1e9 rejects as a "grave 'injustice the lumping together
of non-Christian existentialism j which the Pope condemned in hiJ
Encyclical Humani Ge~,is, with the existential Christianity of
Kierkegaard."53 The danger that eX'istential encounter faces j namely
of lapsing into unbelief~ is quite unavoidable in any open search
for truth. It is the ri sk that faith must take because there are
no assurances g-jven except the basis of faith itself. If f aith ~<'ere
based on such assurances it \'!ould cease to be faith a.nd ~'JOuld become
a human achievement.
However~ trds does not mean that faith is merely a whim or an empty
gestu 'e. As it w; 11 be shown below. px,istent-j"a-' Ch-l"stl'an~Y,! "• ~ " I . ,,," 1 S
not empty actionalism since its object is the God (the Absolute
Paradox) who is vitally concerned with man and human existence.
Hence faith ho.s to grapp 1e \1ith the meani ng of the Incarnat i on beco.use
faith grapples with life and existence. All Christianity "is existential
Christianity because Christianity is grounded in the Christ-event
._-.- --_.-------,...------ ,..,--_ ..
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whereby lithe Wm'd was made fles,h and dwelt among us.1! If Chr-;st-ianHy
ceases to be md stenti a1~ it destroys faith as ongoing encounter;
it closes its eyes to the challenges of contingent experience;
it becomes an institutionalized religion and within it faith is reduced
to belief in creeds and the pontifications of councils and synods.
The danger of actionalism is only real ~Jhen faith is removed from
its object ie. when ~~~itur (the faith ItJhich is believed)
and f'ides aua creditur (the faith by which it 'is believed) is separated.
---=-,!_--~...
HOIrJeVer 9 such a separation in existence is impossible. l-loV. Martin
states it sucC"inctly~ liThe f-ides qua creditur ••• and the fidesqu,3.e
creditur ••• are as congruous as the human hand in a skin-tight
glove." 54 "They cannot be sepaY'ated in existence ll says R.G.
Smith 9 because u e>dstential faHh is a unity in relation of the
Giver of faith and the believer." 55
The existential dimens·ion is concerned \'iHh the ~t.Y of the
e,dsting subject who -is continually striving and \'Jhose modus vivenct-j
~....,..,~."..-..--"'"~- ~-~ ..."""",,~ ~_.--~
obtai ns in vHa1 commitment. Hence while Christian existentialism
remai ns prob lematic, thi s dimension of the exi stenti a1 which has
in our t-ime been uncovered, has important impl'ica.tions for the under-
standing of faith which even the most orthl)dox believein , after he
has rejected existentialism~ cannot ignore for the Gospel's sake.
Hhen applied to Christian self-undetstanding, (doctrines 9 creeds
and such like), the existential injects nei'J vitality without which
/
ChristianHy ceases to be understandable or relevant. Paul Till"ich
makes an incisive comment in this connection which should be quoted
in full. He wrote,
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A 1imit i ng statement must be made about the ca.pabi 'I ity
of existentialist thought to answer the questions
implied in man's existential predicament... Certainly,
there are existentialists who have answered tnose
questions in terms of cl specia'j religious tradition
and others who have answered them in terms of a
special human'istic traditiono But these answers
are not deri ved from the; r ex; stenti a1i st analyses. They
~,_=__'_,~_.~._~_~__"""",=,~,,".-a,,-~._.~"~"'-"'~"""""-=·"I''''' ~_
are derived from the cultural or religious traditions
~ 'T_' ....__~~~~
out of ltJhi ch they evo'} ved... But if they are answered
-~ _.-- .._",,,,
out of these traditions 9 ~uec~ve9 a..!)~-!!~i n99
a new power and a ne\1J existential truth. 56
~---.__..-._~-_.~.._.~
In the analysis of faith as ex"istential encour~ter and the nature
of this encounter in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard t Rudolph Bultmann,
Emil Brunner ~ Fri edri ch Gogarten 9 Pald Ti 11 i ch 9 Gerhardt Ebe i i ng
and others, the attempt is made to 'isolate this "existential truth"
which can be to Christian theology lI a new p01/Jer". Such an analysis
must begin with Kierkegaard not only because he was the first in
the modern period to reawaken our attention to the existeiltial but
also because he gave to the other theologians under consideration
a legacy of thought-forms that appears over and over 9,9ai n in thei r
writings.
2.3 S~REN~~~ARD: FAITH ,NO BEING CHRISTIAN
Kierkegaardls thinking was shaped by his own struggle for faHh
s
a struggle that gained intensity in the face of Cl form of Christianity
he was deeply alienated from a,nd which. he believed. had made null
and void its New Testament helAitage. Faith had ceased to be personal
cmnrni tment but had become
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manifestation ungirded by Cl
theo1ogy that was 1arge ly tri umpha1'i st i c because of its idea1i st,
especially Hege1ian~ moorings. Kierkegaardis vie\'Js were conscioLlsly
a po1em; c agai nst both !'lege1 ! S i nfl uence and the Chri stendom of hi s
time. It -is against the backdrop of this polemic that h-is ma"in themes
and
of faith" are best understood.
2.30'1. CONTRA HEGEL IS LOGICAL SYNTHESIS: A THREAT TO FREEDOM AND
Fat' Kierkegaard, Hegel's universal synthesis constituted the gt'eatest
danger to both human freedom and faith. Freedom was endangered
because in Hegel's logical ~ dialectical system the individual had
no real piaceo He represents only a moment in the fulfilment of
the whole. Log"icality not only distorts the nature of historical
"facts" t'lhich cannot shed thei r uncertai nty and unpredictabn ity"
but also~ it fails to grasp the meaning of history because it levels
out individual ~ or r"ather, personal uniqueness. It has no place
for ambi guity and hence exc 1udes inadvertently e}<1 stence itse1f for
human existence is fundamentally ambiguous. 5"7 Building an objective
system is therefore an abstraction. In his Concluding Unscientific--
.!:..ostcd e! Ki er'kegaard argued that Hege 1 had not broken IrJi th Kant I s
dua 1i srn by construct i ng hi s "fantastic hypothesis". He wrote~
To anst",er Kant with a fantastic shadow-p 1ay of pure
thought is preci se ly not to anS\'ver frim. The on 1y
thing··in-itself which cannot be thought is existence
and this does not come with i n the provi nce of thought
to think. 58
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Hegel removes the irrational and- th-is is his greatest problem because
he does not escape the opt imi srn of the En1i ghtenment. Ult-imate 1y
hi s vi ei'!S stand or fan on the ~'as"j s of hi s understand; ng of man ?
which for Kierkegaard was basically unbiblical because it denies
man's cant i ngency and reduces man to a determi ned function wi thi n
the whole. The battle between Augustinianismand Pelagiarrism ;s
a perpetual battle in human history and revolves around this very
problem of man's possibilities. Hegel~ for Kierkegaard, represents
the example £~ excellence of Pelagian optimism, for both make
Christianity conform to the world. 59 Kierkegaard insisted, like
St Paul had done, that Chri st'i anity must be transform"j n9 not conform; ng
for therein lies freedom. To use Hege1 to understand human freedom,
he sai d. is 1i ke usi ng Cl map of Europe to tt'ave 1 thtough Denmark
\'Jhere Denmark appears the size of the head of a stee1 pi n. 60
Hegel makes "nonsense" v/hen applied in detail to history. 61 If A
philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chimera. If .62
\fJith his flair for sto.ting t.hings
wrote concerning Hegells system,
If tongue"i n-cheek" ~ Ki erkegaard
••• men are determi !led to 10se themse 1yes i i1 the
totality of things, 'in wor~ld history, fascinated
and dec ei ved by mag i C vii tchery , no one want s to
be ~9.i_v.~ dua 1 human bei n9. . • PIS par v; cu 1ay' human
bei ngs they fear that they ~'ri 11 be doomed to a more
; so 1ated and forgotten exi stence than that of a
man i Cl the country; for if a man 1ets go of Hege 1
he \'Jil1 not even be "in a position to have a letter
addressed to him, 63
Hegel's immanentist and logical solution cohstitutes the greatest
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threat to freedom because it 'tri vi a1i zes the i ndi vi dua l' s strugg 1e
for authent'ic existence 9 ~'Jhich is also the struggle of faitho It
reduces human l'ife to Cl. single plain.
he stated 9
In a Journal entry in 1844,
A view which sees life's doubleness (dualism) is
higher and deeper than that \lJh-lch seeks unity and
pursues stud; es tOIfJard uni ty (an expression fi'om
HegeL •• ). The passion which sa\lJ paganism as sin
and assumed eternal tormtmt in he 11. i s gl~eater th,1I1
the . SUn1i:l? su~~rum of the thought1es sness (\'111 ich
is d<j sheve 11 ed) wh i ch sees everyth i ng -j n i mlTlanence. 64
Hegel's negative implications for freedom are inextricably bound
~'.]ith his negative implica,tions for.'aith. His ultimate synthesis
removes the mysterium of faith. Contradictions and anything that
prods reason is explained awJ.y and ~Jith them also the object of faith 9
the God-mai1~ is rationalized aV1/ay. The God-man 9 Kierkegaard was
~iont to remind us is, "the greatest mystery (and) is absul"d ••• (for)
Godls eternal being is bounded by the d·ialectical detemination of
existence." 65 On the contrary, because the object of faith ;s a
person and not a doctri ne? the cannot be removed. 66
If Christianity is reduced in this Hegelian sense 9 then wHh the
loss of the irrationa1 9 doubt is also abolished. Faith becomes blind
faith because fa"ith and doubt t a1tho~gh at opposite poles. are mani-
festat"ions of freedom. liThe means 9 11 D E Roberts succinctly states,
IIby which \'Je apprehend the historical must have a sttCoucture analogous
to the historical itself. Faith possesses that character, Ii 67
It \"las in this connection that Kierkegaard was at pains to define
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the limits of reason. Since '~the Absurd ll or lithe Paradox of the
Incarnation" is the object of f ai th it cannot be deY'i ved any more
than e:-:i stence can be deduced. There are no logical certainties
that reason can supp ly nor can the risk be 1091 cally removed for
then faith itself 'is abolished. As Kierkegaard descr-iptively stated
t~hen faith beg'ins to feel embarrassed and ashamed~
1i ke a young ItJOmen for whom her love is no 1anger
sufficient 9 but who secretly feels ashamed of her
lover and must therefore have it estab1i s!led that
there is something remarkable about him - "':hen faith
thus begins to lose its passion~ \'Jhen faith begins
to cease tb le ~ faith t then a proof becomes necessary
so as to command respect from the side of unbelief .•• 68
Albert Camus l reaction to KierkefJaard on th'is point should be mentioned
at this inHial stage of this analysis so that this common abject"ion
does not cloud an appreciation of Kierkegaardis idea of faith wh"ich
follmlJs below. Camus -in his My~i..~_~~ held that Kierkegaard
had through d "strai ned subtefuge" given lithe irrational the
appearance 9 and God the aUri butes ~ of the absurd H and that for
Kierkegaard "since nothing is proved 9 everything is proved. 1l 69
Camus~ however~ t~eacts from h-is own presupposition that hope has.
no place in the un'i verse b~· ause there is no God. Lescoe rightly
po; nts out that lithe absence of God 'j s of course a gratui taus assump-
tion on Carr.Js· part." 70 By jettison'jng Kierkegaar'd's presupposition
of God 9 Camus like Sartre is forced to make authent·ic existence the





In Part 1 it was pointed out, how for Kierkegaard~ the ind'iv'idual,
who by the nature of his being an existing individual.ll must face the
dread and angui sh of freedom but that that freedom is authentically
manifested when the individual. as Luther said 9 exists coram deo.
The anx iety and dread that accompani es existence (and th'j s does
not mean we are unmindful of the positive moods of existence \vh-ich
Bo 11 nm:v wi shed to rem; nd us) ~ these negative moods have the propensity
to lead us to despair which 9 left unattended~ is sino 71 However~
this s'in can be atonc-d by single-eyed commitment for flpurity of heart~ll
said Kierkegaard lIis to will one thing. u 72 As Roberts states 9
UFor Kierkegaard truth does not lie in trying to show that history
as a II'Jhole is rationally ordered but at the point \'Jhere "interplay
ta.kes p1ac(~ betltJeen human freedom and di vi ne freedom. I1 73 It 1"c-'
in this interplay that faith emerges.,
he maintains that it is at the level of one's own existence and finitude
-
that one comes to terms ~Jith the lowliness of the Il one who gives
himself out to be God (and) appears to be a 1m'1 class g poor g suffering
and finally impotent man." 74 It is in the' Incarnation that there
exists the potential for man to recogrrize r1'is dependence on God and
hence to man"ifest his freedom. 75 God, therefore~ is not to be found
in a grand metaphys"ical system but at the point where He tOllches
human €:)(; stence m~ He is not to be found at all. Thus contrarv to
making the subjective experience of the individual all impo~·tant~
as many of Kierkegaai~d's critics wrongly think, he was in fact attemp-
ting to make central to theology~ to faith and to human existence
and freedom, the Christ-event and the God-man. Therefore, in spite
of his criticism of existentialism, the later Barth's Christo-centricism
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remains faithful to Kierkegaardis principal thesis.
Faith is not a feeling but a ri,;k of existence. It is that state
of wholeness \l\Iher'eby ~ Ir-Jithout cl os i ng ones eyes to the dreaG of
ex"istence, one does not give into dispair or the "sickness unto
death." 1\5 B. Reichenbach states 9 !lA thing is qualitatively that
by \I'lhich it is measured, and in the state of wholeness it is measuted
by God ••• whereas despair was before God~ faith or wholeness came
about before God.1! 75
2.3.2. CONTRA NOMINAL CHRISTIANITY: A RELIGION WITHOUT FAITH
K'ierkegaardis refutation of the institutionalized Christ'ianHy of
his day vias a corollary of his polemic against Hegel. Hegel l s thought
had had a marked 'influence on the theology of Europe and his laudatory
stance towards the Pruss; an State di d much to confi rm the all i ance
between the state and the Lutheran church in Denmark and other European
countri es. K-I erkegaard cons; dered the pastors of the state church
" Y'oyal officials" who were paid by the State and had abrogated
their caning as outlined in the Net'>} Testament. 76 He was not,
unm'ilare of the need to criticize the prevailing forms of Christianity
in order to liberate faith.
lhe whole of my work as an author is related to
Christianity, to the' problem of Ibecoming a Chr'istian'
\dth direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous
illusion ~'>Je call Christendom or aga'jnst the illus'ion
that in such. a land as ours all are Christians. 77
All Danes by virtue of the"ir birth were Christians and the fact of
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their faith maoe little or no difference to their lifestyles. He.
ccrrplaincd that the "illusion of a Christian \.. iInat,l 011 ••• lithe
pm'ler which number's exerc; se over the imagination." 78 People had
become cOii"tplacent in the fact of their church membership and 9 as H.
Diem pointed out v IIA wealth of information about Chr'istianity had
caused men to forget what it meant to exist as a Christian." 79
Therefore~ Kierkegaard held 9 lilt is easier to become a Christian
~1)'hen I am not a Chri st i an than to become a Chri st i an ~ \>'Jhen I am
one. 1I 80 He camp1al ned that his contemporari es I quest for an objective
faith had 'led to Ch,r.-istianity becoming a 9
little system~ if not quite so good as the Hegelian •••
It is as if Chri t were a professor ~ and as if the
Apostles had formed a scientific society. Ver-ily
if it was once difficult to become a Christiano""
it has now become easy. 81
His reaction to the Danish State Church \'Jas exemplified in his assess-
ment of Bi shop Mynster vd th \'Jhom he had entered "j nto contl"oversy
and who had recently died. He wrote 3
If only it had been possible to persuade him to
end his life \1ith the admission that what he had
represented It/as not really Christianity~ but a mitiga~
tion of it: that would have been most desirable
3
for he carried a whole age along v~ith him... Dead
without having made the admission~ everything is
altered; now it .i1erely remains that h'ts preaching
hardened Christianity into a deception. 82
Kierkegaard struggles to present a challenge to those who pay lip-service
to faith and who rest contented in a religion e~~~.
He perceived his calling as that of a missionary within Chr-istendom
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itself and aimed to "introduce Christianity into Christendom. ll 83
It is within this context that his views on lithe individual," "truth
as subjectivityn and "faith as encounter" must be understood.
Out of this conte)(t he can be easily misunderstood. As J Collette
stated, "He fought for the rediscovery of the specificity of a
Christian becoming. His effort is still ours today." 84
2.3.3. FAITH AND THE INDIVIDUAL~ EXISTING SUBJECT
~.=-~_.~_ ...,~~ ......"""",,-~.~~ ......~~*-,,=,~
For Kierl<egaard 9 more than any relation to a person, th"ing, race
or even church, to n;late oneself to God "in faith is the most irnportant
manifestation of freedom. He, therefore, refoctlses on the individual
who had been lost either in the logical system (Hegel and dogmatic
systems) or in the crmvd (state church and nonri na 1 Chr"j stendom) •
He repeats the viev>i that lithe crm"ct is the lietl because,
it renders the i ndi vidua1 completely impenitent
and irresponsible, at at least reduces h-j s sense
of responsibi 1ity by reducing it to a fraction.
Therefore, in Ei ther Or he argued not for "knm;; thyse1f" but
for IIchoose thyself ll • 86 Only thus and not in the crowd can man
understand sin, penitence ar.<I responsibility. 87
wrote,
liThe crowd" he
is an abstract-ion and ha:; no hands •• " none has more
contempt for what it -j s to be a man than they who
make it their profession to lead the crOWd ••• Therefore
v/as Chri st cruci fi ed 9 because a1though he addressed
himself to all, he he'!':.! no deal'ings with the crowd
because ... he would be what he is, the Truth vihich
relates to the individual. 88
Over against
-192-
O'the abstract; fantast ica1 and impersonal crowd li
Ki erkegaard seeks to reaffi rm human freedom by refocus i rig on the
mdsting subject~ the "flesh and biood indi\lidl1al~ii as Lescoe says~
Unot some Platonic form or even Cl moment in a Hegel"ian d-lalectic
processo ll ,89
clarifying his understanding of the existing subject. I i1 Hei deggev',
man l s finitude was the basis by ~Jhich to grasp the idea of Being
but Ki erkegaard had placed man B s fi nitude in the context of man IS
relation with God. Finitude not only is the ground fo'" man to come
to terms \lIith his s'in but ·0.150 H:. is his highest value because it
is the bas'is of his freedom. Temporality, finHude and history are
not evil in themse1ves~ On the contrarY9 history is the sphere of
human freedom for salvation is not the escape from terrveralii;y 'like
some form of moksha or nirvana. Salvation is grounded in history
because it is based on the Incarnation. g'l It is 'j n the awareness
of onels finitude that faith becomes possible. Hence existential
Christian'ity is neither supra-histOt~'ical nor a-historical.
It is on 1y \'Jhen man takes seri ous 1y hi s finitude which in Pal"t 1
\'\1as defined as limited~ historical and contingent exp.\rience 9 only
then will faith and freedom be possible. As A. Shumu~li argued 9
In order to become authentic and truly human~ one
must fi rst recogni se hi s 1imits. • • the aestheticist
is indifferent to his limitations o •• (he) does not
choose facticity or himself; facticity chooses
him and manipulates him mechanica'lly. The true
man, however, consciously chooses his OVln facticity
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and assumes responsibility for it. 92
Existence and the penJna'l rea'lity of the individual are synonymous.
The individual does not exist in " empty solitude ll and therefore
the common charge of so l"i pc i srn that is 1evCln ed at Ki erkegaard is
ill-founded. "The individual is alone before God" and "in the relation
betvveen God as personal be; rig and the bel i ever as personal be; n9 ~
in existence~ is to be found the concept of faith." 93
In this connection 9 Kierkegaard made a ~tatement which taken out
of the context of the discussion on faith ho.s been frequently misunder-
stood. He stated,
God only eX'ists for an existing man ie. he can only
existJn ,faith. Prov;dence~ atonement etc. only
exist for an existing individual... Faith iso.o
the ant'icipation of the eternal which holds the
factors together, the cleavages of existence. t'Jhen
an existing individual has not got faith God is
not, neither does God ex; st, althouoh understood
~ ......"..,.. y
from an eternal poi nt of vi e~lI God is eternally. 94
Kierkegaard is not saying, as many think he is, that God is a subjective
experience or that the atonement is not an objective \I·ark. Nothing
is further from h-j s mi nd! On the contrary, he takes the objectivity
of God 2 and the atonement as axiomatic bl'·'. contends that one can
only speak of that which one is altJal"e; that God 9 over and above
the catalogues of propositional statements about Him, is on'!y really
understood in personal encounter. Even if the universal could be
expressed in abstract terms it still remains meaningless unless appro"
priated by the existing subject. Hence his emphasis on "true in-
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ItJardness!l 'is not an escape into subjectivism but an emphasis on
living faHh." This is IrJhat he meant by Il an objective uncertainty
held fast in the appropr'iatiofl prdcess of the most passionate 'ifl\'Jar-d-
ness ••• the highest tr'uth attainabl~ for an existing individuaL B 95
Some have criticized this view of Kierkegaarc\ on the ground that
the rejection of objectivity leads to the lose of the transcendent. 96
Others, similarly, have argued that subjectivity must presuppose
objecti vity si nee a person must kl101lJ \fJhat Chri st -j anity is before
he can ref"lect on it. 96 Such viev-Js, as we have intimated already,
miss the intent'ion of Kied<egaard. He did not deny the need for
reflect"ion on doctrine nehher d-id . he intend deny'ing the validity
of systematic theology but was affi rmi ng that no amount of i nformat ion
about Christianity makes commH;ment or decision any more v'lable because
faith is not logical'!y arrived at and because freedom g like ej(iste!1ce~
is not a postulate. As F. Nucho stated?
••• applied to Christian"itys the difference betllJeen
objectivity and subjectivity is the difference beb.reen
kno\'ring ~Jhat Christianity is and be'jng a Christian.
SubjectivitY9 therefore, implies continual striving
without which human life disintegrates and man ceases
to be a person. 97
Faith is the qualitative mode of l.Jeing that crosses g say S E Stumpf
lithe distinction bebJeen tLle and realitY9 and bebJeen objectivity
and subjecthity." 98 For Kierkegaatd faith was the mode of £~~
Christian.
These aspects of faith are most vividly presented in Fear_~d Trembling
in his incisive analysis of the faith of Abraham.
ABRAHAM:
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TRAGIC HERO OR' KNIGHT OF FAITH?
~ ~~
Kierkegaard I s choice of thi s story to expound on faith was not an
arbitrary one. Hegel also had used the example of Abraham to inustrate
that the drastic break from native cultural and natural ties is achieved
in order to produce a ne",! beginning; in Abrahamis case~ the beginn-ing
of Judaism. 99 Hegel had placed the story in socio-cultural and
historical terms. Kierkegaard believed that the story of ,I\braham
could only be grasped if it \'1as set in existential terms since there-in
lay the clues -;:0 understanding the nature of faith.
1. Abraham's E~rti~u~~E. relationship with God d"jspenses \'Jith any
form of mediation (community~ state g tradition and such like) and
as ind'ividual he sustains as absolute relation ~ljith the AbSOlute.
The kni ght of faith has the po\rJer to concentrate the who 1e of l-i-re
and the whole significance of life in one single wish; 100 to concen-
trate the whole resu It of the operations of thought inane act of
consciousness. 101 He is not like the capitalist 1/.710 spreads his
investments so that if he loses on the one he wi i 1 gai n on another.
Abrahamis is courageous belief because he "bel-ieves for his
life
ll
; 102 he makes faith everything~ Itvhich is what it is. 103
The courage of faith is paradoxical because in faith the individual
is higher than the universal since his relation to the universal
is determined by his relation to the Absolute which is greater than
the universal. It is paradoxical because in faith meaning is grasped
11 by vi rtue of the Absurd. It 104 Croxa 11 suggests that 11 I Kraft af"
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shou 1d rf'lther be trans 1ated 'u on the authorHyll instead of "by
virtue of" siilce it points to the authority of action. 105 Believing
by tile aUf:hm~ity of the Absurd is f ..w Kierkegaard a radical fu1fi lrnent
of Luke 14: 26 ~ Ii If any man cometh unto me and hatet.h not his father
and mother and wife and children and brethren and sistrr5~ yea, rds
own life also~ he cannot be my disciple.1! "Th"is -ls a hard saying"
says Kierkegaard» 1I~'\Iho can beaf to hear it? For this reason "it
"is heard very seldom." 106 He complains that by Ildistasteful exegesis ll
the radicality of Christian commitment is explained atIJay by Christen-
dome 107 He !;!rote of the choice fadng the C;r;stian thllS 9
Either there is an absolute duty tc ~ard God~ or
if so ~ it is the paradox here descri bed ~ that the
individual as -individual is higher than the universal
and~ as the individua1 9 stands in absolute relation
to the absolute or else faith never ex i steel or to
put it differently~ Abraham is lost. 108
Here ; s the fundamental difference between Abraham g the kni ght of
faith~ and the tragic hero. The tragic hero saclAifices himself and
all that he has foy' the wrlversal vl/hereas Abraham does nothing for
the universal but stands in absolute relation to the Absolute. Hence
Abraham was justified in keeping silent about his purpose before
Sarah g Eleazer and Isaaco The tragic hero~ on the nther hand,is
revealed and in this self-revel~tion is ., the be loved son of
ethicso ll 109 He does not know lithe distress ll nor the terrible
res pons -j bi 1ity of so1Hude. 11 0
2. Abraham resigns infinitely to God's \A/ill whereas mediation in
Hegel ~\las supposed to explain everything. Every movement of infinity
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comes about by passion and no amount of reflection can bring it about.
IIWhat ollr age lacks ll • sa-id Kierkegaard~ "is not reflect'ion but
pass-ion.1! 111
He explains what the infinite resignation of faHh is by the allusion
to learning hm'J to swim. \~hen a learner is suspended by a s\II!ilnrn-ing
belt he makes the mot-ions of sltJ'imming but he is not swimming unt-il
when thrm·Jn into the \'\!ater, _ he starts making the movements of
inf'inity s-ir.ce his life depends on them. Faith does the opposit.e~
a.fter hav-ing made the movements of infinity~ it makes those of finH-e"
ness. 112
Therefore, anyone \'Jho thinks that he can reasonably deduce faith
or that the story of Abraham \'JilllTove him to believe, deceives himself
and "wants to s\"iind 1e God out of the fi rst movement of faith, the
infinite resignation." 113 The infinite resignation is the last
stage prior to faith and only in this stage is one a~'!are of one1s
eternal validity and only then can then~ be any question of gr'asp'jng
existence by virtue of faith. 114
Furthermore, the kn'ight of faith does not annul h'is resignation but
preserves hi slave just as young as it was in its fi l~st movement.
He never lets it go from him, precisely because he makes the movements
infinitelyo 115 Hence faHh cannot lapse into blind faith or belief
because it remains ongoing encounter with God.
3. There is a double-movement of the Spirit by which ~fter the infinite
res i gnat i on the kni ght of faith 1i ves in the fi nite but in encounter
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with God.
The tragi c hero gave up hi s \i~i sh in order to accomp 1'1 sh hi s duty.
For the knight of faHh 9 vrish and duty are also ident"ica1 9 but he
gives up both. The trag'ic hero knows no absolute duty although he
has a sense of a h'igher duty. There iS 9 hOlfJeVer 9 a continuity bebleen
the "15 11 and the Il ought" even if that cont"inuity is perce"ived
antithetica.l1y ie. bebJeen ItJish and mora'l duty. The kn-ight of faith 9
on the other hand 9 makes the rl10vement of faith 'j n the author ity of
the absurd c ItJ'j thout po,ss'~on of one's sou 1 and a11 one! s heart one
cannot reach inf"inite resiglJ£\tion and 9 therefore 9 cannot reach faitho
In Abraham the double-movement of the sp"irit is most clearly evident
when Abraham broke his silence to anSlrler Isaac~ "God \'ri11 prov"ide
Himse 1f the 1amb of the burnt offer"j ng 9 my son.1l The double movement
took place in his soul:
of faith. 116
the infinite resignation· and the movement
4. The fearful teleological suspension of the ethical is exemplified
in Abraham's faitho If the ethica'l telos means as in Hegel tho.t
man can transcend himse If by abandon'! n9 himse1f in the uni versa 1~
then Ki erkegaard argues that Abraham becomes a murderer 0 117 However ~
Abt~aham who stands in absolute relation to the Absolute is higher
than the universal.
The dHference between the tragic hero and the knight of faHh is
here again clearly evident. The tragic hero rema-jns 'rJithin the ethical
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while Abraham suspended the E!thical because he possessed a higher
ie1os. 1'18 t4hile Agamemnon j the tragic hero~ has need of tears and
cl a<ims them~ one cannot weep over Abraham; "One approaches him
Abraham cannot be a tragic hero; he is either a murderer or a
believer. 120 Abraham \'JaS the kni aht of faith because ~'1hil e 'Ithe
""
Hence. Abraham needed no "panegyric to console h'im" for he "didst
gain an and didst retain Isaac. li 122 The paradox of faith ;s that
in staking all~ one gains all. Faith is not an aesthetic or ethical
impulse because its presupposit'ion is resignation. Neither is it
an i I1sti net of the heart but obta"j ns in the paradox of 1He and
existence. The structure of ex"j stence is analogous to the structrue
of faHh which is also ana.logous to the object of faith. the God-
man. To remove the pai~ado;{ or to reduce logicaliy existence to Cl
continuum of predictab"ility or a rational v~hole which does violence
existence itself and to GoeL Faith is ultimately distorted. The
call to faith~ therefore~ -is a can to live authentically ie. to
live fu!_1y human. In Part 1 vie have described this living as taking
seriously the cn~tingency of reality and the historicity of man.
The existent'lal~ must not be reduced again to an ontological ~i~2.
like the later Existentialists have done 9 but must remain as Kierkegaard
intended it~ the description of the vital and dynamic modus vivendi
of the man of faith.
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Some of the main c\Aiticisms of K'ierkegaard 9 s position must nm'4 be
addressed since very simi'lar crHicisms can be levelled at C~lristian
faith in genero'l. An evaluation of these crit'icisms will permit
easier discussion of other descriptions belo\'J of existential faith
and will obviate the need to examine these criticisms in each instance.
1. There is the general criticism from non·~theistic and atheistic
quarters v;Jhich reject any attempt to vieltJ man's salvation in the
realm of faHh. Camus' objections for example 1t has been already
mentioned. Herbert Maf'cuse~ also, argued that Kierkegaal'd held to
a content that could no longer' take re'ligious form. In Kierkegaard~
he cl aims 9 the truth 11 gets separated from thE~ sac; a1 all9 po1it i ca1
vortex in ~'1lhich it belongs. 1I 123 He points to Feuerbachgs perception
that KielAkegaatd failed to see that the human content of religion
can be preserved only by abandoning the relig"jous, other-worldly,
forms. liThe realization of religion requires its negation. 1I 124
This criticism is a critic·ism of religion in general and is based
on certain presuppositions that are problematic. The problem with
reducing religion to a social function and the danger of operational ism
have been amp ly stated already. Thi s v·j ew is based on the gratui tous
belief that God cannot exist. The burden of providing convincing
proof for God cannot be placed on Kierkegaard who vis-a -vis philosophi-
ca1 and theo 109i ca1 attempts to prov"j de such proof, poi nted out tha.t
faith obtai ns in taki ng human exi stence seri ous ly and that there
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cannot be proof in the natural '''scientific'l s~nse. If human existence
cannot be forced -j nto the Procrustean bed of log; c ~ then nei ther
. can God i"!Or faith~ i'Jhich are inextricably bound ItJith existence. be
restr-icted in this "'Jay.
Kierkegaard~ howevet s made a most important point \'Jhich these critics
have failed to grasp. He struggled to clarify that even after proof
of the mi racu 1ous or the Absurd -j s provi ded s such a lid; scovery"
will not matter a jot to a person until· he confronts it and
appropriates it for himself. A rational explanation or public demon-
stration of d-ivinity w-ill not conv,nce man. That conviction must
be the resu 1t of hi s 01tJn encounter wi th truth. Hence Kierkegaard
spoke of God existing for the exist-jng man. Only such an er.~ounter
~lIill preserve faith from the danger of actior.alism~ because faith
does not derive the transcendent from existence, as Karl Jaspers
tends to do~ neither does faith or the object of faHh become the
self-actualizing or self-transcend-ing act of the individual. The
object of faith is the God··man \vho identifies with man in history
and, whatever else men think of Christ. they cannot wish him Bltlay
from time and history.
2. A general critic"ism of Kierkegftrd is that in his trdnking, in-
dividualisrn turns into lithe most emphatic absolutism." "125
Walter Kaufman claims that Kierkegaard "tried to introduce the
indiv"idual into our thinking as a category. 11 126 J van Rinte·'en
maintained that this individual-ism "closes the door to authentic
metaphysical tl~anscendence \vherei n hope and the wholeness of the
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person lie." 127 Mack"intosh~' also, held that Kierkegaard ""induces
distortions of belief so violent and perverse as gravely to impei~"il
om' hold on the New Testament ~o~ceptiof! of God••• ()f the Life fns
children are called to lead ••• his ind"htidual"lsm is of so extreme
a type as iargely to disqualify him from understanding actual religion."
All these reactions that perceive Kierkegaardls refocusing on the
indiv·idual oS Iiindividualism!! or "isolatiorl'ism" misconstrue his
intention and fail to understand him agai nst the background of the
Hegelian hold on theology and the nominal complacency of Christ"ians.
They do not orasp his concern to restore the vitality
and c1,ynamign of Christian faith. If this central intention is missed
one can a.ccuse Kierkegaard of a host of ino.dequacies 9nd omiss"ions
which he had no intention of denying in any case.
Any refocusing on the individual ahJays must run the risk of this
kind of misunderstanding and Kierkegaard was not una~Jare of this
danger. ~Jhi1e he emphasized the uniqueness of each existing subject,
Cl
the d"j fferences l'lbetv;een peop 1e, he careful to point out,
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when truth is discovered from. the inside, when we learn im'iardness,
that love can be commanded. 130 Only then are men set free to 1i ve
for each other. This isa far cry from irdividualism!
Kierkegaard understood his own work as maieutic in that he a.imed
to make men a\'iare of who they are and ~\lhat the'j r si gnifi cance and
value was. 1\. Shumueli reminds us that Kierkegaard addressed himself
to the educators and the clergy attempt i n9 to hi gh l'j ght the need
for this maieutic; "an indirect communication ••• 'jntensif~ing the
learner's subjectivity." 131 According to Kierkegaard, Christian
soci ety is "the £~~~ quo. 'r~on of Chri st i anity, and no man
can be simu'!taneously a Christian and a hermit." 132 Those who aCCUS2
Kierkegaard of individualism and isolationism fail to see that ordy
by a mai euti c approach It!hereby i nd'i v'idua 1 man achi eves authent -j ci ty
that the problem of solipcism and alienation can be solved. In hi s
Works of L~, Kierkegaard's concern for the whole of society is
clearly indicated. 133
In this connection, 0 E Roberts mainta"ins that "the acid test ll
of existential Chr"ist-janity is its ecclesiology. 134 This is true
but, be that as it may, what is equally true and even more fundamenta.l
is that unless the ind"ividual can extricate himself from nMtural,
historical, traditional or cultural 'e-ies and unless one's commitment
to Christ is the most important relation. the un'ity and catholicity
of the church is endangered. IHence L Dupre argued that Ki erkegaard IS
emphasis could serve an important ecumenical purpose within, for
example, the Roman Catholic Church. He thinks that Kierkegaard's
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insights have the potential of highlighting the fact that Christianity
is not a social institution but a matter of individual commitment. 135
30 An equally unfounded criticism levelled aga"inst Kierkegaal"d is
that he is anti-rational"ist. Marcuse maihtains that his. attack on
the abstract led him "to assail certain universal concepts that
upho"ld the essential equality and dignity of man." 136 Kaufman thinks
that Kierkegaard IIrenounces clear and distinct thinking altogether. 11
He cites as "proof" of his claim I<ierkegaard ' s statements such
as "The conclusions of passions are the only epigrams" and\ "What
our age lacks is not reflection but passion, !I 137 He states,· "Reason
alone t to be sure~ cannot solve some of life's most central problems.
Does it fo 11 ow that passion can 9 or that t4 eason ought to be abandoned
altogether?~ 138
Again Kierkegaard's critics fail to grappple with the essentials
\
of hi s thought. It is far removed from the truth that if one states
that faith cannot be derived logoically or that in the face of the
Absurd, reason is impotent 9 that it in fact means that one is anti-
rationalist. On the contrary, he he 1d great respect for Socrates
and claimed that Religiousness A "which is based on i~easonu prepares
the way for Religiousness B "which is v.:holly of faith:' However?
he po"inted out that Socrates also did not fh'st get proofs of the
immortality of the soul so that he could live on the strength of
such proofs but ~ on the contrary, "he said that the possibility
of there be; ng an immortal i ty occupi es me to such a degree that I
unquest i onab ly stake my who 1e 1He upon it. .. 11 139 No one, however,
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. t' 'I' t'would cla"ilrl that Socrates '",as arrtl-'ra lona IS".
Ki erkegaard G s concern to 1i mi treason v"Ias only to temper t.he vri 1d
cla'irn for reason that Hege'l and his contempoi"aries had ma.de \lJhkh
invariably debunked the individual, In this connection~ Kierkegaard
rued having criticized Socrates in this M.A. thes'is. He wrotc:~ $
Influenced as I was by Hegel and the moderns, without
maturHy enough to grasp ItJhat is great s I cou 1d
not help in one place in my thesis indicating it
as a defect in Socrates that he had no eye for
totalitys but C'11y tr'eated individuals as separa.te
entities. 0 ~'Jhat Cl Hegel'ian fool IVJas! This is
precisely ~~ gl2at proof of how great an ethicist
Socrates was. 140
It is stangely iron"iea1 that what his critics accuse him of today~
he in fact had cr"iticised Socrates of~ but had come to see the folly
This point brings us to an important awareness that Kierkegaard himself
i'Jas nrindful oL He knew that his emphasis on faith would invariably
lead to an "1l11ba I ance but he proceeded fu l1y a\j~are of the danger because
he was convinced that the si tuat"ion in \lihich he found himself ~\Ias
aln:ady greatly balanced. H"15 crH:ics should take heed of his remark
"I am we l'j aware that every
human be'j ng is more or 1ess ones i ded and I do not regard it as a
faulL .• but the onesicledness of the intellectual creates the illusion
of hav'i ng everythi ng. 11 '141 Hence L. r'~ackey quite rightly stated s
The fact rE~l1lc.ins that Kierkegaard's Christianity
is inba"lanced and excessive. And the facts still
outstanding. is that Kierkegaard kne\'J it and meant
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it that way.. ~22.ingoi!,~~ristianit'y'9Feat~~
I~bl.~~g_9 the Fr!.~~~~~~ th~~~2l:~ and an
the rest were but ! correcti ves I recommended to
the camp1acent debi 1i ty of the present age. 142
IiGood GOd ll 9 wrote Kierkegaat~d9 IiWha't is easier for one who has first
giver. the corr'ec-.ive to go on and add 'the complimentary aspect?&!. 143
Adding this "complimentary aspect" is the ongoing t.~kT=of !..':.!..9.1ogY,a.......~.. - ----.-..-~
~~~~t !..':i Vi!1~,!he_th~q£L]~~l_tas~~ bu:t~e.~E~~up -I e_~.
ltJith the mOfe press<ing task of reinforc"ing faith in order to restore_ -......... =- ~--"'" _ = m _-===--~__
the balance. "He intentionally and purposely overemphasized
the role of '~aithgU says Lescoe g llin ol"der to compensate
for Hegel's overemphasis of the function and 'importance
of reason.1! 144 His central aim lr'Jas to show the austeY'ity
of believing and the seriousnes~ of faith.
,
4. A criticism levelled at Kierkegaard and the existentialists "in
genera19 is that they are a-hi stori ca 1. It 'j s con-cei vab 1e how the; r
emphasi s on transcendence and the se If-tra.nscendi n9 act may mi n'im'j ze
the relevance of histoY'y for the eX'isting subject. Hm~ever, if that
act i 5 placed ItJithi n context of Chr; st i an faith then it; s an act
rooted in hi story. If the object of faith is the God-man~ then a
historical rooting is an ~ric:~i of existential Christianityo With
such faith goes both reflection on the Scriptures and the significance
of the Christ-event (a \\fhollyhistorical event)9 and the Iristory
of the interpretation of those scriptures v.Jhich has already spanned
almost two thousand years.
0, E.Roberts maintains, however, that Kierkegaard has failed to clarify
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tile relation between faith ann history. 145 However 9 Kierkegaard
wi shed to po'j nt out that the bare facts of hi stm~y cannot stand alone;
that they have meaning in so far as the existing subject grasps them.
The bridging of faith and history has been the central aim of all
hermeneutics. The bridging is ultimate'ly fulfilled in the existentia"i
encounter "dth Christ; that iS 9 in faith. In other words 9 historical
facts do not stand alone as inanimate objects do. Unders tand'j ng
history ultimately means the apprehension of those facts ItI.'1ich involves
a decision being about them.
Kiet'l<egaat'd addressed this problem ~'!hen he referred to Lessing's
doubt vJhether one can base faith upon the accidental truths of history.
Fot' him, this "historical 11 basis was the Incarnat"ion. But to
the question \'IIhether this histor-ical fact is certain~ he answers p
.··even though it were the most certain of an histor'ical
facts s it I'JOuld be of no help~ there cannot be any
direct transition from an historical fact to the
""-""_........"-'"
foundati on upon it of an eternal happi ness, That
is something qualitatively new. 146
The underlying a"im of his thought was to highlight the 'importance
of the most -important decis"ion _abE,~!. history _in history: "1 choose;
that histor-iea'l fact means so much to me that I dec'ide to stake
my whol e 1He upon that 'if. .. \AJithout ri sk faith is an impossib'ility."147
The aesthete v/ha stands aloof from existence and who insists on that
aloofness in the name of "objectivity" vdl1 find this understanding
of h'istorical rootedness a scandal because he wi 11 claim that one
can be deluded into belieVing that this is of God. Not so, thinks
I<ierkegaard, if the choice is made in the. midst o'f' e " tXl S ence; a
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choice that ca11 s the \riha 1e person into questi on because it is ma.de
with the ':·jhole lHe. The fault of our age 9 he said~ is that it does
not 11 gr1 eve deep1y e~wughli in order to L1nderstand the cho; ce of
freedom. Hence its joy is superficial. 148 "At the hour of death U ,
however, "most people choose the right thing." 149
vJahl, furthermore, questions YJhether Kierkegaard ultimately does
not remove the scandal when he claims that for those who see the
truth, the Paradox vanishes. 150 Is Kierkegaard, therefore, not
rationa1'i z'j ng the Paradox altJay? On the contrary, what K-ierkegaard
said was that from the vantage po"lnt of Uthe d'ialect'ic of beliefl l ,
in encounter ~i1;th the Absurd "in faiths the apparent contracl"ictions,
not the Paradox, are removed. To remove the Paradox would means
that faith ll'li 11 be d-i started. Hence he wrote, Ill~hen the bel i ever
believes, the Absurd -is not the Absurd - faith transforms it; but
in every weak moment, to him it is again more or less the Absurd. II ••• 151
5. Another critici srn of Ki erkegaard ; s that he reduces the content
of religion to a minimum. Alisdair Maclntyre, for example, asks
what difference does it make to be Christian, to be before God inwardly,
since the knight of faith outwardly appear's accord-ing to Kierkegaa.rd,
as if he ~"Jere a tax-collector. The bareness of Kierkegaard i s response,
he claims, allows for easy seculahzation of his main thesis. 152
Matthew Spi nka~ simil ar 1y 9 argued that the revel at; on of God in Chri st
ought to have been g; veil greater \'/ei ght. He thi nks that K"j erkegaard IS
emphasi s on the transcendence of God endangers the Chri sti an doctri ne
of man as the image of God and that Ki erkegaard fosters a di stort ion
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of Christianity as serious as the one he fought against. 153
Again~ on0 must be reminded of Kierkegaard i scentral purpose whIch
IHas not to work out a systemaUc theology but to highlight the bas"is
of theology; a living~ dynamic f"'itho fJ,s Croxall stated~
There are those who may wi sh Ki erkegaard had concerned
himself mOl"e \!~ith questions of orthodox dogma~ all
of which 9 in the Chalcedon-ian sense, he accepts
w"i thout demur. But he S31'J hOlfJ easy "j t is to get
bogged down in dogma and miss life. 154
He ItJished to restote Cl dimensioli to doctrine that had become obsolete.
Contrary to what r~aclntyre int~mates, namely, that the knight of
faith goes on as before, Kierkegaard intended il as we observed in
fear and Trembling~ to highlight the fact that in the knight of faith,
while the external change may not be percept"ible, the internal change
is totaL Faith means the transformation of the person's disposition
to life. In Pau1ine language, he is in the world but he is no more
of the \AJor 1d. The knight of faith "walks in nevmess of life"
(Rom. 6:4); the "old manu he \r~as in Adam is crucified It!ith Christ
(Rom. 6: 3; Hence Blackham describes KieTkegaard's call as
revivalist's call to repentance (and) turning to Christ for salvat·ion,
the gift of faith, new b"lrth and the lFe of grace. 1I 155 To criticize
Kierkegaard from what he did no'~ say "IS an inadnissible
from silence.
argument
What these critics fail to remember is that Kierkegaard did not primari-
ly set out to achieve a fool proof metaphysic of belief for he claimed
that such a superstructure vJas not only impossible but also undermined
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faith itself. PIS Stumpf states', "~Jhat Kierkegaard wanted to underscore
was that v>!hen a person has knowledge, he is sti 11 in the predicament
of having to make a decision." 156
Kierkegaard was concerned with a pre-reflective question. nam(~y~
the nature of believing itself~ the struggle of faith. Christianity
had become contented only ~'Jith the t~esuJt of faith~ that is~ doctrines
and confessions. He complained that~
People are curious about the result. as they are
about the resu 1tin a book - they ~vant to knov~ not hi ng
about dread. distress~· the paradox. They flh't
aesthetically with the result. it comes just as
unexpectedly but also just as easily as a prize
in the 'lottery; and \oI}hen they have heat~d the result
they are edi fi ed. 157
Th; s easy goi n9 acceptance of doctri ne or lithe end ll he likened
to the"pillaging of the hold~ an act ~vorst than Judas' betrayal,
Kierkegaard did not intend to tr'ivialize theological reflection or
any of the doctrines of the church. 158 He ~I/ished to remind Christians
that before one can proceed with theo 109Y and erH i ca1 refl eet ion.
there ;s the struggle of faith itself and that this stl~uggle ;s an
ongoing one which keeps theology from lapsing into a fixed and stc,tic
systen. 159 To ignore this struggle and only to rest in the end of the
struggle is 1i ke exa 'lti 1'19 only in the fact that in the end Isaac
ItJas saved and forgetting the deep struggle of faith that Abraham
experienced long before that happy end and without any assurances
of such an end. 160 The struggle must o.lways be bt'ought into focus or
else,
only an ass,
that he had a
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One mounts a. winged horse, the same instant one
is at Mount Mori ah 9 the same <j nstant one sees the
ram; one forgets that Abraham, rode
which walks slm'dy along the road,
journey of three days, that he needed some time
to cleave the vJOod, to bind Isaac and to sharpen
the knife. 161
Faith, therefore, is not the end of the struggle but the beginning.
It is not a completion but a commencement. Only in vie\'~ of the
struggle of faith I.';ill the existing in faith remain an ongoing and
vital becoming. The kni ght of faith does not remai n stand'j ng in
faith but is on the move, the most important factor \fl/e have argued
in Part 1 that wi 11 ensure hi s freedom, for freedom it has been argued,
obtains in the ongoing quest for authentic existence. Freedom is
endemic to being human but only manifests itself and remains authentic
in continual affirmation; in the ongoinq quest whkh is commensurate
with h'j s chang; ng experi ence of 1 ••reallt,Yo Faith as encounter spurs
that movement on G It does not retreat into an ecclesiasticdl or
theological cocoon. The knight of faith is always on the move and
does not remain standing. "He \liould be offended,1I says Kierkegaard,
... if anyone were to say this of him. just as the
lover would be "indignant if one sa"id that he remained
standing in love. for he would reply, '1 do not
remain standing at love, my wh'lle life is this.' 162
This is the dynamic of Christian faith! This djnamic will be furthe~~
enquired into in the study that follm'ls of some theolooians of our
.J
century who have been i nf 1uenced by Ki erkegaard and \'/ho have also
attempted to clarify the natute of faith as ongoing encounter. In
our attempt to place I<ierkegaard in his histor"ical setting and to
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show why many of his critics have missed his intention 9 we have not
intended to imply that Kierkegaard himself \fiaS free of a constitutive
mode i . Hi s assertion of the subject - object scheme, hi s vi e1fJ of
the Absolute and the Paradox ~ are all part of such a model.
As soon as one verba1i zes Cl standpoi n tone i nvari ab ly sets up such
Cl model ~Ihich itself must be continually questioned OY' else ~'\jill
also become a fixed theoretical frame\'wrk. ~~hat Kierkegaard's model
_d=res not take sufficient notice of (and th<js is understandable within
his own historical situation) is the encounter with one's fellm\1
man. This dimension -is given its ;~ightful place in the encounter
of faith for example~ in the theologiec, of Ebeling and Gogarten v/hich
we shall later observe. Th . d . . f 11 h'" h' h15 lmenS'IOn 0 t e otner, \'J lC Kierkegaard
igllores~ is indispensible for the ongoing~ critical nature of theology
which will concern us in Part 111.
2.4 RUDOLPH BULTMANN: FAITH AND AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE
2.4.1. FAITH AND EXISTENCE
It has been i nt imated ah~eady that the prob 1em with "Christian"
existentialism is that "its existentialist presupposHions~ based
on the presuppositions of Heide'gger ' : philosophy in Bultmann's case~
become the basis for reading the Bible. It attempts to understand~
in our toimes" the Biblical message of the life, death and Ressurection
of Christ v/hose elements of the miraculous and the mystical are dis-
al10weci by the functionalistic and PosHivisistic spirit of our age.
Yet 9 as was stated already, in the attelnp+- to k th" ma e e message
•
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of the Bible more access'lh'le tb our age; it imposes on the Biblkal
texts a world-view quite foreign to it.
of Bultmann's demythologiz~tion programme.
I
TI11 s was the rai son cl etre
Neverthe 1ess, the hermeneutics of Bu ltmann remai ns hi gh ly prob 1emat i c
( I' 222) d the so called 11 "l\!el," quest for the historical Jesus iler 0 o. an _ -. ' 'Y
is an attEi1~t to redress the defici ences of the approach. The
litheologians of hope,ll Wolfhart Pannenberg and JUrgen Moltmann 9
in their attempt to understand the nature of revelation and provide
a greater hi storica'l rootedness for the Gospel, go even beyond the
new questors by offering a historical paradigm with which to understand
revelation. All these attempts \fis~a -vis traditional Christianity
have prob 1ems of the i r aVIin. The dynami c nature of theo 1ogy demands
that the constitution and reconstitution continues and that the
questioning and being questioned by new perspectives be insisted
upon.
Regarding Bultmann~ Tillich and others whose theologies will be referred
to be low 9 it shau 1cl be noted that the vary; n9 degrees of i nfl uence
that existentialism has had on them has to varying extents also in-
fluenced their under'standing of God~ scripture, Christology and other
dactri nes. th· resu 1ts of \'/h i ch are not a1ways free of prob 1ems.
Ho\'/ever. as it will be stated in Part 111. this very fact that
theolo9 i es do stand in controversial relation to each other demands
that theology remains an ongoing critical discipline.
However, an analysis of their understanding of these doctrines does
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not fall within the scope of this study. \,jhatis of lasting value
in their work~ and which can, make an important contribution even
to the most rigid orthodoxy 9 is their grappling with the existential
and their und:.:rstanding of Christian faith and commitment. This
dimension v/hen applied to even the more consetvative Christian under-
standing of life and doctrine infusps into them a ne\f~ vHalHy and
dynami srn. Christianity ceases to be existential (not ex-jstent'ialist!)
if it loses its ability to communicate life to man. Theology then
petrifies into one or other confessional or denominational stanc~
(cL part 111).
Bultmann v/as aware of h-is use of the existentialist's percept.ion
and the concomi tant prob 1ems his m'!l1 theo1ogy faced. He wrote,
Some critics have objected that I am borrow; n9
He'idegger! s categori es and forei n9 them upon the
New Test.amento I am afraid th'is onlY shm\!s that
they are b1i ncJi ng thei r eyes to the real prob 1em
9
~~hieh is that the pfrilosophers are saying the same
thing as the New Testament and saying it quite
independently. 163
Bultmann is quite right in so far ClS he applies the existential to
the 1He of faith. The criticism of his theology still holds true
for h"i s hermeneut"ica 1 method. For exarnple~ when he interprets the
Resurrection exi stenti ally 9 an important task for all Christian pro-
clamation, but funct"i ons on the )renli se that such an event was
mythological because the idea of Resurrection is "scientifica1ly"
impossible. Hi s method at thi s poi nt restri cts hi s ,ans\'ier and in
the process says more than is permissible.
Pure existentialism does not take the relation between man and God
into consider-atio~) at all.
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But this. for Bultmann. is its merH
it is just this procedure IfJhich gives that analys-is
'its freedom ••• an aspect of Be-j n9 is thereby expC'sed
which faith. but only faith. understands as t.he
relatedness of men to God. 164
In 50 far as existentialism or any philosophical analysis highlights
manis predical11ent~ even though they remain neutral and meW not provide
the answers. they do formu 1ate and accentuate the questions that
are put to man. They assi st the Chri sti an 8_ns\-vers to be meani ngfu lly
put because it i 5 not as if Chri st i an proc 1amat i on proceeds with
dispensing answers without taking cognizance of the questions besetting
man. Furthermore. such Cl. v"iew does not e)(clude the Tact that the
Bible also puts questions to man. But since the God of the Bible
is the God that identifies IIJith human existence~ the questions that
the Bible puts and those that derive from an open analysis of existence
itself. do not contradict each other. Hence while Bultmann's demytholo-
gi zat"ion programme is undoubtedly prob 1emat-ic for the same r'easons
that \fIe criticised Hegel-ian or Positiv"istic attempts at absolutizat"ion
of methodology~ one should not rule out that which is of lasting
value in his thought;
as authentic existence.
name ly, the understandi n9 of the 1He of faith
Helmut Thielicl(e's alarm about Bultmann's posHion should therefore
be cautioned. He wrote that Bultmann,
is compe 11 ed to carry the method he has chosen
namely, that of secular ph"jlosophy - to its logical
conclusion .. , Whenever a non-Biblical principle
from contemporary secu 1ar thought is app 1i ed to
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the interpretation of the Bible, the Bible's fac.~_as.
s~ i nterpretand i is vi 0 1ated, 'I;ith f ata 1
results. This is what happened in I<ant i s philosophy
and again in theological ideal"ism. It is happening
with Bultmann too. 165
Thielickeis concern is applicable in the spheY'e of hermeneut'ics but
his kind of caution and disjunct"ion between theology and philosophy
misses out Bultmann i s perception of the dynamics of faith.
Aust"in Farrar maintained that 1I1 n so far as existentialism opens
and enlarges vision, what can we do but v;felcome it? But when it
is used to set up arbitrary 1imits to the scope of our thought wc
have every reason to suspect and hate it." 166 In so fa.! as he rejects
methodological absohltizo.tion \lJe can only agree with him. HOYJever,
he too rejects Bultmann's theology at the very point at v'Jhich it
can make its greatest contribution to Chr;st-ianity and th"inking at
large 9 namely in its implications for faith. Hence one cannot agree
with hi s next remark that an examp 1e of 11 arb-! traryl! limH'ing of
thought is its fixing of lithe narrow model of persona·' encounter
on the whole form of our relation with the creator ••• " 167 It is
at this point at which Austin Farrar th-inks that Bultmann's vie\'I'
is at its nai"rowest~ that it is in fact at "its broadest.
It is unfor ~unate that in the controversies surrounding "demytholo·
gization" the theological spotlight fell only on the problem of
hermenelltics. This is evident in the vJrHings of Ernst Kinder, \~a1ter
KUnneth, A Oepke 9 Gerhard G1oege, an-d Hans Irf,vand amongst others. 168
Even Karl Jaspers and Karl Barth ('eacted to Bultmann mainly on the
issue of hermeneutics. Jaspers argued that,
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Kierkegaard and Bultmann posit a doctrine intended
to counteract a false rationalism I/Jhich unwitt'ingly
provides the bel"iever with a means to persevere
in his faith with good conscience, at the price
of violence to his reason. 169
HO\JJever ~ \'Jhatever the problems one may have with demytho log'j zat; on ~
Jaspers 9 says Bartsch ~ fa; 1s to see that "it was the resu'lt of a deep
concern for the church's preaching. 170 Bultmann demythologized
in order to prevent faith being based on human achievement; that
-is, where fa.ith becomes based on the proof of the m'iraculous or
faith becomes blind faith and the intellect is sacrificed. 171 HmtJever,
even if we go beyond Bu ltmann and retain the m'l racu 1ous and the
Resurrecti on ~ such a me~sage has still to be communi cated and thi s
primarily involves not a historical or cosmological question but
an existential one. 172
Karl Barth in h'is assessment of Bu'ltmann asks vJhether the "New
Testament's affirmations about God's saving act and about man being
in Christ are statements about man's subjective experience?"
He continues 9
Is this not reversing the New Testament?.. The
New Testaments however, focuses, corrects and
radicalizes this knowledge of man before faith.
it tel le; him not only that he is 'inauthentic and
fallen s uut that he is powerlE::;s to extr-icate himself
from his plight. 173
There is no need to argue whi ch comes fi rst) the awareness of need
and then the Chri st i an answer or t.he aVoJakening of the need by the
Christian witness before its ans~ver may be given. It is quite possible
that man ':ecomes al';are of such a need lonq before he ' f_ 1S a~'1are 0
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Christ in as much as it is possible that the exposure to the Christian
proc 1amat ion brings consciOllsness of such a need. Bm'th's view
does not take into cons'ideration people "in other rel'igiolls who~ in
their sincere search tI.Jithin those religious persuasions. eventua'l1y
are led to Christ. Their previous striving was the pre~~\~~~
e~~. Furthermore. BuHmann VJould have no quarrel with Barth
that man is lipowerless to extricate himself from his plight!! since
novJhere does he reject grace or percei ve of fa; th as not be; ng a
gift of God, (cL below) 0
, "-
Bultmann's contribution is best gleaned Vl~-a -vis his central intention
which was as F. Schumann pointed out,
. , ,to 'i nterpret the gospe 19 and the gospe 1 'j s not an
analysis of the formal structure of human life or
of the universe, but the proclamation of event and
encounter: God is present in Jesus Christ. 174
He might even claim. says Ba.rtsch, that Bultmann was trying to'iprevent
the Barmen Dec 1arati on from hardeni n9 into a doctri na 1 propositi on,
so that all that \'Jas necessary 'fJas to gi ve it formal assent." 175
Bultmann's interpretat-ion of the creed, he claims, lays emphasis
on the 11 'credo' - 'I believe' as Karl Barth taught us to do"" 176
Bultmann stated it thus,
The man IrJho wishes to believe God as his God must
realize that he has noth i lg in his hand on which
to base his fa.ith. Ye IS suspended in mid-air and
cannot demand a proof of the "lord addresses him. '!77.- ..
It was over the issue of faith as gift, the work of grace, that Bultmann
ultimately differs IrJith existential'ism and maintained a critical (iistance.
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He "Jrote~ IIThis is wh'2re we part company. The New Testament affirms
the total incapacity of man to release himself from the fa"llen
state go.!I 178 Elsewhere he states ~
Here then is the crucial dist-lnction betvJeen the
Ne\'J Testament and existentiaHsm, behJeen Christian
faHh and the natural understand-ing of Being. The
New Testament speaks and faith knows of an act
of God through ItJhich man becomes capable of self-
commitment~ capable of faHh and love "and of authentic
existence. 179
In the New Testament there are tvlO series of statements concerning
reve1at ion " Bu ltmann categori zes the fi rst ser; es as that wh i ch
deals ~'Jith the revealing of Christ and of life. The second seri es
reveal the \tJord of faith and proclamat·ion. In the first series
revelation is presented as an occurrence and not primarily as a
communication af knowledge 9 while in the second~ this occurrence
180is not placed outside of us but is present in prodamat·iG'TI. lm
Bultmann attempts to rescue revelation from purely epistemological
terms by describing revelation as an happening which "encounters
man in the world." 182 Outside of faith revelation is not v"isible.
This does not 9 as many think, deny the objectivity ef revelation.
It is merely stating that it is only in faith that the object is
disclosed and therefore faith itself belongs to revelation. 183
The Bible has an existential "impact on one in a double-sense. It
not only shows one a possible 'day of understanding onels eX'istence
which may be accepted or rejected. 1'10re than that "it assumes the
shape of a viOrd that addresses ,I'.',e ..... ersor1la·lly 'sometl-,,"ng l.'h,·ch- jJ •• , I ,~ ,
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cannot ~nticipate or take into account as a systematic prinicple
for my exposition," says Bu ltmann; that in traditional language
is "the work of the Holy Spirit." 184
It should be remembered also that Bultmann was reacting ~D the liberals
like \fon Halri'H.lck of the rjinetoo~1th century and the History of Religions
school which had reduced the Christian message to certain timeless
truths and had jettisoned hi story altogether. Bultmann attempted
to reaffirm the histor"ic Christ-event "through which God has v~rou9ht
manls redemption because his person is what the New Testament proclaims
as the dec is i ve event of redemption. 11 185 "Redeemed" exi stellce s
lI au thentic existence" and lithe life of faith"
These must now be more carefully studied.
2.4.2 FAITH AND AUTHENTICITY
are all synolijms.
The life of faith is authentic life and means the abandonment of
a11 se 1f -centred securi ty. This in Pauline language is the life
of the Spirit. The oppas He 'j s the '" 1He in the flesh" (Phi 1.
3:3f) which Bultma.nn describes as "the sphere of visible, concrete,
tangi b1e and measurab 1e real i ty s the sphere of corruption and death"
~vherein man is vlei ghed dmvn by anx i ety (;u >:_ eIr v cf... \I 1 Cor. 7:32ff;
Rom. 8: 15) • Life 'in the flesh is a transitory sphere, anxiety r;dden
and wHhin it security can only be achieved at the other's
expense. 186 Unlike the "spiritual man", the "natural man"
his confidence in the flesh (Phil. 3:3f). 187




he IIlosesll himself "in the world and identifies h-imself in the sphere
of the f1 esh or he preserves an inner distance from the \twr 1d by
t~emaining open to the future. Thus the choice facirg man is that
of inauthenticity in the world or freedom from the world. This choice~
man as to face by virtue of his being a uniquely historical being
\tJhose histor'icHy (Geschichtlichkeit) is either authentic or inauthen-
tic. As Schubert Ogden states it~
To be man is to· be canti nua l1y confronted VJi th
decision~ I;ihich is posed by one's present encounters
with other pel~sons and wHh desti ny ~ whether to
lose oneself "in the past constituted by one's inner
and outer \.;Jor 1d or rather to become the new future
se "I f tha';~ is ahlays be-i ng offered one to become. 188
To live according to the flesh (\<'AleI.. (Jo',P1<.c\..) is to adopt the attitude
and conduct that is directed to the sphere of the flesh from wh"ich
'it takes "its norm. 189 r~an becomes the slave of that very sphere
he had hoped to master because "the flesh" becomes a power over
him. 190
Life in the flesh is also described as life under the Law (GaL 3:23),
Inauthentic existence manifests itself when obedience to the Law
is changed into an accomp 1i shment and ~ as the Jei'/s had m"i sused the
Law~ it became a means of self-glory and boasting. Therefore, stated
Bu 1tmann, "The primal s'in is not aninfer'jor morality, but rather
the understandi ng of onese 1f in terms of onese 1f. and the attempt
to secure one I s existence .. 0 by means of one I s ovm aecomp 1i shments ... "
(cL 11 Cor. II:18)~ 191
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To be in Christ g said Paul g ~s to be Il a new creature" and "to
be in the Spirit" means to exist in a "ne~'! mode of being ll • Sin for
Paul and John is not merely moral attitude but is,
... the basic attitude of natura1 man who cannot bear
to l-ive in uncerta'inty before God, but longs to
secure his ex i stence and endeavours to create such
security ••• Sin is to \'1ant to live out of one's
se 1f, out of one's own pO~Jer', rather than out of
radical surrender to God g to wha.t he demands••• 192
Being a 11 seW' is ...mat being a man means but being a creature leads one to exist
by and for himse1f(superbia). 193 Freedom ma.nifests itself in the
ongoing affirmation of authentic existence and, even in the mode
of inauthentic existence, the self cannot be entirely lost. Bultmann's
G1auben und Verstehen argues that even 'j n its i nauthent'i c freedom,
the self remains free to sane extent because'
11
it itself in its authentic
freedom and responsibility is the only ultimate cause or explanation
of its own inauthenticity." 194
In the transition from La\'J to Grace, a new understanding of one's
self takes place. It is not a mental development but "is decis-ion
in regard to the grace which encounters man in the proclaimed." 195
In this connection, Bultmann m(linta~fled that Heidegeris ontological
ctnalysis "can be fructified by Kierkegaard's explicitly Christian
understanding of man wHhout He-jdegger thereby becoming a theo'logian
or Kierkegaard turning out to be a philosopher. 1l 196
In contradistinction to inauthentic 'life in the flesh', the "life
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of fa.ith means the abandoned of. se1f~contrived security for "this
1He must have fa-j th in the grace of God ~ faith that the unseen ~
intangible_reality actually confronts us as love, open-ing UpOUf
future and signifying not death but life. 1I 197 This faith _invariably
places the La~'! and the world in its proper perspective. Because
faith is based on justification bt.~ and not on
man shou1d boast"g faith frees man from the ~JOrld.
II works 1est
I t restores to
the war1d its proper autonomy as. the "field of man's labours. 1I
The life of faith places the believer in a paradoxical relation to
the ~'Jor1d and the world-view of modern science since he lives in
the ~\lolld but is not of the war 1d.
"WS rl..l ." 198
He relates with the world
Hence for Paul and John the lHe of faith is not a static state
but a dynamic movement in tha dialectical tension of "i5 11 and "not
yet. II '199 Bultmann describes this as a tension between the indicative
and the imperative.
To eX'ist as a Christian means to l'ive in freedom,
a freedom ; n \fih i ch the be 11 ever is brought by the
divine grace which appeared in Christ. The one
justified by faith is set free from r.is past~ from
h-is sin, from himself. And he ~s set free for a
real historical life in free decisions. This is
made clear by the fact that the demands of God are
summed up in the commandment of love •• , \lIJh;ch does
not consist in formulated statements. 200
This Pauline descr-iption of the life of faith finds a counterpart
in John's thought where the' life pf faith is described as eschatological
existence. John applies the indicative - imperative paradigm to
explain the bel"levers liberation from sinning and the constant tempta-
tiol1 he faces even after such a l-iberation. The tension obtains
in the fact that the believer does not sin (1 John 3:9; 5:18) yet
the equally true statement that iI If we say ItJe have no sin \'Je decei ve
ourselves and the truth is not in us." (1 John 1: 8) • John be1i eves
that freedom from sin is an ong01ng tension and the apparent contradic-
tion between the statements form a paradoxical unity in the life
of faHh. The tension is unavo·idable. On the one hand 9 it maintains
a "radical consciousness of being a sinner" and on the other hand~
prevents the life of faHh f'rom lapsing "into any false security.
2.4.3. FAITH AS ONGOING EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTER.._----~._---_.~--
Jul"ius Schniewind and the major-ity of Bultmannis critics accuse him
of ignoring the connection beb/een faith and the historical event
of the dea.th and l~esurrection of Christ. Bultmann's ansl,'Iers to this
criticism highlight his understanding of faith as encounter.
To ignore the connection between faith and history in this "'lay, he
poi nts OLlt, wOlll d 1ead to the surrender; ng of the kerygma and that
\<Jas not his intent ion. 202 What he was concerned with was the
"permanent historic sigrrifkance of the cross", not as a timeless,
abstract idea, but as an "everpresent. reality in the kerygma and
sacraments
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(both of whi ch are forms of persona I encounter) and •••.
in the da"ily life of the Christian. 1l 203
In reply to Schniewind he pointed out that he had no object"ion to
speaking of Il a unique and final revelation of God in history" 204
provi ded that the context put the mean"j rig of the claim beyond a11
doubt since it was not as if we were mal< i ng a statement Cl.bout ~ for
example 9 the history of Anglo Amer-jcan relations. The danger of
the statement is that it may make revel at ion into a .~.ev~!!1.~ sometlri ng
which took place in the past and which can now be an object of detached
observat"ion. If this happens then the CfOSS 'Ioses its eschatological
character 205 anti the kerygma becomes merely a "bare report about
something now dead and done with. l ! 206 If this eschato1ogical dimension
is lost~ says Bultmann$ then it \'vould be forgotten that~
now is the day of Salvation.eo (that) it is only
through the proclamation that the cross can become
a personal encounter and so an ever-present real i ty.
But this not to deny the un; queness of Chri st.
On the contrary ~ it gi ves fu 11 we'j ght to 'the \~ord
made flesh' "in which alone the proclamation has
its origin and credentials. 207
He states emphatical1y~ .. I 11ave no '. ~ - h t f d .lntentlOn w a ever 0 enylng
the uniqueness of the first Easter day in spite of my· "insistence
on the significance of our being crucified and risen
wHh ChrisL" 208 Chr"ist's destiny, he believes, VJas indeed bound
up with 'chat of the whole human race but that universal significance
can only be realized through encounter with the kerygma and the response
of faith. This he argues, is what the Reformers meant by extra nos. 209
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The hi star; an I s personal encouilter \!IJ; th the past does not take place
by reproduc; fig the events of the past ; n memory but by encounteri ng
those events as past human existence together with its ; nt€:pretat ion.
Kerygma, on the other hand, represents the past events 'i n such
a \'1ay that it rene\l'JS th~m and becomes a personal encounter for me.
Hence lithe NO\;J of the kerygma (2 Cor. 6:2) is not purely fortuitous,
but ident"ical with the advent of Jesus and his passion." HO\lJever,
for Bultmann, trust in the reliat,rilit}' of the tradition should not
be identHied with "fiducial faith. '! 210 BuHmann here separates
Gesch;c~ and H~ri!, a separation which several have shown to
be problematic. The dualism between salvation history am:! tr~ secula,r
is quite unwarranted as Pannenberg and others have recently shown. 211
Nevertheless s Bultrnann 'is quite correct in highlight'ing the "No\'!"
of faith as the ever present moment of deci~ion before God. He writes~
I ••• assert with the New Testament that \lJe are
confrontEtd vd th the eschaton in the Now of encounter, ..
Here indeed is that paradox of the f ai th of the
New Testament, and here is the ansv-Ier to the question
of eis t; and of the telos. 212
-~ --,~
Therefore~ Bu ltmann refutes the cri t'i ci sm that he runs away from
Historie in order to take refuge in Geschichte whereas what he was
-,---- _'_O-......-"""._~........~...
renouncing was any form of encounter with a phenomenon of past history.
inclUding an encounter with the Christ after the flesh. so that he
may encounter the Christ procla"imed in the kerygma which confronts
one in one's present histor'ic situation.-_...~..........,.--... That 9 he claims, is the
on ly way to preserve the paradox or skanda1on of Chri st i an Droe 1ama-
..,----_..._~. ~
tion. 213
3u1tmann quite definitely overstates his case when he claims that
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the myth makes the mi stake of 'fjetti ng r-i d of the offence and of the
i ncogn"ito of the I'lord and therefore on ly i nterpretat i on can preserve
the eschatolojical significance of the Cross. He overlooks the fact
that the apostles, VJho did not understand. ',-he Christ-event as myth
but as real event in their time, \'JPre very av/are of the scandalon
of the crosso Also Itmvth" itself, like Bultmannls existentialist
interpretation, also atterl1pted to ItKlY{\ out the eschatological implications
of that event. Hml-Jever, Bu ltmann makes the vety import.ant observati on
that It the i mposs i b'j 1ity of provi ng the kerygma need not surpr i se
us, for the Saviour, as he appearc; in history, identifies completely
with man (Phii 2:7).11 214 He will remain incognito
the historian.
even for
Austin Farrar maintained, in this connection, that the work of histori-
cal scholarship may bring me face to face with what \P/ill awaken faith
in me. !! I may be1i eve then and there 5 11 he \rwote, 11 and w'ithout
waiting to hear Dr 8ultmann preach (Christ) to me from the
pulpit." 215 Of course what Farrar states 'is quite possible but this
kind of response overlooks the crisis of proclamation. One can on'iy
understand the significance of the message and work of Christ through
the reports one has from the apostles, which reports are not a catalogue
of naked facts but a record of living convictions of the reality
of the Christ-event. This is the difference between reading a personal
letter and reading a dictionary.
Bu1tmann, in spite of the problems one may have with his hermeneutics,
intended to clar"ify the need for the personal encounter of faith
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as the basis of understanding: He, therefore, is not concerned too
much vri th the 11 howll of God! 5 speech but wi th the 11 hOi"l' of our
listening. "\lie must be prepared" he says, "to let Godls word challenge
everything in us and everything in the \'!orld ••• we mu::t give up every-
thing to which we are attached, everything that binds us." 216 He
It/ho is reverent and humble before life will hear "God's voice in
a11 its roar. 1I 217 On ly he villa is open to real Hy, whi ch \tie have
described as open to the contingency of real"ity and the limitation
of his own truth; aVJd only he lNTIO takes ex; stence
the call of faith. Bultmann wrote after the war,
seriously wi 11 hear
•••• Has the war not also revealed all the dark,
demonic forces of the humc;n heart, all the passi ons
of self-seek"ing and falsehood, of brutality and
hate? •• the depths into which we gaze are really
the depths of God; that mysteries and riddles
constant ly emerge ane\'!~ that God "j s a God of contra-
dictions ..•• clarity VJi11 be given to us from "level
to 1eve 1, and as the r-i dd 1es increase, so a1so
vJi11 God's graces •.• And if we kneel at first humbly
and reverently before the hidden God of the riddle,
then we kneel humbly and reverently before the revealed
God of grace. 218
Th; s new 1He of faith is expressed as "encounterll not on ly because
faith is vie~\led as "answer", "decision" 2nd "authentic exi stence"
but also because the "walk of faith"'- is an ongoing, dynamic experience
before God Q Therefore, the life of faith cannot be expressed only
in indicative terms. It needs an imperative to complete it. The
,decision of faith, in other words, "needs to be renewed ; n ead
life situation." 219 This does not mean that faith implies a "timeless
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now ll says Bu1tmann~ but that as long as \'iere are historical beings
and as 10n9 as the future, thoLl,gh apprehended, is never a possess ion;
"faHh is still in via (Ph'il. 3:'12-14).11 220 Elsewhere he pointed
out that the life of the man of faith is not removed from its historical
conditions but, because it continues in its hi stor-icity s always has
the possibility of losing itseH. Hence, "1 He is a possibil ity
that can be 1aid hold of, but it is also a possibility that alvJays
must be laid hold of." 221 The man of faith does not ever become
an angel, but as Luther pithily put it, he is simul ,~~.~~~
justus_, 222
2.4.4. FAITH AND FREEDOM
Freedom, maintains Bultrnann, is release from all worldly enslavement
and "radical cj:'Cnness for encounters with God ••• " 223 It i nvo 1ves
the renunciation of every security that a man may achi eve in the
world including even "t~ight doctrine" or correct "Christian"
behaviour or any attempt that makes the free grace of God a possess; on
as if it \;Iei~e an object in the \lwr 1d. Freedom means the escape from
every form of i nauthent i c ex is tence and, therefore ~ is a renunc i at; ion
of every form of legalism or any security "in the world." This
kind of "security wou 1d mean seek i ng security wh i1est i 11 in a
state of unfreedorn; which vlith Heidegger, Bultmann called the state
of fal1enness. Therefore, "genuine freedom of faith is man's radical
surrender to God I s grace as the so 1e means whereby he· is severed
from his factual insecuritY9 his total lostness." 224
In Pauline language, then, freedom is freedom from the Law, sin and
death, and freedom for God and the world. This is what Paul intended
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by the contrasts Ilin the fl esh': and "in the Spirit" or .11 i n the
\Amr 1d" and 11 i n Christ" (cL Rom. 14:7f; Ga1. 2: 19f; 11 Cor. 5:14f;
1 Cor. 3:21-27J ~'Jhen St. Pau 1 announces that the be l"i ever has been
given lithe gift of the Sp"j rH" this is the equivalent of say-
ing he has been given freedom from the power of si n and death
(Ga1. 5: 25 ) • The power of sin which is embodied in the law
n Cor. 15:56), is ended Ilin Christ!! (Rom. 10:4). In Christ~
the law has been internalized which the scriptures described as
"vvritten in the tablets of the hearte" Similarly~ freedom from death
does not mean that suffer; ng or even phys i ca 1 death comes to an end ~
but that suffering is not an end itself (l Cor. 4:12f; 11 Cor.
6:9f). 225 Death cannot anymore have the crippling effect of a future-
1ess anxiety not on ly because dyi ng i i1 fa"ith promi ses hope but because
living in faith fills life with hope.
Hence, faith is hope and hope is the freedom of the future 226
because the man of faith has turned over his anxiety about himself
and his future to God in obedience (11 Cor. 3:1) " The man of faith
ceases "trusting in one's self" ("l1 Cor. 1: 9) or' "in the flesh"
(Ph i 1 3:3f) and trusts in "the God who raises the dead" ("11 Cor.
1: 9) • 227 . that is in the God of the future VJho cannot be 1irni ted,
by time or space or death. This, ult'imately, is the significance
of the Resurrection.
There is for the man of faith, a freedom from the Law and the \!wr 1d,
so that he is freed for the fulfilment of the Law and for the viOrld.





in Ga1. 5:25, If we live by the Spirit \'1e also walk
b . h S"t 11 'rh' "\5 f1if-thenfl tension marks the life of tht'! man erfy t e ~ pl rl •
faithinthev\'Orld. Becausehi:!is free from the obligation to the Law, he
is free to keep it. This d'ialectical relation to the world, Bultrnann
expresses thus,
It is faith in God the creator that Christian freedom
is based.... For such faith knovvs that noth'ing in
the world can ultimately claim me and also that
noth i n9 in the war 1d can destroy me. The man of
faith is free from anxiety because he fears God
and for the rest, fears nothing in the world •••
The PC1'iefSof the vmrld tempt man today as always
to surrender his freedom, and they promise his donl'ina··
tion over the \\Iorld if he vlill fall down and \>JOrship
them. But faith knows such worship is idolatry. 228
When man is freed in this v-Jay from himself, from sin and anxiety,
from the Law and the world, he is free for the world and his fellowman.
Christian faith, argues f3ultmann, ~'ihich claims to exist from God
and for God means to ex i st for my nei ghbour 0 229 Christian faith
11has its limits in loving consideration for the anxious brother
who is unable to free himself of the thought of the gods, evil power .•.
it has its limits in love for the brother." 230 If love is the limit,
in pra:tice it is 00 limit at all because it opens up a vJhole world
and manifests itself :ndlessly.
Hence, freedom in faith is not caprice or lawlessness or "doing
what one \'iants." If man is a historical being, "doing what one wants"
is to relinquish oneself to the past, wh'ich is to live inauthentically.
But freedom is faith grounded in freedom because in faith f;lan does
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v/hat he really v/ants to do,' namely to achieve authenticity, 231
Because
9
for the man of faith g the past holds no tyt'anny and the
v/Orld holds no threat, he is free to l"ive authentically vis-a -vis
the world and his neighbour. Everything worldly acquires a provisional
character (1 Cor. 7:31; 1 John 2:17) and he is free to obeY9 which
implies
9
that he is free to love. Hence for Bu1tmann, the nature
of the Christian life is a life of ract-ical freedom and responsibili-
ty. 232 Bultmann 9 in this connection~ repeatedly refers to 1 Cor.
7:29-31 throughout his writings.
j,lention has already been made of the dia-iectic of Christian existence
betltieen the indicative and the imperative and betwe~;n the "already"
and the Ilnot yet." TIris dialectic is the rl!'.Jwr of freedom and indispensoble
if man as man> and not .Gro~.?"~~2£!l. or si aye ~ is to 1i ve in the \!Jor 1d.
The Christian man. says Bultmann, is a "man beb/een the
times.1! 233 He is never 1imited to the mundane for that wou 1d be
a1i enated and i nauthent i c existence. ilL ife between the times" ; C',..,
1He that is true to the past. on 'Iy because one ; s freed for the
futur-e; 234
In the Gifford Lectures of 1955. Bultmann defined faith as
• •• faith in the future wh i ch God bestows on man.
in the coming of God. And this means that in the
Bible man is understood in his h"istoricHy. as
qualified by his past and required by his future. 235
Schniev-iind objected to Bultlnann's concept of freedom because he claimed
that it overlooks the essential point that lithe freedom Ivhich is
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the theme of the New Testament is of a wholly different order" to
that which Heidegger 9 for example, had understood. It is the facultas
standi extra se coram deo. However 9 Schniewind does not explain
what that freedom befofA God, outside oneself, really means except
to rehash several B-iblical allusions like lIfreedom frJm the curse
of the condemnation and bondage of the law. lI 236 All of these allusions
ay'e not se If-exp 1anatory. They have to be exp1a'j ned outside the
Semi tic or GY"aeco-Roman frame of reference in \flh i ch they are embedded.
They still remain, as Barth ~'iould say, the language of Canaan. 237
Bultmann in his reply to Schnie\'Jind po'jnted out that the philosopher
cannot i dent i fy his 'lI Verfa llenheit'! \\lith the theo 109 i an 's avers"j 0
a deo because on ly faHh can do that. 238 To explain how faith
fallenness was the task he had set for himself, as the
above discussion of his understanding of anthropology and the life
of faHh shoVJs.
J. Macquarrie pointed to what he thinks is an inconsistency in
Bu ltmann' s theo 1ogy for he argues that Bu ltmann sets out to formu 1ate
a purely "existential theology" but that,
as soon as that claim is made, as soon as we speak
of mi ghty acts or of grace, of reve 1at i on or of
Jesus Chr"jst 9 we are making or implying statements
v-Ihich are not statements about human exi stence and
we have abandoned the concept of a purely existential
theo 1ogy 0 Thi s is the i nCOiiS i stency of Bultmanc; s
own position. 239
t1acquarri e is correct on ly in so far as Bu ltmann intended to deve 1op
an existentialist theology, the differenc~ between that and existential
theology is quite obvious and this has already been clarified above.
That 8ultrnann's theology lapses into an existentialist one by virtue
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of his demythologization progr,amme is not beyond doubt and as such
remains highly prob"lematic. However, this does not mean theology
cannot be existential for that IJ./Quld mean faith ceases to be living.
ongoi ng encounter. If theology -i s to be true to its ca11 i n9 as defi nc:d
bv the fact of its object, namely, the God of the Bible and the Christ-
event of history, and to its subject, the existing man in history,
then it cannot be anything but existent"ia"!o A closer look at Gerhard
Ebeling's understanding of Christ"ian faith will help to further eluci-
date this argument.
2.5 GERHARD EBELING: FAI1H PS HAPPENING, EVENT, PARTICIPATION AND ENCOUNTER
_.~'T ·_.W~._,~......,.,••:_,._._.. ,-__- ··~ ......... r-"""_''''''''_'''''''''='''''''*'''''''''''_'~ __=''·_'''''''"'''''-_='''''''''''''''''''-''__··'·_
The danger that faith continuously faces. says Ebel-ing, is that it
can be turned into the IIChristian re"ligoion'l and be submerged by a
rel"igious self-understanding \,Aihich re-introduces the "\t~hole religious
paraphernalia lf of priests. cult and performances. 240 Faith, then,
loses its eschato 109i ca 1 character and becomes immanent i st. Ebe 1i n9
argues that f ai th is not somethi n9 separate from reality such as
a pious mood Ot the sum of religious ideas or a highly developed
theolog"ical system. "In such voJays,1l he writes, "faith is under
suspicion of being mere froth, an ideological illusion opposed to
realityo" 241 It was this "illusion," the caricature of faith.
not faith itself, that Feuerbach and Nietzsche so vehemently criticised.
205.1. FAITH AND EXISTENCE
- ...- ca
Ebellng believes that all meaningful talk ([bout faith or God must
be tied to human experience if it is not to become abstract speculation
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or literaJ ly irresponsible. To S!J'2fl,!< of God and man in or.e sent€l1o:' QelOOnUS that \,;'e
think aOOJt God concretely in term'.; of the artJiguity of er! stence. This arrbiguity
of 1He.
human existence. It must be understopd that lithe sting of death" threatens
our exi stence and in the end ItJe have no future. To tfl"j nk about God
in the face of this reality means to ho·ld to the contradiction that
if God is then we do have a future; that death is not the culmination
In Word and F~ith, Ebelingstates,
Faith is concrete faith in its being related to
a concrete situat ion. Faith is not one act a1on9s i de
other acts but is a I fundamenta 1 act of ex i stence ';
it masters and overcomes the concrete s"ituation
on the basis of the ground of existence. 242
In existence man is radically quest-ioned and this radical questioning
is a concomitant of the passivity of human existence. ~Jhatever \Ale
may believe about God, at least it must be admitted, argues Ebeling,
that man is not hi S oym creator but that he ~"as gi yen no choi ce of
time~ place or circumstances for his be"ing" Th"j s "thro\<'mness"
char'acterisizes his existence between birth and death and he must,
therefore, confront seriously the questions about where he came
and v/hither he goes? 243 The word "God ll is this "radical question
about wher·e man is, the" question which concerns him
unconditionallyo 11 "44 To refute faith means not only to live in open
contradiction of faith, as the nihilist.s or atheists do, but also
to live in contradiction to human existence itself. 245
To speak of faith is to speak of man becuase it is man It/ha encounters
faith as the "I" of faith, It implies the encounter of the indivi-
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,
dual, ex-lsting slJ.bject~ as Kierkegaard had maintained. "But to dispel
j
the fears of those v,lha accuse this view of admitting anI individual"ism,
/
Ebe l-i n9 vJrites that aHhough re'l i gi OLlS reality is d'l reeted toviards
the real exi stence of man it is wrong to suppose that thi s
involves "an ominously -ind-ividualistic benL" 246
"1 of
Sueh
an individualistic interpretation of faith is wholly inappropriate
to understand the entirety of real existencE'" \'Ih'ile the depth of
faith can be glimpsed only in relation to human e)<istence~ faith
is not an empty stretch of time but that i'Jhich is st'i1l to come.
247. It grapples vrith the significance of the history of the
lICrucif-ied One ll 248 in time and space and by virtue of that
s'ignificance s faith is directed to the future, It 'i s at the nexus
of the Cross and t"ime that faith observes in exi stence the omni potence
of God and 9 by a strange paradox~ fa'ith der'ives its power from po\tJer-
lessness. 249 Hence 9 Paul could write 3
but to
man and the IrJeakness of God is stronger
God 0 ••
are perishing
is the pair/er of
is w'j ser than
For the word of the cross is fa l'ly to those \<Iha
us who are being saved, it
For the foo li shness of God
than man. (1 Cor. 1:18, 25) 0
This -is the paradox of faith and it is analogical to the paradox
of existence! A decision about faith. as we observed also in Bultmann.
is to be expected~
actionat the poi nt v"here every carna 1 met'] ve of
\tlihich accompanies faith breaks dOi'm and fal'ls away;
where pure faith is exposed to the test of canfi rma-
tion; where it is deprived of all other powers
and abandoned by them, exposed ~ naked and defense 1ess
to thei r host -j l-j ty, 250
· . - ,.----~._._- -- .. -..- ._,----"-~ -"-.- ------ -- - -------- --- ~-------_-._.-.-------
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Ho\t1ever, contrary to the many. crH;icisms of faith as encounter, wh; ch
have been alluded to already 9 Ebe1i ng makes it clear that the ex i stence
of man and the reality of faith are not identical. Faith does not
receive its signifiance from "man and the frame'.b'ork of his poss'ibil"j-
t"ies." 251 If that were true, says Ebeling 9 then Pelagius i'wuld
have been correct that salvat'jon is derived from free wilL For
that matter, Feuer"bach \'wuld also be right and faith would be man!s
Christian faith, however, is the gift of God in that it is the
renunciation of everyth"ing man can achieve and faith means being
poi nted extra se. It is 1Hero. lly the case of abandoni ng oneself
(sich - selbst - Verlassen). 252 Grace, the gift of God, undergirds
faith because it takes place in enco~nter with Jesus Christ.
2.5.2. THE FAITH OF JESUS
v,lhat "is the connection between faith and Jesus of history? Ebeling
argues that, accordi ng to the wHness of the who 1e New Testament,
Jesus is not an "a\'\Ikv"ard" object of faith but the I! source" of
faith. "He does not make faith harder, but he makes it possible.".253
In his \~ord of God ~,nd T!adition he at~gues that the traditional idea
of Christ's vicaY'ious activity impl'ies his being for others and
in thi s sense means "keep'ing a place •••• \'Jhere the reconcilic\tion
between God and man can take place." 254 He is a "keeper of a place
for God among men, and of Cl ;Jlace for men before God." 255
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In the NeVI Testament records~, one observes that the decisive thing
in all the encounters people had with Jesus of Nazareth is that when
they approached him they v/ere cln.imed by his message. This claim
took the form of Il a seeing and heari ng not for neutral eyes" but
for the lIopenness of faith." 256 Faith in Jesus is to let him as
the \\~tness of faith, be the ground on ,,~h i ch we have to deal "4ith
God because "in him we know what it is to dea.l vd th God both in life
and death. Hence, he can never be just a moral example or a guru\
~ excel_lence. In Jesus of Nazareth~ authent·ic faith comes to full
express'ion. 257
Jesus' faith bears all the characteristics of faith \\lhich Ebeling
in i:Jord and Faith outlines as fo110\'1s: it is faith that concerns
human ex"istence at its very centr-e; 258 it belongs to the \'iholeness
of existence and is directed to the future; 259 as participation
in God IS omn i potence it was not mere ly an i so 1ated human act; 260
ll'its activity is its passivity, its strength of Iflill is its surrender
to the wi 11 of God, its power is its absolute pOltverlessness before
God." 261 In thisregard~ Ebeling makes the important, but oft
forgotten point. that "Jesus d"ici not come in or-der to found a ne\'J
religion, but in order to awaken faith." 262 Jesus came for no other
reason, Ebe1i ng poi nted out in a sermon. II than to gi ve us courage
to believe~ which means letting God be God."263 and \lIe may add,
letting man be man. Jesus as \I-ri tness of faith bore witness to what
it means to do \·,ith God in death as well as 1He. 264 Hence faith
is a following of Jesus not in the sense of repeating "outward motifs"
of his life, like fol1o\'Jing the example of some great person. It
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is \olely the taking up of the· innermost motif of the ItJay of Jesus,
namely, having to do with God, being committed to him." 265
The faith of the early Christians under'stood itself in terms of Jesus
having reach~d the goal. Th; s understand; ng was the ground of thei r
testifying to his resurrection. 266 The transition from the historical
Jesus to the Chri st of faith is no more a matter of course than is
the leap from death to life. 267 Hence, the life of faith, means
discipleship, not in the sense of merely fol1oltJing Jesus example,
but in a sharing of his freedom before God and in shar'ing in h-is
joy, his o"'edience, and his courage in face of the nearness of
God. 268 It is sharing and participating in his inner motif and
goal. Ebeling. wrote,
The ver'y name Jesus Chr-j st. • • • means that Jesus
and faith are joined together as closely as possible;
first~ in that faith is dependent on Jesus, it
is faHh in h"im; and second,_ clearly, in that this
Jesus is to a certain extent dependent on faith:
only faith can recognize him as he vdshes to be
recognised" 269
2.5.3. FAITH AS HAPPEN ING, EVENT AND PARTIC IPATION_=to" .....~__."""'- to _ ""--=<.",,..~.~. _
Faith is Cl.: historical happenin9 ma'intains Ebeling. It comes tJ
us out of history and it takes us into history. 270 Faith is not
some kind of innate truth of reason whi ch we may come upon oS we
please nor is it a private experience or im"'ard happening. It is
rather, the consequence of the "witness" of faith, which Ebeling




faith is historical and can never be true faith if it assumes.
an ahi storica1 detachment. "Instead of bei n9 a turni n9 altJay from
hi story 9 11 faith "opens up true freedom for h-istory." 271 This
openness to\'Jards history is ev"ident in that faith is forced into





it cannot afford to) avoid the contingency of reality.
Yet faith itself urges on historical movement 9 "a being on the
to fulfi 1\"Iay, its existence in the aff'irmation of freedomo" 272
Furthermore, "believing" is an event 0 It is primari ly as a verb
and not as a noun that its rea 1ity is clear ly expressed 0 Therefore 9
to speak of "having faith" distorts the nature of faith; so
does the expression " 1 am a believer" for that matter. To bringJ,
out the idea of event it is better to say " I be 1i eve." 273 A good
example of the distortion that can take place here is the way the
English translation of Hans KUng's Christ Se-in read "On being a--
Christian" whereas the dynami srn of the idea v.as better rendered
"Being Christiano" So was the distortion of the Eng1-]sh rend it ion
of Emil Brunner's \~ahrhei t a1s Beg.~~ as The Divine and Human
·",~'nu~"""",.,.__
Encounter instead of "Truth in encounter. " "Faith is by nature
-~._---
somethi ng 1i ved," says Ebeling 9 "not thought; it is an event,
not an idea. It dGes not have being, but it is." 274
Ebe1i n9 emphasizes the concept of the "Hard of God" because, he
maintains, it provides the most striking expression of \'ihat happens
to man from the side of God. 275 The \-Iorcl of God is not 11 ju st a
piece of information about God" for to put fa i th and Go.d 1 n the
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same sentence is to affirm the possibility of a disclosure of that
God and the possibi lity of pa.rticipation in Him. The Bible does
not provide knovdedge about God in Himself but of the God who is
for U~ and with us. To communicate thi s God who is open to us -j s
to communicate the ~Iord of God and it is therefore the commun"icat'ion
of fa,ith. 276
Faith and the Holy Spi rit aY'e two aspects of thi s one event; the
relation of God and man by virtue of Jesus. "Faith is man's participa-
tion in God ••••• the Spirit is God1s confirmation of this part-ic-ipa-
tion." 277 t'lan is always the subject of faHh, \'ihereas God -is alvJays
the subject of the Spi rite 278 From man's s'ide it "j s faith - from
God's side it is the Holy Spirit This distinction is also the basis
of the difference bet\lJeen faith and grace. From man's side it is
total commitment but from God's side it is totally a gift. A confusion
of the tvlO normally occurs vvhe I man forgets that he can on ly understand
the historical, human dimension of faith just as he can only see
"the human face of God. li 279 This confusion happens an too often
in theological discussion regarding free wills the preservation of
the saints s predestination s grace and such doctrines.
2.5.4. FAITH AS ENCOUNTER
Faith is encountering God vlith one's whole being. Ebeling writes,
God can only be spd.<en of -i n persona1 COffin; tment. •• one
must engage his existence for the existence of God •.•
in the 1ast resort thi s quest -j on cannot be anS\A/ered
in any p-i ecemea 1 1'1 ay , but on ly wi th one IS ovm person,
which awes an answer. 280
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Talk about God is only meaningful if it takes place in life as the
foca·1 point of encounter~ "not death or some artificially induced
funeral mood." 281 God meets us in His Word in the m'jdst of life,
This meeting or encounter, Ebeling sometimes calls~ "communication."
"Communication!! can mean either the communication of something as
in a neVJspaper or as "a means for shari ng" as in Hebrews 13:16.
In the first instance~ communication is limited to speech v/here I
have experi ence of a thi n9 as a subject of an object. In the second
form of communication, something is not only said~ something is done.
Somethi ng happens to me I experience 1aYe. Hence, communication
of the fi rst kind takes part vii th me as the observer';
form of communication, I share an encounter. 282
I n the second
This distinction is illustrated also in the difference between nous
and £~. The image appropri at.e to nous is that of lithe unchangi n9
clarity of the light in ,-which things stand for the gaze of the
observer.1! The appropri ate image for pn_eurna is the b1owi ng of the
I'd nd v"h i ch "catches one up in its movement." 283 Nous is connected
with t"imeless truth \'Jl1i1e pnetHr.-a vrith living power in temporal
exi stence" Ebe 1i n9 poi nts out that the HebrevJ word of "spi rit" has
a personal sense in contrast to the more natural sense of the Greek
usage. The New Testament uses "spiritual" and "Spir·it" to mean
"from God" and "before God ~ " the 1atter bei ng specifi ca lly t.he
sense of "encounter." The man of the "spirit" is the "man of
courase" (the spi ri ted r:lan) I'"ho is,
not divided, or in doubt; he does not stand in his
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own way? he is not consumed by self-contradiction,
t'lor does he deceive himself. He affi rms fl"imse 1f ~
and does not give up. 284-
Paul T111ich, in this connection, described faith "as ult-imate
concetn,1I an IQ act of the total persona1it~I... For faith -i s a matter
of freedom. Freedom is m:rtlring more than the possi bil ity of centred
persona1 acts... Fai th is more than trust in even the most sacred
authori ty. It is participation in the subject of one's ultimate
concern with one's whole being ••• The cert i tude of faith is
'existential' ~ meaning that the \-vhole existence of man is involved
- its certainty is not the uncert.ainty of a theoretical judgement
based on probability.1l 285
It requi res courage to depend on nothing in the \'wr 1d, the realm of
i nauthent i city as Bu "ltmann descri bed it ~ and to "fall -into God~"
as Luther exhorted. This "courage of faith~1I says Ebeling. is
the Holy Spirit 286; lithe happening~ the realizing~ the very presence
of what the Word of God and faith really mean. ll 287 This again rein-
forces the extra se of the Reformers; the fact _of the encounter
bei ng between man and God. It -i s thi s factor of encounteri ng and
being encountered which prevents faHh from being empty actionalismo
Hence faith is -not a self-transcending act but is a llmovement in
which the whole of existence is qiven a-im. definition and gr·ound." 288
Th-is dimension of the ....JOrd of faith~ being also the vJQrd by \'Jh i ch
we are encountered~ is illustrated by Ebeling by the idea of "ltJOrd
,
as encounter. Il \ vtf 1\ applies to the \'Jord of a person and therefore
to the person himself, and is best defined as HvJOrd - evenL H It
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is the sphere of personal encoul\ter "in its New Testament application.
In the Old Testament~ lIbelieving" is never directly related to
a fact but is persona 1 encounter because "the essence of personal
encounter lies in the sphere of the Word. lI 289
On this basis~ Ebeling develops his "theological theory of language"
which is not of immediate concern to this study, accept perhaps
to poi nt out that thi s theory of 1anguage is also based on the ongoi n9
encounter of the language of the Bible with the language of the world.
liThe language of faith" he argues 9 "exists only because of th"is
encounter •li 290 The Incarnation is for him the embodiment of all
the crHer"j a of the 1anguage of faith.





religion<ism s that is, a formal relig<ious attitude that acts as though
it could ex"ist 'in isolation from the experience of the \IJor'ldo 291
The fact that "the ~~ord was made flesh and dv'!elt among us" (John
1 :14) points to the witness and basis of faith. God I sword is where
the communicat'ion of faith takes place. 292 Hence the "real locus
of the Bible is not where faith is being judged, but vJhere it is
being produced." 293
2.505. FREEDOM AND FAITH
Faith in God is <inextricably bound with the question of man's freedom.
It is in the analogical relation of man to God, and with man and his
o\;m existence, that Christian understanding of faith and the question
of human freedom is most meani ng fu lly spoken about. Ebe 1i ng argues
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for this analogy thus:
~Jhat ; s true .of the futuri ty . of God as Deus
Absconditus 294 as a phenomenon of conscience,
-_._-~
is true mutatis mutandis also of man and the I'IOr1d
as phenomena of consci ence. •• Human nature is
respected as personal bei ng on 1y vJhen it is respecteJ
as a mystery that is out of the reach of experi ence,
incalculable, not at our disposal, that is, when
man is respected as man by bei n9 granted fl~eedom,
allowed a future, given a hearing, regarded with
trust. 295
This characteristic of human nature as mystery, which Gabriel ~1arcel
also talks about and which many modern psychologists ignore, is even
more obvious in the relation of man to himself. 296 Only as conscience,
tbelino argues, can man be seen ~as totus homo;
Ebeling finds support for his view in the thought of f'1artin Luther
vlhere freedom is fundamentally spi ri tua1 freedom v/hich affeCts the
very conscience of man and, hence, frees him as man ie. allowing
him to be fully human. 297 The freedom which is received in God,
v/hich vIe have denned above as manls participation in God, ·js
essentially the freedom of man to become fully man. 298 In the Incarna-
tion \<le learn that God being God involves in time God becoming man.
Humani ty is thus i ntertvJi ned with the Chri st i an understandi n9 of
God.
Therefore, faith in God, contrary to what many outside and inside
Cliri stendorn thi nk. is not a retreat from reason or the vJOr 1d of real i ty
and an escape into the other-\\'Orldly. Sue h a view fa i 1s to under stan d
that faHh in God is also faith befOt"e God and hence is involve(;
-246-
vHally with the prob 1em of freedom because 11 on ly the man vJhose
dependence on God has liberated him to live in freedom has no need
to let himself become enslaved to his earthly dependencies. f1 299
If Luther's definition of being Christian is correct~ says Ebeling,
that is"be'j ng before God, U then the Chl"i st i an is subject to no-
one and to no-thi ng. By vi rtue of the freedom imp1i ed in be; ng coram
Deo he is free from all, so that he may be free to serve 0.'11. Thi s
human maturity~ which Ko.nt believed was 'intrinsic to being fully
autonomous, proceeds d'irectly from faith. "Faith is true maturity
because it is true freedom." 300 Unlike the attempts of the Enlighter-
ment and Heg~ 1 to base such freedom ; n reason, YJhi ch we have po; nter
out inadvertent ly does vi 01 ence to human freedom, f a'j th frees man
from "fet i sh'i srn" and i nauthent i c ex is tence. However, because of
this freedom, lTlan is free and also encouraged to use reason and strive
also in matters of faith~ for flan assent to the language of faith."
This faith, which is dynamic encounter, does not d'iminish the value
of reason or else it wi 11 itself be' ":'j enated from experi ence and
rea1Hy. 301
Faith, says Ebeling in his study of the l.ord's prayer, is "God-given
freedom from our dai 1y bread and freedom for our dai ly bread... from
our fell OYJrna' and for our fell o\'mlan ••• freedom from, today and freedom
302for today." This freedom is a new k'ind of being 303 which is
exemplified in prayer, for prayer is fundamentally . "turning to
God." 304 Only thus can we face the ",JOrlet without becoming enslaved
by it. Therefore, having faith in Jesus,· and being Christ'ian is
not to cl aim the right to imitate God in hi s majesty for that God
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is Deus absconditus. As such he "is hidden from us and of vJhom "\tIe
~-_.
at best make idolatrous images." 305 It vJol(ld be important to remember
that such i do 1atrous image's i ne 1ude not on ly the B pagan IS" images
of God but also the more refined J.nd intellectual~ even B"iblical-
sound-ing, theological images that are set up in order for men to
"'JOr sh i p and obey. (.c D t 111) On the con"tl"u"'ry, the freedom\ Cl. I ar" • "
of faith in Christ is "The freedom to follow God in his humility,
"in his suffering, the incarnate crucified God ••• " 306 This freedom
does not vi 0 1ate the paradox of ex i stence or the llcontingency of
rea1ity." It can never be Utopi an or an ideo 1ogi ca1 "opiate."
This faith, furthermore~ does not "seduce" men a~'Jay from real ity
but ehal'lenges him to take lifE. seriously. Hence true faith, as
long as it is h"istorical and is involved in human ex-istence, does
not dissolve the antithesis that Luther observed between freedom
and bondage because vIe only 11 speak of man in thes i ght of God and
of God in regard to man. 11 301 A11 other ta 1k of God and of the freedom
of man invariably lapses into abstract speculation.
Furthermore, this freedom that is manifested in faith as \ personal
encounter with God is not isolationist for that i'JOuld distort its
in his essay, "On the Freedom of the Chri st ian
f'1an lt (1520) and his De sc:rvo arbitrio (1525) against the humanism
of EraslTIus, Luther had argued that freedom through fai th is freedom
to serve in love. He wrote, liLo, that is hm-v 1ave and joy f1 ow
out of faith, and hoVJ love give rise to a free, eager, and glad life
of senli n9 one I s ne; ghbour I'/i thout revlard. It 308 Faith takes man,
who is under the Law, and places his above and outside the Law (supra
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legem et extra legem). 309 I!Fa'ith rema"ins the doer,lI IfJrote Luther,
"and love remains the deed. 1l 310
This fa"i'l:h
9
therefore 9 is good conscience because the ~\lorks of love
to\r,jards my neighbour cease to be \<lOr"5 of supererogation wh-ich aim
to justify a man before God. Such justification pt'ecedes such \lwrks
and this is \t1hat faith is careful to proclaim. If works are not
liberated from "thf~ hi erarchy of a re 1i gi ous scale of values, in
wh"i ch some \fwrks are more meritori OllS than others," 31"1 such \\'orks wou 1d
lapse into empty charity or gestures (,f benevolence.
A factor that Kierkegaard overlooked is that faith also takes place
in encounter wi th other men. Thi s quite agrees with the poi nt
argued in Part 1 that freedom as "ongoing quest" obtains in the
ongoing conflict of different truth-perspectives and forces one to
be open to the other. Th-j s dependence on our fe 11 ow man -j s not a
3<12
burden as Sartre had maintained. "re is a blessing \'~hich \'ie
are most ly not a\vare of until no one takes interest i 11 us and vie
h t t b d d . dd' 1 ,,313 Fa" th ::lnd loveaye 0 ea our rea ay 'I n an· ay OUt a one 0 ,,_
mean the simultaneous conjunction of "radical freedom and rad"ical
subjection to service •.• 314 sola fide is thus in conjunction I'lith
fides charitate formata." 315 Faith that cannot reach beyond se 1f
is not faith at all. Luther went so far as to make this characteristic
the basis of t.rue theology:
sets us outside ourselves." 316
"Our theology is certain because it
Thus, contrary to those who repeatedly criticize existential Christiani-
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ty of: being individualistic~ even solipcistic, a criti::ism we observed
levelled especially against Kierkegaard~ Christian faith does not
take place 'j n the i nVJard!:~.;s of the be 1i evi ng subject.
event taking place betvJeen the existing person and that vJhieh is
.
outsi de of himse 1f - God" and lithe whole reality which concerns
him. 1l 317 Emil Brunner emphasized this aspect of faith as encounter
by arguing that truth obtains, not in the subject's perception of
an object but'in the en<:~~,!::.~_~ri!!.1l. of the object who is simultaneously
encountering us (Wahrheit als Begegnung). He wrote,
There is no longer a place here for the object-subject
ant ithes 'j s .•. an exchange. • • takes place here
which is VJholly wHhout analogy in the sphere of
thinking. 318 The sole analogy is in the encounter
behveen hunan beings9 the meet i n9 of person wi 'ch
person •• o Faith is a change of hands 9 a revo 1ut ion 9
an overthrovoJ of government 3'19 ••• Man in faith is
the new man, life -in faith is the nellJ life. 320
Therefore, his fellow is face to face with him
in a new way ••• Faith proves itself efficacious
in love (because) love presupposes freedom.
In this connection~ Bultmann acknowledged his indebtedness to Friedrich
Gogarten 322 the concept of "ne; ghbour" does not appear in
Heidegger'~ihereas for Gogarten it is precisely in the encounter v~ith
the neighbour as "thou" (not "it") that the historicity of man
and faith i~ most c'learly discerned. For Heidc:gger, man is limited
by death; for Gogarten, he is limited by the "thou". For Heidegger,
decision is demanded as a possibility of one1s own existence, 'tlhereas
for Gogarten, decision is made in relation to the "thou." 323
Hence, the concept of love does not feature in Heidegger's philosophy.
For Goaarten. love is the only pos'sl'bl'll'ty of allt'nc>nt'l'c ex"~"--' , ,~ ,I::>l.enCe,
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because on ly in 1ave is "the other ~ 11 vd th whom one -j s bound throughout
onels life~ become visible and only in love does one understand the
others claim on one. 324 Love under0irds responsibility. UnU"'
such acknO\"iledgement of the other's cl aim~ that "other" stands over
and agai nst one in the Sartri an sense.
Ii the thou" and. appears as 11 ne-i ghbour. 11
In love~ the "other" becomes
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FREEDOM - AN ELUCIDATION
In Part 1 it was argued that freedom does not ari se as the resu It
of any theory about freedom si nce freedom, 1i ke exi stence~ cannot
be derived logically or from one or other philosophical systern and
because 0.11 systems stand in controversial relation to one another,
The contingent exper'ience of rea"!ity is~ therefore, the sphere of
freedom (Rauche) and man is free -j n so far as he l~ema'i ns (or becomes)
fully man. The crisis of modern manls quest for freedom~ as clearly
depicted in his contemporary philosophical quests~ is that freedom
is endangered by a new kind of funct i ono.1i srn or operat"i ono. 1i sm or
acUonalism. i'iian!s al"ienation from reality, a.lbeit "in the name of
freedom, is increased and he eHher has illusions of grandeur as
Grossmensch or~ claiming to be free, in fact, abrogates hi s freedom
and becomes the slave of one or other ideology.
Part 11 of t.his study began with a description of faith in traditional
thought \!Jhere it \'ias pointed out that theological understanding must
be rescued from static epistemological categories and that the
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self-understandi n9 of fai th •must be expressed creat'j ve ly and
existentially; that is, i!l a way that adequately expresses "its
true nature~ that touches life and grapples vJith human existence,
The crisis of faith -is that even ho~"o.feligio2Ys becomes enslaved
to a system of beliefs which holds him in awe a.nd acquires a pO\l~er
of its own over him. Hence s the possibility of him asking vJhether
the objects of his belief have the possibilHy of personal be"ing
is excluded. FaHh as a "belief system," is as totalitar'jan and
absolutist as the philosophical systems that were studied. Man becomes
a function in a relation concretised in creeds or . sacraments which
become the objects of faith. "Faith" becomes "belief" vvhen these
objects arrogate a time 1essness and authority over man that they
can never possess. As such freedom is greatly endangered.
However, the object of faith is not a doctri ne but the God who, we
observe in the Incarnation~ is open to human ex'jstence and in Christ
seeks' to restore man to Itlho 1eness. Th is re 1at ion betltJeen man and
God, exemplified 'in the God·oman, is the basis of the understanding
of faith as existential encounter, which Kierkegaard s Bultmann, Ebelino-'
and others have attempted to shO\lJ. Nmv, the implications of faith
as encounter for man1s freedom must be elucidated.
Kierkegaard has helped us to see that faith essentially is the encounter
of the whole being, a qualHative encounter ItJith the div'ine and a
matter of uHimate decision affecting one's vJhole existence. Faith
is not the possess'j on of the "subject"
object but is in the encounteri no of r;od.------ ......~~--'
in hi s encounter 'Hi th an
Secause faith obtains
in the encountering, the obje,ct of faith must be the ultimate, the
Absolute, as Kierkegaard would say, over and above the universal.
Reason plays the indispensable role of uncovering fraudulence and
the objects of self-deception; tLe finite that parade in divine
garb; the gods of our oVJn creation. Yet faith must also prevent
Reason from rati ona'l i zi n9 avvay the paradoxes whi ch we observed
repeatedly occurred in phil osophy S'j nee the En 1i ghtenment especi ally
in rationalism, idealism, and positivism.
Chr-istian faith lays claim to the ultimate becuse it takes seriously
the paradox of existence. Hence faith is grounded in the Christ-
event \~11ich must not be reduced to its factness or a series of metaphysi-
ca1 statements: the former 1eads to that event bei ng mere 1y an event
in the past which requires a rat-ional decision. The later reduces
the factness altogether or pays scant a.ttention to the humanity of
Chri st. t~ithout detracting from the f a.ctness or the hi stori ca1i ty
of the Chr-ist-event (that is~ the vJhole Incarnation, the Cross and
the Hesurrection). it is only a personal grasping of that event which
explores its significance. One cannot view the crwist-event as a
dispassionate observer anymore then one can reduce Chr"ist to only
a moral examp 1e if one wi shes to gl"aSp the rneani rig of the event.
Ultimately, in vie\'!ing the significance of the God-man, because that
event touches the depth of human ex; stence and therefore can on ly
be stated as a paradox, a question is put to rlan which affects his
'.:ho1e future. HoltJ e'l se can one make sense of Chri st I s cha 11 enge,
"If any rr:an COf:le after :ne, let him first ~ellY rimself, take up his
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cross and follm'J loe daily? (~1at. 16:24; [;1k. 8:34; Lk. 9:23) PIS
Gogarten states it,
••• in the crucified Christ a question is articulated
and if a man can continue to hold to that question
and can refuse to anS\AJer it from the \'JOrld and its
vJisdom, he \1-1111 come to realize that this question ••••
is asked of him. It is a quest"i on that puts him
in question ••• that this being put in question precedes
Jnd is the origin of all his questioning. 325
This question Grin only be answered \AJith one's v~hole being because
it affects one's I-'Ihole ex<jstence, history and future. < K"lerkegaard
described this rlnswer<ing as llpassionate decision
ll because faith
is not a choici! between alternatives but "the very fact that ••••
there is no chllicc, expresses the tremendous passion and intens<ity
\'iith which it f1lIISt be chosen. 1l 326 It is so unfortunate that "scienti-
fic" man believes that faith is for the faint-hearted and the weak.
Gustaf Aulen poitlt:ed out that it was not simply fortuitous that Luther
• 1: '''c''udacious· 'nevertl<leless l "spoKe 0, faith 5 " v or Kierkegaard of
the v/ay faith "casts upon the deep \Vaters" or Paul of our t'Jorking
.... 1 '''1' i-Il "fear and tremb 1, " ng lloue our sa vat i'Hl vt " (Phil 2:12). Aulen
\'Irote, thereforCj, that "in spite of timidity, faith is the soul's
d ' t r,od." 327au aClOUS yes (l"
Uhile the car<iciiture of religion wh'jch fvtarx rejected may be "the
sign of the oppr(~sscd". faHh is for the free. To believe that \'~hich
can be empiric,llly proven does not affect my existence and requires
no courage. TI,I:r.·rore, Chri st I s admoniti on, "Blessed are those
\'Iho have not c, •• '1I vet bel i eve" (John. 20: 19) i snot an adage for
blind raitr, anYIlYIy'(' than it is c \Iay of escape for the fearful.
.- . --_...- ... - -~-_._ .. -.-.--.. _- _._----~----------.-------
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Faith~ in T;l1ich's vJOrds~ is "'a total and centered act of the self.
the act of unconditional, infinite and ult"imate concern •••• a passion
for the infinite," 328 It is noteworthy. in this connection, that
the Biblical allusions to faith are not cast in the substantive. as -in
Greek, but in the verba1. the mode of act; on. The t.hought of the
Bible is not "neuter· and abstractll~ appropriately e'Ttx)died in the
substantival, but -is
verbal. 329
Ilhistorical and personal" conveyed by the
The faith of Christ demonstrated inter alia that faHh is radica'l
1i vi n9 coram, deo. that death cannot ann; hi 1ate faHh as dependence
on God. that such a 1He frees man from himse 1f and from the anx i ety
of death, and opens up the possibil-ity of radical living where each
mor:lent becomes kairotic
future of hope.
(fulfilled time) and tlris life -is an open
Thae1the sting of death -is sin ll -i s se 1f-evi dent to anyone viho takes
seri OLlS ly the passi\rity of existence: passivity is i'llustrated in
the fact that 1'1;2 had no control over our l)e"ing here, our genealogy,
our race, our soci all at and our deat.h 0 Si n resu 1ts I'Jhen we ignore
that \'ie are creatures of death and when our human rest'! essness, the
result of our finitude, leads us to seek our security not in the
author of our "being here" but in the realm of alienation itself.
Yet it -i s only in relation to our existence that \'ie can meaningfully
speak about God. PIS Fbeling stated, all other talk is necessarily
"abstract speculation and literally irresponsible, for it does not
tak::> ;:;13c2 "in the concret2 responsibility of this reality of our
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Faith is based on the Chri st-,event because Jesus bore vii tness to
wha.t it r;'leans to 'lhave to do with God in death as well as in life." 33<1
This event~ VJhich is encountered existent'jally and v.Jhich forms the
ground of faith~ high'li:Jhts also the nature of revelation, VJhich
Bultmann descri bed as Il~~( and "pro r~~1l 332 because it is understood
and recognized only in personal decision.
There is no longer any room here for the subject-object parad"j gm
since faith is an act; an event v/herein man encounters God ~vhich
defi es' an analogy inhuman thoughL Brunner as we have poi nted out,
suggest that the on ly analogy is- the- meet 'j ng of a person VJith person. 333
Gabr"iel ;"larcel used tIle concept of "co-presence" to highlight the
nature of personal encounter. To encounter someone, he says, 'j s
not to merely cross his path but to be ~ear to or wHh him, 334 to
be a "co-pY'esence" IftJhich implies an unconditional mutuality which
affects oneis very being. He gives the example of the ticket conductor
\'iho day in and day out one sees on the bus one trave -I sand itlho one
takes for granted until one day he is hi ct-istress and suddenly one
is d\~a\'m to his aid as a person. He sudden ly becomes a "presence."
One is opened up to him to the extent that in hi s di stress he is
opened up to one. "Sompthing unalterable is implied" in this moment
of openness because now as a co-presence he is encountered. 335
1·1arcel makes an incisive comment 9 in the face of this encounter,
that illustrates what is being said here.
I \'iOU 1d be prepared to say dogmat i ca l'jy that every
relation of being to being is personal and that
the relation behleen ;lie and God is nothinq if ~ tJ '_
is not a relat'ion of being ';11th ~:eing, or strictly,
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of being with' itself. \'Ihile an
can be converted i nto hirn~ God





Thi s faHh as encounter, hO\'1ever ~ presupposes freedom whi ch we have
observed obtains "in man's abilHy to ans\'Jer. Aust i n Bal~ker expressed
this thus: one mark of freedom, he said, is the ability to say III
ought" rather than 11 I must" or III cannot help iL II "To think
-in terms of the 'ought' -, sal ready to be free in some sma 11 way
but to act as \tIe ought is real freedom." 337 Freedom fs not identical
with freewill as Kant had rr:aintained; that is. the ability to choose
betl'Jeen alternatives becau:oe, as Nichola"i Berdyaev maintained, this
assumes a norm outside the person and, therefore, is externally
determined. 338 Berdyaev in his Destiny Of r1~...t~_ maintained that,
1I~1an is free when he need not choose.'1 339
Hence, freedom is endemic to being human and to be fully human is
to manifest that freedom and to protect that freedom.
the Bible means by man being made in the image of God.
Thi s -j s what
Faith av>/akened
by God's love - for love also presupposes freedom - is the only possible
un i on of camp 1ete freedom (endemic to being human) and complete
dependence (the fact of being human, not Grossmensch or slave).
Faith, therefore, "is analqical to the paradox of existence.
ans\veri n9
of freedom.
"Yes" to God with hi S "vho 1e bei n9 is the manifestation
This freedom \'irousht in faith is not another kind of freedom relegated
ei ther to the spi ri tua 1 or I~iora1 side Jf man for then fa i th becor';es
_.. ..."--"'----_.-- ._.~- --- _. -- .. ----' ~ "-- _.. '--- --_. -- .
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one option among others. Tht? will-to-believe is intrins'ic to being
human as is the vJill d ,to-truth and cannot be diminished psychologically
or sociologically as in modern custom. Against such psycho-sociological
reductiorrisro John r~acmurrayls observation should be noted. He \'Irotej>
The only way to avoid religion is to avoid the con-
sciousness that we are members of the community.
The only ~'Jay to reject rel'igiol1 is to reject~ deny
or 'j gnore our re 1ati onshi p to one another... In
a society which has lost the religious intention,
cu 1ture and techno109Y fi nd themse 1ves at ~"ar. 340
To deny the \"ill-to-truth~ like the possitivists, r~arxists and exfsten-
tialists have done~ or the will-ta-believe as ps~udo-scientific,
secularized man caught in our age of fUl1rt'ionalism has done, is to
incur serious negative implicat"ions for man and human freedom. If
the former attitude means the abdication of pllilosophy then it will
abdication of man. Similarly, if the later means the abdica·-
tion of faith, it will mean the abdication of freedom. This is true
because, as D. E. Roberts correctly pointed out, "r~an as such seeks
the Abso 1ute, and if he does not do so with open eyes then he Vii 11
turn fanatical and follow some spurious substitute." 341 Philosophy
as ongoing critical reflection shares an important role wHh theology
of helping to uncover these "spurious substituts" and keeping man
open to truth. Faith demands that trust is never put in any thin 0
less than the ultimate, and indirecL.ly, spurs on the Viork of the
philospher and the scientist.
Faith therefore is the rad'ical anSvlH to the radical question about
man. Faith and freedom are integrally invo!v'?d 't!ith the manifestation
of ~:an as fully f,ian. Luther succinctly stated thl:? claim of faith
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thus ~ JI God became man in order .out of proud and unfortunate gods to
make real m)Jl. iI 342 Cantwel1 Smith in his study of the difference
beh/een be 1i ef makes
I
some important observations that
support our thesis. He argues that "standaY'd man is a man of faith"
and that "faith is normal in human life, and normative." 343 For a
crocodile, he l,vrites, it is easy to be a crocodile; for us, on the
other hand, it is easy not to be fully human and. to slip altJay from
our true calling. 344
To think or to feel that human behaviour may on
occasion be inhuman, that people may be 'less than
human' is to recogni ze 'man' as a transcendent
and not merely an empirical conc'pt. Faith bespeaks
involvement in transcendence... Faith is neither
rare nor automatic, rather 9 it is unbiquitously
astonishing. It is the prodigious hallmark of being
human. 345
It is clear~ that the implications of faith for human freedom cannot
be ignored especi ally in our age where the prob 1em of dehumani zat i on
is a ~vor1d-wi de phenomenon. As J. r~ackay stated it 9 11 the stock's
of man have fallen in the world market!" 346 Now more than ever
before l'le are forced to reconsider man as ; ndi vi dua 1~ for systems
do not change; people do!
Let us enquire a little further into the nature 0:' this freedom man;-'
fested in faith as existential encounter:
2.6.1. FAITH FREES MAN FROM THE PAST
-~--~~-,-,_. ,,=.=-~~~=~
Man is freed from the determi ni srn
of hi stari ca 1 i nevitabi 1ity, the t.yr2nny of habit and necess i ty, and
frorTl the suilt of his ovm '.'rilfulness. fai~h fre2s l1im to ;neasure
-259-
life, time and the future by t~e category of hope.
Faith as faith in God means the opening up of ourselves freely to the
future for this is the import of 'I wa lking in the Spirit not according
to the flesh"; "1 i vi n9 by the standards of the Kingdom of God not
by those of the ki ngdomof thi s wor 1cl; 11
is above and not on what is be low.
"setting our hearts on what
IIThese Biblical exhortations
to "vJalk in the newness of life" is exemplified in the Resurrect'ion
\'ihich proclaimed life in the m'idst of death~ hope in the m'idst of
defeat and a future vJhen we are \\lei ghed dm\ln by 'the burden of the
past. Bultmann maintained that to have faith in the grace of God
means "faith that the unseen, intangible rea1ity actually confronts
us as 1ove ~ openi ng up our future and sign ifyi ng not death but
1ifeo Il 347
206o2~ FiUUI FREES t·fAN FROM HIMSELF Faith f¥'ees man frcm the
and assurances which his own systems provide.
safeguards
In Jesus of Nazareth a ne\v possibility of being fully man is epitomized
in hi s bei ng fu lly -j n cOl1IT'Un'ion vlith God. As JUrgen ~,10 Hrnann stated
"it,
Religion does not claim to elucidate the mvstery
of man. It confi rms and deepens the mystery that
man is .... In the hiddenness of God, man expetiences
his ovm hiddenness; and all his sure, self knovlledge
becomes imperfection, •• (In Christ) he is not
Iput into the picture ' about himself, but filled
\vith a hope and \'11th a commission which brings him
out of the C?fTo-l',",t,,! of r.ll'S i n1a "PS Otl ·"0- v '_ I,,, :i-- L the road
· --_ ....... ------ _.._-_ ....--_ .._.
_. ._~__ -_._..--"'-'_ .,-_~~---=_. . __4._
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of freedom and. danger of I the temptations of the
world and of the consolations of God,l As Augustine
has said •• " The cross is the point of difference
over against ideologies and humanistic images of
man. 348
Faith involves turning our backs on ourselves and our securities
because it vi ews these as inadequate and "begging the question,H
As we have argued in Part 1 9 human systems invar'iably acquire a
pmlier of their m\ln and in the end 9 i','hile they claim to be monuments
to human excellence 9 they hold man himself in their prison.
The tyranny of systems affects the very psych~. of man.
who glories in this state is actually glorying in himself,
Hence he
He confers
absolute value on the works of his own hand. That is 3 at one and
the same tirne 3 idolatry and hubris: man~ having illusions about his
own grandeu.r soon claims to be Grossmensch; he ceases to be 11 humb 1e
before reality," .!:!ubris is exemplified in Adam claiming the right
to be ~od and rejecting pistis~ obedience in trust; faith as participa-
tion in God, as free encounter and evenL Faith ensures that man
remains man because it relates him continually to God. It rescues
him from "being 'c!ise 'in his 0\'1" conceits 11 (Rom, 11 :25). and from
placing confidence in a world-view or theory of his 0\'1n making ~'ihich
in the attempt to give his 1He vJholeness 3 ensnares him. t'Jith in
phi'losophical systems, man becomes a functional relation; in idolatry
of \'!hatever kind, he becomes dependent on the "v!orks ll of his ovm
handso There is little difference bet\t1een the t\./o, Calvin has said
somewhere that, "the human mind is a continuously workin<j factory
()f idols." ~hilosophy as en on90in~: critical c;uest for freedom calls
------------ -
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these i do 1s -j nto quest i on and. hence, is not opposed to the ~oa1 of
faith - the freedom of man before God. Faith prevents man from
being v/hat the Bard expressed as lithe engineer hoist by I:is OVIIl
petar."
Faith that recognizes that "God \voS in Christ reconci'ling the v/orld
unto himse'lf,!1 Moltmann explains, "reconciles man and liberates
him from pri de and anx·i pty, vihi ch has ahvays been the sources of
idolatry." He goes 011,
re who bel i eves no 1anger f 1ees a'v'Jay, 'v'lhether into
an irony that cannot be touched, or into a defi ant
Utopia.1e does not flee in a spirit of social
romanticism into a golden past. He does not emigrate
"itn\lards into purity of heart. Nor does he -, ose
himself in dreams of a better world. He finds
suprisingly :peace in the midst Of strife' and
the reconciling 'yes' in t.he midst of a \'1ell
justified 'no'. 349
Th-j s is v/hat Luther meant by faith comi n9 to its own "\'!ann es in
. das Treffen get." This is the freedom we call faithl
2.6.3. FAITH FREES ~!jAN FI(Q~,1 BONDAGE TO THE LA\,} i\ND TO THE \KjF<LD. If
Fa-ith as we have said, forces man to face the u1timate~ faith rescues
man from the bondage of ne~essity> a distinction that Reason could
not make in the philosophies of the Enlightenment. Kant, and especially
He~e13 did not extricate freedom from necessity because they fai led
to see that freedom \'1as endemic to ;11 an as man. Berdyaev, more
than anyone else in our times 3 has ,Tlanaged to percei ve that the freedm
that :nan seeks is ultimatelj spiritual freedom. 350 In this connectio:1
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Lev Shestov~ the Russian JevJ,ish Existentialist~ maintained that~
I(ant~ like h-is successors - Fichte, Schelling and
J~egel - speaks of freedom often and enthusiastically.
But when these men found themse 1yes f ace to face
with true freedom, they were terrified.... all
of this only pt'oves one thing our thought has
arrogated rights which do not belong to it-c •• Kant
forgot Ho 1y seri pture when he medi tated on the
relationship between science and metaphysics.
That is a pity! If he )lad remembered perhaps he
would even have been led to recognize that the ra-ison
s!.1 etre of metaphys"ics is preci se 1y to return to
man his pr"imordial freedom and to break forever
the bonds in which general and necessary truths
have fettered us. 351
lnauthent"ic existence obtains in living by that which "is regulative
(the Law)~ by the imperative without the indicative or by a utopian
dream of happiness and a society without conflict. All these mystify
freedom and existence. Faith's main role is to safegaurd man's freedom
for God and thus deprive the world and its laws of religious power.
Faith puts man in perspective. Trust in any sort of authority which
claims man's allegiance by parading et form of trushlOrthiness nm'!
lose their hold over man. The former mysterium tremendum et fascinans
that they arrogated to themselves is now exposed as fraudulent.
They have become "frai 1 and supafluQUs says Barth. He goes on.
These are the gods set up. honoured
by men in ancient and recent times:
and \'Jorsh i pped
the author; ties
on whom man relies~ no matter whether they have
the form of ideas or of any sort of pOll/ers of destiny,
no matter 'lihat they are called. Faith de h \fers
us from trust in such gods, and trerefore also TrOG,
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fear of them ... o. We are gi ven freedom to trust in
Him who deserves our trust..oo In God also is there
faithfulness, and faith is the trust tht we hold
to H-imo 352
Faith, therefore, can work closely vdth science and is net intimidated
by it because the raison d l etre of science is to clarify the nature
of the vlorld of man and to demythologize it's religious hold that
it has over man. It de-re1igionizes the vJOrld and its 1o.v1s. Faith
insists that science and philosophy seek out and investigate that
independence so that it may keep its own gaol in focus. In turn,
both science and phi losophy need the witness of faith le.-t they forget
the nistoricity of their own answers. As Gogarten mainta"ined, "If
science indulges in such worship (ie. of the world and its laws),
it abrogates its essenVi a1 tasks. 11 353
2.6.4" FlUTH ALLOHS FREEOm1 FOR THE ltJORD Be:ause man is freed from the
bondage of the world and its la\!Js~ he is ft~ee for his vlOrld and his
fellow mane This d'ialectic of freedom is what is communicated by
such texts as "Be not conformed to this \'lOrld but be ye transformed
by the rene\<lJi ng of your mi nd s. " (Rom. 12: 2 ) • On ly if man is freed
from the world. from what the Bible means by life
he be free to serve h-is world and his fellow man. As we have noticed
in our analysis of Ebeling's views, the choice for or against love
is the choice for Ol~ against freedome Austin Barker provides an
interesting comment in this regard: ":,Je see easily," he says,
"that the man ~"ho is ignorant or afraid is enslaved and \t1i 11 do
han,1. It -is il~!perative both for him and for others that lle should
"he has no means
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become free." 354 \~hat is not often realised. because it -is hidden
behind intellectual sophistication and affluence. or behind the cloak
of general well-being. is that slavery is also the lot of the man
who "lives by his own wisdom because, in the end,
for making the most important decision of all, the decision in principle
for or against love." 355 Christ-ian freedom is the decision -in which
men have freedom of responsi bi 1i ty hence the "faHh that believes
in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit," says Barth. "cannot refuse
to become pub'l i c. If you be 1i eve. you are challenged to pay in person
Luther had maintained that faith is fidele facere (faithful doing),
a fulfilling of freedom in the world (1 Thess. 1:3). 357
\"Iho like r-1ichael Foster 358 and Gogarten insists on the independence
of the world, describes faith as involv"ing
dependence and responsibility." 359
"response and mutuality,
In this regard, it is quite understandable why Hegel criticised Luther's
On Chri st -i an Li be~ as "senseless, soph'istic reason'ing ll because
Luther had not admitted the freedom of the w; 11. 360 The paradox
that man's freedom does not achieve h-is salvation, that freedom is
manifested in Iltimate dependence and that man's salvation, therefore.
is effected in the encounter; ng .~ se, cannot be fitted ; nto a
system like Hege1's •
,~arcuse, commenting on Hegel l s critique of Luther, stated that "inner
freedom 000 is onl~ a transitory stage in the process of achievln<J
Fa~~I', hO\vever, does not distinguish bet~'ieen inner
-265-
and outer freedom because it ·insists that "faith 'tJithout works is
dead" (Jas 3: 7); not that "works" create "f ai th" but that faith
is vita11y bound up ~lJith the God VJho in Chri st encounters man and
this faith r~fers man to his fellowman. It cannot maintain its integri-
ty in a vacuum. Freedom. unlike in the vieHs of some eX'istent"ialists~
is not individualism. Berdyaev maintained correctly that individualism
"demeans man, it is the tragedy of empty freedom." 362 If freedom
is individualism then Sartre vias right. "He 11 is the other person. 11
However ~ v.Jhen man is 1i berated to respond in love, the other person
becomes the "thou" of fel1ow~hip.
Freedom is It/holly different to the realm of necessity. Freedom is
truly freedom in fellm',lship and, therefore. freedom and not necessity
should determine marriage, sex, family. society and service to mankind.
For exarnp 1e. if necess ity \'/as the basis of sex ~ the sex partner and
oneself are immediately reduced to objects \;Jhere the partner ceases
to be the "thou of fellm'ishipH but a "iL" The vvhole spiritual
basis of family and society, and of people themselves, is invariably
eroded. If freedom 1apses into necess Hy it degenerates into
licensiousness, and leads to the abuse of the word and the other. Love
presup~oses freedom and cannot be contained in law as both philosophical
humanism and religious ethicism attempt to do. Only the freedom
in faith can maintain that "all things are lawful but all things
are not expedient (1 Cor. 10:23) because faith gives love a freedm
that places .... above the 1a\\f. lih; 1e legalism dernand1 [. may service
to ~ran, legal"ism cannot legislate love.
As St. Paul stateq,
Love presupposes freedom.
the fru"it of the jpi rit -j slave, joy, ;:Jeace,
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1ongsufferi ng, • gent 1eness, goodness, f ai th, meekness,
temperance: aoainst such there is no law. (Gal.
"'~~~--~"-~:<=.. ----_.-
5:22-23)
Thus faith which affirms that man as Uimage of God" is free, manifests
that freedom by liberating man from the past for the future, from
the law and the world for the \florld and from him'.;elf for his neigh-
bour. 363 This dialectic from and for:. the \fwrld, SCi'ipture describes
as "being in the \fwrld but not of the \'Jorld" (John 15:19; 1 John
2:6). R. G. Smith calls this dialectic the "ambiguity of secularism,"
and J. F. Hamann in a letter to Herder called it "holy hypochon-
dr"i a. U 364-
This dialectic injects into the Christian life, as Kierkegaard, Bultmann
and Ebeling have maintained, a vital and ongoing dimension It,fren'by Fi'rith
is not the end of the encounter but the begi nni n9 of the encounteri ng.
Faith is never a po-lnt of rest but -is expressed by St. f)aul in the
imperative, "walk in the Spirit not in the flesh." (Rom. 8:4).
It is the '·new life struggling continual"ly with the old." (Ebeling).365
11 It means to be trave 11 i n9 along the road bet\hJeen the I a1ready'
and the 'not yet,· a1VI ay s to be pur sui n9 a goa1" (Bu 1tmann). 366
"The only authentic 'work' of faith gll states Gogarten, "is that
it stands constantly in this reflection This work consists
in noth-jng more nor less than man being himseif before God." 367
Faith as encounter is deci si on that is \'Ion ever aneYJ. and \I therefore ~
requires the courage to be hazarded ever anew. If it beco~es complacent
it ceases to be encounter a,nd ceases to be f ai th, r·1an is unfree
,again. st. Pau 1 succi nt 1y ex[)resses the dyncirni cs of faith thus:
"Stand Fast therefore in the freeC:om ','Jherewith Christ has i:lclde us
free, ow' Je not entangL"d dCja'in '8ith the joke of bonda<;e." (Gal..S:l).
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The Christian life has been d'€scribed as characterised by "faith,
hope and love" ("j Cor. 13: 13) but these are oat mere ly mora 1 or
spi ri tua1 qual it i es that Oilt: can be endowed \t~ith as 1atetlt talents
are; neith.er are they abilities or dispositions that can be inculcated
or achieved. Faith in God is that which frees man from the burden
and for his Itwrldo f1.s such, faith is manifested in love. Faith,
hope and love, therefore, are three dimensions of the one event.
~arcuse had rightly contended that Marx's confidence in the proletariat
to free society was ill-founded since the proletariat is as Pluch
-in bondage to the system as those \'/ho manipulate it. ~larcuse himself
suggested that the fringe protest groups or the Third ~1orld may be
However, he became disi 11us-ioned I'Jith
both s"ince, he believed, they did not have the ability to free thern-
selves from the manipula"t-ion of the system or achieve a changed social
consciousness, a prerequisite for chang'ing society. Faith by freeing
man for Gael provi des a standard outside the system to free man from
it so that he may walk in "nevmess of life." (Rom. 5:9).
As we have repeatedly pointed out, especially when Kierkegaard's
reaction to Christendom and the views of Bultmann, Ebe1ing and Gogarten
were analysec;, faith always runs the risk of be-ing systematised
and becomins. as vie observed also in the history of philosophy and
in trcl-~~,ti'v"nal Plr""St"la-n th,"nk,"ng self·r t' 1 'I t"v - v ~I ! ,: "-~on a,nea ana Clo91'lav le.
1t ceases ~~O be dyna;n; c
and self-critical.
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These aspects of faith vis-~ -vis the nature
of theolog'ical method VJill occupy our attention in Part 111.
2.7 SUMMARY AND SIGNIFICANCE
1. Faith in traditional thought vis'ba -vis the development of systema-
tic theology, creeds and institut'ionalism has often lapsed into mere
belief in one or more of these If objects lf and thereby has ceased
to be thellving, dynamic faith that the Bible \'litnesses to. A
corollary tJ this loss of vital-jty is the attempt of ChristianHy
to mediate a posit-ion in terms of modern philosophical quests VJhich
in the main have been bogged down in epistemological categories
(Marxism and Existentialism being notable exceptions).
2. This epistemological stranglehold has led to the discussion of
faith v·lith philosophicc'.1 (and scientific) quests at large being based
on the problem faith and reason. Several computations of that relation
have surfaced since the controversy bet\lJeen Scotus and Aqui nas, all
of which at times led to grand-iose claims for the abilities of Reason
and a concomitant detached scepticism. At other time, it led to faHh
becoming the VJay of escape from the rigours of critical thought.
In our century this antithesis behveen faith and reason has often.
led to the gross trivialization of faith and to the discussions between
t1~eology and both philosophy and science being led into a logical
cul-c'e-sac.
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3. These discussions bet\r~ee(i theology, philosophy and science
have often failed to see the deeply controversial nature of modern
man's quests for freedom albeit "in the name of science and philosophy.
r,1odern man's crisis is the crisis of unfreedom either 't1ithin his
own philosophical and theological systems or within totalitarian.
ideological or collectivistic societies v/hieh undermine freedom.
In Pa.rt 11, it was observed that the quest for freedom, or rather~
the manifestation of freedom that is endemic to man qua man~ is the
true task of an quests for truth, mean-ing and reality. All such
quests must be av...are of their own trlstoricity and the contingent
experience of reality. Hence, the quest for freedom is a far more
fulfilling basis for dialogue betv/een theology and both ptri "Iosophy
and the sei ences 0 It vias poi nted out that theo109Y is dependent
on them for their ongoing critiea-' evaluation of its v.JOn aim. Also
their clarification and constitutive quests aid its own expression
and proclamation for ultimately theology must undergird sound proclama-
tion and this is ahlays directed to men in the-ir O\\ln historical and
contingent situation.
4. Such dependence, of course, requires that· philosophy is constantly
aV-Iare of its ongoing, crHical and reflective nature and that theology
also remains equally dynamic. (cf. Part 111).
5. At the heart of the ai'iareness of the dynamics of theology, is
faith as ongoing encounter, the generative notor of theological ref1ec-
tion. t~ s the ana lyses of the thouqht r v· I· '~l_ OT ~lerKegaaro, ~u tmann,
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amona others have shown, only.when faith is understood in living,
.J
existential terms w'ill faith be prevented from lapsing into belief,
and religion into a belief-system. These theo 109i ans have des cri b-:d
f a-j th as 11 encounter" because it impl ies that faHh is II ven ture,"
Il happeni ng, Il "everlt" and IlparticiDatioo.1I These ideas pre~erve faith IS
dynamics and rescues its se If-understandi ng from degenerating into
static categories.
6. This generative quality of faith, which we have termed the
"existential,1I makes all 1l1l:>aningful theological reflection, in
fact all Christianity~ existentifl.1. Hri s statement. we have argued,
in no \'iay -implies any form of Christian existentialism, the problematic
nature of v-Jhich has also been highlighted. The views of some
of the theo 1ogfans that have beendescri bed may vie 11 1ead to a k-i nd
of Christian existentialism, as any programme of demythologization
or such like vii 11 , since "it would force scripture and the Christian
se If-understandi ng into a preconcei ved theoret-i ca 1 framework. \~here
thi s happens we must part company v~ith them. However, the value
of theil~ work lies in their insight into the nature of faith. These
insights orthodoxy can neglect only at it.s own peril and poverty.
7. The understanding of faith (lC encounter is endemic to the under-
standing of "believing in God" or "trusting in God" in the Bible.
The analysis of the Biblical texts will require Cl study all of its
mm and cannot be fitted adequately into the scope of this thesis.
Neverthp.1r?ss, we may point to a few illustrative Biblical ideas.
;~\s !!er:i1iSSOIl and Lohse ~,,_Jint out, in the Old ;C'sU\'l1ent, the cl~var('ncss
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of faith is illustrated rather. than conceptualised. Nevertheless.
faith is manifested as human re!Jct i on to God IS wi 11 and prom"j se based
on total obed; ence II i n the face of the future and promi sed gift
of salvat"ion." 368 The prophets are ahJays the spokesmen of liv"ir\g
faith and often denounce religion that functions ~ opere o~
\'Jhereby individual commitment and obedience in trust is diminished.
Isaiah "is the example par exs:~lence of the prophet who openly condemns
religion without faith.
Perhaps the most striking of old Testament illustrations of living.
encountering trust in God is the example of Pibraham. 'l'Ihom Kierkegaard
has so incisively unveiled for us.
Another example is that of Jacob's wrestling yJith the ange"' from
dusk to dawn which J A Hackay considered a symbolic expression of
encounter \'iith God whi ch "operates a profound di sturbance in the
life of a man.,1I 369 Faith is a. struggle in timc: and space and a
struggle of life and death. In the New Testament. SL Paul's struggle
against Christianity and against Christ I'/as a struggle of his vlhole
being and his conversion 'illustrates the nature of "being grasped,
laid hold upon j by the One \ltlho encounters (man) in l"ife." 370
Faith is trust, says the Old Testament,!!efore it is belief. As 'Ailliam
8arrett points out, faith is ab-lays represented in Hebraic thou<;ht
as a concrete mode of being of the human person which precedes
intellectual assent. In Job and the PsalIT,s, faith 2S trust involves
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manls whole being: "his bones, and his bml/els." The final solution
in Job, another great Old Testament example of faithful man 9 is not








His relation to God remains of faith from
to fi ni sh though".. it takes on varyi ng
of revolt, anger, dismay and confus'ion ••••
fai th is fu 11 it dares to express its anger,
faith is openness of the who'le man tOI;/ard his
and therefore must be able to encompass all
The re1at ion between Job and God is a re 1at ion betvJeen
an 1 and Thou. • • • each be; ng confronts the other
in lri scamp1eteness. eo • The re1at i on between God
and man is on the level of existence and not reason ••.•
start
modes of being. 371
l-Jhi 1e Jesus, the God~'rnan~ is the object of faith, 'it shall 1d not be
forgotten that his own faith as radical living cora~, both in
life and death, is the example of the faith that is being discussed.
This radical encounter, we have already pointed out. takes pre-eminence
over every other relation. In fact, it places everything in this
vvorld 'in proper perspect'ive. The challenges that ChY"ist places before
nan cannot be softened by intellectual or allegorical exegesis since
such attempts undermi ne faith and make re 1; gi on spi ritua lly balli<rupt.
.Iny attempt to soften these radi ca 1 cha 1'1 enges to man, either by
the Chri sti ans in the 1atter part of the fi rst century a1ready and
definitely throughout Church history since. which were married to
a ~in~ of triumphal ism by the institutionalized church, violates
;)aul's c!octr-ine of justification by faith and the ::eformers' sola
Such faith makes the
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A11 the creativity of 1iturgy, ·then1ogy, polity and such 1i ke become
ends in themselves if the radica1ity of faith is lost. Such faith
alone keeps the imperative of the Christian life of love alive otherwise
such an -imperative burgeons into legalism.
encounter- \.'Iith the God-man a living, ongoing encounter and as such
affi rms the eschata1ogi ca1 si gnifi cance of that event. "In every
rnornent,1l wrote Bultmann, "slumbers the poss-ibility of be-in9 the
eschatalogical momento (One) must awaken iLl! 372
8. Finall,\.', a point that has been repeatedly mentioned in Part 11,
whose signiF-lr".ll1ce rcmtiins to be stat~x1, is that th-!s faith is not a subjective
experience or possession but occurs in the encountering; a.nd is
ex t r a nos as thf: Reformers stated it;
the fruit of grace.
it ahJays rema'j ns "a gift;"
This point, says G C Berkou\-'Ier, is indispensable to the Christian
understand; n9 of faith. Faith and Justification, he points out,
are intertwined. Berkouwer wrote,
Faith does not justify, Christ does; but faith
is justifying because it appropriates the righteousness
of Chr'ist.' Therefore, faith does not mean vwrks.
r=-aith is abandonment to God... '.·{ith faith, sola
gratiae is not spurned; it is verified •.•• 37~
8erkou\,>,er. in this connection, makes two points which support thE~
understanding of faith as ex'istential encounter: firstly, he maintains
that the correlation between faith and grace is "firmly rooted In
concr et e hUi;l a11 ex; sten ce •" 374 Second ly, he po; nts out that Gre.ce
or fai t;~ (:5 aLandon:~ent to (~od does not " l' n - ,.< -'-' ;-'., unyv;ay ueny l.r.e ac"lv1ty
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of faith, its grasp of its objec,t. or "its \t~orking itself out in love.
Faith is still human acto" 375
Therefore, as Ebeling pointed out. "\\I(fi€.,J\E.\I and (iw...\f_<f 6o\,.1 belong
essent oially together. 376 Justif"ication by fa.ith alone is not one
doctrine among others. but is the whole Christian faith. 377 The
reality of faith is the justification of man but justification is
manifested in its "public significance li and concerns the world
as a whole. 378 Ebeling writes,
\'lhat kind of realHy has this faith \t~hich consists
of justification? Its reality is obviously of the
nat ur e of an 1-: ve nt 9 whi ch effects a tOt_ a "i
transformation, and yet never becomes a
possession, b~t remains the ojl1sti-nc8t"ion
of the sinner \l-Jhich lasts as long as
the sinner lives. 379
The relation bet\'Jeen faith and grace has unnecessarily been clouded
by the debate on free vii 11, for freedom, as we have pointed out,
is not equal to ttle freedom of choice but is the ongoing quest for
authentic existence. Faith, it has been argued. is the true f~ode
of authent'ic existence because it al10i'ls man to be fully man, that
is. it manifests man I S pril"1ord; a1 freedom. Furthermore, because
it is ongo; n9 encounter it preserves that freedom from 1aps i n9 agai n
into unfreedolTl. Only if man is free can he indulge "in constitutive
thought and in living in the \tlOrld ~\}ithout becoming a slave to it.
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In Part 1 we obse~ved -.!~at foY" phi "losophy, co nU ngency is the_ realm.
of freedom and, in thi s sect; on of the study I've observed that for
. -
theolo~JY, freedom is ne dynamics of faitho While philosophy!s perpe-
.tual__~09ni Lance of the contingent experience of reality undergirds
!~~~~~~·s~anding of man as finite?._..~isto~~~a~~~!ngei~t_~ith.
affirms that man only before God JS fully ma.tl~d~_ as fully man.
only is he truly free~ If theo 1ogy loses sight of the dynami cs of
faith. then it also, like any philosophy \'Jhich loses sight of the
cant i ngency of real i ty, 1apses into ideology and creates aneVJ the
unfreedom of man. The implications of faith as ongoing and critical
encounter for theo 1ogy form the theme of Part 111.
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PART I!!
SOME !i'.i1PLICATiONS FOR THEOLOGiCAL
METHOD
•-295-
In this concluding section~ some implications of the understanding
of faith and freedom~ proffered in Parts I and II~ for theological
metrad or approach \'Ii11 be highlighted. i~ithin the scope of this
study, only 'int'imations can be made of the direction theology must
take. This direction must be fully investigated in a separate
study. The questions that will occupy us here include the relation
bebJeen faith and theo 1ogy; some modern attempts at the abdication
of theology and the implications of such attempts for faith;
the
relation betlfJeen theological reflection ancl rationalhatioll; th~ definit-jon of an
existent-ial theology and a definition of theology as contextualization.
3.1 FAITH AND THEOLOGY·
._----l'_ .
It has been amply stated that faith, 'in spite of it being personal
encounter with the divine, does not exclude systematic theology.
Yet it \'ias also argued that faith cannot be systematized any more
than freedom or existence can. ~'Jhat, then. is the relation between
faith and theology?
In Part II it v'las also stated that faith always runs the ri sk of
of bei ng systematized and of becomi ng, as we observed in the hi story
of philosophy also (Part I), self-contained and dogmatic, because
it ceases to be self-critical. Faith in God, hOlvever, prevents such
._~~- -- -_. __ ...._-_._,.~-_. _... __.__._.'-~-- "'---_._--_.---_._._~.--_._-
an intrusion on man I s freedom' because of two important dimensions
of its nature:
FAITH AS ONGOING ENCOUNTER
~_ ..-~--,.""""'--'._~~==-.-~-
Kierkegaard and the theologians considered above all agreed that
the attai nment of authentic ex i stence was not merely a platter of
i nte 11 ectua1 st!"iv;ng but of faith and commitment and that such commit-
ment involved a continuous process of cho-ice by the believing and
existing subject. Hence to be Christian is not to arrive at a con"
elusion but to be placed in ongoing ferlOtJShip with God~ which \'le
h( ve referred to as the ongoing encounter of faith. Th;') ongoing
decision is not as 8lackham thinks~ vis-a -vis Kierkegaard,
••.•• a morbid perpetuation of the moment of absolute
choice •.•• a concentration of the li'lhole life in
a repetition of the empty abstract decision itself
\vith increasing intensity. This fatal hypertrophy
of vJill has a terrible fascination~ for one sees
in the dilated organ a living decision repeating
i tse 1f 1i ke an acce 1erated pu 1se separated from
the withered body it shau 1d have an imated.l
Such a vi ev.J removes Ki erkegaard I s understanding of the dynamics of
faith from the dynamics of Christian life and theology. Kierkegaard
had intended to ernphasi ze that Chri st-i an 1He and thought must embody
the puL,ating vitality of faith or else they become a chimera; a
ca... icatlJre of what the Ne,.: Testar£nt \ifitnesses to. "Let us never forget ,) he said~
"that all Christianity is a life course." 2 Blackham is in error
here because he places the perpetuity of faith outside the context
of Ki erkegaard I s concern for reaffi rmi ng persona 1 comiTIi tment in an
age steeped in nominal Christianity and theological absolutism;
an age not un 1i:<e our own. Hi s attempt at the restoration of the
. _._. -_ .....~~.._" .. -_ .. -._.__ ._------ ....- A _ _ • ~ - - -~ -. - -- _. -- ,-~
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balance led him cOllsciously to emphasize decision but he in no place.
jettisons fellovlsh-lp, the church or love for one's neighbour. In
a Jout~na1 entry on 13 February 1839 he wrote, "Fear and Tremb 1i n9
is not the prin:~ in human life. That is love. But as the
balance YJheel in a clock it is the balance wheel in the life of a
Christian.1! 3
Faith is bound up wHh openness and the future, and cannot seek rest
along the way or else it becomes h"istorkist.
future and is the basis of Christian hope and
Faith opens up the
"hope" says Ebel-in9,
is the "measure of time." 4 He also maintained that it is "the
essence of human real i ty" that "nothing is f-inished; but there
is ah'iays something to come, something to expect." 5 Hence, when
we pray for the Holy Spirit '1Je are in fact praying for faith to be
given again and again. 6 Faith is not a matter of "slick theological
solutions" but a lifelong "task". 7 "Till our deathbed,l! he ~Jr"ites,
"I<le have to ''1ork unceasing ly at the one 1esson to 1earn to say Itlith
all our rleart 'Abba Father! III 8
The dynamism of faith also is manifested in the battle it has to
wage with unbelief as long as man is man ie. as longs as he is histori-
ca 1, finite, contingent~ and . .'eXls~lng. Faith i s always accompanied
by doubt and L tru ly faith not \vhen one be 1i eves "i n spite of"
doubt but vlhen c:oubt is defeated 9 wll i ch may we 11 be an escha to 1ogi ca 1
vi ctory for fa ith. Lut her descr-ibed this tussle with doubt thus:
";'Ie are ah-JuYs travelling and must leave behind us what we knovJ and
possess and seek for ':,:hat 'Ne do not yet kno',!! anc; possess. 11 10 "'ence
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Ebeling comments that,
Faith does not die of temptation but of the flights
from temptation ••••• 11 Faith that is not attacked
or tempted is not faith at all. For faith can only
be pl~esent.... Hhere it is rea1i sed in the concrete
circumstances of y"ur life •••• Faith does not believe
because it closes its eyes. Rather, faith means
to hold and trust with eyes that see..... to hope
against hope, to believe against experience. 12
Faith is v·j ctory over doubt, a doubt that is a corollary of human
existing. Faith that gains victory along life 1 s way, therefore~
is not escapism from life but, in the face of the exigencies of
existing, renews itself again and 3gain. Luther said in his lectures
on Romans, "Your life does not consist in rest, but in moving from
good to the bet ter ~ as the sick ma.n moves from si cknes s to hea lth. "
13 Because faith is an event it cannot be possessed but has to. be
continually affirmed. Faith as encounter is decision that is \i'JOtl
ever anew and therefore requi res the courage to be hazarded ever
anew. If it becomes comp 1acent, it ceases to be encounter and it
ceases to be faith.
It is this dynamics of faith~ this "ongoingness" of faith, that
make$ theology, faith's self-avJareness, 3n ongoing ta.sk. This ongoing
dimension. the history of doctri r 2 and the history of herrneneutics
have abundant ly shown to be the basis of Christian self-understanding.
Hence, Gordon Kaufmann correctly assesses the nature of theology
when he maintains that,
Theo 109Y a1so serves hur.lan purposes and needs and
shou 1d be judged in terms of the adequacy with whi ch
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it 'is fulfil1in.g the objectives we humans set for
it. 14 The task of Christian theology is to assess
and crit"icize traditional ideas of God in terms
of tllei r adequacy in express 'j ng God is abso 1uteness
and humaneness~ and to reconstruct the concept of---
God so that it \I/i 11 express these rrotives as adequate ly
and meaningfully as possible in contemporary sit.ua'tkms
ie. so that God's presence in contemporary life
becomes intelligible. 15
Th; s descri pt i on of the dynami cs of the theo 109 i ca1 quest is qu He
correct but the poi nt bei ng made here is that the dri vi ng force
beh'ind even the desire to undertake such a quest and the motivation
behind a serious commitment to the theological task, is the impulse
behi nd the need to be 1i eve or refl ect on God vlh i ch is the event of
faith as ongoi n9 encounter. As Kierkegaard stated~ "The knight
of faith keeps his love young and along with him it increases \lJith
years and in beauty. He does not annul his resignation; he preserves
I
hi slave as young as it was in its fi rst movement. 11 16
help'~~eep faith vital and love for ~Od .~ly~lI.
faith as living encounter __insists that th~~ogy /emains living and
vital reflection.
Theology ensures that unlike the foolish virgins of Christ's parable,
faith and the object of faith are never taken for granted. These
foo 1i sh vi rgi ns, says Ki erkegai:J.rd • "had lost the infinite passion
of expectation. And so their lamps It/ere extinguished .... they had
made thel11se 1yes stran~ers" in the sp'i ri tua 1 sense of the vlOrd ~ through
having lost this passion." 17 Therefore, while the tragic hero rests
sec urei nthe un i ver sal bec ause he fin ish es his f i 0ht, thf=' knicht
..;
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of faHh is "kept sleepless" 'for he is constantly tried. 18 The
"passion" endemic to faith is the life blood of true theology.
The stru99le that is part and parcel of theology is also endemic to
faith. The two cannot be divorced.
Theo 1ogy is the task of faith and must therefore be ri sked over and
over agai n. A creed may be bel i eyed but it cannot mere ly be repeated.
This dynamic nature of theoOlogy, Ebeling accounts for as follo\'ls:
• • .. the church has been sent into the wor 1d and
is obligated to render testimony to Jesus Christ
in the world. The world, hO\>Jever, is continually
in motion, continually confronting us \>Jith new situa··
tions, speaking ne\'i languages and experiencin(]
spi ritua 1 change. 19
This dynamoism. he ri9htly contends, is true for all questions v/hich
have understanding as their goal and which are "accomp 1i shed in
a kind of dialogue and must therefore be ""Ion ever anew, ar.-d must
be hazarded ever anew." 20
Theo 1ogy, therefore> is never above the cant i ngency of human ex i stence.
1. t is forced. because of fai th. to reckon I'd th 1i fe and to enter
dialogue with all quests for meaning and with all the studies that
san cast light on the human situation in the world. The cholef of
these partners in di a1ogue is ph i 1osophy. Theology is forced to
contend with the trauma (and the joy!) of human ex is tence or else
"it easily qoes off at a tangent and becomes abstract speculation
about reliCjious ideas. T.(: it does not constant -'y relate to the onsoing11
encounter of faitll it loses its rootedness in the livin~ situation
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of men. Hence the idea of a professional theologian~ that is. one
who theologizes without commitment or faith, YJho studies or teaches
theology as a vocation alone, violates the nature of theology because
he does not grasp "encounter" • Theo 1091 is then reduced to the
status of any other empi ri ca1 study wh'ich 1eaves the subject untouched
and uncha 11 enged by its fi ndi ngs. Such a person treats religion
as a phenomenon and theology becomt~S the phenomenology of reli~ricr(l.
Religion is treated as a function and faith is catalogued, quantified.
analysed and ordered j-ike the \'/ay a librarian orders books for easy
retrieval 0
Theology is a refl!~ction from faith on faith and the object of faith.
Hence it is &[0 S - AOYI ~ • Because faith ; s an ongo; ng encounter.,
theology itself must remain ongoing reflection.
3.1.2. FAITH IS SELF-CRITICAL
The other 'indispensable diinension of true faith -is the fact of its
self-critical quality "/hich is also a complement to its "ongoing
nature". Christian faith in contrast to every other claim of ultimacy
possesses at its very heart a self-negating and self-critical dimension
v'/hich not oniy prevents the absolutism that irnpingeson human freedo"l
but also stands opposed to self deception and "blind" faith. This
se If -erit i ca 1 d;rnens ion is exemp 1; ed in the Cross \vhich stands opposed
to every fan;] of -1 do 1atry. The Crossa because of l'tS o"n hl'story. ~.,
syf;bo 1i zps thp r",eans of 0, 0 u·, , S ~UQ'ce>lent d
-- - 11 ~ J :iJ., anl grace. It sisnifies
tile juc£e:':ent on sin and the death of ,~clam, the natura 1 ;Iian of th2
\'JOr 1d) a1i enated from reality
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1'n his self-pride. At the same t irne
\
I
it signifies the grace of God to man for it is the basis of man's
reconciliation with God and ultimately is the basis for man becoming
fully human. Paul Tillich perceived clearly this in-built qua'lity
of faith. He wrote,
Every type of faith has the tendency to elevate
its concrete symbols to absolute validity. The
criterion of the truth of faith therefore, is that
it imp 1i es an element of self -negat ion. That symbo 1
is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate
but also its ovm lack of ultimacy. Christianity
expresses i ~se 1f in such a symbo 1 in contrast to
all other 'eligions (and \I/e may add, philosophical
systems,) name'ly in the Cross of Chri st.. o. P.ny
acceptance of Jesus as the Christ which is not
the acceptance of Jesus the crucifi ed is a form
of idolatry. 21
With this observation we come full-circle back to where \</e began
this study, namely, the problematic view of freedom in contemporary
thought and the problem of faith in traditional Christianity. Both
have absent from their systems this self-critical and self-negating
dimension It/hich prevents absolutism, totalitarianism and triur.lphalism.
Tllese i SI11S ignore the nature of ex; stence and curb hUlnan freedom.
CanbJe 11 Srni th I s study, vJh~ ':h h; gh 1i ghts several irrporta.'lt insights on the
nature of faith, on this issue must also be criticised. He held
that "faith is not belief in a doctrine and not even belief in the
truth as such" but "assent" in a "dynami c and persona 1 sense"
of "rallying to it 'i.fi:!.:h celi<:;ht Cind engagement. .•. the abihty to
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see and respond. 1I 22 Hi s aim ; s most prai seworthy, name ly, I! to
open onese 1f to the profundity of bei ng human and of the mystery
of rea1ity . 11 23
of faith is dangerous. He intends to develop a theory of faith which
again is removed from the sphere of existential and (;;-itical encounter.
:,10re than most ~ he takes seri ous cogni zance of other forms of re l-j gi ous
commitment ego the views of Ramanuja , Chu Hsi, Ghazzali ar.-d Hugh
of St Victor. HO\'I'ever, his theory of faith, in isolating sirnilarities 9
levels off major differences and ultimately makes dialogue impossible.
If the critica'! dimension is removed, a kind of universalism replaces
the critical function of faith and t~eology. The cross cannot be
accorrm:x!att-..'d within a theory of faith but must be apprehended in ex;sten-
tial encounter.
A similar danger exists alongside the element of truth in John
rVlacmurray's vie~v, in his Freedom in the Uorld that
-~~-----_.. ')
true freedom is freedom for something greater than
ourselves. That is' to say, freedom achieved as
a result of an object"i ve loyalty~ Cl loyalty which
masters us. 24
This VJould mean that genuine :'1arxists, Capitalists Or' atheists are
a11 free provi decl the; r loyalty is tot a1 and they are "nastered
by thei r loyalty 0 " Here again the disjunction betvJeen faith and
the object of faith emerges. Such a vievJ vlhich absolutizes loYalty
lapses into empty actionalism.
the criterion for reality.
Believing for believing sake is made
In ?art I1 it ~'/as ar~]ued th2t fai~h is :~nC0l1nt2r y,Ji th thE":
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and that is was "ultimate concer;n " grounded in the ultimate.
For Christian faith that Il ultimate li is not a figment of the imagina-
tion or merely a projection of ultimate concern but is the One IJJho
identifies with human existence of whom, the Council of Nicdea expanding
on (fol,PK.J gUi"d. said Vias,
all that makes man 9 man)
)
l:.Y"l..'-l gF1.0I1'IV\ (jcJ.,"/ Td, • (ieo taking on himself
Because such refl ect ion is vitally bound up ~~ith the God-man s the
Absolute Paradox of existence, all speculation and abstraction
is excluded. In Gordon Kaufman's terms 9 the absoluteness of Gods
V'Jhich is common to religions at larse and v/hich can be the projection
of human thinking, is offset by the dimension of the humane. 25
Humaneness and absoluteness must be held in dynamic tension. To
reflect_on the Cross is-to -reflectoA-the--judgement-and the- glory
of the Ilhumane ll ie.of being fully hum-an. The cross v/hich crucifies
II man -in-Adam" also spells freedom for the "man-in-Christ"
freedom to be fu lly human 'Jy reconci 1i ati on with God.
Theology, then 9 must be commensurate to this notion of faith if it
is to be faith's aVlareness of itself and of its object. l3ecause
faith is ongoi~2 encounter, theo logy is ongoing reflection. But
because faith is also .se If-crit i ca1• theology is ongoing, criti ca 1
reflection. The Cross stands opposed to theology ossifying, or to
theological reflection running away v,Jith itself either in abstract
speculation or self-glorification.
It is the cross that prevents -:=aith deteriorating into belief ond
religion;
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that i s ~ re1i gi on 9 Vvt; i ch Conhoeffer defi ned as "an
attitude v'ihich regarded man's life as being somehovv complete by the
addition of God,lt 26 On the contrarY9 the Cross cannot be domesticated
\'Jithin any system no matter how religious or Bibl-ically
It is the embodiment of that critical dimension vvhich spurs on the
life of the believer, the vvitness of the church and the task of theolo-
gy. It is that driving force which the Reformers intimated in their
understandi n9 of the church as ecc 1es i a reformata semper~_!:..efo.rlliandiL
As Ebeling stated it 9
The only reformation which the church always stands
in need of is faith ••• (to overcome) ••• the divis·ions
of Chri stendom, vrith each church impri soned in
its own tradition and full of self-righteousness,
the dogmatics, i nte 11 ectua1i SITlS of theo 1ogy, the
love of prn.-ier o,-r110ng ecc1es.i asti cal .1 eaders., th.e ilXbl~lce
and apathy of the laitY9 the clinging to the past,
the remoteness of sermons from rea 1i ty.. • 27
This Itreformation lt or ongoing rene\val is a corollary of faith as
On90";n9, critical and existential encounter. Theology's task is
to constantly re 1ate to such a dynami c faith by bei n9 dynami c itse 1f .
The Reformation epitomised this critical dimension by its crH"ical
expos "it i on of scri pture. It was critical of t.he traditional viev'l
which held fast to certain dogmatic essentials, which fostered arbitrary
intetpretations and which domesticated the Bible in such a yiiiY that
it did not threaten the ecclesiatical statu~quo. 28 Hence it is
not only the fundamentalists and the literalists who harmonize scripture
~n their exegetical w.-~thodology (29) but any theo 109i ca 1 method that
interprets scripture or the Christian self-understanding from the
position ~f a fi/e~ theoretical framework. The seri ptur~s are
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harmonized to fit static credal positions or institutional parameters.
Faith and theology must exist in dynamic tension. Theology preserves
the dynami cs of faith and vi ce versa. Theology prevents fa<ith ever being
dcrnesticated within 2:rfj systEm, and faith prevents theolcl{f! fmn oss<lfying into an
uncritical system or being dOl'nesticakod wW-lin on institlrt<ion \i~'ffither ecclesiastical
OY' socio~politkal or econanic. Faith is ahmys on the\lJay. The G.ospel is always unfold<ing
(cf contextualization be1c~"I) and can never lose sight of its eschatological
significance or else it becomes static and lifeless.
Furthermore, theoiogy and faith are directed tm'Jards the same object
God 1<lho has to be constantly understood. If the object of· faith
was self··evident, that is, if God vias "visible everywhere not hidden
everyv/here-,II theology would not be necessary arfd faiW-vJbOTd-become
redundant. Such knoV'lledge of God vlould cause faith to "stand still."
But the question of faith is inextricably tied up with the question
of human existence (Part H). Hence the theological qUE~st is never
completed because all theological perspectives are historical and
limited since they are human constructions and stand in controversial
relation to one another.
R G Smith pH-hily states that, "The theology of faith is a theolosy
of the cross and thus a theolog"ia v,iatoru~. It is a theology of
a journey \'Ihich :nakes up its own maps as it goes." 30 This is ,'Ihat
Barth ~eant by theology being science, the nature of which is manifested
in -its on<;oing and critical aspects. 31
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Theology cannot be otherwise because~
i) it is the viOrk of man viho quo. man is finite, limited and
historic2.l;
i i) it is rooted in the cont i ngent experi ence of man and is there-
fore influenced by both theological and non-theological factors
and theological systems stand in controversial relation to
one another. If theology is not done vlHhi n such experi ence
of contingency it rel-inquishes its own freedom for the vwrld
and for all men; and
ii-i) it is driven by a faith tha1- is self-critical and ongoing
encounter with God who identified with human existence.
Therefore. no theo 109Y is fi no. 1• The pursuit of clearer theolosical
self-expression cannot take place in isolation but in constant dialocu.e
and controversy bet~'Jeen the Christian and his fellow believer, and
betvJeen the Christian and his fellm'J rnarL Faith must insist on this
freedom or else a. certain fear or arrogance sets in and this is
neither faith nor 1i vi ng theo 109Y. "t~ethod" must refl ect both freedom
and openness. Christians,even fron opposing theological or ecclesiasti-
cal camps. are united in their contingent experience of reahty and
in their struggle for freedom and faith. The locus of Christian
unity is not the resolution of histoY'ical differences but the
preservinG of faith vis-a -vis the crisis of belief today and man's
increasing dehumanization.
Every theolosical rlethod, l'ike any niethodology in scarch of truth,
:-)ustconstcntlJ'J chanr;e in :~eer,.in(] '.'I'l'j-'nl ~l.f,l.e ,. -_ . ~ - c~anglng experlences
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the human situation. As Bultmanrr stated,
0 •• because theology is an entirely
and as such has no directly divine
- pure doctrine is an eschatological
theology is nothing other than a





As such theo 109Y cannot become dogmat i c? into 1erant or a closed system
for that \tJOuld lead to a form of idolatry (cL Theology and ideology
be 10\11) •
Hence the achiever-lent of an ecumen'ica1 theolosy is not the acquir'ing
of a theological formulation \'Ihich 'has the necessary doctr'ines to
sat i sfy all the vari ous churches, nei ther vii 11 such ecumen; ca1 uni ty
be a.chieved in formal unions of various churches •. An ecumenical
theology is that which understands the historicity of theology, creeds,
statements of belief and ecclesiastical institutions p which grasps
faith as ongoing encounter and \tlhich displays an openness in its
~heological method that is conccmitant \.... ith the dynam-ics of faith.
P,ll theological constitutions are only truth - perspectives , • l\JnlCI1
embody a valuable insight for their times and for the future but
they remai n truth perspecti ves not the v/ho 1e truth because as St
Paul staLes "For now Vle see through a glass darklv ••. now Vle knm'l
in part. •• " (l Cor. 13:12)
Theology must tjrasp the truth- perspective even in opposing views
and use it as " rav1 milterial" to do its vlor!<. For example, Calvin's
for~ulation of the doctrine of predestination and the Anninian response.
Cot:: possess an i :~;1ortan: truth-oersDc;cti ve:, , Ca 1'ri n Vii shed to preserve
the sovereignty
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of God Ivhereas· the f,rmi ni ans l'lere concerned about
individual responsibility. The possibility of heresy arises when
one such perspect"i ve is abso'l ut'; sed at the exc 1us i on of the other
a.nd at the exclusion of historical continuity -ie. \Ihen truth perspec-
tives become a-historical and when they diminish the truth-perspectives
of others. Theology is by nature ecumeni ca1 because it is deeply
aware that it is human work and that it can never be an end in i tse1f •
In dialogue and conflict each learns from the other 9 is rescued from
the limitation of one perspective and in encountering the other develops
a clearer insight into the Word of God.
Theology and faith are inextricably interblined. If the dynami srn of
one is lost, the other is in danger. If the dynarni cs of f aHh is
lost then theology abdicates. In our time there a.re several attempts,
often unconscious, at the abdication of theology as ongoing, critical,
and theoretical reflection.
302 THE ABDIUTION OF THEOLOGY AND THE i~8DICJ\TJ()"-J OF FAITH
/\t least four modern attel~pts, some inadvertent~ at such abdication
i.lay be bri ef ly stated, name ly, fa"lth as experience, faith as corrfessional ism
faith as praxis and faith's subjugation to functionalism
302.1. THEOLOGY Arm EXPEREYCE
The vie\! e:lerc;es ....Iithin certain pi'2tistic-type fornls of Christianity
e~;. fund cii·:::n ta 1-j Si;;, ? '2ntecos ta 1i sn and sOr:le free churches who
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that theology is redundant because it does not affect discipleship,
true commitment and holiness. This view has always emerged in Church
Hi story, as early as the r'1ontani st movement in the second century,
I'/henever theology became caught up vJithin itself and its o\Jm intellec-
tua 1 and 1anguage "games." Th is vi eVI often argues for th~ locus of
faith to be sh i fted from the "i vary tm'ler" or creeds to individual
experience: inner illumination, the enlightenment of the Spirit,
gifts of prophecy and tongues and such like.
This approach right-'y emphasizes personal commitment but it is UI1-
conscious of the fact that its mode of p-iety already presuppos2S
a theolo~JY of its m·m. Its v'ie,,'S of indivicual experience, its emphas:s
on Cletting "back to the Sible," and its overt rejection of the history
of doctr-ine a.nd Biblical interpretation, already presuppose a decision
about certain texts and of the Bible itself. No matter • 1slmr,0
its organization is, or the statements of faith it makes, Cl fixed
vie\'i of man, society, God, inspiration, revelation, church and such
likes is already governing its life and expression.
The danger is that because this governing influence is unconscious,
it is also uncritical. In fact a much 1ar;er theology rer:lai ns under
the surface andi s "at work" than is formally stated. f,s Cantl'JP 11
Smith rnaintci;:ed, it is quite true that any given person may \"Il:!l
be in closer touch with transcendent Truth, with God, than his
intellect.ual-ization. 33 He \tlrHes,
The locus of faith is i:ersons. It is persons not
:;l'opositions, not syi'::)ols anc SaCr2J11ents t!:Qugh
." 11 may be d'ann~ 1So! The locus is cOi~~r:unit-i·?s
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in so far as 'these are personal and not merely
instHutional"ized although again an institution
may be faith!s channel. r'ljoreover, faHh is a quality
of the whole person. It has therefore as many
dimensions as has personhood. AccordinglY9 it
has an intellectual dimension. 34
BecJuse it is the nature of man to question~ to formulate statements,
to express f ai th and to pray, theo 1ogy cannot be excluded. Even
the view that cla-irns that all that is required is to read the 2ible
(ie as one has it) OVE'rlooks the fact that the translation one holds
in one's hand v,as the result of Cl. series of theological decisions
\:Jhich oo'verned;:> translation, language, style, the rnanuscri ~,ts
used and the. hermeneutical presuppositions of the translators them-
selves. Hence, \!Ihile the pietistic truth-perspective that emphasizes
devot"ion -is important, it cannot jettison theology ClS critical, onCjo"ing
and theoretical reflection.
3.2.2. THECLOGY ,l\i:D CGr-W:::SSIONALIS['lj
Another attempt at the abd; cat i on of theo l09Y, and ';Iith a much ':li der
i nf 1uence than the fi rst, -j s the attempt to study theo 1ogy or to
theologize within fixe~ confessional parameters. The negative implica-
tions of this approach are clei1rly evident in the ;Jroliferation of
the Church and the emergence of a multitude of irreconcilable denomina-
tions. [ach believes that they are in possession of the truth, of
having the :,Iost accurate i nterlJretat ion-- , of the c:ble or ,)f , 'oelng
Yet such
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and alienated fronl the truth-perspectives of their felloVl Christians.
The results of this dogmatism are evident throughout Church History;
in the Inou;sit"ions, the over-reaction to dissenters, the religious
\
ItJars~ sect3T'iani~m ~ the crusades, theological polarizations and such
li ke.
One cannot rule out a confessional position because no one comes
to the scripture tabul~asa and without presuppositions.
presupposit-ions and confessional limits \'/hich become parameters vrithin
which to theologise, in effect, deprive theology of its openness
and freedom. Protestantism reacted to Roman Catholicism because
it claimed that the ecclesiastical paramlters fixed by the Pope and
"the traditi ons" restri cted truth. Yet \fJlthi nits ovm ranks such
unfreedom has also l)een consistently propagated. Theology is done
\'iithin carefully defined synodal, conciliar or credal limits. t~h i 1e
Catholicism understood the task of theology to be the definition
and clarification of the church ~ s confes s i on ~ the Protestants haG
ins i sted that its task vias to test the church I S confession. In t.his
"testing" lay theology's ongoing, open and self··critical nature.
ilov-Iever, over and over again, Protestantisr:l has lapsed into a
denominational position; hence, for example, some are clearly
"Presbyteri an," ":lethodi st, "Calvinist," "Pentecostal" and such
like. \lh11e they all insist on theological training, some of wh-ich
is very rigorous and highly aC2c;e,,'iic, such theological training
is confined to a particular theoretici11 framei'lOrk (or \~(.>GL' 1" £1"1' C;ol' \~.C~ \.... J
and as such I-~ust bear all the criticisi;lS \'e have levelled at fixed
\
;:;hi10so;Jhical (\nd th2oret-ical fr2me\lOt(s. (cf. "Christian Ic:eoloS2'
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or Theo"1 ogy?" be 1ov~)
Very often, in this approach, theology lapses into church history
\tJhere certain truths of one historical perspective are clarified,
described and made relevant. At best, this apptoach adapts a certain
fixed perspective to a new situation and context. and theology becomes
indigenization which is too narrow a scope for theology. (cf.
contextua 1i zat i on be 1Olt/) • Such an approach does not take the changi n9
nature of human situations and the contingent experience of reality
seriously enough and therefore cannot be sel1··critical and ongoing.
As Ebeling pointed out.
If you take no notice of vyhat is happen; n9 (10\''' and
are not open to the fact that every thins has t-ime ..•
and flee from the sphere of faith in this way, you
may indeed have a timeless relation to ideas of
faith, but they vii 11 be the ideas of yesterday and
this is not faith. This kind of qeneral availabilitv- ~
of ideas of faith is an abstraction from history. 35
3.2.3. THEOLOGY f,S THE /\CTUf,LlZATImi OF THEORY
There has been a 'didespread react'ion to the theologies of the "first"
and "second \I/or1ds" which ~vere disseminated via the missionaries;
a form of theological expression that legitimated the ~.atus ~~'
This view objects to theology being divorced from the everyday concerns
of people; from their experience of oppression under the very pole/ers
that brousr~t thE: '~os:Je I; from soci a1 injustice and the de.1umanization
man ai'd soC"iet\y, It v"ie1JlJS I" 1 .- t r a(, 1 t 10 na the 0 10 sy asi r r e1evan t to society
;n the Thirdarl~ and oppresse( societies elsewhere.
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The Gospel is v;ewed as Drax is. "To say that the gospel must be.l..____.
understood as praxis~ " \tJri tes Orlando Costas~ "is to say that its
truth must be analysed and reflected upon, but fulfilled and actualized
in concrete situation. 1I 36 Praxis is viewed as action based upon
ref 1eet 'i on or the actua 1i zat"i on of theory.
Thi s approach has correct iy percei ved that theo 1ogy done in i so1at ion
•
from the l-iving situation is irrelevant. Theory cannot be di vorceJ
from practice. It 1S true that traditionally theology has often f"Emained
aloof of the living situation especially in the Third \'Jorld. The
Gospe 1 submerged in a European or /\ng 1o-Saxon perspect i ve of the
e:ghteenth century fails to speak the ~~ord of Faith in a situaUon
where peop le are soci ally or raci ally di si nherited.
must touth life is axiomatic!
That theology
Hm'lever, to make theology praxisie. to merge theory and practice
together in this way is to endanger theology as free questioning
and critical reflection on practice. ;Jhat is rec,uired is for theology
to be truly ongoing, critical and existential encounter. This means
that it is never divorced from practice yet keeps its autonomy as
theoretical reflection.
TL20ry and practice cannot merge in praxis otherwise the criticisms
that were offered against the neo-~'iarxists may also be applied to
it. Theory and practice ~ust rather rer~ain in erHical relation
to each other, affecting each other and calling each other into
question. To resolve this tensi0n in ~raxis is to open the door
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again to operationalism and ac;tionalisl11. The tens"ion betltieen theory
and practice is dynamic because they influence "each other. If
the tension beh'Jeen them "is removed then theology ceases to be ongoing
and self-critical refl(ction, and ultimately abdicates.
Simnarly, some, l-ike the Institute for ConteJrtucd Theology in South
Africa~ call for a upeoples' theology,tl vis-a -vis "academic theologytl
wherein a very similar presumption is tacitly implied. It is axiomatic
that the living situation of the people must form the important agenda
for theology and that people must be involved in the self-understandin0
of the-ir faith but this idea of a "peoples' theology" presuppose:;
too much. It assumes. for instance, that the average individua.
bel iev(~r has the abi 1ity to fulfi 1 the self-critical task of theology
or that they have sufficient insight into the historical conditioning
of their beliefs and religious language. Hhere in the world or in
Church history has such an egalitar'"ian state of affairs ever existed?
This criticism is far from making theology elitist. Rather it
highlights the great \"l::sponsibility resting on the shoulders of
the leaders. pastors, and theologians of the church regarding theologi-
cal reflection. The theologian remains an indispensable servant
of the churclL To level-off the reflective dimension of theology
in this wa~' is often accompanied by a sentimentalization of the situa-
tion or context.
3.2.4. THEOLQ{lY n:D FU~!CTIONALISi·1
n (" l"' L, ~ - S >- h'" greatest' t.I:: "t I • t h 1 .. -~ "OiJ I, -.:' oanger 0: al n 2nd I eo o~~y 1 S the functionalistic
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spi rit of our age that absorbs Chri sti anity over into its frame of
reference. This is an age of description, specialization, professiona-
lism and pragmatism. This functionalism has permeated the Church
to such an extent that Chri stendom does everythi n9 to be modern and
plays up to pressure groups, and the 'elitise sections of our society.
It loses its critical role in society and often shares the protection
of the prevai 1i n9 system. It too, gets caught up, as l1ords~'iorth
said, in "getting and spending and laying waste (its) pm'iers."
Theology may therefore be highly professional and specialized but
constitutes no threat to this Itwrld. Christ, the Gospel and faith
are domesticated. Theology removed f'i'om the sphere of rigorous encoun-
ter wi th the world is content v1ith descri pt i on and remai ns conformi st.
Theology becomes highly special"ized sophistry and I-le are left again
vJith Christendom that remains smug "Jithin th,,: system.
Moltmann rightly points out that it was,
•.•• the non ." Chri st i ans such as >iarx and Ni etzsche
\1110 had to remind the Christians of the crucified
Jesus or of the wretchedness of man, The memory
of thecruci fi ed Jesus is a dangerous one for both
the established church itself and for the societ,Y
~vh i ch erects its i do 1s and taboos in order to "nake
itself safe. ,. his memory emerges again and again
in iconoclasm of liberation a~Jainst the "images of
the beaut ifu 1 and pi ous pretence in v/hi ch men 1ive
and \'Iith \vhich they deceive themselves and others
about the truth. 37
To level radicality Cilri st'i an to or
life " -visthe differences in the Christian understanding of vis-a
the aspirations of a thi s- worldly ~ mundane existence; or to marry
the Gospel of Christ with a vicious capitalistic society or an
oppressive com!7lunist one, is to fall prey to functionalism. This
temptation is accompanied by the Church's seeking safety in numbers
v,hile it loses its crHical role against. the ethos of this age.
Christian service is reduced to benevolence V>Jithin the system, The
latest "prosperi ty message" and the popu 1ar forms of Chri st i anity
in the U S are mere ly extreme examp 1es of a general form of pseudo-
Christianity -in the world. These forms a;'e more difficult to uncover
because they are often highly sophisi'icated and scholarly and
deceptively Christian and Biblically sounding. One may cite as an
example the Rornan Catholic and Lutheran forms of Christianity in
Germany that Bonhoeffer had criticised.
Theology ",ithin the functionalistic ethos is often reduced to a thorough-
ly conformi st form; as such 9 any accomnodat-ion with functionalism
must imply the abd"ication of theology as ongoing and cr"itica1. This
is so because funct i ona I i SITl is diametrically opposed to the Gospe I
of Jesus Christ and the radical nature of his challenge to man.
Theo 1ogy as on90i ng and critical reflection cannot be abolished
because man is essentially a believ"ing beit'9 and he vvill set up gods
\'ihether in the form of emotional experience, Utopia. reason~ science
a host of functionalistic gods or even anti-faith itself.
will-ta-believe is as axiomatic as his-will-to-truth or his-will-
to-live (Schopanhaeur),
- c . -'-' 1
01 T.. Cr uV:, supernatura •!I
As J 0 hn ;-Ji sdor1 po i nt ed 0 Ut ~ inan "hankers
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If faith is to vvin man's Gebotqel'theit (existential safety or security)
.... ...-
it must insist on free critical reflection in order to keep its claims
in check. Theology cannot abdicate because of manls propensity to
believe. If the object of his belief is not evaluated and hi s ovm
belief not constant ly reassessed ~ he wi 11 become i do 1~trous. A man
becomes more human, says ~lo1tmann, if he is put in the position of
being able to abandon his self~deification and his idolatry with
all its gains and its achievements. He goes on,
!'Ihat can put him in this pos it ion? It is the critical-
task of theo 1ogy to take aV.Jay from oJlthropo1ogy
the absolute and totalitarian element and the legalis-
tic view of salvation. 39
lihen this dynamic quality of faith is removed, theolo9Y becomes most
vulnerable to being systematised and descriptively analysed. As Rauche
rEpeatedly pointed out, the method of the natural sciences has been
indescriminately applied to fields like philosophY9 psychology and
linguist.ics (and we may add theology) where it is wholly inappropriate.
tJhen thought is removed from vital commitment ie. v/hen faith ceases
to fuel theolo~jical reflection, systematic theology lapses into quanti-
fication. The '-that of the gospel is bypass€d. In it~ place is put
the remodelling of past rerspectives or the emphasis is placed on
activisrn.
Theology cannot afford to be introverted for then it becomes preoccupied
't,ith its past. It must engage the ',Iorld and all honest quests for
truth. ~t cannot evr::n '::e preoccllpiec '11th systematization. ELelinc:
corr:::ctly ;)G~ntf:C: cut, a.ne! tllis is a point that has reoeatecly bpen
made in Part II~
faith is lHtle capable of being systemat:ised
and exhaustively expounded as life itself. If talk
about fedth <is to be open to the t:mpredictable and
incalculable in 1"ife~ it. can have n.o finished model
that it is to be realised and imitated as the uniform
type of Christianity. 40
To fix a model or method IftJithin Cl creed and limited theological loci
is invariably to rig the understanding of the Gospel.
Theo1091 as 1i vi ng encounter of faith stands opposed to all i do 1atry ~
ft~ees man from his 0\1Jn truth and opens him to his brother. t·jhat
has been said aoout p~i1osophy is even more applicable to theological
method because of the Cross. Theological systems are always tentative
and to absolutize them is to lead to alienation from truth, God,
the Christ-event and life. As R G Smith stated it~
In so far as all the stnlctures of religion, of
seculadzation and of Christendom as a \#hole i parta!«;;
of historical freedom - they are the °jnevHab"le
partners of faith. For faith 1i ves in and by hi story.
And just as there can be no Ol pure!1 theo 109Y, and
no absolute or permanent form of faith, separated
from the untidy, ambiguous and distort-ing fOl/'ffiS of
"man's historical existerH.:e g in an its \-dcissitudes s
so faith is bound to be expressed, and thus communica-
ted, in these same fonns. 41
In view of the historicity of theology and theological structures~
faith has the indispensable ra 1e ofensur<j ng that these structures
do not petr<i fy. Faith, says Smith, has to exetc'j se a constant ct~<itique
of Il re ligious forms" which it must Il aga in and again" overcome;
of "secularist fotms" in order to "expose their uncr-i ti ca1 nature
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proposit'j ons
and to formul ate stnH:tiJreS are tmavoidab1e;
bf1CQ,US(~ ideas" beliefs and truth cannot eidst in wordless nakednesso
Neverthe'less~ such theological t"ef"lection is a lect10n of faith
and the further theo 'j ogy moves a~\J[(V from -I t I 5 pt! 1se (1i vi ng fai th)
to th e>:terrt it becomes Cl 1tdl1 unto itseH; a system out of touch
wi th the ~JOi"d of to man and with the cri S 'j s of the be1i eve',.. in
at the side of it. 43
Theo1ogy fU!'lct'i ons between two po'l es: to refl ect on the ob,ject of
faith and to COrlS t itute its content i fl ever' nev~ freedom 9 but a'l so
to pre:;erve the ongo"lng, dynamic and self-critical nature of fo,ith
"itself. In the process, it is continually renewed. If it abrO~Fltes
sens it i ve ~ consumed ~'iHh se If·'r; ghteousness as the Phari sees in Jesus ~
day were~ love'~ less and devoid of tht~ compo.ssion of Chr~'jsL
3.3 THEOLOGY OR IlCHRISnM~" IDEOLOGY?
In each historical moment the quest for meaning manifests itself
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in an assessment of the predicament of man and in the const"itution
of a framev'Jork in \l>Jh'ich iife may be meaningfu"i1y ordered. Y(:t~ at
the next hist01"icCJl moment 9 that very manifestation and its constituted
framevwrk of mealY! 1\9 is call ed into question, for the context (S i tz~
il'n~'Leben) is constantly changing and each new moment presents a new
cha 1'1 enge to man movi I1g the carpet. from under hi s feet whether he
is aware of it or not.
Any discipline ti/hich addresses itself to the human predicament is
forced to defi ne these changi ng ci i"'cumstances and to c i aii fy man! s
cant i ngency; that i 5.. to formu I ate the ever ne~1J prOD 1ems of human
ex;stence 9 and to offer aHetnat'!ves for ITkiking life meaningful and
authentic. In this connection~ theology can use the ins'ights of
phi losophy provided philosophy realizes its m~m historicity and remains
an ongoing critical quest. The abse~ce of this ongoing critical
dimension threatens the freedom of man for he becomes a mere object
among other objects~ not a ql1est'iori'il1g and thinldng subject. I~ 'one-
d'imensional relation nm'i obtcl'ins bet\r~een an unUl'inking subject and
a rigid ideology.
3.3.1. IDEOLOGY: THE FIXING OF ONE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ,,<
Since the quest for meanin9 is ah'iays Cl human act ;n history~ it
may easily end in the propagation of one or other historical perspective
of truth. Th;:;; s the nature of ideo 1ogy •
""'preliminary findings of this section pUblished in ~£!:'iE~~ No 15
duly 1985, p. 1-22 Univers'ity of Stellenbosch.
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The fixing of one perspective leads to historicism, and the ongoing
crH i ca1 quest ends in accommodat i Oll to one perspective of truth
as vane! for an men c,t an times. In the ~~ords of G jJ1 Rauche, we
have~ as it were, "closed ShOpll; the ali1Jill'eneS5 of the cont:ingBlt~Y
of man and the empirical limits of every human r l)l1struction is lost.
An idE~olog_y is born when one constitut:ion of meaning 'is absolutized.
Ideolog'y~ ther'efore~ is the petrification of open, ftee and ongoing
quest for meaning. As such, no matter how meaningful an ideology
may be for its adherents, -it is static, not dynamic. Change occurs
only ~\lith'in its confines. Its constitut'ive frnctiol1 is an end in
itseH; a !.~!!!!D~.~ ad que~ not a termi n.::~a qui?.
An ideology expiains~ for a community~ the various structures of
its being: social, cuHural~ relig"ious 9 political and such like.
It propagates certain non-negotiable fundamentals and attempts to
guarantee the wholeness of the community or nation. These non-negot·ia··
be1s include the asph"ations and self-image of the group9 resollrt'iofl
of its major fea.rs and protect i on of' its 'j nterests and pri vil eges.
By postulating a rigid theoretical frame\toJOrl< \"J'ithin 'tJhich the "life-
world" of the group is organized, it presents a "\oJOrking hypothesis"
for that 9tOuP.
Nat'ional'istic ideologies aff'irm in particular the survhtal instinct
of the g,~oup ~ often at the expense of other groups. It addresses
their 'jnsecLwities and builds into its l'!orldng programme the ovel"coming
of these insecurities or threats. If it is labelled "Christian,"
or gi v,:n any re I i gi OllS tag then the ideo 109Y has the potential to
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be even more abso 1ut i st and tu have a gv'eater ha 'I d on the mi of
its adherents because both 'its understandi i1g of the imi:1gi? of tfH:
group and its programme to ensure 1ts survival receive divine sanction.
Shlce it possesses the dimenshm of urn tremendum et fa.scinans
q:~€;stioning one at other aspect of the group's percept-lon of the
hm"e the ind'ictment that the religious status
sincere. levelled against Christ himself.
Little wonder that Marx rlHl"intained that for the dialectics "ifl the
class stru9g1e to proceed unh'lndered in order that society may be
false consciousness and mystifies the rcvolutiorHll"y spidL f'~an{
described religion as the.
sigh of oppressed creatlH'e s the heart of a heart-
less world~ as it is the spirit of spirHless concli,·'
t1on5. It is the opium of the people .•. the criticism
of rel"igion is thus in embryo the cdt'icism of the
vale of tears whose halo is religion. 44
Instead of dism'issing the 1V1andst crit'ique~ it should be remt,;mbet~ed
that this crHique a.rose from a deep concern for the enslaved man
,
'., ,e..'''f'.~e.,'t.'.'. ?l,if'l(! 1-1-1. ",-t" 1'~ ·'eJ'Cl',t.ed '" "':"'Rl'C"'C~UI.~' of '," 'd '" ',I v, ,0'" "'''u,- l" "'_" '"" ..:,,,,! <AI.I\:: relgl0n WletY
.vident then and nowQ This form of lnel'igion depended on so::io-econonl"ic
circumstances and on the propagation of the status Marx be 1i eved
that re 1'i 9-Ion requ iv'ed no independent crit i ci Sill S '1 nee it Wo,s Il a
secondary phenomenon,," 45
This description of the nature of ideology and the limits of religion
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may be illustrated by the apartheid ideology prevalent within the
South African s'ituati on. vlhatever U aparthei d" may mean to different
people, "it 'is a pm't1erful ideology that has absolut'i2:ed ethn-lcity.
Over and abov2 its polHical, legal and social implications, according
to A Jab 1ensky, for those VJho have a vested -j nterest in its mal ntenance,
lilt simplif'ies enormously the realHies of the world.
u46
It presents
th'ings in black and \'!hite and excludes all the greys.
Even r~ar;{ and A. Hhusser ~ 47 despite the'j r po'j nts of di sagreement
about whv.t constitutes ideo l09Y, agree that ideology expresses in
pract ice Ii a cogn it i \le ly di storted and impoveri shed grasp of t~ea1i-
ty.1! 48 Within the ideological system~ a particular perception of
the world is entrenched in the psyc~~. of its members which determines
i ntei" a11 Cl. the t~eporti ng of ne~\fS and its 'j nterpretat i on ~ the ~\frH i ng
of histor'Y~ 49 the emphasis in education, the organization of people
and even the natw~e of belh:f in God. Often t.mconsciously~ a type
of hermeneutics is at work which reflects the world-view of its members.
It is the resu 1t of thei r consC'i ousness and H in turn determi nes
that consciousness.
Thi s c i (CU 1ar hermeneut'ics is used not on ly to H read ll the woy'1 d ~
that i 5, even·ts. ne\'iS, cri t'ici sms ~ praises, Emend es or friends of
the system bl.l t ~ if it is a r'e 1i 910115 ideology~ it also detennines
hm'J the pdmary texts and the traditions of that rel ig<ion should
be read. Consider~ for examp'le~ how differently say some Afrikaner
Christ"jans and the Black Ethiopian churches read the Old Testament, 50
Observe their markedly different understanding of the exi le and of
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the coven~mt.
An ideolo9Y h€<s a closed hermeneutic~: an thinking ~'!ithin it
is aimed at describing' and cl fyi rig H::; structures and gOtd s.
It is necessari intolerant one of its
and even h·j stCH"Jl are hez!.v'l'ly censored a.nd ea::> n,Y i i'J.pse i neo propaganda.
What by nature
1s contingent 1s absolutized and given timelessness.
Therefore ~ wh; 1e an 'j df~O '! Of' may undoubtedly prov; de a rneanhlgfu 1
theoret'1 ced framevmrk for a community or class ~ at the same Ume
'it n~presents that which is ossif'ied" driefly becc~use of the absence
of self-criticism.
3.3.2. A "CHRISTIAN" IDEOLOGY?
Some wou 1d argue that if an -1 deo 1 is libaptized" and made
then it can be redeerrled and is therefore accept ab 1e.
in terms. It fails to unden;tand~:he "closeness'!
is a contradiction
a.nd stat i c nature
of an i d(:;o 1ogy and it confu~ ~S
the need for ideology.
need fOV" mean; Yl£j and freedom IfJi th
At first the contradiction is not apparent because
like the term "-ideology," is often 1OOSE:~ ly and \.'Jfong ly used. It
has come to mean that wh-ich represents the teaching of "the Church,"
----_.--- -- ---- ----- ---~-.-._- .-.-------_ ..
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or belief in a body of eccles'iastical dogma.s. This \'wuld mean, for
example
g
the Canons of Dort~ or the ~Jestmin5tel". confession, or the
Canons of the council of Trent or the Savoy Declarat-jol1 or such 'like.
Hence what ona has "j s a mu 1t i tllde of churches ~ each convi need that
italone is preservi n9 the truth 0 Thr~eforel modern attempts at
forming an ecumenical boctY9 in spite of the merits of organic unitys
are at present shaky cong 1omefat ions rilther than homogeneous prophetic
bodies. They make gr'and~ albeit pra'iseworthy~ resolutions but simply
do not change the consciousness of their members,
~~ithin these denominations} some or oth~'r c~'edal form becomes the
theoret'ical framet'JOrk of theologyo IITheology/' as we observed above~
becomes the propagation of one historical perspective,
thus becomes the eqldvaleilt to one or other credal framework which
over and above accepting certain basic beliefs" absolutizes certain
distinctive doctrines at ~ theolog"ical position. Protestants are
as open to the criticism of absolutism as the Roman Catholics whom
they criticize Oll the same issue. Theological positions become
fixed and churches continue to proliferate.· For example 9 it is a
sad commentary on the church that \iJith"j n the South A"fri can Indi an
Christ"ian communHy of about 80,000 is found almost eVE,ry denom"irlation
spawned in Europe and America. There ar ~ over 50 different churches
in the 1l1d-ian communHy in Durban alone. 51
the--..2.en'ial of history and the rejection of tradition~ VJithout \'ihich
~--_._-----~._-------,..~ ..,,~,---"-, ..-
\>ie are arguing here against the denial
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and lack of a~"Jareness of the historicity of these cteeds. theobgies
and of man himself.
As N. Lash states,
The prob1em of ideo1ogy ar'i se;; 9 in the fi rst
instance, • 0 not from the fact that our ideas are
soc'lal products. but from our iforgetfulness i
of this fact. tJe tend to be fotgetful both of the
objective limits that 'deterrwlr.e' our perception
of our circumstances and of the extent to which
the \'Jay "Je tlli nk 9 and percehfe. and argue, ref 1ects
!.mder'lying patterns of SOC-I,ll division and
dam'inance... The symbolic fon/J in i'Jhich ~Ie express
our special relat'ions constHute at one and the
same thll€, the form of our ft~eedom and a threat
to that freedom. 52
In so far as credal Christianity absolutizes one historical perspective
which in turn determines its perception of the wOY'ld~ society and
social organization; or "in so far as creda'\ Ci,ristianity rem?lins
wH:hi 11 any human sy~tem~e'i ther ..-2.E~I!JY__~J2.2.!:!.l~g,": .....th~ theoret'j ca1
framework of that system o~ acgL!iesc"j_~,fL by domesticatinlL itself vl1thin
'it, to that intent. that credal for'lll has become ideololjlca.h
When "Chri st; anI! CE:~ases to be the descr'; pt"i on of a 1hli ng and yHa1
relationship with Christ, a life of faith as existe..tial encounter,
it 'is no dHferent to any other rel'igious or po'lit'ical belief ... system
~vhich uncrHically co-exists in society. It is a religion that remains
il Cl secondary phenori!e'1on."
we sp&)k of being .~ Christian VJhich makes "Christian" descriptive
not ex"istential. The essence of ~c..:i~~'ia!.~, on. the other hand,
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, d,' {-Ine l' mpe"""'t,,, ve 11 :I'f,' an,'j,f maxI come after me._ 1et him'j s Sllmme~ up n 1..01. ' '. tJ, I 9, 1
k • 'I ,-first deny 1l1ffiSe r 9 take (lk p:23)
The challenge of the text
therefore~ is a cOITIlyination of essentially
dHferent a,nd 'irreconc'ilable notions: a vital. ongoing encounter
'le ossif'ied bel'ief-system. Aff'ixing
any human structure whether r<2Hg'ious~ poli'UcQ,l ~ social or economh:
is to v'ioli'Jte the inherent dynamics of fa:ith and theology.
Hmlje\ler~ there is yet another reason ItJhy th'!s coupling is a contrad'ie"
If faith is not to be mere belief in h'lstor'lea: assertions
object of its concern the source of being (God)? in whose 'ima£je an
Faith crffh'ms 9 ItJe have sa'ld~ man; s freedom in God and redempt"iol1
frorn the bondage 'to lesser gods ~vhich a'l'ienat.E:d man (man in Ada.m)
in wont to create. Even the athei st must have a po'l nt of referenc~l
by wll'ich he cm order h'is life m=arringfully. Where some form of
personal 'lntegrat'ion or mean'ing is absent~ man either becomes neurotic
or escapes into even gr'cdtev' bondagE:~. All men are believers G?
som\~ kind" The danger is that' they may believe in a 90d which man
WlliJitt'j ng ly creates i 11 his own imagt~. LHtl ewonder then tha,t Durkeim
the founders of the functional theory v'ie~'l re'liqion as society's
woY'ship of itself. 54 This is what is n::ferred to in this study
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as hubris.
3.3.3. THE PROBLEM OF HUBRIS
In Greek trageqy the fate of the hero -is alwqys predictable: having beccme the hero
h.e camrits the sin of hubr-is; that is~ he trangresses the lcrtJ determining his
mortality and finitude ami therefore mJst? of necessity~ suffet d.efeat al'ld die~ 55
P.g&illOCfl walking on the purple carpet was in fact clcriming to be more than mai'!. In
Sophocle's~ also the hero forgets the lilTnts irrposed on fTis natut'e and glories
in his Cl/m w{wth. There is Cl portion due t::> man (moira) but if he c1,rims rr.ore than
his moira 9 then he carmit's hubr-is and d-)ke casts him back. 56 Hence hubris means
more than man's pride in himself OY' 11 inso1ence in prosperH:y." 57 It is man's self-
worship; manls atterrpt to be rr.OI"e than man and to grasp at divinity.
In the creation story \\le have the clearest insight into the Biblical
understanding of sin as .!JQ!?r'is. Adam's sin is in principle his un-
\lli 11 i ngness to be the bearer of the image of God or to tak.e seri OllS ly
h'j s humanity. He grasps at divinity yielding to the temptation
"ta be like Goci ll (Gen. 3:5). The result 'is the belittling of h'is
mm humanity and his awareness of his nakedness (Gen. 3:"10)0 The
a1ternati ve to bei ng fu lly huma.n -I s not to be d'j vi ne but rather' to
be less than human. Hubris is therefore the flight of man from himself.
~ -=::<=> ..
The 'tJay to measure hubris is to observe the extent of his alienation
and de-humanization. whether he appears in u capitalistic,1l
"nationalistic,
fic ll dress.
lI ecc lesiasti c l! OJ''~ the more illusory~ II sc ienti-
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Flight from God is the story of manls night from himself. Al-ienation
is the mark of origina'j sin. Hubris manifests itself in history
as the att€r.'pts of a1i enated man to construct a meani ngfu 1 t'lOi"1d
vJherein his pal'ities, culture, sodety and religion can be ordered.
Nationalism, Fascism, Communism anrl Capita'lisrn are extreme examples
of this attempt at ordering a world around mctn.
In No.tionalism 9 for instance, there mClY be cleo.r IlChristian" elements.
But elevated alongside God is also some other human concern~ for
example, race, language, culture preservation or survival of the
\folko Elevation of creaturely concerns to the level of ultimate
concern s to such an extent that these i nfl uence Ollr petcept'j on of
the world and man) leads to the domestication of God to worldly,
Ideology~ as a rigid system~ feeds
on hubris. In every ideology some or other creaturely c()ncern~ sometimes
even a doctrinal formulation, 1s given absolute value.
Hubris is sin against God and man. Pharisaic religion 'in the New
Testament is a good example of a reiigious "ideology ~."hich projected
other national or cuHural and even. religious prejudices alongside
God. It so di started its vi e~'J of God and its understand'i n9 of the
human condition, that. when the Grj-man appeared restoring man and
caning all to reconcil-iation with God~ it fa'i"led to recognize him
and sentenced him to death on the charge of blasphemy.
then not the judgement of man's ideological slavery?




Cl reliqious cultus that aave meaning to its adherents but 9 like all- ." .
ideologies
9
it did so at the exclusion of self-crHicism. Its closed
hermeneutics excluded the message of Christ which ca.lled the ~'Jhole
system into questimL For instance~ Chr-ist!s nt~oe in'ro you scribes
and Phari sees 9 hypocrHes ~ who trave'l 'j and and sea to make one convert
and when you have made h'jm you make Irim bJice as fit for hell than
yourse1ves \l (~:laL 23: 15); or 9 IIWoe 9l.1nto you scribes and Pha~~i sees;)
hypocrites~ for you shut lip the kingdom of hea.ven against men: for
you neither go in yourse i ves nor Cl. 11 OV,j them that are enteri ng to
go in. ll U4at. 23:'13) Jllllything that does not fit into the ideological
Procrllstean bed is cons'j dered to be untruths or rejected as blasphemy.
Dio,logue vJHh such a fl mental horizon ll is detei"nrlned and fixed only
by H~ prc~understar.cling of truth; hence thei~e can be no real encounter.
On recogni zi n9 th-j s 9 Chri st i arnented ~ 11 They have eyes and they do
not see; they have ears and they do not heaf~. H HiaL 13:13-15;
Mk. 4:12; 8:18; LI<. 8:10; Jh. 9:39-41). Therefore, they are Il ever
1earn i ng but they do not come to truth 0 il (II T'im. 3:7). Pharisaic
ideology professed to be in the serv'ice of truth, but it was Cl ntruth 91
v"hei~e obed; ence to fi xed norms and the performance of rites that
claimed divine sanction "led to salvation;1I a Iitruth!l that had
enslaved its adherents to the Lat<'J. Christ 9 un the other hand 9 pro-
claimed, liVe shall know the trut.h and the truth shall make you
free. 1I (JhQ 8:32-36)
Thi s study has attempted to sholtJ that to 1 i ve authentically
is to be fu l1y
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human which as Christ showed
is to live coram Deo. To be ti~u'jy free 9 therefore, is to live in
fa"lth; in reconciHation with God. Freedom i5 a precowJHion of
nJanls fun ~1Umardty and of human creativity. This is the mark of
tds being the image of God. D'l vi nitY!l thet'efore, is not opposed
to humanHy othen'rise the Incarnation would not have been possible.
Divinity fulfi 1s humanity; it does not eclipse H.
sionificance of the Christ-event •.",
That is the
If freedom is the precondition of humanity which can only be realized
in encounter with God!l .and. if a1i enati on ; s the deni a1 of such an
encounte"1' it f01101;JS then that the state of al"ienat;on is a state
of unfl~eedom and slavery. Th; s is the reason vihy, as we observed
i i1 Pai"t I!l man 'Js ob nged to pay homage to 1csser gods such as
"nat ion 3 iJ 11 success, I! "Utopi all or 9 as in the case of the humani st,
"human goodness. u Religion within an 'ideological system necessarily
1c.pses into idolatrY\l for Romans 1:"18 defines idolatry as the l"aising
of creatureliness to co-equality with God or~ inversely stated, the
conferring of ultimacy and absolute value on mundane and human concerns.
Fa'j th and theology are by nature opposed to ideology since true ~'Jorship
b Bib1'ically defined as loving God 9 ~'ri th 11 a1'1 one's h.::art, \'Jith
an oneos soul, with an one's mind, and with all one's stl"eng':h"
because "The Lord our God is one Lord ll (Mk. 10:29~ 30). As
KierkegaaY'd stated it, "Purity of heart is to will one thing,." 58
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3.3.4. ItLEOLOGY 2 FAITH AND ESCAPE FROfi] IDEOLOGY
How can the breaking through ideology~ necessary to change soclety!s
consci ousness 9 be achi eved? Halls can tie dra1J} ourselves out of the
system ItJhich contra1SOLiI' veY''j mi nds? It roay \11(;;'11 be the case that
i"(lp'j d sod o-economi c or po1it; ca1 change may fracture an ideo"1 ogy 0 s
theoretical ftame\l'Jork~ since its traditional ans~"ers may no longer
sat i sfy some of its adherents. Two pass i b11 it i es may ari se from
sllch a situation. Fitstly, the jl1stH"icat1ons of the 'ideolog'!cal
stance will change and its educationists 9 political thinkers and
theo109 i ans s amongs t others 9 wi n provi d2 Cl \IIi del' frame of reference
for the group. Its previously restricted self-image may be extended
to i ne 1ude oUlers or the sac; ety \I'd 11 be reorgani zed to counter the
treats to the system. Several changes and "improvements wi 1i be effected
provided the non-negotiable fundamentals remain intact.
Second1y, it may VJen be that wHh time the 'ideOlogy becomes ;ncn;~asiilg­
1y less meaningful ~ soc;etal homogeneity is lost and the hold the
ideology had on its adherE,nts, d~dndles and cHes. It shou'ld be borne
"j n rni nd that we are referri ng to ideo1og'l es at 1arge and \'Jhat is
said here is relevant for social and politica<1 ideologies, like those
\Me face in SOll~h t\frica and severed parts of the vJOrld~ and religious
or "Christ'ia,nl! ideologies which absolutize a creda1 9 theo'logical
or tdstorica~ form. In the lattpl' case~ 'if the ideo"logical ho'ld
is.lost~ relig<ious cormnitment disappear's, the youth may be alienated
from the church 9 church growth is almost non-ex i stent and there may
be genera 1 spi r-j tua1' bankruptcy.
However, such change as described in the second possibility normally
/
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occurs over a very 1ong pe!~i od of time un 1ess it is brought Cl.bout
by revolut-lonary meanso In fact 9 when aspects like race~ nation,
language and ethnicity are absolutized, such a transformation may
never occur.
ideology~ a substitution of one quantum
for another 9 for example~ black for \tJh'ite~ proletariat for bow'ge'losie
or one race for anothet win not achieve the liberation from ictc-ology
~
or the transfor-mat·! on of cOl1sc'iousnes5
soc'ietyo
that is 'Imperative to change
To begin with l it is incumben~ upon us to ask Ufirst order~ questions
in ord(-:t' to liberate us from the hetmeneutical stranglehold of ideology. ,>
For exarnpie~ not merely to ask \\lhether a la\'J is justly adnrinistered g
01' \'ihether justice is properly executed~ but to ask \rJhether the la\1i
i tse1f is jusL The supportel'"$ of the _st.?tuS~g in the enthus'j aSITi
to preserve law a.nd order~ fail ~o see that sevel"al of the lavJs them-
se1ves are designed to safeguard the prejudi ces and b"1 i:,ses of the
systemo
Another example is the liberal p'iea ~:ithin the system for equal
opportunities and equal wages for equal work. However~ the capitalistic
system within wh'ich such paritJ · would be achieved remains unexamined.
UFirst ord[!r" questions v/ould have to enquire into the cfudH.y of
the capitalistic ethic which is b·:,sed on the supposed harmony that
tl~ Enlightenment believed existed in human societies; an ethic
that accepts that the selfish seeking of one's own good will lead
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to the benefit of all.
Failure to cons-iste;'ltly ask questions \tJi1i ahvBIJS.f
1ead LIS to marry off Christiani~y with that which is incompatible
wHh it. The Russian Christians Berdyaev saw~ fm' example~ hOt\! the
o t .. 0, h' 0 '-' h 11 ',' c, a ....d tl'IOve and h~,vp. o"r bp~1 i~lglIcap 1 a11 srn Itn t ltl Wn 1 C ~Je I I V<;:; " - v. • - '" - gave
ri se to the c!l.:.:-persona1i zat ion and de-spi ritua1i zat'ion of man that
prepared the \tJay for Communism" FasC'ism and Nazism. 59 He w7'ote~
Modern capitalistic civilization is essentially
atheistic and host'ile to the idea of God. The c~'irne
of killing God must be la'id at their door-.. The
useful and practical Grd of capitalism cannot be
the true God. 60
Reference has already been !TfY!\~ to t~ris danger that funct-iona'lism poses
to faith and theology.
spi rituality.
Its pragmat"lsm and utilitarian'ism stif'le
Unless l,1/e commH ourselves to a critical analysis of the fundamentals
of our system or the systems \lJithin 1,1flrich men are generally imprisoned~
we pay only lip-service to freedom and to God. Hence even a change 1
of governments or Cl replacement of white nationalism by black
nat i ona1i srn \1.111 mt guarantee the change of consci ousness needed
to transform sac; ety. To met~e ly admit 'lore blacks ; nto the ranks
of the m"i dd 1e- class so that greater numbers may ~\ia 11 O\JJ in greater
opulence~ only mystifies true freedom. It 1eaves the system intact
and the spiritual CdSTs remai ns. The cris'is of man today is hi s
dehumanization and increasing ideological slavery. Berdyaev, haS
rightly pointed out that "any ideology ..• o even the Chr-istioll, can
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. f . It 61be turned to the serVlce a egolsm. The cri si 5 of man IS unfte(;dolll
is his falleness as Cl result of~ and h'!s inability to redeem
himseH and rediscover his fun humanity on his m-m. The more he
tries
9
the more he muely succeeds in redecorating his gods \'ihich
continue to have feet of clay. Thi.~ ideological er'is'is of mo,l1 9 there~'
fore, is his state of idolatry.
HO\lJ then shall ~'Je esca,pe the ideolog'lcal streii''ig:e!101d? It has already
been intimated that only faith as 1i '\1'1 I1g encounter v{i ch God produces
such a breakthrough" FaHh ~ 1i ke fl"eedom 9 can never be a possession;
.i t is a state of be; ng before God \\'hich has to be aff'j rmed tier ane\"!. Only
as such can of aHh and freedom be gift..: of grace.- As vole ah'eady asserted g
~lJhen the dynamics of faHh is lost g man set't'les down and puts down
roots in some or other sj/stem g thus abrogating h'ls freedom" The
object of onels belief 'is the 'ind'lcator of \/Jhether faith is authentic
OY' not~ for God as the object of ultimate concern~ necessari 1y stands
opposed to all poss'jb"e l~'iva'ls. Therefore g all rel'ig'ions~ inc'lurJ'ing
Chri st i an'ity ~ I'Jhi ch accomodate th!Jf1se'lves in a systGTl t,Jhich pmjocts oS pr'imary
a creaturely concern alongside God. are idolatrous.
Tu avo'jd this happening 9 as shown by the ReformatiOfl9 t;1e ongoing
and critical c.{';mens·!ons must be built into theological approach
and method. Tillich called this cr'it'ical dimension the IlProtestant
principle" which he defined as that which~
protests aga'inst the identification of our
uIt i mate concern with any creat i on of the church 9
includ'ing the biblical writings~ in so far as their
~ritness to what is really ultimate concern 'is also
~337-,
a cond'itioned expi'ession of their own spidtualHy. 62
The task of theology "is no longer only clarif'ication and confirmatiof1 3
but the ~_s~~2!lg of the Church 0 s teachi ng; hence the Reformational
an too qUlckly lost the self~critical dirr;ension and beceJre itself insHtutiol1al'lzed
This critical dimens'ion ~',1e have already argued is ind'ispensable to
the Gospel of Jesus Christ which has the Cross at its heart ar.od which
sums up Christ's mm life of faHh. It symbo l'j zes God! s judgement
on the whole system that put to death the God-man. It starK',:; ill
judgemep;: of Cl 11 systems that conU nue to dol stort humanity a.nd the
true 'j mage of God. It stands i r. judgement ~ therefore, of all forms
of human slavery~ of ideolog'ka'! seH-righteol1sness and ar'roga.nce~
of hubris and of an forms of idolatry. Therefo~'e9 Christ proclaimed~
IlAll who save their lives shall lose it but those \?Jho lay down the'ir
livl:;s for my sake shall fhld iL" (r~t. 10:39; ~lk. 8:35; Lk. 9:34;
Lk. 17:33; Jilo '12:25). ~Jhne Adam grasped at divinHy and 'in the
process became dehumanized and unfree~ Christ in the wilderness rejected
the offer of d'ivinity and \'Jilling laid down his life. As Si. Paul
states H 9 "He thought "it not robbe~'y to be equa1 with God: but
made irimseH of no Y"eputat'ion and took l!p~!n him the fot'm of a servant,
and wa_ made in the likeness of men ••• 11 (Ph. 2:7·~8). Hence 9 "'nless
\'ie and a11 that we hold d(·wr stand always under the jUdgement of
the Cross ~ in our quest for freedoil1 9 VJe create greater unfreedom.
Theology as ongoing critical l~ef'lection constantly pY'oclaims the
Cross in each neVJ age and context and can never be merely the explica-
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tion of a creed or a body of dogmas. ~lh'i le a creed may be believed
it cannot be merely repeated. The Christ of the Gospel ~ as it \'iere~
must become contemporaneous with us in order to ca11 us to ever- neVJ
commitment and to cha'l1enge us neveif' to rest "in our mlJi1 system.
The Christ that 'is confined to the B'ible or Cl chuteh tradition cannot
present this challenge.
The nature of a living theology is summed up 'in Christ's can in
Luke 9:23:
If any man wou 1d come after me 3 1et hi m f i r~t ~, deny
hi_m~~lf. and take up hi,scro_~s and i211~~~~e~ ~?dly.
IIDeny yourself ll rescues man from the s'in of hubris; IIfirst ll indicates
that the starting point of his liberation is his acquiring this perspec-
tive of h'irose"lf; IStake up his cross ll is the invitation to walk
the \rJay of fa'ith v,Jh-ich '15 open to judgement and grace~ the o';tical
\i'Jay of faith; "follow me ll affirms the ultimacy of the "'Jalk of faith
.... ,
Vi s-a -V1 s the ultimate object of f ai th; lIdailyll affi ms the ongoi rig
nature of faith as encounter. These i njuncti ons that 1i e at the
heor't of the Gospel have the potential to rescue man from seH-wi 11 9
ideology and idolatry and to draltl him out of his prejudices to live
for God and for otf1ers. Only if the Church takes its theological
task seriously» win "it ",fitness to l"iving Christianity; only then
can 'it be t'hp cI.JlnmUl'-'.,'ty 0-1-,' fai,-th~ only tl--'en ca" t h "- ,d r fj '1l': presen a Cl a! I enge
to every human system \'Jhich tribalizes God; and on '!y then \1/111 the
Chu\,,'ch hcwe the potent i Cl 1 to transfor'm soci ety 0 63
The neo,-!Vlar'xists realized that one could not rely on the proletar'iat~
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as r~arx had done~ to change the system. Only "new men,l! Marcuse
said~ II'Jho themselves have escaped from the stranglehold of the system
can change it. 51} HOVlever~ he did not soy 110\'J these
come about. Humanism, also, \"J'ith its uncrit'ical faith in human na:ture 9
fans to aHer the consciousness 0'; soC"l(?ty.
Only through sp'iritua'j effort, says Pau1 3 \"3'ill we not "conform to
this world but be transformed by
(Rom. '12:2). Berdyaev \'I1ho suffert¥.l the same anxieties as Marcuse
and the humanists concluded~
I became a Chr'istlan not because I ceased to believe
in man~ in I1'1s dignity and higher calling 9 in his
creative freedom, but because I sought a profounder
and more stable basis for this faith. 65
Since nothing short of Cl change 'in consciousness is requil~ed to c.hange
societys the churches 9 in order to be the communities of faiths must
direct 0.11 their energies to fil'''st deve"op'lng a critical distance
from the ~!£..
are seriously heeded:
This may be achieved if the fol1m\ling factOi~s
L S'ince hub:'is is sin and n~ne who have acconroodated themselves
wHhin the system have escaped bo,stet'ing its this sin must be investi-
gated> confessed and repudi ated at every 1eve 1 of Christ"ian existence.
2. Com'11ensurate \'Jith the freedom of fa'ith for the \vorld and for
the other s the church to be tru ly church and not acari cature of




The Russ"j an not'j on of sobon1Dst
_ ...........,....~!O, ..,.",.,..;",'"""""
is a useful
analogy in this connection: a "cOTl1IlIunion of the Spirit;1I "the dynamic
life of the collective body; 11 11 altogetherness" 67 op;Josed to both
authoritarianism and incl'ividualis,'Tl, Ha freedom in love which unites
u
believers, says Bu19akov~ where I'tradition is a check upon melne 1n-
dividualism, but no check upon original ci"eative activity. 11 Sobornost
does not mNln col'lectivism \r1hich is Cl Ilmeans fot donri nat'i on and
\'!;1!··to-p0ItJer ll as the Grand Inquisitor believed~ but is the sph'itual
qual'ity of men and as such recognizes freedom and the va,lue of the
Therefore, t.he Church the commu.,ity of faith and of the
.,
person. as
Spi rit must reject any ideolog"lcal constri ints which threaten to
di start its true nature. The Church as sobornost is in servi ce to
the \J\/hole of humanity and its openness must be vridely proclaimed
in order to preserve its o'tJi1 integrity. A global vision must replace
It is an anoma ly that somt} churches do not a11 ow
evm'ybody to attend its serv; ces or that the; r so 1e preoccupat i on
is to maintain their own confessional. historical or theological
character.
3. Theology~ in order' to make decisirns of faHh possible~ must
bf.~ liv"jng and ecumenical ;n spirit; that is~ it mJst be accomp'i"ished
in corrmunity othenJise it wi 11 alway absoluti _e one tl'uth -peY'spective
at the exclusion of others. Hence every faculty of t.heology should
insist that its doors be open to an irrespective of race. o.r'
dominational affiliation. However, this must not be done because
of soc;o-political expediency, but because of a serious concern for
a living theology" To study theology in racial or denomination isola-
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tion absolut'izes one context or historkal perspective, creates self-
righteousness and dogmatism~ and foster's a d"istorted understanding
of the message of Christ.
4. .~ seH-crHical d"imensioil that disallows ideology mllst be built
l
i nta a11 our hum8n programrnes or theol"et i ca "I framewOI"ks, IfJhether
d .. h l' , • t ~"'. '15 0'" .,.. . 0.':1" l' n"e,.."j- b r,heo's 09Ycree s or c eOlogles, COnSl:l U,,·IO. • S'caU:JEem:s ".11'-
must remahl a theology of the Cross (ef. p 302f L
5. The churches have to face the challenge that thel r relevance
tor sor.i ety is not se if-evident. That the mere cHi ng of some ": r'"ecl a1
position m' Biblical texts or even the name of Christ is not adequate
to validate "its claim to be the cOlTlJmmity of the Sp-iriLThose IrJithin
the churches, who have achieved the esc&p;~fron ideologY9 have
the responsibi"!ity of taking the initiative in leading otr.ers out
of id.eological bond.cJ.ge to face the risk of faith. It is unfortunate
that the hends of churches~ the synods and Uheadquarters U are them"~
selves often ideologically bound and are stumbling-blocks to the
liberation from ideology. It Ulerefore is futile to ask members
of such institutions to vote on whether these institutions should
be opened to an 0(' be changed since they are themselvLs prisoners
to t.he ideology. Such is also the myth of choice prot!€{l in the;
name of democracy a modern obsess"ion that fai"ls to
~
freedom must ptecede choi ce not the other \'Jay around.
understand that
It is clear that ad ho~ socio-polit'ical adjustments will not solve
the problems of dehumanization and ideological slavery. A society
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1 b h d 'f th "s ess of individuals Ii'Jithin 'itcan on'y e c ange ", . e conselOll n
• ! d' f th r ?oh ;\ "t g"'rdo If l-h.e Il.l'."'ll,t'has been cnangeQ an 1 'ese form "I e E.~~..=.. .... ,.. ~
church ll is the cOlnmunHy of faith and freedom, it is 2eso facto the
standard by v~hich socie'Ues a,re judged.
As a writer in Th~ol~~),[~~~9Y stated~
It is true that our politico,'! and social problems
are monumenta1 and need so 1ut i on ~ but it may very
we 11 be that at thei r root is a deep spit'Hua1 cri s"j s
\iJhich ma:<2S any cleaning-up operations frustrating
ilhlS'iol1s. The trllth 'is that \lie have lost touch
with the depth of being and hence have become alienatec'
fl om ourse 1ves 9 from each other and from our
environment as a \'Jhole. Our society, like Humpty
Dumpty~ cannot be put together by an the King's
horses and men ~ no matter hm~ \'Je 1"' f-j nanced they
be. In fact~ t.hey may only make matters \l!o\'"se. 71
Th; s is especi ally true because ~ljhat we have "j s not a church above
the system seek i n9 to transform it through committed serv"j ce (ore
et labore)s but churches firmly set with'in the system 'inadvertently
bo1steri ng it. Therefore~ all their actions~ though sincere and
undoubtedly \'Jell.;.intentioned remain the toil of Sisyphuso They
remain functional "solutions" for a spiritual and existential problem.
3.4 BACK TO THEOLOGY NOT SCHOLASTICISM!
Our emphasis on a return to true theology and not its abdication
in favour of actionalism 0 '"I S functionalism or confessional'lsm, and
the call ",C OIA th("ology to be theo'rog\,f ll f""Y "l,'c':lt ~h b' t".:.:: J 110., ~ " re ° Jec',on
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that th-is is a return to Scholasticism;
gression to academ'ic discussion.1! Such an understanding, says r'fjackay~
i nvo1ves a toto1 mi sunderstand'j ng of ~'ihat true theology is" He cites
the object'ion of none other than John Macmurray \/Jho in his ~~!9"
~l argued that theology is the child of Greek metaphysics. /2
Hh'il e !rl s i nd'ictment on theo 1oGY? for the reasons offered above ~
is incorrect, he has perhaps 'j nadvetter.t ly placed hi s fi nger on tile
pi"ob1em.
The history of Christian U~ought contains ample evidence of theology
being bes'ieged by rigid ph'l.osophical presuppositions; for examp 1e ~
the influence of Platon'ism and neo-Platonism dudng the first five
centuries; of Ar-lstotle!s philosophy in the Medieval period; of
idealism 9 especially Hegel, in the modern period and a host of reactions
to Hege l, from Romantic i srn to Ex i stent'j Cl 1i sm in our century. Theology
must engage all the quests of man in order to undergird its own encoun-
ter ~'!ith the world. \<Je have said already that faith requires thp
ongoing 9 critical reflection of philosophy to evaluate its judgment
of the h-jstoricHy of human systems a.nd to provide new paradigms
to i 11 ustrate its m'ln dynam;c message. It requires the critical
dimension of science to clM'ify its claims that the world and its
la\i<}s cannot have rel'igious ,Jower over man. _Ho~~ theolo~lY must
keep its critical d-istance or else it is subsumed by these philosophica'l
or scientific quests the lim'itat"ions of V<JI11 ch philosophers and
scientists themselves 9 at least the truly great a.mong them. are keenly
aware, Hermann Wayer. the mathematician. for example. admitted,
"t~e have tried to storm Heaven a.nd we have onl\1 sl.lcceedAO' l'n Dilina
J - -- 1"01
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up the tower of Babel." 73
Yet theoloQv has uncritically imb'lbed these secular models and often
-'-'
unconsciousl'y~ compromised its m'3Yl proclamation. Theology is not
opposed to I~eason; that would make -its Dltin formula.tions anornalous.
Yet its model of mM as the man of faith must be protected from the
ravishes of scepticism. Lev Shestov ins-isted that against speculative
philosophy and science (Athens) must be set the revelation of the
Bible (Jerusalem) with its Il paradoxiccd but profoundly true and
liberating proclamation that 3 through faith in God who transcends
all rational categories and human exp:_ctations~ man may not only
agai n foi nd that 'nothing is im: 1ossible' for him but also catch
a glimpse of that true reality \'Jh'ich the light of human reason only·
obscures," 74 He 3 of course 9 was not advocating irrationalism or
anti-rationalism!
There is a majOlA difference between Greek phi iosophy and Hebrcl.'ic
thought, The la,tter contains no eternal n~alm of ideas or essences.
The Hellenic man is the man of reason who raises his eyes to the
un-i versa 1~ the abstract and the realm o! forms e 75 The Hebr-ai C lm.n
is the man of faith who knew the "uncertainties and \fJaverings of
fa; th as a matter' of personal expeY"jence"
. (
but dld not knmil the conflict
of faith with reason; that was to come much later with the Greeks. 76
Hm'iever, even when that encounter vdth the GY'Le.eKS took place, Pa.ul
st ill located the centre of human persona·' i ty ; n fai th wh-j 1e
'it was Ari s tot 1e vmo had placed that centre in reason. William Barrett
cone 1udes that the 0pposit ion is bet\AJeen \'Jhat is vHa 1 and v.;hat is
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rational. 77 Macmurray's scepticism is 1,'4ell~founded in vievJ of the
fact that Western Christian theology, for the large part of its history~
has been an extended footnote to Graeco-~oman theology 0 Hence 'its
plAeoccupation viith cosmologica'l~ functional and ontological proof for
Grid and its indulgence in metapnys'icc:': speculation. As Shestov stcd:ed
it ~ in hi story the case has been that "•.• fi tst Athens was and only
1ater Jeru sa1em 0 And consequent '!y evetyth'j 119 ~'1hi ch proceeded out
of Jerusalem must be vie"j ghed 'j i1 the. balances of Athens 0 11 78
Therefore~ in spite of the fact that Chri st; anity entered the ltJestern
vior'ld almost two thousand years I ~o, its inhetent dynam"ismand message
of unconditional freedom of all men before God has not made an appreci-
ab'le dHference to the quest for freedom because <it has not dislodged
its moorings in Graeco=Roman cultureo Ivan Kireevsky. ('1806-1856)
therefore, accused Western theologians of elevating abstract logic
above the l!cmmnon consci ousness of the Un; versa"! Chruch ll and
therefore the i~estern church "smved \'!ithi n itself the i nesc'ipab 1e
seeds of the Reformation." 79 It i S Graeco-Roman menta1 framevwrk
rendered it incapable of II visual'izing the unHy of the church 'in
any other form than that of a forma 1 un ity under one bishop 0 11 80
Zernov, from a Russ i an orthodox poirt of compares starkly
the differences between ~!est .Y'n Christianity and the Christianity
of Eastern orthodoxy thus:
the vJestern sac i a1 and po 1iti ca1 order has
been bu; It on the Idea of the Law; the ten Command-
ments, the Roman ideal of justice and the notion
of privilege were the three solid pillars which
suppC1r'ted the imposing edifice of European civiliza-
ticn. But the Russians were brought up in the
Spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. 81
This view does not attempt to jettison reason but ml:'rely to keep
reason in perspecti ve. Theo 109Y does not have to make its object"
the object of faith~ logically accessible to mc' ,. That is imposs'ible!
The object of faith must be apprehended exi stenti ally.
its reflection also must bear the character of vital existential
reflection or else it indulges in abstract speculation.
The tendency to systemati ze is ahJays presblt because it is Cl human
tendency to Find assurance in a fool-proA and complete system.
HO."Jever, such a rational system remains an abstraction and is the
greatest danger to faith and freedom. The most potent 1iterary descY'i p-
-Cion of this po'int g \'.1Hhout doubt g is Dostoyevsky's parable of the
Grand Inqu'isitoY'g \'!herein the ecclesiastical hE::ad in the s'ixteenth
century interrogates Chri st; IIv,Ihy di d you come 'ca medd 1e v!ith
US?II he asks. "I knm'l not who you are and I do not ~'iant to knm'!
•••the scme people who today kissed YOUlA feet? win at the fh'st sign
from me rake up the coals at your stake tomorrm'J.!l 82 "Everything;1
the Inquisitor reminds Christ~ "has been handed over by you to the
Pope and, the\~efore, everythi ng is in the Pope' : hands 9 and there
is no need for you to come at Ell1 now - at an, rate~ do not interfere
for the t'irfte be; ng •• 0 A'll that you mi ght revea1 ane~\I wou 1d encroach
on menls freedom for faith g for it ~1}oulc! come as a miracle, and their
freedom of faith ~\1as clearer to you than anything even in those days,
fifteen hundred years ago." 83 Hhat the Inquisitor says next. indicates
most profound 1y hO"'j fa; t h when formulated into 0. system
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sat<lsfies m2n more than true' freedom ~'!Jhich is offered to thciTI in
Christ. "For fifteen centuries,1l says the Inqllisitof 9 1I~'Je have be(~n
tI~oub 1ed by th is freedom 0 NO\AJ H~ over and done with. is The system
has been completed in Christis name. "These men are more than ever
convi need that they are absolutely free 9 and yet thev themse"l ves
hi1ve brought the"ir freedom to us and humbly laid it our feetu ll 84
~1eil fi nd fl"'eedom 11 Cl I"! uri ng" but a150 1I torment i 119 11 • "~~e have corrected
your great work~l taunts the church 1eader ~ "and have based it on
mi rac 1e ~ mystery, and authority. iI 85
The incisive beauty of Doestoyevsky's writing is impossibl~ to reproduce
here, What is cleat, hm'JelJer, is that the ra,dicality of f.:\ith and
freedom often forces man to settle for less. Theo"!ogy caught "in
logic, system=building and structuring~ often sL!ccumbs to the temptation
to systematize, faHh and invariably impinges 011 human fr'eedomc
Such is the bitter fruit of all rationalizations of faith!
The can for a living, existential theology ther'efore, is the call
to place theology lion the Road" v~hich means that it must steer
a\\lay from both the Scylla of theo'log-ical rationalism~ scholasticism
and dogmatism 9 and the Char~bdis of actionalism, quietism, and
ecclesiastical operationalism.
3.5 EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY: A THEOLOGY ON THE WAY
It will be clear that what was si.\id about the existential nature
of faith is equally applicable to the nature of theo"logical method.
,/
Theo1ogy -j s ex i stenti a1 si nee' it is i nextd cab 1y 'i ntertwi ned \;Jith
manls conting':.rlt experience. It is true that is is based on revelat'ion
but the theological task -is to seek out that revelation in history~
in the ~1!orld and in the coming of the kingdom of God. If such revela~
tian ~\!ere self-evident faith would be redundant. G A Rauche in his
latest work points out that 9
Real faith is a. contingent expetience in the sense
that it mi ght happen to man i i1 ~he f(ri dst of the
cri si s of truth o,rld hirnse1f • On the grounds of
the experience of ttis crisis, theology ought to
admi t 'i ts Ot'irt ignorance and confess that it cannot
give COI1ChIS-ive answer'so It is only in this insight
thnt -j t can proceed to its real task of refer-ri ng
man to the.; evpnt of the er-ass as an event of exemplary
fahh and in the face of this eve .t 9 point to the
p~~~~bl~ experience of faHh by man in his actual
exper'ienceo 86
While faith is rooted in and manifests itself in. manis ex'istential
or contingent crisis. when faith "happens~1l the believing subject
remains a.n existing subject and. therefore. can never escape the
cris·is of truth. Rather~ faith confronts these crises and -t 5
stt"engthened in the process. The believer', as Paul says~ mJst "fight.
the good fighl. of faith,," (1 n. 6:'12; -!1 Tie 4:7).
Simi1arly~ theology also is rooted 'in the changing exper'ience of
\
men is cr-j si s of truth 0 It is 1itera l1y always on the vJay ~ or on
lithe road. ll Th'is -is th(0 case, because faHh is not wrought .r::.~~
~,rat.~ but is the ongoing quest for a clarifica.tion of reve1ation;
God with us. James Brovm, for instance. points out that truth does
not 1i e on the road of "an unappy-,jpri ated, unmedi ated object ....
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a hammer is a tool when it is being used (Zuhandenheit).!l 87 Revelation
I
is on ly revel Cl,t ion IJihen it is apprehended and appropri ated othenllli se
it rema-ins' of no effect. Theology like faith appropdates t.radition
(Kierkegaard); it remains li a challenge in the appearance of things ll
(Buber) and is a "_~.2... claim-ing div-ine sanction!' (Barth). 88
Just as the language of faith itself is Cl language of struggle~. says
Ebeling g so theo'logy is, for good reasons s Cl theoY'y of struggle. 89
F.Ho He-lnnemann in his attempt to go beyond Existentialism and develop
his "meta-analytics" ;;poke of the quest for truth as obtai nl rig
tions fm' the viel(J expounded 'in th';s StUdY9 of faith a.s O'flgoings cri-l..:ical
encounter p,'ov'i ded Rauche IS warni ng that thi s Hresponding9!1 even
in faith 9 is not removed from the actuality of human existence and
from the cant i ngent experi nee of rea 1i ty. 91 Theo1ogy is a l\r!ays
on the way because it can nevet~ escape the sphere of human confl i ct.
To speak in these terms 'I s not to deny the objecti vity of v'eve1at-) on ~
nor the finality ~f_,~hrist nor -is it to advocate Christian existentia-
liSnlo Our d-;st:inction between "ex 'istential ll
in Part 11 puts paid to that fear.
and "ex istentialism"
What is bei ng contended h".l'e may perhaps be i ';1 tAstrated by J. A. Mackay IS
d'istinction between theology IifY'om the balconyll and "theology
on the road." For him /lthe Balconi' and "the Road" are qualitative
descriptions of human life. "The Balcony" represents the life of
the spectator for whom 1i fe and the war 1d al'e permanent objects
for study. "A man may live a permanent balcon-ized existence even
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though the physical part of h'im has the ubiquity of the globe
tfotter~oH 92 liThe Balcony" means an Ilimmobility of sOLll" that
may "perfectly co-exist:; \dth a "mob 'j 1e ~ peri pathet i c body. 11
On the other hand~ "the Road ll is~
the place where '~i fe is intensely 1i ved, where
thought has its bi Y'th in confl i et and concern, \!Jhere
cno'ices are made and decisions ai~ecarr'ied out. ••
It is the place of f"ction, of pilgr'image, of crusade,
where concern is never absent frm,: the ~\Jayfcrrer~!s
hear"t. On the Road a goal 'j S SOu9ht, dangers are
faced, life is poured QUto ••• the Road, like the
Balcony, is a state of the soul. 93
Theology must be found lion the Road" bt;..':o,use that 'is where authent"ic
faHh 'is. If it stays in the Ba1cony, then no li!ntter hm1 pr-OfOUiid
its formulation~ it is removed from life and becomes absolutist,
dogmat'ic and life-less. Ernest Renan and several of the questors
for the historical Jesuss; the History of Religions School the libero,lism
of 19th century theo logy§ Ritsch 1 and other thinkers that advocate
an ethical monotheism, and a host of theologians in our time who
have reduced Christianity to form of ethi ca 'I humanisrr.~ on the one
hand, or a rigid. self-contained dogmatics on the other, remain thinkers
in the Balcony. K'j el"kegaard is Upugno et'go sumll i s fot~ei gn to these
theologians.
Finally, I'Je must pu'rsue a definition of theology as con'textua"l-ization
which, it ~1}ill be shown. undergirds the dynamics of faith and \!Jh'ich
offers a methodo 1ogy that keeps both the commi tment to the sources
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of Christian faith and the dynam~sm of that faith in balance. !\gair.~
n g
hI 'order to illustrate the argllment~ home gY"Qi.\ln examples vdll be
e1i cHed though several fl"om ehewhere "'JOll 1cl have also made the po'j nt.
*THEOLOGY r~s CONTEXTUALlZATION
~-~~~....".~~
In recent years llconte)<tualizat'ion!l has become a pOpuliit word 'in
cel~tain theo 1ogica1 cl re 1es 0 It made its international appearance
some 30 0"years ago ;rr and has si nee become the \vatchword of some
theologians, especially thC\se in the Third world" However) it has
Y'ece-ived litt'le attention from theolog')oal facti.Hie: at large where
it has occupied only a small place in the sy'llabus on mission stud'je:::o
Europe, Great Brit-ian and North America have, in the main 9 handled
the can to cOlltextualize theology as a Third ~1orld or a m'issiological
concern and have g; ven it on ly very caut'j OLlS academi c b~eatmenL
Nm'ihere else is this ambivalence towards iicontextuai'ization ll more
ev'iclent than in South Mr·ica. Here" theology is not only taught
mainly \dthin denominat'ional and clearly defined ecclesiastical compart~
ments, but also the issue is confounded by ethnic~ linguist'ic and
v'cl.c;al separation. Hence Bible colleges and faculties of theology
at universities are in the ma,in structured along d,enc"lnat'ional lines s
each wi th its own linguistic or rdcial tag supported by a socio~
political system that has "idolized ethnicityo
,\part -'- of t::e:e f~ nd~ ngs .~a~e ,.been ; 1rea~~ pub 1i shed by the Un'j vers ity
of POL.che~."t,IO?m ~, lnstHUte .'or ~e'lor~allonal stUdies as a conference
paper ent.ltlea Contextual1zatlon OT the Gospel in South Africa:
the questlon of releva.nce" (December 1983).
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3.6.1. THE PROBLEM OF POLARIZATION
This divisive mi"lieu has spawned a ser;e~ of other div·is·ions aiso
ethnically and racially determined; for example 9 church ser·vices~
pol"ity and constitutions. The formal separation of people and
Christians from OYl8 another fosters gross ignorance about the lHe-
world and the aspirations of one another. 95 ~Jhi1e such ignorance
cannot be condoned 9 it can per'haps be understood how g in the vicious
\'JOrld of free enterprise, materialism and soul~less capitansm where
men '1, 'e not thei r 11 brother is keeper, 11 such 1ack of empat' y for
the oVer could exist. HOl!ieVer g \·.jhat is dismaying is that chu'~ches,
the-ir ministers and theologians, have~ by and large, displayed a
s·imilar lack. These divisions in South Africa along ethn·ic~ racial
and denominational noes ml1st also be understood, however, against
the polarization of thought and life symptomatic of our times.
One of the most unfortunate d; vi si ons in tVvent i eth century church
hist.Ofjf ha.s been the f-ixed lines dravvrl between so-called "evangelica.ls'1
and 11 ecurneni ca 1S. 11 The fOl~mer are concerned wHh the preservati on
of Apostolic ChrisUanHy based on the "inel'Tant sCY'ipturesl! and
emphas 'j ze 'the numeri ca 1 growth of the church. COrlvers·j on of non-
Chr'ist<:ms and the t!salvation ll of the \;wrld 1i are among their ·:hief
priorHies. The latter. attempting to unite a divided church, reject
the dichotomy that exists in much of "evangelical" Christianity
between the "sa 1vat i on of the sou 1" and the "\AJho 1e person. 11 They
see as endemic to Christian proclamation the involvement of the Church
in the strugg 1es of the poor. the soci al1y di si nherited and \vith
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the pariahs of modern society •.
~~hi1e "evangelicalsl1 have been accused of encouraging a theology
thati:; @thei"~ t'\lorldly i:P.\'ld wr,-ich 'implies socio~political conformism 9
lIecumenicals" have been accused of theolog'ical liberalism and of
politicising theology_
It is obvious how 9 in South Africa~ theological reflr:;ction \o1rithin
racial divisions has been buttressed by the evangelical and ecumenical
debate abroad. Some have openly given theological credibility to
the under ly'j n9 ideology that pervades thi s countty. Others have
been vociferous in the-;r criticisms of this ideologY9 yet have
estab 1i shed at almost every 1eve1 of the'i r church i s structure a raci ally
disunited ~\ritness to the oneness of the church they siilcerely affirm.
fljany b'!ack Christians~ on the other' hand g dissatisfied \"iith the status
96.9U'£9 either move altjay from fellowship wHh \'lhites or remain \'jHh'irl
the churches deeply frustrated.
Blacks in their theological reflection have been forced to critically
evaluate the theology they inherited via the m-issiona. 'jes and theologi-
cal teache\~so B'Pick theology? for example" attempted to establish
the mean-i ng of the Gospel for people who by the fact of be; n9 black
\'!ere di sadvantaged in soc; ety. Black thee l09Y not on 1y interpreted
the gospel as a means of heal-ing the inner hurts and insecurities
of black people~ but also exposed the irrE'levance for their context
of much of tradHional Christianity which had been \'Jorked out in
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other contexts by othei~ Christi pi1s at other times. Hence black theo'!ogy
~---- ~----, ~=-
aims to be part of the proc ss that de--cu lturizes and I demytho 1og1 zes ;
the Christ'iarJ"ity black people have inherited. 97
In th'is rega!'d~ Fat.her Nolan~ in June 1982, speaking at a conference
on contextual theologY9 at HLlmmanskraal~ pointed out that this inherHed
theology had been 11done" in the context of Western cultute and
liberal capital'islTI and almost a11tJays 'in the context of middle"clo.ss
comfort Clnd complacency and therefore had turn~ out to be 11 s1mp ly
meaningless words ll hl the Third ~Jorld; they had$ he argued~ lino
pm-/er to 'j nsp'j re because they were from I, another war 1cl. 11 98
Tissa Balasuriya~ in the context of the human struggles of India
and Sr'i Lanka~ also lTIal ntEli ned that the 1nherited western theology
lacked 'insp'irat'ion and vias irrelevant for his life=situation. He
wrote,
Jesus of Na.za(,E'~th is one of the persons most mi sre<,
presented and misunderstood in history. \tIe Chr'istians
are largely responsible fm~ this. He was presented
to As; a in lTIodern t il11es hi the manner he v~as thoughtof
in modern Hestern Europe and 1(tter North Ameri ca 0
Both the Prote~tant and Catholic institutions of
religion adapted
ethi c ~ though lith
t;,emselves to the capitalistic
somewhat different accentso 99
B'lack theology aimed to indigenize theology; to make the proclamation
of the Gospel meaningful to black people; indeed s to give the black
experience and its struggle for freedom a biblical basis.
Hhile South Afr-ican,
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the North American brand
of b1ad thee'l ogy, 100 recei ved refi nement at the hands of such
black scholars as Manas Blithele2i~ So ~>1{rimBla~ B. Gobi}, 9 Desmond Tutu ~
d OJ-hors 'r'-I'ey no 1,', only vo'iced the amdet.1J of the South Africanan l. '" , 0 • •
poa!" 9 the sod ally disinherited eJ.nd the pclitica,lly vO'iceless~ but
they also attempted to make the Gaspe1 of Chri st relevant to the
black context.
Some argued that this linew" theology threatened the very nature
of the IItrue gospel 11 because it politicised everything: it dhi not
take seriously the creeds and beliefs of the lhurch.
knm'lrt wh"ite m'issiologist maintained that black theology narrov'Jed
salvation to only political l"iberaUon. He concluded that black
theology was i l1egitimate in South AfriCa since blacks in this country
ha.d neither suffered slavery nor 1l1ynchi rig!! as blacks in the U. S
had experienced. 101 Thus he triv'ialized the struggles of his fenet'!
South Africans and of h'is fello\iJ theologians \1110 grappled seriously
wi th the prob1em of the Il re levance fl of the Gospel of Christ.
Another important attempt at indigenizing theolo9Y "in South Africa
is so-ca11 ad IlAfrican theologY9" sometimes called "cultural
theology.'~ This approach argues~ and rig~:ly 50 9 that conver~ion
of Africans to Chri sti anity does not necessm'ily mean the abandonment
of their cultLH'a"' heritage 9 tradHions and h-istory" The cu Hura1
milieu v1ithin VJhich the Gospel vias proclaimed has a1l'Jays influenced
its express'ion whether Smritic . Greekn Bllzantinen ~~edieval F., ,.J, _uropean,
German, Ang1o-Sa,J(on, Indian or Afrkvn. G Setiloane, for example,
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maintains that black theology in South AfV"ica has not gone far enou0h
in making the gospel relevant to bla,cl< people. In ordel~ foy' theology
to speak to the African mind it had to speak of God in a creatively
neltJ way not only withi n European categori es of thought as B1ad: Theology
does. 102 Such African'izat"ion lfiOllld also help introduce n~i,,! paradigms
to describe 9 expla:in and understand Biblical truthso 103 Hds \'1ould
he1p non-Afrkans also to speak creat'j ve ly of the Gospel. 104
~Jhi1e African theology met \vith the approvai of several m'iss'iologists 9
many believed that such an endeavour could lead to Cl fljrtatior, \'Jith
"paganisino" It tended, they argued, to mininrize the biblic11 metaphors
of atonement~ sacrifice, redemption, propit'iation~ penal just"ice
and such like. For many, such metaphors and symbols, by virtue of
their being part of the Scriptures, wen:: also inspired and were there-
fore inviol'able.
The preceding are not the only examples of theolog"lcal ind"igen-ization
-i n Sbuth AfY'i ca. Another examp 1e of hm'll a community has attempted
to make the Gospel relevant to their life-situation culture and history,
is the theology that has underg'irded a great deal of th~ Afrikaners'
a.ffir,.lation of political and cultutal freedom, a theology that \'a~idated
che Gn::at Trek and provided a scriptUi~al pa.radigm for t~c Aftikaner
to overcome Briti sh imperi ali srn and subdue the lib 1ack threat ll and
enter illto a "covenant'! \1.fith God as Israel had done. In fact.
a Y'8'indelled version of this theology stnl underpins cer-tain latent
aspects of Afrikaner nationalism or its most recent forrn~ euphemisti-
cally cal1ed~ the "self-determ"inat'lon" of all races in South Afr"ica.
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N. Smith~ a Dutch Reformed Church minister and former professor of m-issiology at the
University of Ste'llenbokh 9 \necently pointed out t'le role his church 9 for exal1ple;
hBr.J played "in initiating and propagat-ing the ideology of separate development. 105
Hris kind 0'; theology of race ;s not unique to tne trrrikaner. In
sim-llar vein the "British-Israel ll theory found acceptance a.mong
some fit1g1o-Saxons. The writer came upon a book wh"ich pw~ported t.o
be Ba survey of scriptural pr'ohecies over the last 3 9 500 years 9 i'Jh'jch
by their fulfilment 9 prove conclusively that the Anglo-Saxon race
is the Isrf11 nation of the Bible. 1l 106
Thus theological compartmenta"l"ization has been fostered ~'Jithin South
Afric,a as theologies~ functioning with'in clearly defined theoretical
f}~ame\'llorks, have created within this countl"Y, b!.!t also else~Jhere~
Cl theological impasse. The problem with these attempts at seeking
theological re"levance is that ~'!hile they offer" important new insights
wh"ich a11 of Chri stendom can benefit from; they Cl 1so fh: one perspecti ve
or one theoret'ical frame of reference which becomes the parameters
of their theo'logical pursuit whether these are embodied -in the
categories "black," "Aftican,ll "race~" "fl.frikaner~" 11 Ang 1o-Soxon, 11
Illiberation,1I Il po litical chan';le,1l "success" II nation" etco As
such the c itidsm 'levelled at f-j}{ed theoretical frameworks in both
philosophy and theology (Part I and Il) nlLiSC also applys though to
varying degrees, to such categorica.l absolutiLat'ion. For examples
the category "1 i berat ion" obvi ous 1y has broo,der scope than 11 Ang 10-
Saxon ll O'~ lib1arl 1I H 11 h t .I , .;<. owever 9 a sue ca egones \'1hen absolutized
vitiate the dimensions of "origo'ingness" and "self-criticism."
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One is rem; ncled here of So 1z~enitsyn I s criti que of modern soc; ety.
In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech he observed that 9
People of different countries (\,!e may add Iiraces~"
classes·' 01" Ii co lOtlr'sll) bring their OIJJn scales
of value to events. Unyielding and in fu 1'1 seH-
confi denc,~, they , . by that sca"le~ and by noJucwe
"-'
other ..• There 'is Cl scale fmq things that happen
nearby and a seal e fmq thi ngs that happen far aV-Jay ••••
There a,~e different scales of humiliation ••• dHferent
scales for punishment and for crime... confidently
we 'udge the \\!hole vwrid by our scale. For this
reason lI'/hat seems to us gteater~ more painful or
more intolerable is not that which actually is greater.
more pa1'1ful or more tolerable but that which is
nearer to us. Anyth-ing further altJay. which is not
actua lly threateni ng to aVT-j ve on our front-door
step is accepted by us ~ \'ri th a'll its groans of
pain, smothered· screams. destroyed lives and even
millions of vkt"ims ". as something genera"i"ly tolerable
and within reasonable limits. 107
The fact of different and fixed frames of refei'ence and absolutized
truth perspectives, and different Il sca les ll foY' viewing
crisis and IItheir ll concerns, explains also the incongruency that
obtains in theolc:gical pursuits. In South Africa, for examp"'e, b'lack
and white Chri st -j ans sp?ak more often than not at cross purposes.
vJhile the former \\!ork I-or l"iberation and j:..;stice, the latter are
at pains to emphas'ize the need for lm"J and order. The gulf widens
as the age feeds on self-righteousness which polar-1zes allegiances
anx i et i es that inhere
betlfJeen Ch r is t i ans and
rilJY, \
to hear \) r .... ' .J thp
L\ <J1-,.KQUtiV -
Christians. Both sides listening but failing
"j n the stnJgg 1e of faith
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I I • t b r. 'h u Cb'~t';cal " sc ;;;les ll whl·err.in each otner s com:ex s ecaus'c or t le n ! I .. u "
govern their very thought.
3.6.2. CONTEXTUAlIZATION: THE WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE
_=~_~..~~""'~~ .......~""""""'~.. _.'""'~"'·_""'''''=='-='''''''''''''''""""K·",""~·.~"","""~,"",,,,,,,-~
In view of the danger of indigenous or "contextual~ theology degenera-
ting into IlChrisban ii <jdeology~ it would seem that contextualization
'is a h'ighly sLlspect enterpr'ise~ ra'lsing fears among those concerned
lroJith l! preservi n9 the Gospe1Ql~ On the contrai'Y ~ conte),tua1i zat ion is
endem'jc to the very methodology of theology as ollgoing~ critical
reflection of faith. Contextualizat'ion is part of the process of
understanding the Gospel and is the buhJal"'k against theology degenera-
t i ng into ideo109Y • In m~der to elucidatl~ the points made in th'is
statement \oJe have to c'IarHy severa.l other issues first" We beg'in
by first seeking a definition of contextual theology.
The pamphlet published by the Institute of Contextual Theology defines
contextual theology as lithe conscious attempt to do theology from
~'Jithin the context of real life hI the \\lor'ld.""108 B Goba~ commenting
on the t'ais~~~s. of contextual theology, pointed out that lithe
t'i~Jht method of doing theology in our context is that of taking a
stOY'y of our t.imeooo as being pa.rt of the ~~ord of God... there
is a challengi: to evolve a ne~1J theological methodo'logy~ the involvement-
opt ion methodo 1ogy. '0 there -1 s a need to move from orthodox v to
cl
orthopraxis~ a move from deductive to inductive reasoning which puts
a high premiu.n on sense observa.tion and on contextualization particula.ri-
ties." 109 Goba's idea of orthoprax"is, as we have pointed out. already~
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-j s bound to endanger ultimately the autonomy of theory. It tends
to diminish the necessary tension that must remain between theory
(whether induct-lve or deducth'?), and practice. /\s Ebeling had stated g
The hermeneutic task consists for theology 'Jr, noth-ing
else but -j i1 understandi n9 the Gospel as clddressed
\=
to con~~man. Hhoever does i,ot expose himself
to the tens-ion that entails 9 betrcws both the Gospel
and contemporary man alike. 110
Goba ~ however g quite correctly poi n'ts to the need for theory to be
relevant foY' ptC\ct-ice and for ne~'! theory VJh-ich takes the context
of its hearers seriously enough even to generate new
or categories or loci for the theological task.
John Aitchison in his repoy't on the conte,<tual theology seminar held
by the Association of Southern t\frican Theologica'j InstHutions (ASftTI) ~
defines contextua.l theology as the~
... t.aking of the concrete -situation itself as text
vritrdn the broader real life situation or context.
It is a recognition that the concrete situation
is itself a 'text' and contains 'information that
has to be 'read 9 ' 'comprehended' and 'integrated'
into our ex;st-jng store of experiential and literary
knm'Jledge. 111
In this ASATI experiment on contextual'izatiol1, severed characteristics
of contextual theology emerged. It was found tha' contextualization
requit'ed a reformation of the traditional theological curriculum
and the ~~us op~~ of theo 1ogi ca1 and Chri st i an educati on" It
meant that students and staff have not on ly to exper-j ence the prob 1ems
of 1i vi ng 'tiith the d-j sadvantaged, to ana lyse thei r contexts with
the aid of the social sciences and then to ask what light the Christian
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faith thrOlt\)s on t}lese issues, but also to make a commitment and within
theh" commullHies to act on the basis of this commitment. 1"12
It is important
9
at this point 9 to disting\rlsh behveen I!contextualiza~
tion ii and 'l.indigenization.i! The latter 9 as we have int-imated already~
is the attempt to mak€~ the Gospe I relevant and understandable to
CA given contexto Contextualization is the attempt to reflect critically
within the context so that the Gospel may be understood. Hence con ..
textualization precludes the cC':!'t£.?~nc:.'l<:' appl"lcat-ion of a ~riven
body of Chri st i an teachi 119 to a context even if contextual "i 11 ustrat ions
and e)wmples~ be they cu"ltural, economic or political ones~ are 'Jsed
to explain a predetermined view of what constitutes Gospel; that
is the approach adopted by some attempts at i ndigenoj zatiorL Contextuao -
1i zot; on reverses the p? ocess. Its teE!~~nus.2Lgu~m"1s the Gospe 1
of Chri st not the app lieat'ion of that Gospel to a context as -j s the
case with indigenization. 113
Contextualization as a theolog'icCll methodology often presupposes
indigenization but goes beyond it. 114
both exercises in indigenization not contextualization;
_._._...•.~,-~~----'" ----"---------
the latte' has greater scope for contextualization.




2.-9.t!£ of indigen-ization is some consdollsly or unconsciously compre-
hended body of Christian doctrine which is adapted or made accessible
to a gi ven context (termi nus ad quem). ~lany of t.hose who at thi s
point advocate the v'iew that contextual theology begins in the context
and moves to\"Iards t",he Gos elp - , hmlJever, fail to realize the just
cS
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one co.mat re:~j the text vvithout presuppositi ons ~ 1i kewi se no
one can read the context in a presupposit'ionles.s vI/ay.
Contextua1i zat i on rather refers to what \'Je have been stat i ng throughout
this study~ that- theological reflect-ion is done in the full uiltierst()l1,i"ir.g
of the contingency of human experi ence of real Hy. Cont.extua1 theo 1ogy
a,ttempts to reflect reflexively l"j 4 from a context to the Scri pture
and in the process it addresses both the conte)ct and man at large,
This distinction seeinS not to have been sufficiently grasped because
much of the wr'itin!':' on contextualization relapses into v'ievvs not
dissimilar to indigenization. This is illustrated in a recent editorial
• ~, . • 1
1n ;'11 ss10, og.v • Arthur Glasser claiming to be "reasonably aware
of the vaded ways 'in wlrich the term cantextual-izo.t"ion is being cun~ent-
-ly harnessed to a w-jde range of mutually - exclusive presuppositions 9 "
proceeds to poi nt out that many evange1i ca1s have pas Heel
1il1:Hati ons to any contextual i zi n9 process" because they
"harsh
"raise
the orange flag of cautionf! v/hen the 1l1 eg 'itimate demands of the
gospel ~\lhich they believe -is precisely defined in Scripture ll have
to be worked out withi n Ii any specHk cultural contexL" Glasser
points out that all too often this caution renders them (evangelicals)
Ilincapable of d-iscern'ng the s'ignificant ways in which the gospel
impinges on the cultural context." "They need~JI he mainta'ins. lithe
breadth of perspective that the social sciences bring to the analysis
of culture. lI 115 Glasser also maintains that "liberal scholars"
have "taken the dissection of economic, social and political components
of a cu lture so far that thei r contextual i zi ng of the Gospel withi n
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it seems deri ved from warm hearted imag-j nati on rather than from hatd
biblical exegesis.~ 116
It is obvious that Glasser's description of contextualization is
not different from the preceding definition of indigenization. However,
in his critique he highlights the problem of contextualization to
be the neg 'I ect of Il han\, hi b1i ca1 e)(eges is." The text;.'! to put it
simply~ must not be neglected or subsumed in the pi'~eoccupat"ioi1 with
context.
John Aitchison~ in the report already cHed~ raises the inverse of
this problem. Having insisted that contextlH1l theology begins vJith,
as it were, the sociological, psychological and economic "exegesis!!
of the context, he concludes the report with the statement 9 "I thought
(in preparing this paper) I WOLl 1d read up some of the documents
on black theology. I took up .u.lista'ir Keels A Reader 'in PolHical
2~ and read art'ic1es by Cone~Wi1more and rltpunzi. I \-IJas struck 9
fascinated~ horrified to notice something I had never noticed before 9
that their presentation all had a starting point in the wrHten text
not experience .'0 I found these ess a,Ys i rredeemab ly "I i t.erat'Y.
Their fundamental reference point (in spite of pretensions of relevance
and contextuality) was academic literC:lture 9 not real e)(peri enc(C ," 117
Thus whi le Glasser attempts to save the !e~.!: from being subsumed
undel .£~~ Aitchison struggles to
subsumed by the text.
save the context from beino--- ...;
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Both writers vis-a -vis the nature of contextualization have highlighted
unnecessary problems mainly because they have failed to interpret
COirtextua"lization as being endemk to the nature of every relevant
and living theology~ the absence of \'Jhich alloltJs theology to lapse
into ideology and religion into idolatryo In the ongoi ng and dynami c
process of theo109Y 9 \{Jith its goal the proc 1amat'i on of the tlord of
faith 9 the question is raised afresh -in a nevJ 1He situatioil t namely
IIl-Jhat is the Gospel of Christ to me?" The context 9 asH were 9 provi ck!s
the agenda and the exeget i ca 'I too 1s to extend the process of uncler-
standi fig who God is and what the Gospel is; '"' question that confronts
man already in the Incarnation and VJhich elicited a hermeneutical
challenge IPihich ViaS faced already in the Bible a..'1d has corrtinuL.>Q for almost 2000
years since. It is not as if vl/e have a "Gospel kit ll which can be
modified to suit new contexts.
wh i ch have not been hitherto
Rather the context ra; ses eriter-] a
raised and which challenge all our
preconcei ved vi e\tl!S about God and the Gospel. The context thereby
cans the text (ie. the Scriptural witness and \1!Hness of the church)
into quest"ion 9 fOl"cing a ne~'J and engaging dialogue between context
and text.
In doing th'is~ contextua1ization touches the heart of the nature of
theological reflection itself.
3.6.3. CONTEXTUALIZ/HION IS "DO ING" TI1EOLOGY
Theology (reflection about God) has never occurred in a socio-cu1tural
vacuum. Evey'y theological ex s' h 'h t_ ;pr'CS.lon, W er. er crne, prayer, hymn
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Ot~ Chr"istian act, has been influenced to some degree by its Sitz-
im-Lebeno Hence every theological expression signifies a decision
about the text w!1"ile at the same tit"e embodying a \\!orld~\iieV'J. Everv
theological statement 9 no matter how simp'le, is historically con-
d-it'ionedo This follows from the fact of the historicity of man,
his language and culture, and also from the fact that these statements
always remain human perceptions about God. At best \t~e only 11 see
through a g'l ass dark lyll, seek i ng to knOifJ more fu lly the Chri st who
has come and VJho promi sed to be with LIS alwa,ys.
?ecause of the historicity of theology, a er .ed is often mO'~e important
for \lJhat it emphasizes than for its overall theologi'al or ;~~jbliccd
content, Every context which h&, made a creed necessary had ra'j sed
questions which~ vrithin that context, had threatened the very authenti·..
city of Chri sti anfaHh. Hence whil e every creed attempts to o.ffi rm
the "whole" Christian Gospe-' (the whole truth about God) its value
lies in its conception and understanding of the Gospe-' in so fa.r
as its o...m quesd ons are ans\JIJered 0 For example, in the struggle
between A1ex ander of A1exandr'i a and Arius, the Council of NiG~1ea
used the creed of Eusebius of Caesai"ea which Wi;lS wholly indifferent
to tho. controversy at hand. That creed had to be edited in order
,0 make it relevant to the problems v1hich Eusebius of N·jcomedia.~
the supporter of Atius , had rai sed at the Counei 1. Hence, at the
points of the editions the historical relevance of the creed in its
o\lm life situation breaks forth. The rest did not occupy the partici'·
pants at the Council v"ith the same historical imporL ~Jhile each
creed in responding to its particular questions highlighted a new
--- ------ ----- --------- --3bb~----------------------------------- - ----- -
perspecti ve on the understand; n9 of God 3 and IMhil e therefore the
creed is be 1i eved ~ it cannot be mere1v repeated in another contextv _..-...~
which has its own, indeed different~ questions.
The historic~l condHioning of creeds is amply attested to ifJhether
we ex ami ne the ex i gene; es tha,t 1ed to the J:~9,~_l a=f,~.~ei of Tertu In an;
the creed of N-icaea, the Augsbury Confession~ the canons of Dort~
the ~Jestm inster confess'ion~ the Savoy Declarat'ion or the CcUes'loe
Declarat-jon.
In fa,ct, th-is historicity of statements of bel'ief may be discerned
within the scriptures themse'lves. For instance 9 Paul had no intention
in h-is lettets to Rome or Galatia, for example, to pronounce on the
~:;~<?l! body of Chl'~istian truths \','hatever that may be. Ne'i ther di d
he conceive of the idea that his letters would be vHal parts of
a future canon of scripture and that they would share the same im-
portance as the Old Testament scriptures vvh-jch he himself greatly
venerated. On the contrary, in these letters he was reflecting on
the contextual problems of his fenow Chr'istians and these letters
\.<Jere 'in effect the fh'st contextualizat'lons of the Gospel 0 Cei'tain
problems, controv~rsies and questions of the congregations in his
charge elic-i'ed his theology. They prompted him to formulate gU'idelines
and doctr'; nes; to ask afresh what the death and resurrect; on of
Christ meant for these Chl~istians. In this ItJay he was able to elicit
from hi s text (the 01 d Testament and the oral tradH-j on about Chri st)
a new signHicance that 'in his many years as a Je\1ish scholar and
Phar-j see n' e had not seen. TIle C'O' n;·ex.... .,< ' . t' d tl t t- ",d_, 0..-; 11: were~ orce le ex s
-- -- .. ..-- .------- ----- - --- -;.;.36/;;---'
into G\ nev~ and even more fru'itful dialogue, Other sections of Paul's
\'Jritings~ l'i!<e the Pastoral letters~ are obviously reflections from
wit!l'in a changed, or changing, life~situationo Paul's context~ as
~----
it were~ produced the text. Thh means that what we consider text
today It/as actually Pau1•s response 'j n contexL
These t'emarks on the historicity of Scripture in no way quest'ions
--~""",,-",,-...--...-........._ .........~-=-=--~---~-- =-~--~--..."",..-...-=-:"' .. -.... ... ~".. ..._-_........
its inspiration or its normative character, They are intended merely-------------- ---~...~~-
to c'larify the fact that the biblical \\'rHers themselves, whether
prophets or apostles, r1erceived God in the'ir deep invo-!ven1C'nt in
the crisis of their own contingent experience; that their proclamation
v'Jas concom'itant wHh their encounter of faith 'in the midst of their
living situations that demanded an account of their faith and that
the"ir resp'onses \'Jhich today form ouy' ~. was the result of their
deep concern for the proc 1amati on of the Gospel wHhi n thei r contexts,
For instance~ the ItJriters of the epistles could not have understood
the contexts of future Christians vllho hlOU 1d be readi ng thei r 1ettcrs:
like the changed life-situation of the Je',vish Christians after 70
AD (only a few years a~ter they wrote) or the tussle with Gnosticism
in the second century (one generat. ion 1ater) • Neither had Isaiah 3
for example~ who foretold the com'ing of the suffering servant of
God g conceived that h'is prophecy or the 'fJhole history of
prophecy wou 1d be rea 1i zed in the context of an anonymous manger
and on a cross en::cted on alone 1y hi n •
To speak in this ""ay of the historicity of the text and the creeds
is in effect to understand contextuality, not to trivialize the text
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or the vJord of GoeL it i nd'i cates the error of the ar~)Urnents (repre','
sented by Glasser and Aitchison) ItJh"lch separate text and context
as if one is the subj,:::ct and the other' the object" To affirm the
lrl stor"j city of both text Ell'ld cont(~xt is to a.vo·j d the tendency to
app ly the text 1JJi 1'!y nfl ly to any contel{t; a tendency V'IF: i ch e'j ther
reduces the B<l b1e to Cl cOlnpendhlm of proof teKts or 2j i:\ paper pope
wh'll.:h mer. can carry around in the"i r pockets. la 118 ltHri h~ fundamenta 1'i sm
has been "isolated 'in this cmmect"ion
of tradH'j ona1 Chl"''isti anity and the more
special criticism. much
1I acadenri ca1"Iy i nfonned"
theolog'ies are also guilty of this k"ind of reduct'ionism? especiany
since they advocate .?_ priQ!~'i f'!){ed ancl predetermined credal l'im1tso
In the interpretat'ion of Scr'ipture 9 t context of the Bibl"ical \;Jr1ters
themselves is tr'hdalized "if a particular "interpretat"ion of the text
is 'j mposed upon the i nterpreter ~ s context 0 Instead, the task of
i nterpretat i on is for the interpreter to 11 cha 1"1 enge ii the text "its€' 1f
1n making the text live. In other v}ords~ the questions and problems
of the interpreter~s context addresses the text in a unique' vJay r:lence
making the text speak unique·ly.
and text is a V"IO'''way process.
the context in turn. 119
But this dialogue betvi/een context
The text on coming alive questions
Some have referred to a 11 liE'mf.::nevtica'l circle" \rJhich Ebeling expla"ins
obta"ins in the text "illumina.tin~1, oneijs self,c'understand'ing; and one is
illurrdned seH"understanding enables one I! to perceive mean'ing in
darkened corners of the text., 11 "120 HOI'Jever. what \tie are
referr'"1 ng 'to r.1e.l"e ·t'S" flot ,...., el",'::J."ly ThE' d'j' al b . .l.f· t 'I" l-" ,ogue etween Cle 1n :erpte-cer s
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self-understandiftg and the mental horizon of the Biblical writers.
Olt that in the end what is requited is -merely a Ilmerg ing of the
menta1 hori lons ll of the interpreter and the ItJri tet of the tej(t.
This hermeneut'ical process may st'iU remain ahistorical or ever.
idea1'istic unless it is rooted 'in the context of the interpreter.
The text is 'ill d'j a1ague with context which 'j ne llides the e)c!sting
dimensions of his life-world.
ph'ilosophkal~ economic and other
/
To i"llustrate this~ vJe may cite the process involved v1hen historians
attempt to understand a past event.
oescribe the event are aca.m.Jlated;
Primary sources (text) that
then the vari Ol~S i nterpretat-i ons
of those sources by other hi stori ans are also consu 1ted. (These
secondary sources are equivalent to our Bib'lical commentaries and
the who'le of church history) 0 In the process of rejecting distorted
or erroneous interpretations of the event~ the historian has to isolate
authentic sources of evidence fY'om inauthentic ones before a decis'ion
is made about the event.
of the qual i ty of the evidence
The deci si on must be made on the· bas -j s
\l1hi ch wall 1d possess greater or 1esser
pt'obabi 1i ty. In other words, the sources have no authori ty of thei r
own except that which the historian gives them on the basis of carefully
v~e'i ghed warrants and rebuttals. Hence every historical judgement
is an exerc'ise in het"meneut"lcs. The same procedure :,nheres in textual
crit-j ci srn. A textual read; n9 ; s not necessarny author'itati ve because
"it has 200 manuscriptal citings I'lhile another may have only t\~o.
In the process
counted.
of textual cy'Hicism, manuscripts are we'j oiled
.----~-..-
not
While the Scriptufes have an al,lthority of their ovJl1~ they ItJete \\!ritten
not on ly in fore; gn 1anguages to our m-m but also -in a plethora of st.y'l es
and i di oms 9 embodyi ng a vast Y'ange of symbols 9 metaphors ~ stori es
and socio"cu1tur~\l images; 0.11 attempting in buma~."~o~9]~ to gra. p
the ltJord
9
the most defiwitive form of the v>!hich It/as the "i-iord made
n esh ll who d'lJe1t among us "fu 11 of grace and tri.rth ii
These vmrds also, l"ike creeds, \'ihile they must be wholeheartedly
be1i eved 9 cannot be merely repeated 'i n another 1ife-sHuat ion.
Theology is not merely translation or accamooat'ion of the text within
another context; that is indigenization. The understanding of the
text is more complex than that. Her"e the theo-loSJian goes even beyond
the histor-·ian. The level of assent or belief that his interpretation
achieves is based not merely on the Viarrants that Old and Ne~J Testa.'t0.nt
scholars give the text but on the accessib'ility to the text that
his context achieves. In other \-\lords, th~'o"logy aims to create faith
in the now on the basis of making the \4ord 1'i ve aged n. In th"i s regaY'd~
the theologian is aga"jn different from the hi stOY'; an \lJho has to achieve
assent about a past t: lent on the bas'j s of probabi 1i ty. The theo 1ogi an
in the encounter of faith himself has to make a judgement about
the meaning of the text on the bas'is of h"is encountering his context.
He canrot~ ther'efore~ be c"losed to the a.nalyses of his context: made
by other disciplines~ most especially by philosophyo The l1exegesis"
of his context which these offer are indispen5able for his own exegesis
of the text.
An undef"standi ng of the context also i nvo lves an understandi n9 of
the confl'ict situation that obtains between the various theological
systems or theo!'; es i!l that c'Ontext vJh i ch stand hI controvers i a.l
re"~at"ion to each othero An human attempts at theological theories
in ah'uw be in natural c:onnict. HOi'!eVel'~ th"is conflict SHUCltio!l~
Ivhich every theolog"ian must be fully submerged "jn~ "is itself the
bri dge for di a1ague b('tv~een different per-:;pt>ctives 0 One ty'anscends
the pr"i~;on of onels ovm truth~ on the one handjl by being illurri"i
by the text and dravm out of the 1in1'! tat"j on of onels 1imi tee! perception;
on the other hand ~, by expos"] rig one se 1f to the theological pE:rspect i ve
of the othero This exposure~ hO\iJe\fer~ -is not d"isinterested acaderrric
ana lys"i s of the oth ,:1" IS \1"1 evvs but encounter \fJith the othE:Y' $ ItJlth
the truth perspective of the other and liiith thE': cris"is of truth that
is experienced in each context.
Only because one understands one!s context and the cr"is'is of truth
that it embod"ies can one grapple with the I!mc:ntal hor"izon" of
~-friters of t.he B"ible 5 other~'rise one may easi end up with merely
an exercise in the realm of ideas. Theology 'is not merely adaptation
of Cl precm,cc'"ived body of truth to our cont.exts even if such adaptat"ion
is made wHh the use of inustrat'ions from our context.; this "is
stnl i igewization. Contextualization 'is the rnef:'ting of our unique
context \J\lith the text and the who 1e hi the interpretations
of the te)ct. Our 1if'~~situation prepaY'es the agenda for that meeting.
~Jhat then does "it mean to affhm with the Refonners the theo! ogi ca1
For Luther such an affirmation was
the guiding principle in the contextualization of the Gospel in
sixteenth century Germany. H'is context \'ias the mor"jbund totalitat'ianism
.--- ------.-----. --- -372<$>·--------·--·· - ..... --._....- . -..-.
of the church patterned after: the oppressive feudal rnentalHy; an
age that fostered sacramentalism and accolTlroclated side by side I,eJith
Scripture a \lJhole body of tradition that claimed an authority of
the; r QV-If!. f~uch of th'j s tradH i on dud rg the 't"ime of the church
fathers had been contextual theolog'jes which had attempted to clarify
the Gospel. By the sixteenth century 9 hmt.Jever ~ it Vias no 1anger
possible to distinguish living tradition from the lifeless past beliefs
whi ch no\'! posed a threat to the very understand'j n9 of the Gospe 1
i tse1f. ~~.2cript~ was. the Reformers i watchword \lJhereby such
traditions which stHled the Gospe'! were rejected so that the \,~ord
could live again.
Aga'j nand aga-j n in ch u reh history \,,~ observe hm'J the 1i vi fig ~Jord
has been constantly threatened by the very theology which attempted
to clarify it. Each attempt to theologize has itself to be re-evaluated
~'Jithhl new contexts or else the Gospel becomes historically ossified.
Theology is the critica'l and ongoing hermeneutical process that inter-
prets and re"interprets~ seeking the living t~ord and fostering faith.
vJhen thi s process stops 9 then the very theo 1ogy that is gospe 1 -j n
one context becomes "law" in another; that vllhich is "the spirH
that gives life" in one context" becomes "the letter that kills"
in another. (11 Cor. 3:6),
The Reformers' sola scriptura~ sola gratia and sola f-ide are essential
~...--~---- ----- ---
'pr'jnciples of t~QQ1091cal contextualization: sola scr·ip'~uY·a. rejects dead tradition
and affirms the ongoing SE:.'arch for the liVing \<Iord; ~~.?la fide is the rejection of an
hL5Tlan wurks including a11 theologies as ends in them se 1v e S , and affirms
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an ongoi ng abandonment of oneseif to the hope \tit! i ch ; sin Ch d st
Jesus; ~.!g¥'at"ja rejects any form of se1f-suffiC"iency~.£~~~
hubris and arrogance \tJhich would presctibe truth for all time and
affirms total dependency on the SpirH of God in \!-JhOSf~ pm'Jer we face
the future.
~Ihen these pr"j nd pIes ceased to be dynami c pri nc; p1es 9 Protestant
orthodoxy found itse1f confounded by the very scri ptura,l pr; nci pie
it was at pains to preserve. Now the problem was "how should Scripture
be interpreted?" This dilemma led to numerou" dry-as-dust theological
controversies and credal formulations which en~Qd with Protestantism
great 1y di vi ded. Scri pture as a.n "author; ty" in itself proved
as problema,tic as the pope pontificating Oil Christian trutl'lo At
least in Roman CathoHcism the church rt~mail1ed largely intact, One
needs on'!y to take a brief 'look at the history of Protestantism in
thellth and -18th centuY"j es to SE~e how .~£~o~.scr.ifc~"a" had become
a hackneyed and mean'ingless prhlC'jple \'lh-ich generated strHe 9 intole-
ranee and dogmatism.
In all these controversies~ the other Reformational principle had
been !Iforgotten~" namely~ ecclesia reformata semper reformanda.
--=-~.'~~'-~_."'~---'-~-
This principle is pe~'fectly compa'cible \>rith 1.-:..11'" definit-jon of contex-
tualization as an ongoing"cTHical reflection; the ongoing refomation
wherein the creative tension between Letter and Spirit, Law and Gospel,
Creed and meaningful proclamation and~ text and context is maintained,
Because this ciynamic tension was not ahJays rna'jntained~ t.he h'istory
of the church is the history of a series of ossifications. of the
contextual process;
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each ossificati'on crea.tes irlUllutable doctl~inal
frame\'lorks \'Jhich subsequent generations ardently perpetLlate~ each
be1'j evi 119 that they alone are pre:>ervi ng the Gospel. To argue for
opposed to the human tendency to abso1ut i le its own-----------,--'- er, ations. 12'j
t,!hile this monadization 122 may not be readi'!y evident to Europ;2ans~
the British 01" North I\mericans, perhaps it is clearer from th'2 vantage
point of the TlYlrd World where geographically, cultural1Y3 and histori-
cid 1y IrJe are d'l stanced from the burden of the past controversies
in those countries' h-jstories. It~ therefore~ is V(~('y d'isma.ying
that in the Third ~Iorld the conflicts of Europe. and Britain are
S"Ul1 propagated. For examp1e 9 in a small community like the Indians
in South {\fr'ica \'Jith some 80 9 000 Christians almost every denomination
spa\lJi1ed 'in Europe, Brita'ln and the U S are to be found 0 In this
communHy and e·lsev.lhere allegiance to Chr"ist has become alleg"ii'wce
to a particular historical perspective of Christ. These perspect i yes 9
v/hi ch were crysta 11 i sed in far-removed contexts ~ have become for
us the "Gospe'l." Conversion meant conversion to a particular v'iew
of Chri st, a Chri st vlho says very'! Ht 1e to our context and its
anxieties, where one has to struggle to find Him. Hence while affirming
J creed (lod believing the Bible, one is in constant dai1~?,r of losing
Therefore~ the numero'.JS theological images, symbols, metaphors and
such like can never be final, all-encompassing vehicles of truthQ
Truth is greater than Cl 11 of them. If the Hard is to live in the
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context of faith, theology (pnd preach"ing) must not on'!y attempt
to speak meaningfully in a context «lndigenizat'ion) but it mllst also
a11 QV; the human cona; t ion it addresses to thrm'! up new categori es;
indeed. it must conscio~sly seek out such categories. 123 New parables
and new pa\~ad"l gms must be created flAom the human stor"l es of our un; que
contexts: alienation of the human spirit. povertY9 oppression, racial
di scl"iminat'i on, dehumanization. a society whose faith is placed in
arms and techno"logy. the widespread tr"ivialization of life and fam'j '!Y.
middle class complacerlcy. the exploitat'ion of labour, 124 the economic
\'JOes resu 1t i ng from an econorni c system where the poor get poorer ~
the manipulation of all by a fet'J) an emergence of a popular culture
controlled by an amoral educational system, v'iolation of freedom
by propaganda a,nd manipulative ne~'JS repol"ting~ a soc-jety V-Jith"irl a
world "out of ,ioinL Ii These 'issues cannot be relegated to discussions
under ethics~ pract"ical theology or apologetics anymore than con-
textualization can be confined to an exercise in ndssiology. They form
the basis for contextual"izatioi'l and contextualization is
theo109Y. These -j ssues must form the agenda for a relevant theo 1ogy
of an peoples; in the South African context they affect the lives
of both black and vJhite Christians for both groups ar'e inextricably
bound up with the state of th-j ngs as they are 'i n tr is country 0
6.LL Sm·lE FACTORS THAT HAVE TENDED TO IVlIL ITATE AGAINST THEOLOGICAL
~~=--- ~. _..--._----~---~~ ..~_..__._-..'--~--~
CONTEXTUALIZATION, WITH SOME SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOUTIi AFRICA
~-,,----..__. _.__........",... ......~~--~.__.__._.
"I. Theology, in the main. is stud'ied by different race groups in
separation from each other sinceiil South Afric2. the human constructs
of language, race, culture and denomination have been absolutized.
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Theological institutions and ch~rches have, consciously or unconscious-
ly. entrenched these div"jsions beti'Jeen whHes and whites (Afrikaners
and Fng l'j sh) and beb'lfeen \'Jhites and blacks. Hence, while part of
the same conte)(t~ each group sti 11 views the s"i-'cuat'ion from its per-spec-
tive. its "scaleH only. Ideological commitments, dogmatism and
'insens-it:ivity are thus fostered.
20 The content of theological syllabi and the approach to ministerial
training sholtl in the main, little Ot~ no creativity. i~e have been
satisr-ied ma"irl1y \iJith systernatiz'ing and order'lng theologica" loci:
beginning vd th the doctrine of God and with eschatology.
To this extent we have not progressed beyond Peter Lombard ( C '1100-
1160), '125 Systemal>iZ'ing~ ordering or quantifying is not theolog"jzing.
Contextua1'i zat'ion forces us to cons; del" or create na1! lr,c"j aid parad'j gms
or else God and the Gospel become historically hamstrung.
Furtherrnore~ a programme of study at our institutions may \",e11 be
the same as that which ;s offered in lubli1gl'\I) Oxford or Princetono
The fact that it is offered in South Africa makes little or no
difference to its character 0 This criticism does not imply that
VJe mJst not master Greek and Hebrc\foJ, h 'j stori ca 1 theo 1ogy and hermeneu"·
tics s or that we should abandon the ha!~d slog through Luther, Calvin s
Barth and others. We can only do that to our detriment. Our deficiency
l'i es -j n the fact that we ha.ve not gone fut'ther.
in the ma:in. an exercise in historical theOlogy;
of it being "academ"ic theology" and irrelevant. '126
Theology has been s
hence the charge
Perhaps a word of caution shou 1d be sounded here 1 n vi e\'J of some
v1ho in their anxiety for a relevant theology belHtle ser"jous acaclem"ic
preparation. We should be careful in sett"ing the balance that the
pendu"lum does not swi ng the other v1ay. Theo logi ans 9 \I!hether pastors
or teachers, are always servants of the church, a principle that
the Roman Cathahe Church has properly mai ntainedo The irrelevant
theology that must be discarded is the theology that is not commensurate
vdth faith as existential encounter; \'Jhich does not prompt one to
pray more fervently and love one! s nei ghbour (and one IS enemi es)
mOle ernest 1y. A theologian can never be more than a servant!
I! Academi e" thee 1091 (" ba1cord sed ': the.ology) because "j t propagates
a spiritless and cerebral Chr-jstianity, must be discounted as an
exercise in souness sophistry. But this criticism also affirms
the need for' theo"!og;ans and minister's to commit themselves even
more to study so that our presuppositi ons (the furniture of our
minds) may be constantly questioned. "127 For this reaS0t1 9 the theolo-
gian cannot confine himse 1f to the Bible and church history only.
If he is to exegete his content he must be in d-lalogue \'!i th 9 amongst
~"
others 9 scei 0 logi sts 9 hi stori ans and more especially phil osophers .128
30 The formal separati on of peop 1e in South Afri ca by the Group
a distorted v"ie\!J of man, a vie\'I VJhich stands diametrically
to the humarri ty that the freedom of the Gospe 1 piJi nts to.
opposed
These
la\\ls have created racial te,ns"ion on the one hand~ and racial smugness
on the other. Now after many years of their execution, a very plausible
case is offered for \!Jhy these very 1aws are necessary in order to
mai nta in 1ml} and order;
laws themselves createdo
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thus increasing the polarization ~vhich the
The most dismaying effects of Vris sepaY'at'ion are that the possiL.i1ities
for encounter and critical dialogue are removed and with them GO.j
any real oppot'tunities for the escape from the ideolog"jcal piA-IsOllo
4'0 Theology in South Africa, Cl.nd e"!sellJhere, propagates eYl ui1\IJarranted
division bebJeen c"lergy and laity. This is all the more unnecessary
VJhen one considers that~ and k]~~~o~ were rnag"istp'l"ial not biblical
terms borrowed by the church in the thi rd century to va l"i date an
hierarchy that rerllains 9 till this day, elitist andlarge"ly obstructio-
nisL Hence many laymen are excluded from the process of etHical
self-reflect"ion and dialogueo ~Jhat E \~ F Tomlin said of philosophers
is equally true of theologians. ilWe shou 1d beware," wrote Tom1i n ~
1IO'f a philosopher who offers to think on our beha1f~ and vI/ho, by
adopting a jargon c<': his Ov'ill, seeks to exclude us from ~ds delibera·'
tions." 129
3.6.50 To conclude this section~ and this study, we should pel"haps
return to consider a possible objection that rn"ight be levelled at
contextualization, namely,
and does it not absolutize the context? Thi S obje 'ti on ~ whn e it
may be val-id for some aspects of indigenization, is not valid for
contextua 1i zat i on as we have defi ned it here; n, Refocusing on the
context by vi eVli n9 contextua l"j zat i on as endem-j c to theo 109i ca 1 method
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is. as VJe have observed. et ca 11 to refol"m the very nature of
theolog"izing. The possibilHy of contextualization degenel"at-ing
differer~ly, if the tension betv~een theofl_Clnd pract2~!.!-...!.ej('~~
context is dissolved.
Theo 1091 refuses to 1i ve -j n the PDst though it takes its past ser'i OllS 1y.
As Tillich stated it,
A theological system is supposed to satisf~ two
bas'ic needs: the statement of truth of the Christian
message and the i nterpretati on of the truth for
every new gener'ationo Theology moves back and fm"th
between two poles. the eternal truth of its foundation
and the temporal situation in which the eternal
truth must be received. Not many theological systems
have: been ab 1e to balance these tv/O denli:\nds perfect ly.
Most of them either sacrif'ice elements of the truth
or are not ab 1e to speak to the sHuat ion. Some
of them comtl'i ne both shortcorni ngs. no
Ti 11 i ch st i 1'I speaks of a body of eternal truth that have to be communi"
cated to a situation whereas our contention is that the situation
is the bdSis to actually seek out the significance of these lI eternal
t.ruths. 1I This is not to deny their objective nature but to accentuate
the fact: that they have to be existentially encountered for them
to have meaning fot~ my situation.
HOilJever. Tillich does highlight the need for balance betv/een context
and tex~ or 9 put another way, bet\lJeen cant i ngent experi ence and hi story.
l3ishop Oesmond Tutu clearly pey'ceived the need of a thofough histor-ical
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understand; ng It/hen he wrote ~ generations of Christians
win appropdate the genuine insights of the past theologiz"ing 'f1.
these are relevant to thei¥' m-m contexts s and vdI'! build on those
abidoing truths which have been apprehended during the hectic business
of l"iving the ChrisU"n life by earlier generations of ChristiC'Jls. 1i 131
Contextualization takes history seY-iously but refuses to abso"'utize
a.ny one historical perspective for then it will become hi stolkisC I
The coronary of being thorough"ly historoical an9. contextual so that
the text may live asuin s 'is "its open-ended future. Contextualizat"ion
and, therefore~ thec,logy~ is an ongoing critical struggle to speak
meaningfully about God.
When philosophy ceases to be an ongoing critical argument it degenerates
i nta i c1eo 109Y. By the same token, wrlen theo 109Y ceases to be an
ongoing cdtical struggle concomm"itant wHh the dynamics of faith,
it collapses into ideology, and Chdstianity becomes idolatrous.
132 Thi S \"\Ias i 1<i ustrated \'Jith reference to how even HGospel ll
becomes 15L aw, II and "Spi rH" becomes the IILetter. 11
\4hen the theological frarre of reference is absolutized only then
vdll the fear of the 'ritics of contextuai"ization be valid. Hm'i2ver~
these critics, 'in their anxiety to conserve truths open themselves
up to a s'irnilar charge being level"led at themo The terms IIconserva··
and III i bera 1H are each inadequate to descri be a re 1evant
theo i ogy, for the 0liiphasi s of both are endemi c to i 'cs nature name ly,
oche commitment to the text and history e'eternal truthH )., and the context
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(" ex istential truth"). Theology as contextualization cannnot ignore
the ~~ichness of th2 text which past contexts have uncovered (conserva-
t. i ve) nor can it not a.ff'i rm an ongo-i rig and open-ended methodo 1Cl:)y
Every theo 1ogy is a human construct and therefore every
theology is inadequate and must b~ reformed and renewed.
Furthermore~ another reason why contextualizat"ion cannot be local
only lies "in the fact that it creates a new bas'is for ecumenicity.
For example~ an South Africans can come together in spite of the-it
history of separ'ation, not on the basis of their histm'ico-theolo9i-
cal positions but to read and Ilpxegetefl
all share.
the one context which they
Another very important aspect~ perhaps the most important, which
the antagonists of contextualizat"ion fail to see, "is the fact that
every va 1id -1 nterpretat i on of the Gospe 1 unearthed by the ex i genei es
of a part"jcular context is valid for all mer;. '133 A context dra~lJs
out of the text an element which would have otherwise remained
hidden. 134 It h"ighlights a ne",! dimension of the God all Chr'istians
worship ~,.herever they may be. The God who -i s ahvay present w'j th
man -is also ahii:.lYs hidden (.deu5 absconditus). Every ne~'1 hi stor'j ca1
• n !l
expenence dra\tJs Him out shlce Yevelat-;on is historical. 135 God
is not revea1ed everywhere but ishi dden everywhere both in the tex t
(Scri pture) a.nd the _~.~~x!. (hiSt.oy·y). Therefore~ the perspectives
of God that are di scovered in the ongoi ng d'j a1ague bet\lJeen text and
context must be taken seriously by all. Thus contextualization lIlust
all-Jays also affirm catholicity and universal relevance. 136
For example~ the perspectives. about God and the struggle of faHh
that blacks uncover in their theological reflection has relevance
for man at large who, ~e have repeatedly pointed out~ struggles against
the fOl"ces of dehumanizat'iono ~1alcolm Muggeridge incL;;ve'ly descr'ibed
the dehumanized and oppressed state of western man when he wrote.11 •••• it
has become abundant ly clear in the second ha H of the tlttlerrt'i eth centui"Y
that t4estern man has decided to abo'lish i!'imself. Having vvearied
of the struggle to be himself~ he has created h-;s boredom out of
his affluence~ h'j s ov~n in'f.'{ftence out of his erotomania s h-is Oi'in
vu 1nerabil ity out 0-0 his strength; himself b 'Iowi ng the trumpet that•
br-ings the ~'1ai1s of Il'is o\rm cHy tumbling down ••• until at last;
havi ng educated himse1f into imbecil ity, and polluted and drugged
hhnse1f into stupefac:UOi1~ he kee 1s ove\~ ~ a v.Jeary ~ battered 01 cl
brontosaurus~ and becomes extinct ••• " 137
This startling vis'ion of the way man is going~ br-ings us back to
where we began thi s study ~ name'ly the problem of the freedom of man
\'/lrich manifests itself in his alienation from God and from himself s
and also hi s ens 1avement to systems ~ theori es and mmdane securities
which accentuate his -in:FAthentic ex;stenc(~. (Part 1) Faith as ongoing
and critical encounter manifests man's freedom coram deo because
it allows man to be fully human and because it frees h'im from himself
for God, his neighbour and the world. (Patt II) Theo 1ogy and faith
are i nextr'i cab ly interdependent because both share a dynami sm that
keeps them vital and living encounter, (Part Ill) In l'iving faith
there is hope for the heal i n9 of man IS spi r'j tua 1 sehi lophreni a Clnd
dehumanization because in faith through Christ he is reconciled with Gcx:i.
po 103
p. 98
Ope cit .• p. 119
Ope ci t, s
Ope cit. s p. 177
The Nature of Faith, p. 145-146
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~er~ po '16
"Christian Theo'!ogy and Contextual'jza-
tion" opo C"iL~ p. '1
9.2~~Y e.:: 9 p. 52
2~~~.~~~_~i~~9 p. 166
.. Ope Cl t., p. 22
Ope cit 0' p.121
Ope cH .• p. 49
Q~ P_raxer • p. 68f
The Nature of FaHh 9 p. 124
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L Blackham~ H J
2. cL rila1antschuk ~ G
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4. Ebellng 9 G
50 Ebeling 9 G
6. Ibid.) p. 107
7. Ibid. , p. 19
8. Ebeling, G
9. cL Ebe l'j ng, G
"10. cited Ibid q p. 162
1L Ib'id., p. 179
12. Ibidv~ p. 159
13. Ebeling 9 G
14. Kaufman, G
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24. r~ackay 5 J A
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30. Smith, R G
3,. Barth ~ K
? '; Bultmanr., RJi-o
po 40
Fundamentalism,






Faith and Belief, p. 158
._-_A,....~_~~
36. Costas, 0 E
35. Ebe 1'i n9, G The Natute of~2.!h.9 po 159
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,,).1 Cl ~10 1tmann, J op. cH q p. 20~2'1
40. Ebeling 9 G
41. Snrith, R G
cf. Hawtof1? H
op. c it, ., p. 194
p.194··195
44. cf., for example r"arx, K "To\'lords Cl




of Hegel l s
selected
45. McLellan) 0





47. ~\!e do t1ot, wHhin the scope of this study, haVE: to deal with
the de' ate on PI lthusser I sand Harx I s use of the vwrd 11 ideo1ogy; If
whether, as Althusser puts "it 0 "Human soci eti es secrete ideo 1ogy
as the very element and atmosphere irx!isp2r.sable to thei r ~l"i stari-·
ca'l respiration and life," or whether ideology is a system
of representations that mystifies the relation between men
and U)'2'ir conditions of existence and is a means by wh'ich the
rul'ing class ma"intains its posit"ion "by obscuring the condHions
of exploitation and oppression at the heart of society." In
rlarx. ideology 'is not ah'iays equated with illus'ion; he lists
judicial, polittcal, religious, artistic or philosophic forms
as ideological forms, ;n \lJhich men become "conscious of the
- -----_.----- .-----.-- ••- - - .-- ------. ------------.-.---•• ---•• -.--.- --.-------.--------~.-- ---~~~-.---------.-__• • ~ ·_· 4 • ._._ _ •••
conflict (in societ'r . and fight it out." Althusset~ goes
so far as to maintain that. lithe distortion of ideology ;s
socially necessary as a function of the very nature of the
soci a1 tota1Hv, more prec i se 'iy, as a function of its , detenninai'ion
" ,'" , . I' d '1 'h S"'A1~'(~H:,)by n.s strllcIun';S, wnlC 1 1S rna e, as a! I 1: e \).,.,0.1, opaque
for i nd'j v'j dua1S vvho occupy a place detenl1'j ned by the structure.
The opacity of social structure rnBkes necessar-i 1y myth'ical
the represe'ntat:ion of the wor-'ld necessary for social cohEsl0no!1
cited in Larrain" T The Concept of Ideolo9Y9 po 'i56f
It appea.rs that A1thu sser, ·-l11aT(lri~sT--:rcreoTo1j'y"'~~mCI;lsr,€ilsab'I(~ to
societies~ has ovei~stated th(~ case. He has confused the norma'l
process of sociat-ion and the need fot mea-wing \I!ith ideo"!ogy
which we defhled as Cl. cryst.a'llized truth perspective 'in \lJ~l'ich
certain non·-negotiab'les a.re fixed for an time and -in \:1hich
one or more socia" ~ cultural or political aspects of the society
are e.bsolutiz,,~.
cf.' f¥lephar!l~ J and Ruben~ D H Issues in rljarxist Philosophy
Vol. 3; Callinicos~ A Althusser's r"1amsmrancrROhas~-·JTae()logy
and the social sciuce. --~------
48. Lash, N
490 cf. Cornevin~ M
A matter of Hope. A Theologian's
EIcreCtTOn:7:7~fjU---
Aparthe'id~ povver and historical
falsffication~--·-p. 78f for examples
of~n;s;fOr1c:~ myths that have been
propagated vdUl'in the preva"i 1ing
ideological confines.
50. cL for exarnp'le~ Sundkler, B p. 238f
51. Oosthuizen, G C Pentecosta.1 penetration into the Indian Community
in South Afri ca, ~o ."-7tFf;~"-~-·_=-~··----~··,-"-~--_._.-~-
vrrraY:-GJ-~'li g!~_at!~t~.? Chapters 3 and 5
52. Lash, N Ope cit.~ p. 130
53. Paul Til1ich described faith as "more than trust in even Hie
most sacred authority. It is part"icipation in the subject
of one's ultimate concern with one's whole being." Therefore,
the term IIfaith ll shoulr not be used in connection v.Jith theoret'i-
cal knm'!ledge. cL his Dynamics of Faith, p. 4; 3~'; also
p.8. Faith is def,ned as "a to-Earancrcentred act of uncon-
ditional, infinite and ultimate concern:
54. Pillay, G J Ope elL, p. i-x where an assessment of the
funct i ona 1 theory of re 1i g"j on 'j s offered.
55. !\lu rr ay , Gilbert
56. Ibid., p. 85; also Kitto, H 0 F Form and ~1eaning "in Drama
p.7. To the Greek "the essence of-plety wasnurnTlHj, tn~
consci ous. ack:1ow1edaement that the gods are greater than man,
and man's greatness {s held by their sufferance: Vellacott, P
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Introdu~!O~~esch.L,luS>: The Oresteian tri1og~.i. p. 26; also
Lucas, 0 t~ .I.~r~!a~~£-et~ p. 95; 133
58. Kierkegaard g S
The LH~ of Gree~~, p. 186
!:u!.:2~_H£~9 p. 47f
60. Berdyaev , N
61. Berdyaev, N
~reedom~: Life and teaching
~f NicLo'l~s B,~~, p. 132
~1eanj~,st~H~:Y9 p. 2'17
~ 1every and Freej2~' p. 43
62. Til1ich, P Vol. 2~ p.37
63. Ebeling maintains that, "If discipleship means sharing in
the way of Jesus 9 then understnndi ng hi s preach'j ng of the w111
of God means shar1 n9 in hi s freedom, and understandi n9 hi s
message of the rule of God means shar'ing in f)'is joy, his obedience
and his courage 'in the face of H,,· nea\~l1ess of God." The Nature.?!..!!' i .~~, p. 56 ~~-=~_._,~-,
the Realm
~l.~~.~L_.~.n~_~,Fr:£~d?m, p. 68; po 201
cf. R.M. French's translator's note
regarding the difficulty of translating
"Sobor~ost."
65. Bev'dyaE'v ~ N
66. Lowrie, 0
Berdyaev 9 N
67. Berdy aev, N
64. f''iarcuse argued tha.t II society vd 11 be rational a.nd free to
the extent to v!hich "it were organised~ sustained and reproduced
by an essentia'l1y new historical subject. 1l One Dimensional
Man, p.252; cL also his~:.ssay on Liberation. ~-~-~~--~._~,.
Drea.m a~~~1.:!.tY9 po 19'1
~!l12~~rophet, p. 216




68. Blllgakov, S ~~:~_~fh~ p. 74
Conter<)OI~ary Continental Theology, po 37
___. _"'-'O.."........."=~"'-'"_-.,~_...,,.._"'-:....,_-,.-""""~
Freedom and the Spirit , p. 20
~....~-..._.--~"""~'-"""'_'_~__'~__'~h
71. ~Jil'liams> J G IfOther~4orldly Christianity: Some posHive
cons'iderations
ll
Theology Today, p. 27. This comment was made
in connection \'iitn qun:e'-'a"~(fifferent issue to the one with
wh'; ch th is study is concerned.
72., Ibid. ; p. 22
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73. cited in Barrett, W
74. Shestov, L
. Irrational _~~n, p. 40
A Reader in Jewish Existentialism
T1f~lrecr:r;-p:-~"----
Russian Intellectual fnstory, p. 181
~--.,-.---..--~...-:---
Th~~~~and Practice, P.288
Subject and Object in ~"odern Theology,
....~~=.~_.._'...--..'"....-.~<.- .."_--._~_~-__._-;.o,>_~...".,,,.__.__-.:,_"".
op. cH., p. 77
293p.The Brothers Karamazov,
=-~_ ..=----_.. ..........,.,_.--,,-,,=,,~-
Op. ch. 9 p. 28
75. Barrett, H
76. Ibid.~ p. 92
77. Ibid.~ p. 93
78. Shestov, L
79. Raeff, M
80. Ib<id q p. 181
8i. Zernov, N
82. Dostoyevsky, F
83. Ibid. , p. 294
84. Ibid q p. 294
85. Ibid., p. 301
86. Rauche, G A
87. Brmm, J
p. 173
88. Ibid., cf. po 181
89. Ebeling, G
90. Heinnemann, F H
~JOr'~,._~~~I~. p. 211
Ex<istentialism and the Modern Predica<··
!!!ent 9 p. <190f
Jlo Rauche. G A
92. Mackay s ,] A
~~~~Actuality)
op. cit. 9 po 29
81
0'".7;) • Ibid., p.30; \LM. Horton identified this existential dimension
as a "fourth dimension" ~'/lrich he claimed was missing in the
"neat, orderly, three d<imensional world of Anglo-Saxon theology.
This "fourth dimens<ion fl was "full of terror as well dS of
glory, demons as well as angels, and only to be known through
suffering; yet so fascinating and compelling to those who
have known it that they V'iOu<ld never aoain be content in our
plumber 's paradise, nor exchange thei r apoca lypt i c torment
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for an eternity in our bourgeois bliss~' ~?ntemporary Cont'i~t~~
.I~.?g'~~,:;. An ._l.!2!erp~etation_!_~_An~.~~2..r1s3 p. xxi.
cL l-Iarvie f·fi, Corm "Contextualization: \t~here do we begin?"
in Evan'1elicals and Libei"~tioQ.. (ed. Cad E Armerding) 9 p.
90-f2U~-~)ffers i;j--histoncal rev'ievJ of the contextualization
clisclIssion. Within South Afr'ica it is claimed that the idea
of contextual i zat-j on goes back to the 1ast quarter of the '19th
cen:,ury ~\lhen the independent churches broke away from the main-
line 9 traditional churches. (Minutes of the Institute for
Contextual Theology Confet'ence (Consultation) Hammanskraal ~
11-12 June 1982)"
For examp 1e" a survey conducted recently by the magazi ne IQ
found "that most South African whites are totally ignorant
of the polHical realities of this country." The survey found
the majority of vJhite South African teenagers to be I!complacent~
self-satisfied and content to bask in white baaskap for as
h .. ng as possible ll reported IQ., vJhite teeilagers~ for example.
had diff'iculty \",Hh even basfc· quest-ions Sur)l as \'>1110 the State
Prf'sident VJas, Prof lrJ'il'len Kleynhans and Or Hennie Coe'~zee
of the departments of political studies at UNISA and . and
Afri kaans Urrivt;.>rs'i1:y confi rmed the f-j ndi ngs of the survey
on the bas'j s of the-; r ovm researches. ~ Star 28 September .1984.
The series of scll"isms ftom the miss"ion churches theft have led
to the Etlli opi an movement and the mu H.itude of Zi ani st churches
are proof of this breach of feilowship. It is estimated that
independent churches exceed 3000 in number (information provided
by G C Oosthui zen 9 research(~r of these churches: Uni vers ity
of Zulu1i:md). However, this um\lillingness to continue cl-ialogue
with white Christians is also widespread among many blacks
Irrithin the established churches also. They rnainta'in~ understand-·
ab'!y so. that d'lalogue has. achieved very little and that \'1hites
are not prepared or IrJi ll'j ng to understand the black strugg 1e
or t.he crisis of faith for the disinherited in South Afr-ica
because they have a vested interest 'i n the maintenance of
the status quo. The writer continues to maintain this fellowship,
(.11 thoi.igfi'''lie'too is di sill us 'icmed with white attitudes in South
Africa~ so as not to give into dispair. He is of the opi:don
that those VJho are IAesponsibl€'c for the dehumanization of ()thers
i t,vari ab ly become dehumani zed themselves and alAe also in need
of . the Gospel of freeoon.
The following are representative of the black theological approach
described here:
~1. Buthe 1ez"j "~1utua 1 acceptance from a Black Perspect i ve" JTSA
June 1978 No. 23, po 71-76; "The Relevance of Black Theology'w'
SO.~!.! ..~..~~_!~~£~~JLut~~ December '1974·, p. 198-'199; "Christ'ianity
'in South Africa" Pro Veritate June 1973, p. 4-6; B Goba "An
African Christian lfieology: _.- TovJards a Tentative r'1ethodolooy
from a South Mric'cln Perspective" JTS/\ September 1979 no.
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28 ~ 7-13; S Gqubu 1e ~ "Wh at ; s Ba1cl< Theology?" .JT~ Sept.€JTbeT 1974
No. 8 l6'~23; E fvJgojo '"Ptolegomenon to the Study of Black
Theolo'gy" JTS/\ December 1977 No. 2'1, p. 25-32, J'!1~_: JOUlhna'j
of Theologym- Southern Africa.; 0 . Tutu, "Bl~, Th~ology'!
Frontiel~ 17:2 (l974) 9 p. 73-76; i!Chunh and Natlon Hl the
'Perspecf-lve of Black ThGo"logyli ~ \June 1976 No., 15. 9 p. ,5-
ii; A. Boesak Fare~ell to Innocence, "Relevant Preachlng
in a Black Situat i onl'''~lrunamiSl':r:rgTr; 8-14.
--~--
98. Ft. A Nolan, l''Jlhat is Contextual Theo'!ogy?" Lectute published
by the Institute of Contextual Theology (Braamfontein) June 1982.
99. Ti ssa Bal asuriya 0 .flt1. I. Jesus Christ and Human Liberation, p.l
-...st~""'-'"'-"~"'--
100. The most vu 1nerab1e of these aspects are some of the vi ews
of James Cone, for example, that sail close to charges of racism.
cf. h'js Black Theology and Black Power •
..-<'~ """"'~... _ 4 .._~_
10"1. C ~\i H Boshoff, "Christ in Black Theol09Y in a South African
Context,!l Tht:: South African [vlissiological SoC"iety annual congress
Potchefstroom 1981.
102. IIBlack Theology,1I Setiloane wrote, "is still doing theology
within the field of Western European, Graeco-Roman rooted thought-
fotms and Heltanschauung,1I "Theolog'ical Trends in Africa ll
l'lissiona1'ia Vol. 8 No. 2. August 1980, p. 48. cL also
'J1r'll\lirewJ liThe f1eaning of Africa,n Theology!iJTSA No.
1975.
103. cL E IN Fashole=Luke, liThe Quest for Afr'ican Christian
Theologies'l in G H Anderson and T F Stransky Mission Trends
No. 3 p. 135-150; B H Kato~ "Black Theology and Afrfcim"heoTo=
gy" Evangelical Review of Theology October 1977~ 35-48;
J S ~lb 'itT~,(1i7rs1""faXiTIY~ana -.l\'frl can ClI lture li ,JTSA September
1977 ~ Noo 20~ p. 26-40; D Tutu~ African Challenge po 56-
65; IiBlack Theology/African Theology-·--:'~"-So'tn~fates or
Antagonists?1i Journal of Rel~~_ous. !ho<ug:~c 32:2:1975, p. 25-33
1040 cL Albert t'Jidjaja IlBeggarly Theology" in J C England (ed)
Living Theologies in Asia Orbis: p. '154·-155. He points out
tfi'iif-tl1eOTQ-9ifaroeggTng' s \vhich was one of the major outcomes
of the western mi ss 'j onary endeavour ~ ; s unfortunate ly perpetuated
by third vlorld churchmen. Hence any theological pursuit that
is not from the theo 109Y of Luther, Barth, Bu 1tmann etc. '1 s
considered shallO\'J, untheological and even perhaps s'inful and
secular.
105. Or Nico Smit pointed out that is was the NGK that had sent
a de'legation to Smuts asking to introduce laws separating
Universities and Group !\J'eas. He believed that the only way
open for thi s chut~ch was for it to "ca 11 a Day of Atonement." ..•
a day of confession of sinning against God and man - and admit
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that it co-operated in leading the country down
di saster ~ and ask God to save us frcm the mess.




106. A ,1 Ferris
Sussex~ England:
107. Solzhenitsyn, A Nobel Prize lecture~ p. 25
~, ........""'"""'"""'"...........;c.......,'~..... ....,.,"""'",..,.....~
108. What is Contextual Theology. Braamfontein: published by the
Institute of Contextual Theology n.d.
109. Bong~njal0 Goba, Report on the formation of the Ecumenical
P,ssociation of African Theologians. The Southern Mrican Region
(E/·\AT SA). Hammanskraal v4ay "18 - 20, 1983 "in Voices from the
Tf1"ird World M'in'ila~ Philippines: ElH\!JOT DecemberT91rJ-,-P:-~19~
110. Ebe1ing, G
In. John Aitchison, A COtICrete ex~r~!2sma"1 ~~.
of the ASATI staff conference on Contextual theology in Southern
7-rrr~trraamf(jntern:'~-JanuaY'Y 1"915"27p:~~>--
112, Ibid. 9 p.8
113. Or Shoki Coe of TaivJan, in attempting to d-ls'tinguish bet\!wen
indigenizat:ion and contextuo_lization, pointed out that indigen"j-
zEltion derives from the idea of IItaldng foot in the so-ill!
and tends to suggest a static response to the Gospe 1 in terms
of traditional culture. Coe maintained that contextualiza-
tion conveys all tha.t -is implied in indegcrrization yet seeks
IIto press beyond for a more dynamic concept which is open to
change and which is also future .. orientated," cL "Con'tex·"
tualizing Theo1ogi' in Gerald H, Anderson and Thomas F Stran-
sky ~~2rends No" 3, p. x
114. J S Krugei~ in IITheology as response to social change: a caSG
study" Missionalia April 1979 Vol. 7 No. 1. 17-30 defines
"reflectivetneoTogy" as "a theology wh"ich does not take
account that iti s a human effort at gi vi ng mean; ng to 1He
and action and that it is linkecl to its soc-ial context with
a 1000 threads, namely purpor'ting that it is truly passing
on d-ivine Truth, may in f et be reflecting uncritkally on
the needs, aspirat-ions and intei--ests of society ••• 11 Reflexive
theology" which is rad"ical1y conscious of "itself be'j ng "a" human·
product takes its own social s'ituat"ion into fu"ll and expl"icit
account and crit i ca lly refl ects on the 1inks between the soci a1
reality and itself," p, 22
115, Arthur F Glasser "Help from an Unexpected Quarter or the Old
Testament and Contextual"ization" ~~2l9gy October 1979 Vol. Vll
No. 4, p, 404
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116. Ibid., p. 404
117. Aitchison John
1'18. T Preiss~
Ope cH., p. 14
'The Inner Witness of the Holy Spirit'
Interpretation Vol. 7, 1953, p.
·m=-i!fm:--r!ie cl i che I am borrow; ng
is on page 262
119. cL R HardO\'\IilA ajono g IlServ ing the Faith by Promoting justice
in J C England opo cit.~ po 148"154. In a slightly d-jfferen'c
connection~ the vJriter illustrates hmi this tvJO-vwy proce.ss
proceeds \rJhen he states ~ "the church -j s to evange1i se the ASH1ll
revolution and at the same time she is to be evangelised by
the Asian revolution. 1I po 152
1200 Ebeling~ G
121. cL here G D Kaufman;; IIChristian Theo';ogy and Indigenization"
in A Vision for Man (5. Amifthuri ed) Madras: Christian Literature
socTeEY1Y7g:---[essays in honour of J' Chandran). Although
Kaufrnan in this article is in fact discussing contextualizat"ion
not indigenization as his title suggests, his insights are
interesting. He places the \",Ihole process, quite rightiy~ at
the centre of theologizing.
122. vie are adapt"ing the idea of Liebniz here that monads are self-
contained, self-sufficient units (gesch1ossene and volendete).
123. cL S Kappen 1\ Or'ientation of Asian Theo 109Y" in Logos Co 1ombo ~
Sri Lanka Vo 1. 20 NO I 9 t-1a.rch 1981. Kappen states-'ffit "
the primary locus of God - encounter is to be sought not with; n
but outs i de and beyond Y'e 1i g"j on in its 'i ns t Hut lOna l'j zed forms.
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